本书介绍的外国政界,学界的观点和看法涉及反腐倡廉的各个方面,如廉政,相互制衡,反腐,内外制约,制约机制,道德规范,道德教育等.

ABOUT THE BOOK:Hermeneutics, Holography and Indian Idealism is a cross-cultural and interdisciplinary analysis of the notion of projection. Advaita Vedanta informs us that mind is projected `out-there` into the world during perception. Is this notion.

In 1872, Emil du Bois-Reymond delivered an astonishing lecture entitled “The Limits of Science” at a Congress of German Scientists and Physicians in Leipzig. No stranger to polemic and bellicose oratory, and possessing among his generation of physiologists unmatched rhetorical abilities, du Bois-Reymond had already attracted much public recognition and acclaim for his denigration of French culture at a time when belligerence and competition between Prussia and France had peaked. Yet, the topic of his 1872 lecture had a signal significance (...) which not only would inform du Bois-Reymond’s subsequent public lectures on literature, art, civilization and science, and the place of Darwin in the modern world, but would also elaborate a mechanistic and fatalistic view of consciousness, one that denied scientific understanding of the phenomenon as even obtainable. Controversy exploded—and from all quarters. Renowned scientists accused him of pessimism and of failing to apprehend the progress of in .. (shrink)

Este artículo discute la cercana relación entre la teología y la filosofía natural de Newton. Tomando como punto de inscripción el ejemplo de la Óptica, se refutarán estas lecturas de Newton. Primero, se examinará la evidencia que muestra que Newton contempló una declaración explícita de filosofía natural para la primera edición de la Óptica. Luego se discutirá el material teológico-natural añadido a la Optice de 1706. Al hacerlo, se señalarán ejemplos de su relación con las afirmaciones hechas en el Escolio (...) General de los Principia, se demostrará cómo éste está iluminado por las afirmaciones más explícitas hechas en un borrador a la Cuestión 23 (31), y se explorarán conexiones entre las declaraciones públicas de las Cuestiones y material más explícito sobre teología natural en los manuscritos privados de Newton. Luego se mostrará que, así como en el Escolio General, el material añadido a las ediciones posteriores de la Óptica también incluye claves sobre su teología antitrinitaria herética. Finalmente, se sugerirán formas en que los compromisos de Newton con la teología natural, y un poderoso Dios unitario del dominio, ayudaron a sustentar su filosofía natural. En suma, este artículo sostiene que la teología natural de Newton y su teología herética se relacionan con la filosofía natural de la Óptica de maneras que son mucho más fundamentales que un delgado barniz de retórica. Este artículo se basa no sólo en un análisis de los textos publicados, sino también de los borradores relacionados con la Óptica y otros paralelos textuales en los escritos inéditos de Newton. Estos manuscritos privados ayudarán a abrir una ventana en el sentido que buscaban los textos públicos de Newton. (shrink)

Building on the discussion between Stephen Darwall and Michael Tomassello, we propose an alternative evolutionary account of moral motivation in its two-pronged dimension. We argue that an evolutionary account of moral motivation must account for the two forms of moral motivation that we distinguish: motivation to be partial, which is triggered by the affective relationships we develop with others; and motivation to be impartial, which is triggered by those norms to which we give impartial validity. To that aim, we (...) present the second-person standpoint of morality, first as Darwall conceives of it, and then as we reinterpret it from a naturalistic approach. Then we synthesize Tomasello’s evolutionary account of morality, and Darwall’s objections to it. To reply to those objections, building on Tomasello’s proposal, we argue that the motivation to be impartial, and the feeling of obligation to comply with normative requirements, appeared when humans anticipated and, critically, internalized others’ sanctions to the violation of social norms. Consequently, we posit that social norms and sanctions appeared first at the community level, and only after that were they internalized in the form of self-directed reactive attitudes. Finally, we derive some corollaries that follow from our proposal. (shrink)

Habermas meets science Content Type Journal Article Category Essay Review Pages 1-5 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9560-2 Authors Stephen Turner, Department of Philosophy, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL 33620, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

One could describe political philosophy from the Enlightenment to the present, or at least until World War II, as largely an exercise in defining true freedom, as well as a call to liberate the mas...

