This chapter tracks the development of the concept of self-awareness (jikaku, 自覚) in the thought of the Japanese modern philosopher Nishida Kitarō (西田幾多郎) (Kitarō Nishida) (1870–1945), founder of the Kyoto School. Nishida’s oeuvre can be divided into distinct periods, from the 1910s to the 1940s until his passing, during which he thematized and focused on different issues. Nevertheless, self-awareness is a unifying theme throughout. In the chapter we trace how Nishida develops this concept through distinct periods in his career. His (...) initial focus upon pure experience gives way to his focus upon its articulation in reflection vis-à-vis intuition as the unfolding of the will. This then leads to his thematization of the place wherein judgment or propositional thought unfolds and the broader contextual place wherein that place is situated. That thematization of place, in turn, develops into a look at the world where we interact as historical and social bodies with others (nature, other people, etc.). Nishida understands self-awareness in accordance with each of these themes in the respective periods of his oeuvre. But common to all of them is how Nishida understands self-awareness as a self-mirroring – self-reflection as reflexivity – founded upon the premise assumed by the articulated image or object of awareness, a premise necessarily irreducible to, and in excess of, the image or object. This is the a priori that Nishida for the most part calls the “absolute nothing” (zettai mu, 絶対無). To explain this Nishida makes use of Josiah Royce’s notion of a self-representative system as well as Richard Dedekind’s notion of an infinite system in his set theory. On the basis of Nishida’s references to the mathematics of set theory, I further compare his understanding of self-awareness to Kurt Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems as well as to more recent mathematical theorists, influenced by Gödel, whose understanding of the infinite resonates with Nishida’s understanding of the absolute nothing as assumed by self-awareness. (shrink)

In this paper we examine Husserl’s ethics contribution to the understanding of human action determined by self-responsibility. We admit that self-responsibility is that ‘capacity’ of any subject to take a reflective stance on himself and his life. In this sense, the subject only experiences fully being responsible when guides his reason in the multidimensionality of his actions, aiming at a personal and cultural renewal. To show this, we firstly analyze the project of renewal of man and culture in the personalist (...) ethics proposed by Husserl, viewed from the history of parricide Karamazov. Secondly, we inquire about one of the two dimensions of human personality, self-awareness and presence of oneself, to approach the complex intentional act in which this selfconsciousness takes place. Thirdly, we analyze how the ability of self-determination, the other key dimension of the person, makes possible the self-appraisal by which the new man values his actions, motives, means and ends. We conclude that the self guides his life in full participation and emotional manifestation out of experiences that strengthen the ‘self’ and the ‘us’. (shrink)

This research study aims to highlight the personal experiences encountered by the participants, compare the differences between both narrations, and lastly identify common phenomena. This study utilized the auto-ethnographical research study. Ellis and Bochner (2000) describe autoethnography as "an autobiographical form of writing that exhibits several levels of awareness, linking the personal to the cultural". Autoethnography may include a wide variety of topics, from personal research experiences to parallel explorations of the researcher's and participants' experiences, as well as the (...) researcher's experience while undertaking a particular piece of research (Ellis & Bochner, 2000; Maso, 2001). It appears that practice teaching enables interns to experience the actual classroom teaching and school paperwork preparation. Aside from the technical aspects of the internship process, it prepares the student-teachers as well in the different course of school activities that will immerse them in the process of management. Generally, the personal experiences of the different interns vary from the school environment, protocols, and learning resources of the school assigned. The different practice- teaching experiences narrated by the interns that will have a common phenomenon will be a strong determinant of a certain situation. (shrink)

La présente étude entend tracer et analyser le déploiement de « la Vérité de l’Etre » afin de montrer en quoi celui-ci est indissociable, pour Heidegger, de ce qu’il appelle, dans un passage tardif des Cahiers Noirs, l’« auto-annihilation ( Selbstvernichtung ) » du judaïsme. Nous montrerons en quoi et pourquoi, chez Heidegger, l’« Histoire » de la « Vérité de l’Etre », en se déployant elle-même, produit aussi un antijudaïsme, indissociable d’un antisémitisme, sans précédent dans l’histoire de la (...) philosophie occidentale. En effet, le judaïsme, pour Heidegger, se voit brutalement exproprié de toute possibilité d’être, et, par conséquent, demeure résolument forclos de l’« Histoire » gréco-allemande de la « Vérité de l’Etre » pour ne séjourner que dans l’« inessentielle » machination et exploitation « indéterminée » du monde. Il nous appartiendra de souligner, depuis le « dispositif » heideggérien de la « Vérité de l’Etre » – un dispositif, contrairement à ce qu’en dit Heidegger, dès plus technique – en quoi le judaïsme se voit condamné à son « auto-annihilation ». C’est ainsi que l’antijudaïsme de Heidegger, inséparable d’un antisémitisme catégorique, est à comprendre depuis sa pensée philosophique elle-même. Ce qui exige de nous une relecture dès plus vigilante, dès plus intransigeante et un questionnement critique circonstancié de cette œuvre et du rapport qu’elle détermine entre l’« Histoire » de la « Vérité de l’Etre » et l’« auto-annihilation » du judaïsme. Ainsi, à aucun moment ne s’agira-t-il, pour nous, de rejeter purement et simplement la pensée philosophique de Heidegger. Car, c’est aussi par une relecture critique de cette même pensée, par une confrontation incessante envers ce qui s’y cache dans ses plis les plus obscurs et douteux, que peuvent aussi se révéler d’inédites possibilités de repenser notre tradition philosophique tout entière en l’ouvrant vers une tout autre histoire de la philosophie – tout autre que celle qui se sera consacrée et déterminée dans et par le « dispositif » heideggérien. (shrink)

Due to the complexity of the cavity/vehicle and oscillation characteristics, streamlined shape integrated design of conventional fully wetted vehicles is not suitable for supercavitating vehicles. In this paper, a set of design criteria is highlighted to optimize the length and streamlined shape of a conical section subjected to realistic design constraints, which integrate the complex characteristics of the cavity/vehicle system under the condition of auto-oscillation of supercavitating vehicles. The auto-oscillation and its time-domain characteristics are determined. By deriving the (...) equation describing the cavity/vehicle relationship and identifying the maximum amplitude of the Euler angle, the cavity/vehicle tangent point criterion is proposed to determine the theoretical optimum value of the length of the conical section. A method of equal cross-sectional area for gas flow is proposed to design the streamlined shape of the conical section. Water tunnel and autonomous flight experiments were carried out to validate the feasibility of the design methodology developed in this work. (shrink)

Declaration of cardiorespiratory death, as defined by the Uniform Determination of Death Act, requires irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory function. A physician’s ability to confidently declare death is paramount because death is both a biological and social construct, and can afford a dying patient the opportunity to be an organ donor via donation after circulatory death. Inconsistencies related to cardiorespiratory death and DCD include the specific language used in the UDDA, specifically the use of the word “irreversible”. Additionally, (...) in DCD there is a large focus on the auto-resuscitative capacity of the heart, however recently some have argued that instead the focus should shift to the brain and a determination of how long it needs to be without circulation to cease functioning prior to declaring death. In this paper, I discuss inconsistencies with cardiorespiratory death as they pertain to organ donation and posit several possible solutions to mitigate these inconsistencies. (shrink)

The fundamental determinant of death in donation after circulatory determination of death is the cessation of brain circulation and function. We therefore propose the term donation after brain circulation determination of death [DBCDD]. In DBCDD, death is determined when the cessation of circulatory function is permanent but before it is irreversible, consistent with medical standards of death determination outside the context of organ donation. Safeguards to prevent error include that: 1] the possibility of auto-resuscitation has elapsed; (...) 2] no brain circulation may resume after the determination of death; 3] complete circulatory cessation is verified; and 4] the cessation of brain function is permanent and complete. Death should be determined by the confirmation of the cessation of systemic circulation; the use of brain death tests is invalid and unnecessary. Because this concept differs from current standards, consensus should be sought among stakeholders. The patient or surrogate should provide informed consent for organ donation by understanding the basis of the declaration of death. In cases of circulatory cessation, such as occurs in DBCDD, death can be defined as the permanent cessation of brain functions, determined by the permanent cessation of brain circulation. (shrink)

The principle of self-determination, as commonly established, is based on a formal and individualistic view of liberty rights. This perspective, however, is inconsistent with the needs of a community and particularly with the necessity to promote integration between subjects and a relatively stable social order. I propose a different perspective, the one that not only takes into account individuals but also relationships. In particular, what I propose is: 1) that any community is aware of a specific social order, which (...) consists of a set of practices, 2) that these practices express specific values, 3) that these values are the result of historical and cultural circumstances, 4) that they are subject to a permanent public debate, and finally 5) that the individual praxis can lead to recognition of rights only if it is consistent with these values. In this perspective there is no general liberty for self-determination of the subject outside specific relationships. It only could be stated that one has a practical liberty (not a right) to do and behave as one wants, but one's rights depend on the relationships in which the person is engaged. El principio de auto- determinación, como comúnmente se pretende, se plantea sobre una visión formal e individualista de los derechos de libertad. Esta perspectiva, sin embargo, es incompatible con las necesidades de una comunidad, y en particular con la necesidad de promover un orden social estable, y una integración entre los sujetos. Yo propongo una perspectiva diferente, que tenga en cuenta las relaciones y no solo los individuos. En particular, lo que argumento es que 1) cualquier comunidad se da cuenta de un determinado orden social, que es un conjunto de prácticas; 2) que estas prácticas expresan valores específicos; 3) que están sujetos a un debate público permanente y, finalmente, 5) que solo si la praxis individual es consistente con estos valores puede llevar al reconocimiento de los derechos. En esa perspectiva, no existe una libertad general para que un sujeto pueda auto-determinarse, sin considerar una relación específica. Solo se podría afirmar que uno tiene una libertad concreta (y no un derecho) de hacer y de actuar como quiera, pero los derechos dependen de las relaciones en las que participa la persona. (shrink)

