Results for 'defeaters'

155 found
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  1.  53
    Defeaters and Rising Standards of Justification.Mikael Janvid - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (1):45-54.
    The purpose of this paper is to refute the widespread view that challenging a knowledge-claim always raises the original standards of justification–a view often associated with contextualism. To that purpose the distinction between undermining and overriding defeaters will be used. Three kinds of challenges will be considered that differ in their degree of specification. In all three kinds of challenges, the rising standards of justification model fails to capture the dialectic of justification in the case of undermining defeaters. (...)
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  2.  47
    Where There Are Internal Defeaters, There Are “Confirmers”.Ralf-Thomas Klein - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2715-2728.
    There is widespread consensus that there are undercutting and rebutting defeaters that diminish or destroy the warrant of a belief B. I argue that there are counterparts of defeaters: the counterparts of undercutting defeaters are “requirement fulfillment beliefs”, the counterparts of rebutting defeaters are “consistency beliefs”. These beliefs confirm the warrant of B, I therefore call them “confirmers”.
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  3. Defeaters and Practical Knowledge.Carla Bagnoli - forthcoming - Synthese, DOI: 10.1007/S11229-016-1095-Z.
    This paper situates the problem of defeaters in a larger debate about the source of normative authority. It argues in favour of a constructivist account of defeasibility, which appeals to the justificatory role of moral principles. The argument builds upon the critique of two recent attempts to deal with defeasibility: first, a particularist account, which disposes of moral principles on the ground that reasons are holistic; and second, a proceduralist view, which addresses the problem of defeaters by distinguishing (...)
     
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  4. Defeaters in Current Epistemology: Introduction to the Special Issue.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2845-2854.
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  5.  69
    Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence? Screening-Off Vs. No-Defeaters.Roche William - forthcoming - Episteme.
    I argue elsewhere (Roche 2014) that evidence of evidence is evidence under screening-off. Tal and Comesaña (2017) argue that my appeal to screening-off is subject to two objections. They then propose an evidence of evidence thesis involving the notion of a defeater. There is much to learn from their very careful discussion. I argue, though, that their objections fail and that their evidence of evidence thesis is open to counterexample.
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  6. Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements.Michael Bergmann - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):419–436.
    Internalists tend to impose on justification higher-level requirements, according to which a belief is justified only if the subject has a higher-level belief (i.e., a belief about the epistemic credentials of a belief). I offer an error theory that explains the appeal of this requirement: analytically, a belief is not justified if we have a defeater for it, but contingently, it is often the case that to avoid having defeaters, our beliefs must satisfy a higher-level requirement. I respond to (...)
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  7. Reliabilism and the Problem of Defeaters.Thomas Grundmann - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):65-76.
    It is widely assumed that justification is defeasible, e.g. that under certain conditions counterevidence removes prior justification of beliefs. In this paper I will first (sect. 1) explain why this feature of justification poses a prima facie problem for reliabilism. I then will try out different reliabilist strategies to deal with the problem. Among them I will discuss conservative strategies (sect. 2), eliminativist stragies (sect. 3) and revisionist strategies (sect. 4). In the final section I will present an improved revisionist (...)
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  8.  30
    Two Varieties of Conditionals and Two Kinds of Defeaters Help Reveal Two Fundamental Types of Reasoning.Guy Politzer & Jean-françois Bonnefon - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (4):484–503.
    Two notions from philosophical logic and linguistics are brought together and applied to the psychological study of defeasible conditional reasoning. The distinction between disabling conditions and alternative causes is shown to be a special case of Pollock's (1987) distinction between 'rebutting' and 'undercutting' defeaters. 'Inferential' conditionals are shown to come in two varieties, one that is sensitive to rebutters, the other to undercutters. It is thus predicted and demonstrated in two experiments that the type of inferential conditional used as (...)
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  9. Warrant, Defeaters, and the Epistemic Basis of Religious Belief.Christoph Jäger - 2005 - In Michael G. Parker and Thomas M. Schmidt (ed.), Scientific explanation and religious belief. Mohr Siebeck. pp. 81-98.