I n Citizenshi p an d Migration : Globalizatio n an d th e Politic s o f Belongin g publishe d in 2000 , Alastai r Davidso n an d I showe d tha t globalisatio n an d migratio n thro w u p serious challenge s fo r citizenship . Thi s articl e goe s further , b y examinin g change s resultin g from th e emergenc e o f a ne w constellatio n (...) o f internationa l politics , whic h I refe r t o a s the hierarchica l nation-stat e syste m . Th e bipola r syste m o f th e Col d Wa r i s bein g superseded b y a ne w dichotom y betwee n Nort h an d South , bu t wit h a singl e super-powe r dominating both . Fo r th e firs t tim e i n history , mos t o f th e world ’ s peopl e hav e th e lega l statu s of citizenshi p an d liv e i n politie s wit h th e lega l for m o f democrati c nation-states . Althoug h all nation-state s ar e formall y equa l i n status , ther e i s i n realit y a hierarch y wit h regar d t o such factor s a s internationa l law , rule s o n trade , monopol y o f th e mean s o f mas s destructio n and influenc e o n globa l governance . Thi s make s i t necessar y t o mov e fro m th e notio n of differentiated and contradictory citizenship tha t w e outline d i n 200 0 t o a notio n o f hierarchical citizenship, base d o n shar p difference s i n th e degre e o f empowermen t an d right s tha t citizenship o f variou s type s o f state s confers . Hierarchica l citizenshi p help s t o shap e th e right s and life-chanc e o f differen t group s a t bot h th e nationa l an d internationa l levels . I t i s closely linke d t o discourse s o n th e naturalnes s o f violenc e an d chao s i n th e South , whic h help s to legitimat e Norther n dominance. (shrink)

In summary, Hellman’s book is well worth reading. It is powerful, well-written, and interesting and explains much of the prominent case law on discrimination. Her theory, however, is false because her explanation of wrongful discrimination fails to track a wrong-making feature. Her theory does not focus on a right-infringement in or unfair treatment of the person whom is discriminated against. It also does not focus on an incorrect attitude in the person who discriminates. These intuitively seem to exhaust the reasons (...) that make an act wrong because it wrongs someone. Her account of wrongful discrimination fails to identify the correct wrong-making feature. (shrink)

The love that we feel for our friends plays an essential role in both our moral motivation to act towards them; and in our moral obligations towards them, that is, in our special duties. We articulate our proposal as a reply to Stephen Darwall’s second-person proposal, which we take to be a contemporary representative of the Kantian view. According to this view, love does not have a necessary role neither in moral motivation, nor in moral obligation; just a complementary (...) one. Yet this proposal faces three difficulties: a psychological problem, a practical problem, and a theoretical problem. In contrast, we argue that both moral motivation, and moral obligations emerge from our interpersonal relations with particular others. We further argue that obligations in the context of friendship are moral because they come with a feeling of obligation and have been internalized. Thus, the three problems raised to the Kantian position are clarified, and the role of love is emphasized in both our moral motivation, and our moral obligations towards friends. (shrink)

Al-Fārābī, in the Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, is apparently the first person to maintain that existence, in one of its senses, is a second-order concept [ma‘qūl thānī]. As he interprets Metaphysics Δ7, ‘‘being'' [mawjūd] has two meanings, second-order ‘‘being as truth'', and first-order ‘‘being as divided into the categories.'' The paronymous form of the Arabic word ‘‘mawjūd'' suggests that things exist through some existence [wujūd] distinct from their essences: for al-Kindī, God is such a wujūd of all things. Against this, al-Fārābī argues (...) that existence as divided into the categories is real but identical with the essence of the existing thing, and that existence as truth is extrinsic to the essence but non-real. The Ḥurūf tries to reconstruct the logical syntax of syncategorematic or transcendental concepts such as being, which are often expressed in misleading grammatical forms. Al-Fārābī thinks that Greek more appropriately expressed many such concepts, including being, by particles rather than nouns or verbs; he takes Metaphysics Δ to be discussing the meanings of such particles, and he takes these concepts to demarcate the domain of metaphysics. This explains how al-Fārābī's title can mean both ‘‘Book of Particles'' and ‘‘Aristotle's Metaphysics.''. (shrink)