En este artículo se ofrece un acercamiento riguroso a la ética existencial de Kierkegaard, a la vez que se muestra en qué momento se separa de la filosofía moral de Kant y opera como un correctivo de la misma. A partir de ambas concepciones de la ética es presentado el problema del actuar moral, tanto en su dimensión pura práctica (Kant y Kierkegaard), como en su dimensión existencial constitutiva (Kierkegaard), resaltando la importancia de la elección del sí mismo en conexión (...) con los principios de la moralidad. (shrink)

Daniel Kofman | : La littérature philosophique récente concernant les droits juridictionnels suppose qu’on puisse les justifier par une « théorie des droits territoriaux », sans faire appel à une théorie de l’autodétermination. Or les principes d’autodétermination des peuples devraient déterminer les principes des frontières juridictionnelles, et non le contraire. Les « droits territoriaux » sont essentiellement des droits de gouvernance, lesquels découlent eux-mêmes des principes d’autodétermination. Pour défendre ces thèses, je critique les arguments de Brilmayer, Simmons, et Stilz. | (...) : Recent philosophical literature on jurisdictional rights assumes they can be justified by a “theory of territorial rights” without a theory of self-determination. However, principles of self-determination of peoples should determine principles of jurisdictional boundaries, not the contrary. “Territorial rights” are essentially rights of governance, which derive from principles of self-determination. I support these theses by criticising arguments of Brilmayer, Simmons and Stilz. (shrink)

Comment la philosophie de Hegel pourrait-elle encore promettre quelque chose puisqu'elle est apparue, aux yeux des lecteurs contemporains, comme une entreprise d'annulation du temps? Le savoir absolu n'est-il pas le resultat du processus dialectique par lequel l'esprit releve toute temporalite et par la toute surprise, l'evenement se produisant toujours trop tard? D'une absence de pensee de l'avenir dans la philosophie de Hegel decoulerait une absence d'avenir de la philosophie hegelienne elle-meme. C'est contre une telle assertion que le present ouvrage s'inscrit (...) en faux; il se propose pour cela de travailler le concept de plasticite, montrant comment il forme en profondeur, a la fois comme sa structure et comme son rythme, le contenu speculatif. Est plastique ce qui est susceptible de recevoir comme de donner la forme, mais aussi de l'aneantir. Hegel degage ce concept de son sol natal, l'art, pour le rendre a sa veritable origine : le developpement de la subjectivite. Est dit plastique, en effet, le rapport que la subjectivite entretient avec l'accident, avec ce qui arrive. L'auto-determination apparait comme proces de temporalisation au sein duquel la subjectivite, dans l'attitude contrastee d'un voir venir, se donne et par la recoit sa propre forme, anticipant son avenir tout en renoncant a en maitriser l'irruption. La plasticite du concept hegelien de temps est le foyer de resistance clandestin ou se prepare la reponse a l'accusation de vulgarite portee par Heidegger a l'encontre de ce meme concept. (shrink)

In this article, the author represents the aspect of philosophical and religious doctrine of Czeslaw Stanislaw Bartnik, a Polish personalist, which deals with the way the philosopher understands freedom as a structural component of a personality that enables a man to realize his inner and outer potential in both individual and social planes, in all dimensions of human existence: soul, body, intellect, will, actions, perception and creation of existence. Interrelation and interdependence between freedom and responsibility of a personality, as well (...) as between freedom and will of a person, are the issues of principle for a Catholic thinker. As interpreted by Bartnik, responsibility is a measure of freedom, because of direct relationship between them: the more freedom a person possesses, the greater responsibility it takes to implement and use it. The relationship between freedom and will explains the dialectic character of structure of a personality. Freedom of a man is manifested through auto- determination, which means the ability of will to make free choices, and ultimately the will determines itself, being evaluated by practical mind. Freedom in personal existence concerns personality as a whole, but not the will or actions taken separately. That is why, Bartnik believes, it is better to speak about personal freedom and free existence of a personality. Choice -making proves freedom of a man, but when choosing an option, a person chooses himself, thus creating his own spiritual image. Existence consists of possibilities to choose from and means the core and backbone structure of a personality in the dynamic process of self-realization. (shrink)

On peut se demander si les grands développements de l’autobiographie auxquels nous avons assisté depuis les années soixante-dix ne correspondaient pas finalement au genre littéraire d’une époque, c’est-à-dire à l’avènement d’un sujet capable d’auto-détermination en des contextes changeants, mais suffisamment stables pour anticiper un devenir, une trajectoire, une mobilité. L’autobiographie est le genre de texte par excellence dans le cadre duquel s’effectue une dévolution à l’individu d’une c..

1. La partition entre vie et existence La notion d’existence animale sonne, du moins à l’oreille du philosophe contemporain, comme un oxymore. N’est-il pas en effet admis jusque dans les manuels de cours et les ouvrages à visée didactique que l’homme seul existe – ek-siste – tandis que l’animal n’est qu’un « simple vivant », au même titre, donc, que les végétaux? On pourrait définir le « simplement vivant » comme ce qui mène une vie pauvre en auto-déterminations, la (...) totalité de ses détermina... (shrink)

The paper explicates what the World War 2 era Japanese philosopher, Miki Kiyoshi, of the Kyoto School, called the logic of imagination and of forms as an ontology. I understand this ontology as ultimately an “anontology”, where novelty and creativity are predicated upon the pathos of singularity and contingency that Miki calls “the nothing” (mu). Its productive function that is technological vis-à-vis the environment involves an embodied praxis that Miki, borrowing the terms of his mentor, Nishida Kitarō, calls “enactive intuition”. (...) This productivity unfolds the historical world, on the basis of that deep pathos within us in synthesis with logos, as what can be characterized as the auto-determination of the indeterminate. But the advance of technology today takes this unfolding of the world perhaps beyond what Miki anticipated with his self-professed humanism. To make these points, the paper, for the most part, focuses on the last and longest chapter in Miki’s Logic of Imagination, where Miki discusses and appropriates Kant’s concept of imagination and its schematism from both the first and third Critiques while also showing the influences of Heidegger along with Nishida. But the originality in Miki takes his philosophy of imagination beyond these predecessors while also raising questions as to the relationship between human beings and nature and to the very meaning of “nature” (shizen) in Miki. I will also discuss post-war theories of imagination and technology coming after Miki that respond to the more recent digitization and virtualization of the real. (shrink)

L’analyse de la question nationale dans les territoires anciennement habsbourgeois fut longtemps conditionnée par les catégories posées dans l’immédiat après Première Guerre mondiale, dans le contexte de construction de récits historiques des États successeurs. Cette approche dissimula longtemps des dynamiques d’identifications qui ne se réduisaient pas à la seule dimension nationale. Les processus de constructions nationales du xix e siècle furent bien plutôt marqués par des combinaisons de dimensions territoriales – locales et régionales – ou historiques tout autant que nationales. (...) Peu de groupes nationaux de la Double monarchie conçurent un projet étatique national jusqu’à la Grande Guerre. Cet impensé des constructions nationales peut être analysé comme l’une des raisons de la grande variété de cas de figures observables à la fin de la Première Guerre mondiale, lorsque différents groupes, qu’ils fussent nationaux ou non et à des échelles variables, se prévalurent de la notion d’« auto-détermination » pour réorganiser politiquement cet espace. (shrink)

L’auteur lit le Discours de rectorat non comme une aberration ou une « erreur » limitée à la période « politique » de 1933-1934, mais comme l’expression condensée des thèmes philosophiques les plus persistants de Heidegger : l’accentuation, procédant de l’idéalisme allemand, sur la liberté et l’auto-détermination, le motif nietzschéen de la volonté et de l’auto-affirmation, la prédominance platonicienne de l’étonnement comme fondement du savoir philosophique, la demande socratique de suivre l’injonction delphique, ou l’exhortation hölderlinienne à suivre l’appel (...) du peuple comme réalisation de la loi du destin historique allemand. Tous ces thèmes directeurs se concentrent dans le Discours selon un engagement martial et politique qui bloque tout accès à ce « chemin de pensée » que Heidegger considère comme nécessaire pour dépasser le nihilisme de l’époque moderne.The author reads the Rectorial Address not as an aberration or « mistake » that can be consigned to the « political » period of 1933-1934, but as a concentrated expression of Heidegger’s most persistent philosophical themes: the emphasis on freedom and self-determination that belong to German Idealism, Nietzschean gestures to will and self-assertion, Platonic priority of wonder as the foundation of philosophical wisdom, the Socratic entreaty to heed the wisdom of the Delphic oracle, and the Hölderlinian call to the Volk to fulfill the law of Germany’s historical destiny. All of these issues appear thematically in this address in a martial-political commitment that blocks all access to the « path of thinking » that Heidegger deems necessary for a Verwindung of the nihilism that plagues the modern world. (shrink)

In spite of the importance of point mutations for evolution and human diseases, their natural spectrum of incidence in different species is not known. Here I propose to determine these spectra by comparing consecutive sequence periods in stretches of repetitive DNA. The article presents the analysis of more than 51,000 such point mutations identified by this approach in the genomes of human, chimpanzee, rat, mouse, pufferfish, zebrafish, and sea squirt. I propose to explain the observed spectra by auto‐mutagenic mechanisms (...) of genome variation involving the inter‐conversions of nucleotides, single base‐pair inversions and their combinations. (shrink)