    I critically examine two features of Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology. (i) If basic theistic beliefs are threatened by defeaters (of various kinds) and thus must be defended by higher-order defeaters in order to remain rational and warranted, are they still “properly basic”? (ii) Does Plantinga’s overall account offer an argument that basic theistic beliefs actually are warranted? I answer both questions in the negative.
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  10.  7
    Two Varieties of Conditionals and Two Kinds of Defeaters Help Reveal Two Fundamental Types of Reasoning.Guy Politzer & J.-F. Bonnefon - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (4):484-503.
    Two notions from philosophical logic and linguistics are brought together and applied to the psychological study of defeasible conditional reasoning. The distinction between disabling conditions and alternative causes is shown to be a special case of Pollock's (1987) distinction between ‘rebutting' and ‘undercutting' defeaters. ‘Inferential' conditionals are shown to come in two types, one that is sensitive to rebutters, the other to undercutters. It is thus predicted and demonstrated in two experiments that the type of inferential conditional used as (...)
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  11.  35
    Unjustified Defeaters.David Alexander - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):891-912.
    A number of philosophers have recently claimed that unjustified beliefs can be defeaters. However these claims have been made in passing, occurring in the context of defenses of other theses. As a result, the claim that unjustified beliefs can be defeaters has been neither vigorously defended nor thoroughly explained. This paper fills that gap. It begins by identifying problems with the two most in-depth accounts of the possibility of unjustified defeaters due to Bergmann and Pryor. It then (...)
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  12.  37
    Pollock and Sturgeon on Defeaters.Albert Casullo - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2897-2906.
    Scott Sturgeon has recently challenged Pollock’s account of undercutting defeaters. The challenge involves three primary contentions: the account is both too strong and too weak, undercutting defeaters exercise their power to defeat only in conjunction with higher-order beliefs about the basis of the lower-order beliefs whose justification they target, and since rebutting defeaters exercise their power to defeat in isolation, rebutting and undercutting defeaters work in fundamentally different ways. My goal is to reject each of these (...)
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  13.  27
    Defeaters and Practical Knowledge.Carla Bagnoli - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2855-2875.
    This paper situates the problem of defeaters in a larger debate about the source of normative authority. It argues in favour of a constructivist account of defeasibility, which appeals to the justificatory role of normative principles. The argument builds upon the critique of two recent attempts to deal with defeasibility: first, a particularist account, which disposes of moral principles on the ground that reasons are holistic; and second, a proceduralist view, which addresses the problem of defeaters by distinguishing (...)
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  14.  12
    Defeaters to Best Interests Reasoning in Genetic Enhancement.Sruthi Rothenfluch - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2845-2869.
    Pre-natal genetic enhancement affords us unprecedented capacity to shape our skills, talents, appearance and perhaps subsequently the quality of our lives in terms of overall happiness, success and wellbeing. Despite its powerful appeal, some have raised important and equally persuasive concerns against genetic enhancement. Sandel has argued that compassion and humility, themselves grounded in the unpredictability of talents and skills, would be lost. Habermas has argued that genetically altered individuals will see their lives as dictated by their parents’ design and (...)
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  15.  18
    Two Varieties of Conditionals and Two Kinds of Defeaters Help Reveal Two Fundamental Types of Reasoning.Politzer Guy & Bonnefon Jean-Francois - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (4):484-503.
    Two notions from philosophical logic and linguistics are brought together and applied to the psychological study of defeasible conditional reasoning. The distinction between disabling conditions and alternative causes is shown to be a special case of Pollock’s (1987) distinction between ‘rebutting’ and ‘undercutting’ defeaters. ‘Inferential’ conditionals are shown to come in two varieties, one that is sensitive to rebutters, the other to undercutters. It is thus predicted and demonstrated in two experiments that the type of inferential conditional used as (...)
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  16.  1
    Two Varieties of Conditionals and Two Kinds of Defeaters Help Reveal Two Fundamental Types of Reasoning.Guy Politzer & Jean-François Bonnefon - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (4):484-503.