In "Kant on Freedom and the Appropriate Punishment," the author begins by noting that in The Metaphysics of Morals , Kant asserts that a wrongdoer should be given a punishment that is similar to his wrongdoing. He then makes two interpretive claims with regard to this assertion.First, he claims that the best way to understand this assertion in the context of other things Kant says is that the state is obligated to punish a wrongdoer in a way that imposes on (...) the wrongdoer an amount of suffering equal to what he caused and through an action that is similar in type to the wrongdoer's offense. The argument in support of this claim occurs in section II and rests on two more specific interpretive claims about Kant's theory: that state punishment should resemble the wrongdoer's acts and should involve the same level of suffering as was involved in the original wrongdoing and that punishment in accordance with these constraints is an obligatory duty.Second, the author claims that on Kant's theory this principle of appropriate punishment is justified because it restores equality in the distribution of freedom for members of the state. The argument in support of this claim occurs in section III. The argument rests in part on Kant's justification of the state and coercion in terms of the value of equalized freedom. By applying this same justification to Kant's principle of appropriate punishment, the author claims to be able to account for the principle as well as to relate the principle to Kant's political theory. Der vorliegende Beitrag beginnt mit der Feststellung, daß Kant in der Metaphysik der Sitten geltend macht, ein Übeltäter solle eine Bestrafung erleiden, die mit seiner Tat vergleichbar ist. Im Hinblick auf diese Forderung Kants werden zwei Thesen aufgestellt.Erstens wird behauptet, die genannte Forderung sei vor dem Hintergrund sonstiger Äußerungen Kants am besten dahingehend zu verstehen, daß der Staat verpflichtet sei, einen Übeltäter in einer Weise zu bestrafen, die diesem ein Maß von Leid zufügt, das dem von ihm selbst verursachten gleichkommt. Geschehen müsse dies durch eine Handlung, die in ihrer Art dem vom Übeltäter begangenen Verbrechen entspricht. Die Begründung dieser These erfolgt in Abschnitt II und stützt sich wiederum auf zwei mehr in die Einzelheiten gehende Thesen zu Kants Theorie: Staatliche Bestrafung sollte den Handlungen des Übeltäters ähneln und Leid in einer Größenordnung mit sich bringen, wie es auch die ursprüngliche Tat zur Folge hatte. Bestrafung in Übereinstimmung mit diesen Bedingungen ist eine Pflicht.Zweitens wird die Auffassung vertreten, dieses Prinzip angemessenen Strafens sei im Rahmen der Theorie Kants gerechtfertigt, weil es für die Mitglieder des Staates die Gleicheit in bezug auf die Verteilung der Freiheit wiederherstelle. Die Begründung dieser These findet sich in Abschnitt III und beruht zum Teil auf Kants Rechtfertigung von Staat und Zwang durch den Verweis auf den Wert gleichmäßig verteilter Freiheit. Die Übernahme eben dieser Rechtfertigung auch für Kants Theorie angemessenen Strafens soll sowohl dazu dienen, das Prinzip selbst zu begründen, als auch dazu, es in Kants politische Theorie einzuordnen. (shrink)

El presente artículo trata de las ideas de inte r pretación e int e g ridad s e gún D w orkin, al tiempo que considera e r róneo el posit i vismo jurídico y sostiene la e xistencia de la objet i vidad moral y jurídica. Así mismo, plantea que la idea de "tomar algo como propio" es esencial para la idea de inte r pretación, y conclu y e a f i r mando que la inte r pretación (...) en el derecho, como en la democracia, se basa en lo que la gente realmente cree. De ahí se deduce que considerar el proceso de e v aluación de las prácticas jurídicas un asunto de "inte r pretación const r uct i v a" resulte en g añoso, ya que lo más llamat i v o de la teoría de la inte r pretación de D w orkin reside simplemente en que ofrece una crítica moral (sólida) de las prácticas e xistentes en relación con una concepción muy abstracta de la igualdad. Esta conclusión se con f i r ma con la distinción que D w orkin esta b lece entre los a r gumentos de "ajuste" y "sustancia" en el razonamiento jurídico, pues está claro que los a r gumentos de ajuste son sólo a r gumentos de sustancia disfrazados. Los a r gumentos en torno al ajuste ganan peso gracias al principio moral basado en el cumplimiento de las e xpectat i v as razona b les y al principio democrático que se basa en la idea de que la l e gislatura tiene el derecho moral de l e gisla r . Las conclusiones generales a las que se ll e ga en el presente ar tículo son que la teoría de la int e g ridad de D w orkin está orientada en la práctica al mundo real y que, de este modo, constitu y e únicamente una teoría de la "s e gunda mejor opción", y que el derecho inspirado en el ideal de justicia si r v e mejor como modelo con el que comparar las teorías del mundo real. En pa r ticula r , en lo que se re f iere al modelo de justicia, jamás se les podría pedir a los jueces que mintieran (como reconoce D w orkin que podría ser el caso de la int e g ridad), se preser v aría la estrecha con e xión entre derecho y justicia en el entendimiento común, y los casos difíciles se entenderían mejor como llama mientos directos a la justicia. (shrink)