Purpose. With the consideration of anthropological tendencies in modern science, the purpose of the article is to analyze the problem of the subject of cognition, philosophical-psychological rationale for the need to complement it by the concept of "the researcher’s personality". Theoretical basis. The authors rely on post-non-classical methodological tools and basic principles of complexity theory, as well as theoretical provisions of epistemological constructivism, the results of theoretical and empirical psychological studies. In them, authors revealed psychological features of the potential of (...) self-realization of a person prone to innovation and research activities and transfessionalism, including the resources and reserves of the researcher’s personality. Originality. The concept of the subject of cognition is expanded by the concept of "researcher’s personality" and derivative concepts that describe the dynamics of self-harmonization of originative co-generative strengths and opportunities of self-realization of an enlightened person, reveal the degree of correlation in the cognition of the subjective and objective dimensions of his life. It is substantiated that further analysis of the problem of anthropologization of science requires appropriate onto-epistemological grounds that reveals the unity of cognition-education-skill as an essential characteristic of the maturity of the researcher’s personality of scientific knowledge. Conclusions. In the context of anthropological shifts in modern science, the philosophical-psychological analysis of the problem of the subject of cognition is actualized. The psychological research proves the advisability of using the "researcher’s personality" concept as a basic one for understanding the formation of an enlightened human-creator, capable of auto-eco-organization, self-transcendence, and syzygy with the Universe at different levels of innovational research activity. The self-realization of the researcher-personality is a way-search for the authenticity of the multiform unity of life, the personal meaning of scientific truth, and the self-harmonization of the originative co-generative co-determinative strengths in the knowledge of an enlightened person. Including the concept of the subject of cognition in the ontology of the unity of difference-multidimensional poly-essential autopoetic integrity, the anthropologization of science is intended to revive the ancient idea in the unity of truth, education and skill of a scientist, defining the ideal of a modern human-transfessional. (shrink)

A part of the “return to religion” now evident in European philosophy, this book represents the culmination of the career of a leading phenomenological thinker whose earlier works trace a trajectory from Marx through a genealogy of psychoanalysis that interprets Descartes’s “I think, I am” as “I feel myself thinking, I am.” In this book, Henry does not ask whether Christianity is “true” or “false.” Rather, what is in question here is what Christianity considers as truth, what kind of truth (...) it offers to people, what it endeavors to communicate to them, not as a theoretical and indifferent truth, but as the essential truth that by some mysterious affinity is suitable for them, to the point that it alone is capable of ensuring them salvation. In the process, Henry inevitably argues against the concept of truth that dominates modern thought and determines, in its multiple implications, the world in which we live. Henry argues that Christ undoes “the truth of the world,” that He is an access to the infinity of self-love, to a radical subjectivity that admits no outside, to the immanence of affective life found beyond the despair fatally attached to all objectifying thought. The Kingdom of God accomplishes itself in the here and now through the love of Christ in what Henry calls “the auto-affection of Life.” In this condition, he argues, all problems of lack, ambivalence, and false projection are resolved. (shrink)

How, if at all, consciousness can be part of the physical universe remains a baffling problem. This article outlines a new, developing philosophical theory of how it could do so, and offers a preliminary mathematical formulation of a physical grounding for key aspects of the theory. Because the philosophical side has radical elements, so does the physical-theory side. The philosophical side is radical, first, in proposing that the productivity or dynamism in the universe that many believe to be responsible for (...) its systematic regularities is actually itself a physical constituent of the universe, along with more familiar entities. Indeed, it proposes that instances of dynamism can themselves take part in physical interactions with other entities, this interaction then being “meta-dynamism” (a type of meta-causation). Secondly, the theory is radical, and unique, in arguing that consciousness is necessarily partly constituted of meta-dynamic auto-sensitivity, in other words it must react via meta-dynamism to its own dynamism, and also in conjecturing that some specific form of this sensitivity is sufficient for and indeed constitutive of consciousness. The article proposes a way for physical laws to be modified to accommodate meta-dynamism, via the radical step of including elements that explicitly refer to dynamism itself. Additionally, laws become, explicitly, temporally non-local in referring directly to quantity values holding at times prior to a given instant of application of the law. The approach therefore implicitly brings in considerations about what information determines states. Because of the temporal non-locality, and also because of the deep connections between dynamism and time-flow, the approach also implicitly connects to the topic of entropy insofar as this is related to time. (shrink)

This paper argues that the most famous objection to backward time travel can carry no weight. In its classic form, the objection is that backward time travel entails the occurrence of impossible things, such as auto-infanticide—and hence is itself impossible. David Lewis has rebutted the classic version of the objection: auto-infanticide is prevented by coincidences, such as time travellers slipping on banana peels as they attempt to murder their younger selves. I focus on Paul Horwich‘s more recent version (...) of the objection, according to which backward time travel entails not impossible things, but improbable ones—such as the string of slips on banana peels that would be required to stop a determined auto-infanticidal maniac from murdering her younger self—and hence is itself highly improbable. I argue that backward time travel does not entail unusual numbers of coincidences; and that, even if it did, that would not render its occurrence unlikely. (shrink)

To address the theological turn in phenomenology, this paper sets out critical arguments opposing the theist phenomenology of Michel Henry and Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy of the event. Henry’s phenomenology has been overlooked in recent commentaries compared with, for example, Jean-Luc Marion’s work. It will be shown here that Henry’s philosophy presents a detailed novel turn in phenomenology structured according to critical moves against positions developed from Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. This demonstration is done through a strong contrast with Deleuze and (...) a short engagement with Quentin Meillassoux. The paper presents an argument against the theological turn on the grounds that it misunderstands the form of affectivity when compared to Deleuze’s work on affect and event. It will be argued that Henry’s search for a free-standing affect deduced as a condition for any appearance underplays the way any affect is included in many causal and transcendentally determined series such that any notion of the pure affect independent of other processes is a fiction. The loss of this pure affect entails the questioning of the theological turn in Henry. (shrink)

A clarification of Husserl's changing conceptions of imaginary consciousness ( phantasy ) and memory, especially at the level of auto-affective time-consciousness, suggests an interpretation of Freud's concept of the Unconscious. Phenomenology of consciousness can show how it is possible that consciousness can bring to present appearance something unconscious, that is, something foreign or absent to consciousness, without incorporating it into or subordinating it to the conscious present. This phenomenological analysis of Freud's concept of the Unconscious leads to a partial (...) critique of Freud's metapsychological determination of the Unconscious as a simple, internally unperceived representational consciousness. It also suggests an account of how a reproductive inner consciousness can free the subject from the experience of anxiety by allowing for possibilities of self-distanciation and symbolic self-representation that protect the subject from traumatic affection by and through its own instinctual drives. (shrink)

Origin of a dissipative structure in a chemical dynamic system: occurs under the following constraints: 1) Affinity must be high. (The system must be far from equilibrium.); 2) There must be an auto-catalytic process; 3) A process that reduces the concentration of the auto-catalyst must operate; 4) The relevant parameters (rate constants, etc.) must lie in a range corresponding to a limit cycle trajectory. That is, there must be closure of the network of reaction such that a state (...) sufficiently close to the prior condition is achieved at the corresponding part of each oscillation. If these constraints continue to be met interactions of the system with the rest of the world are quite different in the presence of the dissipative structure than they would be in the absence of that self-organized coherence. Closure of a network of relationships which gives rise to a dissipative structure is a 'unit-determining' feature. The effects of the structure as a whole are the resultants of the effects of the components, but the concentrations of the components at any instant are effects of the closure of the limit cycle. This is an influence on components arising from what those components constitute --- downward causation. (shrink)

A part of the “return to religion” now evident in European philosophy, this book represents the culmination of the career of a leading phenomenological thinker whose earlier works trace a trajectory from Marx through a genealogy of psychoanalysis that interprets Descartes’s “I think, I am” as “I feel myself thinking, I am.” In this book, Henry does not ask whether Christianity is “true” or “false.” Rather, what is in question here is what Christianity considers as truth, what kind of truth (...) it offers to people, what it endeavors to communicate to them, not as a theoretical and indifferent truth, but as the essential truth that by some mysterious affinity is suitable for them, to the point that it alone is capable of ensuring them salvation. In the process, Henry inevitably argues against the concept of truth that dominates modern thought and determines, in its multiple implications, the world in which we live. Henry argues that Christ undoes “the truth of the world,” that He is an access to the infinity of self-love, to a radical subjectivity that admits no outside, to the immanence of affective life found beyond the despair fatally attached to all objectifying thought. The Kingdom of God accomplishes itself in the here and now through the love of Christ in what Henry calls “the auto-affection of Life.” In this condition, he argues, all problems of lack, ambivalence, and false projection are resolved. (shrink)

Apart from these reservations, however, the child sacrifices certain immediate ends of satisfaction for ends which by their very transcendence elude him. The consequence of his new attitude on his interpretation of the actions of other individuals will he striking; for, inasmuch as their acts and gestures no longer signify as means to his immediate and tangible ends within his life-space, their behavior will be problematic, and the child will attempt to interrogate its meaning. Under the old dispensation he could (...) grasp the meaning of a bodily movement by following its direction towards an object in his proximate environment, and the end of the movement was simply the object viewed as terminus ad quem or as positively charged with respect to action. Under the new dispensation, based no longer on Pleasure and Pain but on Good and Bad, the signification of the gestures and speech of those around the child is transcendent in the sense that it does not aim at material objects or at combinations of the same in his proximate milieu, but at possible or ideal objects separated from the child not by an interval of space but by an interval of time. Thus the transcendent terminus of a gesture is not a materially given object but an object to be constructed and as yet existing only in the projects of the parents. Moral and intellectual formation is a process of self-alienation, of auto-suggestive submission to the Transcendent, interrupted periodically on the part of the child by acts of defiance, systematic contradiction and obstinacy, and regression to earlier modes of adjustment with considerable nuisance-value. If under the regime of indulgence the child becomes what he is by acquiring his immanent meaning in his activities of self-gratification, under the regime of discipline he becomes other than he is by a sacrifice of his determinate individuality. (shrink)