    Two notions from philosophical logic and linguistics are brought together and applied to the psychological study of defeasible conditional reasoning. The distinction between disabling conditions and alternative causes is shown to be a special case of Pollock's distinction between ‘rebutting' and ‘undercutting' defeaters. ‘Inferential' conditionals are shown to come in two types, one that is sensitive to rebutters, the other to undercutters. It is thus predicted and demonstrated in two experiments that the type of inferential conditional used as the (...)
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  17. 'Partial Defeaters' and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Michael Thune - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):355-372.
    Can known disagreement with our epistemic peers undermine or defeat the justification our beliefs enjoy? Much of the current literature argues for one of two extreme positions on this topic, either that the justification of each person's belief is (fully) defeated by the awareness of disagreement, or that no belief is defeated by this awareness. I steer a middle course and defend a principle describing when a disagreement yields a partial defeater, which results in a loss of some, but not (...)
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  18. Epistemic Reasons, Evidence, and Defeaters.Errol Lord - forthcoming - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
    The post-Gettier literature contained many views that tried to solve the Gettier problem by appealing to the notion of defeat. Unfortunately, all of these views are false. The failure of these views greatly contributed to a general distrust of reasons in epistemology. However, reasons are making a comeback in epistemology, both in general and in the context of the Gettier problem. There are two main aims of this paper. First, I will argue against a natural defeat based resolution of the (...)
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  19.  10
    Defeaters” Don't Matter.Zina B. Ward & Edouard Machery - 2018 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41.
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  20.  92
    Misleading "Misleading Defeaters".Peter D. Klein - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (7):382-386.
  21.  1
    ‘Partial Defeaters’ and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Michael Thune - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):355-372.
    Can known disagreement with our epistemic peers undermine or defeat the justification our beliefs enjoy? Much of the current literature argues for one of two extreme positions on this topic, either that the justification of each person's belief is defeated by the awareness of disagreement, or that no belief is defeated by this awareness. I steer a middle course and defend a principle describing when a disagreement yields a partial defeater, which results in a loss of some, but not all, (...)
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  22.  11
    Disagreements in Moral Intution as Defeaters.Andreas Mogensen - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):282-302.
    People may disagree about moral issues because they have fundamentally different intuitions. I argue that we ought to suspend judgement in such cases. Since we trust our own moral intuitions without positive evidence of their reliability, we must necessarily extend this trust to the moral intuitions of others: a fundamental self-other asymmetry in moral epistemology is untenable. This ensures that disagreements in moral intuition are defeating. In addition, I argue that brute conflicts in moral intuition require suspension of judgement only (...)
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  23.  87
    Probability and Defeaters.Alvin Plantinga - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (3):291–298.
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  24.  50
    Warrant-Transmission, Defeaters and Disquotation.R. M. Sainsbury - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s1):191 - 200.
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  25.  29
    Reliabilism, Analyses and Defeaters.Alvin Plantinga - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):427 - 464.
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  26.  49
    Justification and Misleading Defeaters.James Cargile - 1955 - Analysis 55 (3):216 - 220.
  27.  41
    The Internalist Character and Evidentialist Implications of Plantingian Defeaters.Michael Czapkay Sudduth - 1999 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 45 (3):167-187.
  28. Internalism, Externalism, Defeaters and Arguments for Christian Belief.Alvin Plantinga - 2001 - Philosophia Christi 3 (2):379-400.
  29.  36
    Reliabilism, Analyses and Defeaters.Review author[S.]: Alvin Plantinga - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):427-464.
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  30.  55
    Misleading Defeaters.Steven R. Levy - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 75 (12):739-742.
  31. Chapter 19. Misleading Defeaters.Richard Foley - 2012 - In When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. pp. 95-98.
     
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  32.  3
    Warrant-Transmission, Defeaters and Disquotation.R. M. Sainsbury - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):191-200.