The Brahmaj?la Sutta includes a list of ‘views’ that are wrong in some sense. The present paper turns the focus away from the content of the views to ask in what sense they are problematic, by what criteria they are here found to be so, and, indeed, just what kinds of things the views are. The frameword in which the views are set suggests that what the Buddha finds problematic is not the content so much as the epistemological standpoint, or, (...) more properly, the mode-of-being of which the views are a part: it is the sama?a-br?ma?as who proclaim the views rather than the views per se that are wrong. (shrink)

One could describe political philosophy from the Enlightenment to the present, or at least until World War II, as largely an exercise in defining true freedom, as well as a call to liberate the mas...

This paper argues that Kierkegaard is not an irrationalist, but a "responsible fideist." Responsible fideism attempts to answer two important philosophical questions: "Are there limits to reason?" and "How can the limits of reason be recognized?" Kierkegaard's account of the incarnation as "the absolute paradox" does not see the incarnation as a logical contradiction, but rather functions in a way similar to a Kantian antimony. Faith in the incarnation both helps us recognize the limits of reason and also to a (...) degree overcomes those limits. /// O artigo defende que Kierkegaard não é um irracionalista, mas antes um "fideísta responsável". Como tal, o "fideísmo responsável" tenta responder a duas questões fllosóficas particularmente importantes: "Existem limites para a razão?" e "Como podem os limites da razão ser reconhecidos?" Na sua interpretação da incarnação como "paradoxo absoluto", Kierkegaard não interpreta a incarnação como uma contradição lógica, mas antes a vê funcionando de um modo similar à antinomia kantiana. Fé na incarnação ajuda-nos não só a reconhecer os limites da razão, mas também nos ajuda, pelo menos até um certo ponto, a ultrapassar estes limites. (shrink)

[EN]Most theories of causation assume that it must involve some kind of necessity, or that the cause must be entirely sufficient for the effect. Others have already suggested that it should be possible to get a theory of causation from a theory of powers or dispositions. Such a project is far from complete but even here we find that the key point in a dispositional theory of causation has been lacking. This paper attempts to establish some of the most important (...) principles of such a theory and in so doing turn the existing discussion in a new direction. [ES]La mayoría de las teorías de causación asumen que debe envolverse algún tipo de necesidad, o que la causa debe ser enteramente suficiente para el efecto. Otros ya han sugerido que debería de ser posible obtener una teoría de causación a partir de una teoría de poderes o disposiciones. Un proyecto tal está muy lejos de estar completo, pero incluso aquí encontramos que ha faltado el punto clave en una teoría dispositiva de causación. Este escrito intenta establecer algunos de los principios más importantes de una teoría tal, y al hacerlo inclina la discusión existente en una nueva dirección. (shrink)

This paper proposes an intermediate account of personhood, based on the capacity to participate in intersubjective interactions. We articulate our proposal as a reply to liberal and restrictive accounts, taking Mark Rowlands’ and Stephen Darwall’s proposals as contemporary representatives of each view, respectively. We argue that both accounts fall short of dealing with borderline cases and defend our intermediate view: The criteria of personhood based on the second-person perspective of mental state attribution. According to it, a person should be (...) able to participate in intersubjective interactions. We apply our proposal to the borderline cases of non-human primates and human infants. (shrink)

I outline Gould's conception of evolutionary theory and his ways of contrasting it with contemporary Darwinism; a contemporary Darwinism that focuses on the natural selection of individual organisms. Gould argues for a hierarchical conception of the living world and of the evolutionary processes that have built that living world: organisms are built from smaller components and are themselves components of groups, populations, species, lineages. Selection, drift and constraint are important to all of these levels of biological organization, not just that (...) of individual organisms. Moreover, both drift and constraint are more important than orthodoxy supposes. While having some sympathy for both of these lines of argument, I argue that they are more problematic than Gould supposes, and that he understates the power and the heterogeneity of orthodox conceptions of life's evolution. (shrink)

Critical Review of 'The Form of Practical Knowledge', by Stephen Engstrom.