A growing literature has focused on understanding how to detect and deter unethical consumer behavior. In this work, we focus on a particularly important type of unethical consumer behavior, consumer insurance fraud, and we analyze a unique dataset to understand how experts investigate suspicious claims. Two separate but related literatures inform the process of investigating suspicious insurance claims. The first literature is grounded in field research and emphasizes the importance of secondary sources. The second literature is grounded in laboratory studies (...) that emphasize the importance of interpersonal interactions. Here we draw upon both literatures to consider the importance of claimant interviews within the context of many investigative actions and the potential for claimants to avoid interviews. In an empirical study using qualitative and quantitative data from auto insurance claim investigations, we analyze investigative chronologies conducted by skilled experts. In doing so, we find that even when investigators can access information from a variety of sources such as witnesses, databases, and physical evidence, claimant interviews are the most important step in determining whether or not claims are denied or paid. Furthermore, we identify interpersonal avoidance as an important signal of unethical claimant behavior. Our findings inform deception detection theory and practice. We identify implications for deception detection in business, particularly for consumer unethical behavior and insurance fraud investigations. (shrink)

A growing literature has focused on understanding how to detect and deter unethical consumer behavior. In this work, we focus on a particularly important type of unethical consumer behavior, consumer insurance fraud, and we analyze a unique dataset to understand how experts investigate suspicious claims. Two separate but related literatures inform the process of investigating suspicious insurance claims. The first literature is grounded in field research and emphasizes the importance of secondary sources. The second literature is grounded in laboratory studies (...) that emphasize the importance of interpersonal interactions. Here we draw upon both literatures to consider the importance of claimant interviews within the context of many investigative actions and the potential for claimants to avoid interviews. In an empirical study using qualitative and quantitative data from auto insurance claim investigations, we analyze investigative chronologies conducted by skilled experts. In doing so, we find that even when investigators can access information from a variety of sources such as witnesses, databases, and physical evidence, claimant interviews are the most important step in determining whether or not claims are denied or paid. Furthermore, we identify interpersonal avoidance as an important signal of unethical claimant behavior. Our findings inform deception detection theory and practice. We identify implications for deception detection in business, particularly for consumer unethical behavior and insurance fraud investigations. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se desarrolló una investigación descriptiva transversal, con un enfoque cuantitativo, en la que la muestra fue seleccionada de manera intencional pura, no probabilística, según criterios establecidos por los autores del estudio. Quedó constituida por las variables del Sistema Comprehensivo Rorschach pertenecientes a 120 protocolos de sujetos con trastornos depresivos, de ellos 82 presentaron depresión moderada, y 38 depresión severa. Se aplicaron los siguientes métodos empíricos: entrevista, observación, Autoescala de Zung y Conde, y el Psicodiagnóstico de Rorschach. Los estadígrafos que (...) se utilizaron fueron el Test de Kolmogorov- Smirnov, el Test de Comparación de Proporciones y la prueba de Mann-Whitney. Como principales resultados se obtuvo que las variables del Sistema Comprehensivo Rorschach, que establecieron diferencias estadísticas altamente significativas entre los grupos de sujetos fueron: Lambda alta, Proporción afectiva baja, total de respuestas, las respuestas globales, Suma Ponderada de respuestas con el determinante color cromático y la Experiencia accesible. ABSTRACT A transverse descriptive investigation was developed, with a quantitative approach, in that the sample was selected in a pure intentional way, not probabilistic, according to criteria established by the authors of the study. It was constituted for the variables of the Rorschach Comprehensive System belonging to 120 protocols of individuals with depressive disorders, of them 82 presented moderate depression, and 38 severe depression. The following empirical methods were applied: interview, observation, Auto-scale of Zung and Conde, and Psycho-diagnosis of Rorschach. The statisticians used were the Test of Kolmogorov - Smirnov, the Test of Comparison of Proportions and the Mann-Whitney test. As main results, it was obtained that the variables of the Rorschach Comprehensive System, which established highly significant statistical differences between the groups of individuals were: tall Lambda, low affective proportion, whole of answers, the global answers, exaggerated sum of answers with the determinant chromatic color and the accessible experience. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: What explains first-person authority? What explains the presumption that an utterance is true when it is a sincere intelligible determinate first-person singular simple present-tense ascription of intentional state? According to Rockney Jacobsen, self-ascriptions each enjoy a presumption of truth because they are systematically reliable. They are systematically reliable because they are typically both truth-assessable and expressive. Such self-ascriptions, if sincere, are certain to be true. This article presents a defence and a critique of Jacobsen's theory. It is argued that (...) the purported prevalence of expressive self-ascriptions is at best contingent. This contingency cannot explain why self-ascriptions are necessarily authoritative.RÉSUMÉ: Comment expliquer l'autorité de la première personne? Comment expliquer la présomption qu'un énoncé est vrai lorsque c'est une attribution d'un état intentionnel, sincère et intelligible, à la première personne du singulier de l'indicatif présent. Selon Rockney Jacobsen, les auto-attributions jouissent d'une présomption de vérité parce qu'elles sont systématiquement fiables. Elles sont systématiquement fiables parce qu'elles ont pour caractéristique d'être à la fois expressives et évaluables en termes de vérité. Si de telles auto-attributions sont sincères, elles sont certainement vraies. Cet article présente une défense et une critique de la théorie deJacobsen. L'auteur soutient que la prétendue prévalence des auto-attributions expressives est au mieux contingente. Cette contingence ne peut pas expliquer pourquoi il est nécessaire que les auto-attributions fassent autorité. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 23 (2003) 178-181 [Access article in PDF] Buddhist Perceptions of Jesus. Edited by Perry Schmidt-Leukel with Gerhard Koberlin and Thomas Josef Gotz, OSB. St. Ottilien: EOS-Verlag, 2001. 179 pp. The papers collected here represent a significant step forward in European scholarship on Buddhist-Christian relations. As Perry Schmidt-Leukel remarks in his helpful introduction, they are an experiment in correlating auto-interpretation and hetero-interpretation, introspection and extrospection.Each of the (...) first three sections—on China/Japan, Southeast Asia, and Europe—begins with a historical study. Iso Kern clears up some misconceptions about the Jesuits' approach to mission work in China, stating that they did in fact preach Jesus crucified (37) and the doctrine of Atonement (41) in the face of a grave danger that Christianity would simply be absorbed into Buddhism (33). Whereas Buddhism had no specifically religious clash with the state, Christianity did, and this was eventually sealed by martyrdom in both China and Japan. Introducing part 2, Heinz Murmel gives a sober reassessment of the vehement controversies between a certain segment of Buddhism and a certain type of Christianity in Ceylon. Only the high-caste highland nikayas were protected by the British (63); the more popular, rural Buddhists of the lowlands felt excluded and threatened and gave rise to what became known as "Protestant Buddhism." The "great debates" between bitterly anti-Christian monks and Protestant clergymen were not as important as the records may suggest, and even the fiery Anagarika Dharmapala later disclosed that he felt great devotion to Jesus. Finally, Frank Usarski reviews the heated debates between ill-informed Christians and overaggressive Buddhist converts such as Karl B. Seidenstucker as Buddhism established itself in Germany in the early decades of the twentieth century. The History of Religions school seemed to suggest that Christianity was culturally inferior to Buddhism, which was allegedly proved by Christian attitudes to [End Page 178] vegetarianism and the general anti-intellectualism of Christianity. Christianity was inauthentic, derivative, "Buddhism in Jewish garments" (120).Yet even Seidenstucker, the renegade Protestant, converted to Catholicism toward the end of his life.Each historical contribution is followed by an essay on the contemporary situation in the three regions, and these vary greatly in substance. Shizuteru Ueda offers a profound meditation on the significance of Keiji Nishitani for Buddhist approaches to Christianity. If Nietzsche posed the fundamental question of "life without why " (44-45), the thought of Meister Eckhart contains the answer (curiously, Ueda insists that this answer must be European, because Europe "determines the world" [47]). The "ground" on which we stand, interpreted as Nishida's "place (basho) of nothingness," is "ground-less." This is not nihilism but the overcoming of nihilism by nihilism, the shûnyatâ of shûnyatâ (46). Jesus as the Christ is the God/man and therefore the mediator, the absolute in history (53). He occupies the "place" (basho) of infinite openness, unconditioned ultimacy (55). He is thus unique, but not universal: the ultimate "for me" is not necessary "for the whole of mankind" (56). The actual encounter between Buddhist and Christian absolutes takes place in silence.Santikaro Bhikkhu, the friend and translator of Buddhadâsa Bhikkhu in the last eight years of his life, tells how his mentor gradually overcame his initial suspicion ofChristianity, perhaps because he was not confronted with colonial oppression as Dharmapala was in Ceylon. Distinguishing between "people language" and " dhamma language," he eventually arrived at a certain equivalence between the Christian God and Buddhist dhamma understood as a nonpersonal, nondual transcendent that is nevertheless not outside nature (85, 90). What Jesus the Teacher of Wisdom offers in the Sermon on the Mount, if practiced, is sufficient for salvation (93). In the perspective of dhamma language, however, the God of Christian convention is conditioned, and Jesus as Son of God cannot be unique. Though inconclusive and sometimes obscure because of Buddhadâsa's indifferent grasp of English, this is surely an astonishing journey for one who tried to understand each tradition, including his own, from the sources. It brought him fierce criticism from fellow Buddhists, however, who branded him a... (shrink)

As linguistic competence so clearly illustrates, processing sequences of events is a fundamental aspect of human cognition. For this reason perhaps, sequence learning behavior currently attracts considerable attention in both cognitive psychology and computational theory. In typical sequence learning situations, participants are asked to react to each element of sequentially structured visual sequences of events. An important issue in this context is to determine whether essentially associative processes are sufficient to understand human performance, or whether more powerful learning mechanisms are (...) necessary. To address this issue, we explore how well human participants and connectionist models are capable of learning sequential material that involves complex, disjoint, longdistance contingencies. We show that the popular Simple Recurrent Network model (Elman, 1990), which has otherwise been shown to account for a variety of empirical findings (Cleeremans, 1993), fails to account for human performance in several experimental situations meant to test the model’s specific predictions. In previous research (Cleeremans, 1993) briefly described in this paper, the structure of center-embedded sequential structures was manipulated to be strictly identical or probabilistically different as a function of the elements surrounding the embedding. While the SRN could only learn in the second case, human subjects were found to be insensitive to the manipulation. In the new experiment described in this paper, we tested the idea that performance benefits from “starting small effects” (Elman, 1993) by contrasting two conditions in which the training regimen was either incremental or not. Again, while the SRN is only capable of learning in the first case, human subjects were able to learn in both. We suggest an alternative model based on Maskara & Noetzel’s (1991) Auto-Associative Recurrent Network as a way to overcome the SRN model’s failure to account for the empirical findings.. (shrink)