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  33.  1
    Two Varieties of Conditionals and Two Kinds of Defeaters Help Reveal Two Fundamental Types of Reasoning.Politzer Guy & Bonnefon Jean-Francois - 2006 - Mind Language 21 (4):484-503.
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  34. Skeptical Theism and Undercutting Defeaters.Mike Almeida - 2014 - In Trent Dougherty & Justin P. McBrayer (eds.), New Essays on Skeptical Theism. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 115-131.
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  35. Divine Methodology: A Lawful Deflection of Kantian and Kantian-Esque Defeaters.Tyler Dalton McNabb & Erik Baldwin - 2017 - Open Theology 3:293-304.
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  36. Religious Exclusivism Unlimited.Jeroen de Ridder - 2011 - Religious Studies 47 (4):449 - 463.
    Like David Silver before them, Erik Baldwin and Michael Thune argue that the facts of religious pluralism present an insurmountable challenge to the rationality of basic exclusive religious belief as construed by Reformed Epistemology.I will show that their argument is unsuccessful. First, their claim that the facts of religious pluralism make it necessary for the religious exclusivist to support her exclusive beliefs with significant reasons is one that the reformed epistemologist has the resources to reject. Secondly, they fail to demonstrate (...)
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  37. Modal Scepticism, Yablo-Style Conceivability, and Analogical Reasoning.Peter Hartl - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):269-291.
    This paper offers a detailed criticism of different versions of modal scepticism proposed by Van Inwagen and Hawke, and, against these views, attempts to vindicate our reliance on thought experiments in philosophy. More than one different meaning of “ modal scepticism” will be distinguished. Focusing mainly on Hawke’s more detailed view I argue that none of these versions of modal scepticism is compelling, since sceptical conclusions depend on an untenable and, perhaps, incoherent modal epistemology. With a detailed account of modal (...)
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  38. Undefeated Dualism.Tomas Bogardus - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):445-466.
    In the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many philosophers as true, including many non-dualists. This ‘striking’ generates prima facie justification: in the absence of defeaters, we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be, i.e. we ought to be dualists. In this paper, I examine several proposed undercutting defeaters for our dualist intuitions. I argue that each proposal fails, since each rests on a false assumption, or requires empirical evidence that it lacks, or overgenerates (...). By the end, our prima facie justification for dualism remains undefeated. I close with one objection concerning the dialectical role of rebutting defeaters, and I argue that the prospects for a successful rebutting defeater for our dualist intuitions are dim. Since dualism emerges undefeated, we ought to believe it. (shrink)
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  39.  86
    Understanding Undermining Defeat.Giacomo Melis - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):433-442.
    Taking the inspiration from some points made by Scott Sturgeon and Albert Casullo, I articulate a view according to which an important difference between undermining and overriding defeaters is that the former require the subject to engage in some higher-order epistemic thinking, while the latter don’t. With the help of some examples, I argue that underminers push the cognizer to reflect on the way she formed a belief by challenging the epistemic worthiness of either the source of justification or (...)
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  40.  58
    Explanationist Aid for Phenomenal Conservatism.Kevin McCain - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3035-3050.
    Phenomenal conservatism is a popular theory of epistemic justification. Despite its popularity and the fact that some think that phenomenal conservatism can provide a complete account of justification, it faces several challenges. Among these challenges are the need to provide accounts of defeaters and inferential justification. Fortunately, there is hope for phenomenal conservatism. Explanationism, the view on which justification is a matter of explanatory considerations, can help phenomenal conservatism with both of these challenges. The resulting view is one that (...)
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  41. Defeasibility Theory.Thomas Grundmann - 2011 - In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 156-166.
    This is a survey article about epistemic defeaters: what is defeated, how defeaters work, different kinds of defeaters, indefeasibility and how defeaters fit into epistemic internalism and externalism.
     
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  42. Does Plantinga Have His Own Defeater?Bruce Reichenbach & Adam Nugent - 2006 - Philosophia Christi 8 (1):141-150.