Este trabalho, uma das primeiras obras dedicadas ao significado do Tratado de Lisboa (2007) nas suas vertentes política, histórica e jurídica, constitui não apenas uma reflexão clara e bem fundamentada sobre o seu objecto (o que já seria notável dada a sua complexidade e ainda relativa novidade) mas serve ainda ao leitor, especialista ou não nas matérias da União Europeia, como um guia para a análise do Tratado de Lisboa e do processo que lhe deu origem, a falhada «Constituição Europeia», (...) a d... (shrink)

Stephen Hetherington é um dos mais proeminentes epistemólogos a defender que é possível ter conhecimento segundo as condições de crença verdadeira e justificada, apesar dos contraexemplos elaborados por Edmund Gettier. Ele fundamentou sua perspectiva no pressuposto de falibilidade do conhecimento e naquilo que ele chamou de "falácia de contrafactuais epistêmicos", segundo a qual não se deve assumir impossibilidade do conhecimento factual apenas em virtude da sua impossibilidade contrafactual - o que é reiterado por Anthony Booth. As críticas apresentadas por (...) Brent Madison, John Turri e Duncan Prtichard apontaram para a relevância das suas ideias, mas também para o fato de que Hetherington ignorou que há diferentes tipos de sorte que podem interferir no processo de aquisição de conhecimento. Palavras-chave: Falácia de contrafactuais epistêmicos. Falibilismo. Infalibilismo. Sorte epistêmica. Stephen Hetherington. (shrink)

Just a Song: Chinese Lyrics from the Eleventh and Early Twelfth Centuries. By Stephen Owen. Harvard-Yenching Institute Monograph Series, vol. 114. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2019. Pp. 420. $49.95.

Stephen J. Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and the Failure of Law Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998, xii + 284 pp.

[ES] Los trabajos recientes de Stephen Schiffer en el desarrollo de una explicación pleonástica de proposiciones producen resultados importantes que cambian el significado tanto de la ontología de primer orden como de la meta-ontología. El objetivo del presente trabajo es dejar en claro cuáles son estas consecuencias y por qué son tan importantes. Según mi punto de vista, la mayor amenaza para los partidarios de la metafísica proviene de un punto de vista que yo he llamado en otro trabajo (...) el acercamiento «fácil» a la ontología: los argumentos de Schiffer a favor de proposiciones «pleonásticas», propiedades, estados, eventos y personajes ficticios; los argumentos neo-fregeanos a favor de la existencia de números; y mis propios argumentos a favor de objetos sociales, culturales, y personajes ficticios, y objetos ordinarios como mesas y sillas. El trabajo expande estas tres diferentes formas de ontología fácil, mostrando sus interrelaciones y argumenta que estos acercamientos nos dan un realismo ciento por ciento directo, sobre las entidades en cuestión. A un nivel meta-ontológico, sin embargo, el trabajo sugiere que el debate ontológico serio es confundido porque sus preguntas ontológicas tienen respuestas tan directas. Este acercamiento podría ser la amenaza más importante para la metafísica seria, pero también es extremadamente prometedor como una manera de disolver misterios y clarificar la epistemología de la metafísica. [EN] Stephen Schiffer’s recent work in developing a pleonastic account of propositions leads to major, game-changing results in both first-order ontology and meta-ontology. This paper aims to clarify what these consequences are and why they are so important. In my view, the biggest threat to the metaphysical party comes from a view I have elsewhere called the «easy» approach to ontology: Schiffer’s arguments for «pleonastic» propositions, properties, fictional characters, states and events; the neo-Fregean’s arguments for the existence of numbers; and my own arguments for fictional characters, social and cultural objects, and ordinary objects such as tables and chairs. The paper draws out these three different forms of easy ontology, showing their interrelations, and argues that these approaches really give us a straightforward, out and out realism about the entities in question. On the meta-ontological level however, it suggests that serious ontological debate in metaphysics is confused because its ontological questions have so straightforward answers. This approach may be the most important threat to serious metaphysics but it is also extremely promising as a way of dissolving mysteries and clarifying the epistemology of metaphysics. (shrink)