El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo determinar los tipos de actividades de reformulación conversacional que aparecen en conversaciones en adultos mayores con diferentes niveles de desempeño cognitivo: normales y trastorno cognitivo leve, a partir de una tarea de construcción de un discurso narrativo-argumentativo. Desde una perspectiva de investigación cualitativa, se obtuvo un corpus de 4 entrevistas, que fue codificado con la ayuda del software ATLAS.ti lo que permitió la generación de conceptos y el desarrollo de explicaciones a partir de los (...) datos, los que fueron contrastados con el marco teórico disponible. Los resultados indicaron que los hablantes realizaron actividades de auto-reformulación auto-iniciada, auto-reformulación iniciada por otro y hetero-reformulación derivada del auto-inicio. Las dos primeras se redujeron en los hablantes identificados con trastorno cognitivo leve, mientras que el último tipo de actividad fue el más frecuente y dominante en la conversación. Los hablantes con trastorno cognitivo leve realizaron reformulaciones que no corregían o adecuaban el discurso, por lo que no cumplieron con la finalidad de la reparación. This study aimed to determine the types of activities of conversational reformulation that occur during oral dialogues with older adults who have varying levels of cognitive performance. Study participants, who ranged between normal cognitive function and mild cognitive impairment, were given the task of constructing a narrative-argumentative dialogue. For qualitative investigation purposes, a corpus of four interviews was obtained. Each series of interviews were encoded using ATLAS.ti software which generated linked concepts and explanations from the data. Findings were then compared with the available theoretical framework. The results indicated that participants exhibited three modes of reformulation technique: self-initiated self-reformulation activities; self-reformulation started by another person; and hetero-reformulation derived from self-start. The first two were reduced in speakers exhibiting mild cognitive impairment, while the latter was the most frequent and dominant mode in the conversation. Speakers with mild cognitive impairment executed reformulations that did not correct or enhance the speech, and as such did not meet the purpose of reformulation. (shrink)

Résumé Ce compte rendu de Formes de vie de Jacques Fontanille cherche à montrer que l’ouvrage s’inscrit dans une certaine continuité, notamment par rapport à Pratiques sémiotiques, mais qu’il constitue aussi un nouveau tournant, qui fait évoluer la sémiotique et la positionne dans le champ des sciences humaines et sociales. D’abord, nous discutons le fait que, selon Jacques Fontanille, les formes de vie font « vaciller » la frontière entre la nature et la culture. Nous soulignons le fait que Jacques (...) Fontanille développe après Descola, Latour et Lotman les notions de régimes de croyance d’identification, de mode d’existence social et de sémiosphère. Ensuite, l’accent est mis sur le « vivre-avec » comme macro-expérience. Il s’agit de mesurer les conséquences d’un double choix qui permet de dépasser le stade de l’auto-organisation : d’une part, le rapport au monde est médié par l’actant-corps ; d’autre part, l’activité sémiotique consciente d’elle-même est une activité méta-sémiotique. Enfin, il importe d’évaluer la part du culturel dans la constitution des formes de vie. Nous nous interrogeons sur l’« instanciation » des formes de vie dans un lieu et dans un temps déterminés. (shrink)

From the contents: La fenetre sur l'absolu selon Fink (Laszlo Tengelyi).- Temps, espace et monde chez le jeune Fink (Marc Richir).- L'auto-reference de la phenomenologie (Bernhard Waldenfels).- Phenomenologie et critique chez Fink et Husserl (Ronald Bruzina).- Le spectateur phenomenologisant: au seuil du non-agir et du non-etre (Natalie Depraz).- Nouvelle determination de l'ideal (Hans Rainer Sepp).

The book explores the themes of a) “radical concepts” in politics (inspired by François Laruelle’s “non-Marxism” and “non-philosophy,” developed in accordance with Badiouan and Žižekian “realism”); b) politically relevant and applicable epistemologies of “Thought’s Correlating with the Real” (Laruelle), inspired by Laruelle, Badiou and Žižek and c) the possibility of hybridization of the epistemic stance of “radical concept” with the politics of grief and “identification with the suffering itself” proposed by Judith Butler. Radical concepts, the political vision and the theory (...) based on them, are always already succumbing to the “Lived” (Laruelle), to the singularity of the Event (Badiou), to the encounter with the “kernel of the Real” (Žižek) conditioning a political horizon and the grand and small political narratives taking place within it. The thesis of the book is that the instances of the “lived,” the “event” or the “Real” can be inherently inter-connected by virtue of the category of the “experience” which is an instance of the sheer lived, the bare being subjected to an occurrence which is always already an instance of trauma. The mere subjection to certain” taking place,” the passion (in the etymological sense derived from the Latin verb pati or in the Spinozian sense) which is category beyond the psychological notions of feeling, rational (or irrational) thought, i.e., an ontological category referring to our relation with the “Out-There” which always already happens to us, is that to which the radical (political) concept succumbs to as the ultimate authority rather than to a doctrine, a system of thought, to the “philosophy’s auto-mirroring” (Laruelle). Political revolt or the revolutionary stance stems from precisely this bare experiential, the sheer lived and thus, from the Real of the conatus of staying-in-life. Paradoxically the survivalist stance, the principle of self-preservation is also the revolutionary stance which is by definition destabilizing and destructive. Bodily resistance to subjection (i.e., to discipline) and the continuity of the Self in-the-Real is the source of resistance. The Real of grief and mourning, the identification with the purely experiential stance of the suffering itself is the foundation of a “radical concept” of political solidarity, which by virtue of its being grounded in the Real, i.e., in the Lived, provides the possibility of acting in a revolutionary way. But it is also a form of human universality or political universality, which yet again is not historic universality but rather purely categorical. Other concepts that can be called radical, concepts which are minimally transcendental (Laruelle) and are, therefore, of revolutionary potential are also violence, mourning, labor (work) and gender (the trauma introduced by the linguistic determination as a “he” or a “she”), life, death, animal. Yet, the main focus of the book is the exploration of the lived of vulnerability, trauma and the conatus of life as the determination in the last instance of the revolutionary (political) stance. Clearly, the revolutions and the revolutionary stance this book advocates, or rather, whose potentiality it explores, are not necessarily historical revolutions produced by the intentionality to create politico-historic change. They are not this necessarily. Yet again they are such possibly. Still all purely (on the formal level) revolutionary stance tends to introduce universal change, radically change the political horizon and to reverse the politically unthinkable into a thinkable by elevating it to the level of a universal political truth. (shrink)

A educação do homem interior: O cultivo da vontade em Agostinho de Hipona Resumo: O estudo aqui apresentado tem como objetivo principal a investigação da formação humana nas obras filosóficas Comentários Literal ao Gênesis, A Trindade e O livre-arbítrio, de Agostinho de Hipona. Para isso, aborda-se a noção da antropologia do referido autor; a sua compreensão de corpo e alma (dimensão humana no homem animal) e, por último, objetiva-se explicitar alguns pressupostos de uma educação do ser humano orientada a uma (...) boa formação da vontade. Trata-se de uma pesquisa bibliográfica, exploratória e de caráter hermenêutico. Agostinho concebe a ideia de homem como um ser dotado de corpo e alma. A alma, quando bem formada, pode conduzir os indivíduos à vida com sabedoria e, portanto, a uma beata vita. A vontade é o que movimenta toda as outras dimensões do ser humano e, por isso, ela deve ser bem formada. A educação da vontade, para o pensador, consiste em realizar o jogo de utilizar os objetos que servem de meio para algo e fruir ou contemplar aquilo que é fim em si mesmo. A vontade humana difere do que se passa no reino animal e é capaz de guiar bem o homem, concedendo-lhe minimamente uma relação de desprendimento com a matéria. Conclui-se, a partir dessas linhas mestras do pensamento do autor, que a ética agostiniana ao mesmo tempo que estabelece princípios para o bem agir e lograr uma vida feliz, exige, para isso, um processo formativo que consiste na educação da vontade, uma vez que Agostinho compreende-a como livre em si, isto é, como autodeterminante, ela pode voltar-se por si àquilo que é presença constante, isto é, a objetos de foro contemplativo e afastar-se, tanto quanto possível, dos ditames de uma vida submetida ao mundo material. Palavras-chave: Formação; Vontade; Cultivo; Santo Agostinho; Alma. La educación del hombre interior: el cultivo de la voluntad en Agostinho de Hipona Resumen: El estudio aquí presentado tiene como objetivo principal la investigación de la formación humana en las obras filosóficas Comentarios Literal al Génesis, La Trinidad y El Libre-Arbitrio, de Agostinho de Hipona. Así, se trata la noción y antropología del referido autor, su comprensión de cuerpo y alma (dimensión humana en el hombre animal) y, por último, se objetiva explicitar algunos supuestos de una educación del ser humano orientada a una buena formación de la voluntad. Es una investigación bibliográfica, exploratoria y de carácter hermenéutico. Agostinho concibe la idea de hombre como un ser dotado de cuerpo y alma. El alma, cuando bien formada, puede conducir los individuos a la vida con sabiduría y, por lo tanto, a una beata vita. La voluntad es lo que conduce todas las otras dimensiones del ser humano y, de esta manera, ella debe de ser bien formada. La educación de la voluntad, para el pensador, supone realizar el juego de utilizar los objetos que sirven como medio para algo y fruir o contemplar aquello que tiene fin en sí mismo. La voluntad humana es distinta de lo que se pasa en el reino animal y es capaz de guiar bien el hombre, le permitiendo mínimamente una relación de desprendimiento con la materia. Se concluye, desde esas líneas maestras del pensamiento del autor, que la ética agostiniana al tiempo que establece principios para el bien actuar y lograr una vida feliz, exige, para eso, un proceso formativo que consiste en la educación de la voluntad, una vez que Agostinho la comprende como libre en sí, es decir, como auto determinante, ella puede volverse a lo que es presencia constante, o sea, volverse a objetos de foro contemplativo y aislarse, tanto como sea posible, de los dictados de una vida sometida al mundo material. Palabras-clave: Formación; Voluntad; Cultivo; Santo Agostinho; Alma. The education of the inner-man: The cultivation of will in Augustine of Hippo Abstract: This study is aimed at investigating human formation in the philosophical works On the literal meaning of Genesis, On the Trinity and On free choice of the will, by Augustine of Hippo. To meet that aim, the author’s notion of anthropology is addressed; his understanding of body and soul (human dimension in the human animal) and, finally, we explain some assumptions related to the education of the human being as leading to the good formation of will. This is a bibliographical, exploratory and hermeneutical study. Augustine conceives the idea of man as a being with body and soul. The soul, when well formed, can lead individuals to life with wisdom and, therefore, to a beata vita. Will moves all the other dimensions of the human being and, thus, it must be well formed. For Augustine, the education of the will consists of performing the game of using objects that work as means for something and enjoy or contemplate what is an end in itself. Human will differs from that of the animal kingdom and is capable of guiding man well, granting him a minimal relation of detachment from the material. The conclusion, based on such guidelines from Augustine’s thought, is that Augustinian ethics establishes principles for acting well and reaching a happy life and, at the same time, demands, for those aims, a formative process that consists of the education of the will, as Augustine understands it as free in itself, i.e., as self-determining, for it can turn by itself to what is a constant presence, i.e., to objects of contemplative scope and move away, as far as possible, from the dictates of a life submitted to the material world. Keywords: Formation; Will; Cultivation; Saint Augustine; Soul. Data de registro: 07/03/2020 Data de aceite: 22/09/2021. (shrink)