    Thomas Reed argues that the Christian, if apprised of Plantinga's central claims in Warranted Christian Belief, should be agnostic regarding Christianity's central tenets. Reed models his argument on Plantinga's own argument against naturalism, according to which naturalists have a built-in defeater for their epistemology. Reed bases his argument on the contention that if Christian theism cannot be shown or demonstrated, rational Christians should refrain from believing. Not only does Reed's contention not follow, but he confuses logically possible defeaters with (...)
     
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  43. How to Use Cognitive Faculties You Never Knew You Had.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):251-275.
    Norman forms the belief that the president is in New York by way of a clairvoyance faculty he doesn’t know he has. Many agree that his belief is unjustified but disagree about why it is unjustified. I argue that the lack of justification cannot be explained by a higher-level evidence requirement on justification, but it can be explained by a no-defeater requirement. I then explain how you can use cognitive faculties you don’t know you have. Lastly, I use lessons from (...)
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  44. Defeatism Defeated.Max Baker-Hytch & Matthew A. Benton - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):40-66.
    Many epistemologists are enamored with a defeat condition on knowledge. In this paper we present some implementation problems for defeatism, understood along either internalist or externalist lines. We then propose that one who accepts a knowledge norm of belief, according to which one ought to believe only what one knows, can explain away much of the motivation for defeatism. This is an important result, because on the one hand it respects the plausibility of the intuitions about defeat shared by many (...)
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  45. Debunking Morality: Lessons From the EAAN Literature.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):208-226.
    This paper explores evolutionary debunking arguments as they arise in metaethics against moral realism and in philosophy of religion against naturalism. Both literatures have independently grappled with the question of which beliefs one may use to respond to a potential defeater. In this paper, I show how the literature on the argument against naturalism can help clarify and bring progress to the literature on moral realism with respect to this question. Of note, it will become clear that the objection that (...)
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  46. Ideal Rationality and Logical Omniscience.Declan Smithies - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.
    Does rationality require logical omniscience? Our best formal theories of rationality imply that it does, but our ordinary evaluations of rationality seem to suggest otherwise. This paper aims to resolve the tension by arguing that our ordinary evaluations of rationality are not only consistent with the thesis that rationality requires logical omniscience, but also provide a compelling rationale for accepting this thesis in the first place. This paper also defends an account of apriori justification for logical beliefs that is designed (...)
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  47.  50
    Two Types of Debunking Arguments.Peter Königs - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):383-402.
    Debunking arguments are arguments that seek to undermine a belief or doctrine by exposing its causal origins. Two prominent proponents of such arguments are the utilitarians Joshua Greene and Peter Singer. They draw on evidence from moral psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary theory in an effort to show that there is something wrong with how deontological judgments are typically formed and with where our deontological intuitions come from. They offer debunking explanations of our emotion-driven deontological intuitions and dismiss complex deontological theories (...)
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  48. Understanding Without Justification or Belief.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):239-254.
    In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest among epistemologists in the nature of understanding, with some authors arguing that understanding should replace knowledge as the primary focus of epistemology. But what is understanding? According to what is often called the standard view, understanding is a species of knowledge. Although this view has recently been challenged in various ways, even the critics of the standard view have assumed that understanding requires justification and belief. I argue that it requires (...)
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  49. Knowledge and Evidence You Should Have Had.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):471-479.
    Epistemologists focus primarily on cases of knowledge, belief, or credence where the evidence which one possesses, or on which one is relying, plays a fundamental role in the epistemic or normative status of one's doxastic state. Recent work in epistemology goes beyond the evidence one possesses to consider the relevance for such statuses of evidence which one does not possess, particularly when there is a sense in which one should have had some evidence. I focus here on Sanford Goldberg's approach (...)
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  50.  65
    On the Epistemic Significance of Evidence You Should Have Had.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):449-470.
    Elsewhere I and others have argued that evidence one should have had can bear on the justification of one's belief, in the form of defeating one's justification. In this paper, I am interested in knowing how evidence one should have had (on the one hand) and one's higher-order evidence (on the other) interact in determinations of the justification of belief. In doing so I aim to address two types of scenario that previous discussions have left open. In one type of (...)
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