En este artículo se quiere trazar una teoría política de la insurrección en el pensamiento de Max Stirner, en tanto alternativa ética y política a la revolución. Se mostrará cómo, según el pensador alemán, la revolución es en última instancia una estrategia fallida de emancipación en tanto en cuanto no libera al individuo de las formas de subjetividad que lo mantienen dependiente del poder. Más en general, se enseñará como el orden liberal post-revolucionario, detrás del lenguaje secular de los derechos, (...) las libertades y la igualdad, engendra técnicas más sutiles de gobernabilidad del individuo. La insurrección, en cambio, puede ser vista como un rechazo de las identidades y de los roles que disciplinan al individuo. Al respecto, se prestará una atención especial al concepto stirneriano de Eigenheit, como estrategia ética de auto-determinación y liberación de las formas rígidas de la subjetividad. En última instancia, se querrá mostrar cómo todo el proyecto político de la insurrección stirneriana se basa en un anarquismo ontológico que rechaza la lógica teleocrática del racionalismo moderno y pone en entredicho la misma noción de realización. The aim of this article to outline a political theory of insurrection in Max Stirner’s thought as an ethical and political alternative to revolution. I will show that revolution is ultimately a failed strategy of emancipation as it does not free the individual from the forms of subjectivity that keep her dependent on power. Insurrection, on the other hand, can be seen as a rejection of the identities and roles that discipline the individual. In this regard, special attention will be paid to the Stirnerian concept of Eigenheit as an ethical strategy of self-determination and liberation from rigid forms of subjectivity. Ultimately, I will show how the whole political project of the Stirnerian insurrection is based on an ontological anarchism that rejects the teleocratic logic of modern rationalism and calls into question the very notion of realization. (shrink)

In the twenty-first century, human rights play a very important role in modern society. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, released on 10 December 1948th was thought to become an everlasting source of fundamental human rights and freedoms. The Declaration corresponds to the situation that global community was facing 60 years ago. Today it is a collection of articles that is the cornerstone of the whole system of human rights protection. However, gross human rights atrocities, the dynamic process of legislation, (...) technological progress and changing social values have prompted many to revise the concept of human rights. Today many areas of life have changed: we have untraditional marriages and families, the individual enjoys a completely different social status than 60 years ago. These factors have prompted the creation of an entirely new dimension to human rights and freedoms based on personal autonomy, dynamics and self-regulation. Nowadays, the realization of rights and the aspiration to personal happiness are closely connected with personal autonomy. Autos and nomos—these two terms describe the ability of an individual to initiate one’s actions, to realize them by making independent decisions. This article analyzes whether this ability is a natural right or a privilege, what factors determine the exercise of this right, and what is the role of the state in this process. (shrink)

Le sujet qui perçoit, ressent, se remémore, ou imagine a conscience de son activité mentale, et notamment du mode — perceptif, mnésique ou autre — de ses états. Le mode des états expérientiels va de pair avec une relation spécifique (variable selon le mode) du sujet à ce que l'état représente. Par exemple, le sujet qui se remémore se trouve (normalement) dans une certaine relation à la scène remémorée : il a perçu celle-ci dans le passé. La thèse principale de (...) l'article est que le sujet conscient d'être dans un état donné s'auto-attribue implicitement cette relation avec ce que l'état représente. Cette auto-attribution implicite (immunisée aux erreurs d'identification) constitue la présence du sujet «comme sujet » dans le contenu de ses expériences, distincte de sa présence « comme objet » lorsqu'il fait lui-même partie de la scène représentée. [English abstract] The subject who perceives, feels, remembers or imagines is conscious of his or her experiential states and, in particular, of their ‘mode'. The mode is what enables us to classify experiential states into types such as perceptions, memories, etc., quite independent of the content of the state (what is perceived, remembered, etc.). It is argued that the mode M of an experience determines that (if all goes well) a certain relation RM holds between the subject of the experience and what the experience represents. For example, the subject who remembers a scene normally stands in a certain relation to the scene in question, that of having perceived it in the past. The article's main thesis is that the subject of an experiential state implicitly self-ascribes the relevant relation to what the state represents. This implicit self-ascription (which is immune to error through misidentification) corresponds to the presence of the subject « as subject » in the content of his or her experience. (shrink)

Arthur Kaufmann is one of the most prominent figures among the contemporary philosophers of law in German speaking countries. For many years he was a director of the Institute of Philosophy of Law and Computer Sciences for Law at the University in Munich. Presently, he is a retired professor of this university. Rare in the contemporary legal thought, Arthur Kaufmann's philosophy of law is one with the highest ambitions — it aspires to pinpoint the ultimate foundations of law by explicitly (...) proposing an ontology, a general theory of knowledge and concept of a person. Kaufmann's work derives, first of all, from the thinking of Gustav Radburch, his teacher, and then from ideas of Karl Engish and Hans-Georg Gadamer. The philosophy undertakes to pursue the ultimate foundation of law, law which is understood by Kaufmann, first of all, as a "concrete judgement" that is, what is right in a concrete situation. Justice belongs to the essence of law and "unjust law" is contradictio in adiectio. Kaufmann opposes all those theories, which as the only foundation for establishing just law (Recht) adopt legal norms (Gesetz). In Kaufmann's opinion , such theories are powerless in the face of all types of distortions of law rendered by political forces. He suggests that the basic phenomenon which needs to be explained and which cannot be disregarded by a philosopher of law is so-called "legal lawlessness" ("Gestzliches Unrecht"). "Legal lawlessness" which forms a part of life experience for the people of twentieth century totalitarian states. It proved "with the accuracy of scientific experiment" that the reality of law consists of something more than bare conformity with legal norms. The existence of lex corrupta indicates that law contains something "non-dispositive" which requires acknowledgment of both law-maker and judge. Kaufmann, accepting the convergent concept of truth and cognition, assumes that "non-dispositive" content, emerging as the conformity of a number of cognitive acts of different subjects (inter-subjective communicativeness and verifiability), indicates the presence of being in this cognition. The questions "What is law?" and "What are the principles of a just solution?" lead straight to the ontology of law, to the question about the ontological foundations of law. Kaufmann discerns the ontological foundations of law in the specifically understood "nature of things" and, ultimately, in a "person". He proposes a procedural theory of justice, founded on a "person". In my work, I undertake to reconstruct the train of thought which led Kaufmann to the recognition of a "person" as the ontological foundation of law. In the first part, the conception of philosophy adopted by Kaufmann, initial characteristics of law — of reality which is the subject of analysis, as well as, the requirements for proper philosophical explanation of law posed by Kaufmann are introduced. In the second, Kaufmann's reconstruction of the process of the realisation of law is presented. Next, the conception of analogy which Kaufmann uses when explaining law is analyzed. In the fourth part, Kaufmann's conception of ontological foundations of law is discussed. A critical analysis is carried out in which I demonstrate that the theory of the ontological foundation of law proposed by Kaufmann and the concept of a person included in it do not allow a satisfac¬tory explanation of the phenomenon of "legal lawlessness" and lead to a number of difficulties in the philosophical explanation of law. Finally, the perspectives of a proper formulation of the issue of the ontological foundations of law are drafted in the context of the analyzed theory. My interest is centered on the conception of philosophy adopted by Kaufmann, according to which the existence of the reality is inferred on the basis of a certain configuration of the content of consciousness, whereas at the point of departure of philosophy of law, the data to be explained is a certain process, which is, basically, a process of cognition, while the reality appears only as a condition for the possibility of the occurrence of the process. I wish to argue that the difficulties which appear in the explanation of law are a consequence of the assumed fundamental philosophical solu¬tions, which seem to be characteristic, though usually not assumed explicitly, in philoso¬phy and theory of law dominant at present in continental Europe. Thereby, I wish to show the significance of ontological and epistemological solutions to the possibility of a proper formulation of the problems posed by philosophy and theory of law. Kaufmann proclaims himself in favour of a philosophy which poses questions about the ultimate foundations of understanding of the reality. In epistemology, he assumes that answers to the questions "What is reality like?" and ultimately "What is real?" are inferred on the basis of uniformity of a cognitive acts of different subjects. Cognition of the reality is accomplished exclusively through the content of conceptual material. The two fundamental questions posed by philosophy of law are "What is just law?" and "How is the just law enacted?" The latter is a question about the process of achieving a solution to a concrete case. Since, in Kaufmann's opinion, law does not exist apart from the process of its realisation, an answer to the question about the manner of realisation of law is of fundamental significance to answering the question: "What is law?" and to the explanation of the question about the ontological grounding of law, which is, as well, the foundation of justice. The proper solution has to take into account the moment of "non-dispositive" content of law; its positiveness understood as the reality and, at the same time, it has to point to the principles of the historical transformation of the content. Law, in the primary meaning of the word, always pertains, in Kaufmann's opinion, to a concrete case. A legal norm is solely the "possibility" of law and the entirely real law is ipsa res iusta, that which is just in a given situation. Determination of what is just takes place in a certain type of process performed by a judge (or by man confronted with a choice). Kaufmann aims to reconstruct this process. A question about the ontological foundation of law is a question about the ontological foundations of this process. In the analyzed theory it is formulated as a question about the transcendental conditions, necessary for the possibility of the occurrence of the process: how the reality should be thought to make possible the reconstructed process of the realisation of law. Kaufmann rejects the model for finding a concrete solution based on simple subsump¬tion and proposes a model in which concrete law ensues, based on inference by analogy, through the process of "bringing to conformity" that which is normative with that which is factual. Kaufmann distinguishes three levels in the process of the realisation of law. On the highest level, there are the fundamental legal principles, on the second legal norms, on the third — concrete solutions. The fundamental principles of law are general inasmuch as they cannot be "applied" directly to concrete conditions of life, however, they play an important part in establishing norms. A judge encounters a concrete situation and a system of legal norms. A life situation and norms are situated on inherently different levels of factuality and normativeness. In order to acquire a definite law both a norm (system of norms) and a life situation (Lebenssachverhalt) should undergo a kind of "treatment" which would allow a mutual conformity to be brought to them. Legal norms and definite conditions of life come together in the process of analogical inference in which the "factual state" ("Tatbestand") — which represents a norm, and in the "state of things" ("Sachverhalt") — which represents a specific situation are constructed. A "factual state" is a sense interpreted from a norm with respect to specific conditions of life. The "state of things" is a sense constructed on the basis of concrete conditions of life with respect to norms (system of norms). Legal norms and concrete conditions of life meet in one common sense established during the process of realisation of law. Mutatis mutandis the same refers to the process of composition of legal norms: as the acquisition of concrete law consists in a mutual "synchronization" of norms and concrete conditions of life, so acquisition of legal norms consists of bringing to conformity fundamental principles and possible conditions of life. According to Kaufmann, both of these processes are based on inference through analogy. As this inference is the heart of these processes it is simultaneously a foundation finding just law and justice. How does Kaufmann understand such an inference? As the basis for all justice he assumes a specifically interpreted distributive justice grounded on proportionality. Equality of relations is required between life conditions and their normative qualification. Concrete conditions of life are ascribed normative qualification not through simple application of a general norm. More likely, when we look for a solution we go from one concrete normative qualified case to another, through already known "applications" of norms to a new "application". The relation between life conditions and their normative qualifica¬tion has to be proportional to other, earlier or possible (thought of) assignments of that which is factual to that which is normative. Law as a whole does not consist of a set of norms, but only of a unity of relations. Since law is a, based on proportion, relative unity of a norm and conditions of life, in order to explain law in philosophical manner, the question about ontological base of this unity has to be asked. What is it that makes the relation between a norm and conditions of life "non-dispositive"? What is the basis for such an interpretation of a norm and case which makes it possible to bring a norm and conditions of life into mutual "conformity"? This is a question about a third thing (next to norms and conditions of life), with respect to which the relative identity between a norm and conditions of life occurs, about the intermediary between that which is normative and that which is factual and which provides for the process of establishing of norms, as well as, finding solutions. It is the "sense" in which the idea of law or legal norm and conditions of life have to be identical to be brought to mutual "conformity". In Kaufmann's opinion such a sense is nothing else but the "nature of things" which determines the normative qualification of the reality. Since establishment of this "sense" appears to be "non-dispositive" and controlled inter-subjectively (namely, other subjects will reach a similar result) so, in conformity with the convergent concept of truth, the "nature of things" must be assigned a certain ontological status. According to Kaufmann this is a real relation which occurs between being and obligation, between the conditions of life and normative quality. However, it should be underlined that from the point of view of the analyzed system the "nature of things" is a correlate of constructed sense, a result of a construction which is based on the principle of consistent understanding of senses ("non-normative" and "normative") and is not a reality which is transcendent against the arrangement of senses. In Kaufmann's theory, inference from analogy appears to be a process of reshaping the concepts (senses) governed by tendency to understand the contents appearing in relations between that which is factual and that which is normative in a consistent way. The analogical structure of language (concepts) and recognition of being as composed of an essence and existence is an indispensable requirement for the possibility of the realisation of law, based on specifically understood inference from analogy. It is necessary to assume a moment of existence without content which ensures unity of cognition. Existence emerges thus as a condition of the possibility of cognition. According to Kaufmann, the "nature of things" is the heart of inference through analogy and the basis for establishment of finding of law. Inference from the "state of things" to a norm or from a norm to the "state of things" always means inference through the "nature of things". The "nature of things" is the proper medium of objective legal sense sought in every cognition of law. In Kaufmann's view, the question whether the "nature of things" is ultima ratio of interpretation of law or is only a means of supplement gaps in law or whether it is one of the sources of law, is posed wrongly. The "nature of things" serves neither to supplement the gaps nor is it a source of law as, for example, a legal norm may be. It is a certain kind of "catalyst" necessary in every act of making law and solving a concrete case. Owing to "nature of things" it is possible to bring to a mutual conformity the idea of law and possible conditions of life or legal norms and concrete conditions of life. In Kaufmann's conception the "nature of things" is not yet the ultimate basis for understanding the "non-dispositiveness" of law. The relation between obligation and being is determined in the process of the realisation of law. Both the process itself and that which is transformed in this process are given. A question about the ontological bases of "material" contents undergoing "treatment" in the process of the realisation of law and about being which is the basis of regularity of the occurrence of the process arises. Only this will allow an explanation that the result of the process is not optional. Thus, a question about reality to which law refers and about the subject realising the law has to be formed. To this, Kaufmann gives the following answer: that which is missing is man but not "empirical man" but man as a "person". A "person" understood as a set of relations between man and other people and things. A "person" is the intermediary between those things which are different — norm and case are brought to conformity. A "person" is that which is given and permanent in the process of the realisation of law. It determines the content of law, is "subject" of law; this aspect is described by Kaufmann as the "what" of the process of realisation of law. A "person" consists of precisely just these relations which undergo "treatment" in the process. On the other hand, a "person" is "a place" in which the processes of realisation of law occur, it is the "how" of normative discourse, a "person" is that which determines the procedure of the process, being "outside" of it. This aspect of a "person" is connected with the formal moment of law. A "person" being, at the same time, the "how" and the "what" of the process of the realisation of law, is also, to put it differently, a structural unity of relation and that which constitutes this relation (unity of relatio and relata). According to this approach a "person" is neither an object nor a subject. It exists only "in between". It is not substance. Law is the relation between being and obligation. That which is obligatory is connected with that which is general. That which is general does not exist on its own, it is not completely real. Accordingly, a "person" as such is also not real. It is relational, dynamic and historical. A "person" is not a state but an event. In Kaufmann's opinion, such a concept of a "person" helps to avoid the difficulties connected with the fungibility of law in classical legal positivism. A "person" is that which is given, which is not at free disposal and secures the moment of "non-dispositiveness" of law. Kaufmann concludes: "The idea (»nature«) of law is either the idea of a personal man or is nothing". Theory points at the structure of realising law and explains the process of adoption of general legal norms for a concrete situation. The analysis has shown however, that in this theory a satisfactory answer to the question about the ultimate foundations of law is not given. It seems that in the analyzed theory the understanding of human being takes place through understanding of law. What is good for man as a "person", what is just, what a "person" deserves may be determined only against the existing system of law. A "per¬son" adopted as a basis of law is the reality postulated in the analysis of the process of the realisation of law. It is a condition of possibility of this process ( explaining, on one hand, its unity and, on the other hand, the non-dispositive moments stated in this process). A "person" in the discussed theory is entirely defined by the structure of law, it can be nothing more than that which is given in law, what law refers to, what law is about. Being, which is a "person", is constituted by relations between people and objects, the relations which are based on fundamental links between norms and conditions of life established in a process of bringing them to conformity. It has to be assumed that man as a "person" is a subject of law only as far as realising law "treats" given senses according to their current configuration. The system of law is a starting point and it describes in content what man is as a "person". Moreover, being a "person" is the condition for entering legal relations. Consistently, Kaufmann writes that "empirical man" is not the subject of law, man is not "out of nature" a "person". People become "persons" due to the fact that they acknowledge each other as "persons" — acknowledging, at the same time, law. This acknowledgement is a con¬dition of existence, of the possibility of the occurrence of process of realisation of law and of constituting legal relations which ultimately constitute a "person". Kaufmann assumes, that law tends towards a moral aim: it may and must create an external freedom, without which the internal freedom to fulfil moral obligations cannot develop. However, this postulate is not based on the necessary structure of human being. From the point of view of his system, it is nothing more than only a condition for the possibility of the occurrence of the process of the realisation of law — lack of freedom would destroy the "how" of this process. Thus, the postulate to protect the freedom of personal acts has to be interpreted, in accordance with the analyzed theory, as a postulate, the fulfilment of which aims ultimately at the accomplishment of the very same process of realisation of law itself and not the realisation of a given man. Kaufmann considers a "person" to be an element which unites the system of law as a whole. Law is a structure of relations, which are interdependent and inter-contingent. Consequently, a "person" which is to form the ontological basis of law has to be entity consisting of all relations. Being also the "how" of the process of realisation of law, if a "person" is to warrant its unity, it has to be a common source for all procedures. Hence, a single "person" would constitute a subject of law. Man appears to be only a moment of a certain entirety, realisation of which should be an aim of his actions. Law, creating a "person" as an object and subject of law becomes a primary entity. In the analyzed theory, the basis for determination of aims which law sets to man is not the allocation of man-subject to something which improves him but rather, such relation is only just constituted by law. A question appears, why should aims set in law also be the aims of "empirical man"? Why is this "empirical man" to be punished in the name of a "person" understood in such a way? If, however, it is assumed that what is man is determined by a system which is superior to him, then man has to be understood only as a part of a whole and there are no grounds to prohibit istrumental treatment of man and so the road to all aspects of totalitarianism might be opened. A problem of the application of created theory to the reality arises, the reality which the theory pretends to explain. Ultimately in his theory Kaufmann does not give any systemic grounds for a radical questioning of the validity of any legal norms. Every new norm becomes an equal part of system of norms. It is only its interpretation and application to given conditions of life that may be disputable, however, this refers to all norms without exception. Cohesive inter-pretation of norms and applications is necessary and sufficient for the acquisition of just law. New norms have to be interpreted in the light of others, correspondingly, the other norms require reinterpretation in the light of the new ones. Contradiction in interpretation of a norm does not form a basis for questioning norms but may serve only to question the manner of their interpretation (understanding). Therefore, no grounds exist to assume any legal norm as criminal or unjust, and in consequence, to question any consistently realised system based on formally, properly established norms, as "legal lawlessness". As law and a "person" do not exist without the process of realisation of law, the role of legal safety becomes crucial as the condition for the possibility of the occurrence of the process of realisation of law. Denying legal safety would be tantamount to negation of law in general (also of moral law) as negation of safety takes away, at the same time, the basis for occurrence of the process of realisation of law. Moreover, any lack of legal safety would also mean lack of a basis for the existence of man as a "person". Kaufmann's thesis, that civil disobedience is legalized only when it has a chance to lead to success, consistent with his concept of the foundations of law, seems to point directly to conclusions which deny the facts taken under consideration and doubtlessly Kaufmann's own intentions, since it would have to be assumed that accordingly there are no grounds to question a legal system in force based on violence which secures its operation. Force finally seems to determine which one of the mutually irreconcilable normative systems constitute law and which does not. A legitimate position is one which leads to success, it is the weaker system which is negated. If so, then basically violent imposition of law is not an act directed against the law in force but, to the contrary, realisation of law. In the context of the new system the former system of law may be talked about as unjust solely in the sense of being incapable of being consistently united with the new. However, at the base, ultimately, lies force which reaffirms differences and excludes from the process of realisation of law certain norms and their interpretations. Kaufmann was aiming at grounding of that which is "non-dispositive" in a certain given framework of interpretation. Nevertheless, he does not provide foundations for the understanding of phenomena, which he undertakes to explain at a point of departure. Instead of explaining them the theory negates the possibility of their existence. The reality postulated in regard to "non-dispositive" moments of the reconstructed process of acquiring law consist of a specifically understood "person", which appears in Kaufmann's conceptions as a condition of the possibility of the realisation of law. According to this approach understanding of a "person" may be only a function of law. To understand "legal lawlessness" and foundations of justice it is necessary to look for such theory of law in which understanding of man as a "person" and being is not a function of understanding of law (in which a "person" is not only a condition for possibility of reconstructed process of realisation of law; for possibility of cognition processes). It seems necessary to start from theory of being and a "person" based on broader experience than the one assumed by Kaufmann and reconstruct the ontological foundations of the process of realisation of law only in such perspective. Kaufmann points out that that to which law refers is ipsa res iusta a concrete relation of man to other people and things. This relation, in his theory, appears to be basically only just constituted by law (normative senses "applied" to conditions of life). Therefore, understanding the relation between a given man and other people and things which constitute the aim of his actions, that is understanding of good, is enacted against the background of constitution of senses; constitution which is a result of a process aiming towards consistent understanding of particular contents (of nor¬mative and non-normative senses). "Being" is secondary towards constructed senses it is only their correlate. The primary relation consists of relation of a man to law (system of norms), while the secondary relation is one of man to something which is the aim of his action (relation between man and good). Considering such approach it is difficult to envision a satisfying answer to the fundamental question: why does law put concrete man under any obligation to obey it? The source of this problem can be seen in reduction of the base for understanding good to content of obligation formulated in auto-reflection. Such reduction seems to be a consequence of Kaufmann's adoption of "convergent concept of truth" and in con¬sequence his recognition of indirect, essentialistic grasp of reality formulated in concepts as the basic and only foundation of theory of being and of law. In view of such an approach, analogy of law, concepts and being is the condition for the possibility of the process of transformation of senses which aims at consistent interpretation of all law. Existence is postulated with respect to the possibility of unity of experience and cognition. However, also a different approach to understanding of the problem of being and good is possible. In spontaneous cognition being is affirmed, first of all, not as a certain, non-contradictory, determined content, but as something existing. Together with a cer¬tain content (passed indirectly through notions) existence of being is co-given. The basis for unity of being is not formed by the consistence of content, as it is in the case of the theories departing from the analysis of cognition processes, but by an act of existence realising content (essence). Such an approach makes it also possible to go beyond the convergent concept of truth. It is worth mentioning that allocation of an agent to good is realised not only by the content of duty. A statement that something is good is primary with respect to determination of this good in content. The recognised good always bears some content, however, there are no reasons to base the concept of good exclusively on indirect, formulated in concepts cognition. As primary, can be adopted the relation of man to good and not of man to law. Determination in content appears to be only an articulation of aspectual cognition of being, as an object of action. In such a case the basis for relative unity of norm and conditions of life is not the "nature of things" understood as correlate of sense but it is relation to good based on internal constitution of man as potential, not self-sufficient being. It does not mean, that the moments of the process of realisation of law singled out by Kaufmann are not important to determination of what is just. He, quite rightly, points to significant role played by norms in the evaluation of concrete situations, in man's search for closer specification in content of good innate to him. The structure of process of determining law for a concrete situation, to a great degree corresponds to the processes of determining law which take place not only in the legal sciences. Kaufmann's analyses of the process of realisation of law show the complexity of the structure of these processes and point towards important moments allowing a better understanding of law and man. Nevertheless, these analyses cannot be a basis for construction of philosophical theory of law, theory which hopes to point out the ultimate, ontological foundations for understanding law. Kaufmann's results may become fully valid only in a more general perspective including broader experience at the point of departure. (shrink)

Il saggio propone una nuova analisi della crisi capitalistica che si ricollega alla teoria dell’economista e teorico sociale Karl Polanyi, innovando la tesi di quest’ultimo del doppio movimento di mercatizzazione e protezioni sociali, fonte di lotte e conflitti, con un terzo asse: l’emancipazione e le sue proprie lotte. Le lotte per l’auto-determinazione e l’indipendenza sono qui interpretate attraverso la chiave di lettura dell’emancipazione, teorizzata come «il terzo mancante». Perciò, al doppio movimento di Polanyi subentra il «triplo movimento», che forma (...) il nucleo della riflessione teoretica e pone sotto una nuova luce la crisi capitalistica delle società attuali. Ognuno dei tre termini è ambivalente e nessuno dei tre può essere preso in considerazione senza gli altri due.This paper suggests us a new analysis of the crisis of capitalism. Fraser’s analysis builds upon the theory of the economist and social theorist Karl Polanyi, argomenting Polanyi’s thesis of a double movement of marketization and social protections, reason of struggles and conflicts, with a third axis: emancipation and its struggles. By emancipation Fraser understands the struggle for self-determination and independence, which she theorizes as «the missing third». Thus, instead of Polanyi’s double movement, she speaks of a «triple movement». This threefold movement forms the core of her theoretical reflections which cast the current crisis of capitalist societies in a new light. In fact, each term of the triple movement as ambivalent and none of the three can be adequately grasped in isolation from the others. (shrink)

En la actualidad se habla de la anomalía dentomaxilofacial como una enfermedad inherente a la civilización, cuya prevalencia varia en las distintas partes del mundo, el alto índice se relaciona a la heterogeneidad genética. Estas anomalías tienen una etiología multifactorial donde intervienen diversos factores internos o externos, que provocan variabilidad en su forma de presentación; cada una tiene características muy particulares y diversos grados de complejidad a la hora de ser tratadas, sin embargo poseen un aspecto común, afectan por lo (...) general la estética y la psiquis de los pacientes que las padecen. Con el objetivo de determinar afectaciones psicológicas en niños y adolescentes con anomalías dentomaxilofaciales se realizó un estudio no experimental descriptivo transversal. Se ejecutó en dos etapas y se emplearon métodos empíricos la recolección de la información a través de interrogatorio y examen clínico, incluido el Test Auto reporte vivencial para determinar la afectación psicológica del niño o adolescente. Se evidenció que los adolescentes resultaron ser afectados psicológicamente en presencia de anomalías de origen dentario. Presently, while prevalence varies in different parts of the world, dentomaxillofacial anomaly is regarded as a disease of our civilization. Its high rate is related to genetic heterogeneity. These anomalies have a multifactorial etiology since various internal or external factors that cause variability in its presentation are involved. Each of these anomalies has unique characteristics and varying degrees of complexity when being treated. However, they have a common feature: they usually affect the aesthetics and psyche of patients who suffer from them. In order to determine the psychological effects of dentomaxillofacial anomalies in children and adolescents, a non-experimental, descriptive, cross-sectional study was conducted. It was carried out in two stages and empirical methods were used for collecting information through interview and clinical examination, including Experiential Self-Report to determine the psychological effects in the child or adolescent. Through this study, adolescents were found to be affected psychologically in the presence of anomalies of dental origin. (shrink)