Proponents of the public goods argument ('PGA') seek to ground the authority of the state on its putative indispensability as a means of providing public goods. But many of the things we take to be public goods – including many of the goods commonly invoked in support of the PGA – are actually what we might term publicized goods. A publicized good is any whose ‘public’ character results only from a policy (...) decision to make some good freely and universally available. This fact poses complications for the PGA, insofar as the set of possible publicized goods is quite extensive indeed. (shrink)

Procreation is the ultimate public goods problem. Each new child affects the welfare of many other people, and some (but not all) children produce uncompensated value that future people will enjoy. This essay addresses challenges that arise if we think of procreation and parenting as public goods. These include whether individual choices are likely to lead to a socially desirable outcome, and whether changes in laws, social norms, or access to genetic engineering and embryo selection might (...) improve the aggregate outcome of our reproductive choices. (shrink)

Social dilemmas, in which individually selfish behavior leads to collectively deficient outcomes, continue to be an important topic of research because of their ubiquity. The present research with Japanese participants replicates, with slight modifications, public goods games previously run in the United States. In contrast to recent work showing profound cross-cultural differences, the results of two studies reported here show remarkable cross-cultural similarities. Specifically, results suggest that (1) as in the U.S., allowing incremental commitment to a public (...) good is effective at eliciting contributions, (2) individual differences in trust affect contributions, (3) the distribution of player types in the U.S. and Japan are very similar, and (4) the dynamics of play in the public goods games used here are strikingly parallel. These results are discussed in the context of the relationship between cross-cultural differences and economic institutional environments. (shrink)

At Universitat Politècnica de València, Meridies, an internship programme that places engineering students in countries of Latin America, is one of the few opportunities the students have to explore the implications of being a professional in society in a different cultural and social context. This programme was analyzed using the capabilities approach as a frame of reference for examining the effects of the programme on eight student participants. The eight pro-public-good capabilities proposed by Melanie Walker were investigated through semi-structured (...) interviews. The internship is an environment in which students can put into practice the knowledge they have acquired in undergraduate studies and to find practical relevance in what they studied. Occasionally, this also entails a critical questioning of what they have learned, a greater awareness of the limits of the contents of their studies and of the way things were taught, and interest in less explored issues that are closely linked to social justice. However, tensions can arise between the pro-public-good oriented perspectives of this programme, and a more instrumental vision. One way to overcome these tensions is to foster consideration of reflexivity, that is, the dynamic relationship between technology and society. To do so, the programme must create space before and during the internship, and upon the return of the students, to discuss and collectively reflect upon their lived experience. Additionally, it ought to engage supervisors in this educational journey, both at the university and in the host institutions, and also involve socially committed organisations in this task. (shrink)

To what extent can we as a community legitimately require individuals to contribute to producing public goods? Most of us think that, at least sometimes, refusing to pay for a public good that you have enjoyed can involve a kind of 'free riding' that makes it wrong. But what is less clear is under exactly which circumstances this is wrong. To work out the answer to that, we need to know why it is wrong. I argue that (...) when free riding is wrong, the reason is that it is unfair. That is not itself a very controversial claim. But spelling out why it is unfair allows us to see just which forms of free riding are wrong. Moreover, it supplies a basis from which some more controversial conclusions can be defended. Even if a public good is one that you have been given without asking for it or seeking it out, it can still be wrong not to be prepared to pay for it. It can be wrong not to be prepared to pay for public goods even when you do not receive them at all. And furthermore, it can be right to force you to do so. (shrink)

We report an experiment on two treatments of an ultimatum minigame. In one treatment, responders’ reactions are hidden to proposers. We observe high rejection rates reflecting responders’ intrinsic resistance to unfairness. In the second treatment, proposers are informed, allowing for dynamic effects over eight rounds of play. The higher rejection rates can be attributed to responders’ provision of a public good: Punishment creates a group reputation for being “tough” and effectively “educate” proposers. Since rejection rates with informed proposers drop (...) to the level of the treatment with non-informed proposers, the hypothesis of responder’s enjoyment of overt punishment is not supported. (shrink)

This paper proposes a way to undercut anarchist objections to taxation without endorsing an authoritarian justification of government coercion. The argument involves public goods, as understood by economists and others. But I do not analyse options of autonomous prisoners and the like; for, however useful otherwise, these abstractions underestimate the real-world task of sorting out the prerogatives of and limits on ownership. Proceeding more contextually, I come to recommend a shareholder addendum to the doctrine of public (...) class='Hi'>goods. This recommendation involves modifying the public goods argument for government coercion to include a contributor-specific compensation provisio, thinking of contributors as investors, and including among the latter those whose investment is in the form not of a market transaction strictly speaking but of sacrifice. To reach this recommendation I constrain the market liberal''s limited endorsement of taxation by drawing on the (idealized) postcommunist privatizer''s continuing commitment to populism. (shrink)

Foremost in importance among these changes has been a transition in many governments' attitudes to fulfilling their role as caretaker of environmental quality. A question remains, however, concerning the propriety of managing a publicly provided good, such as the regulation of water and air quality, through market mechanisms such as optimal taxes and transferable quotas. There are a number of options open to us if we wish to object to the privatization of the regulation of environmental quality from an ethical (...) perspective. This chapter suggests that the shift to privatization of environmental regulation can be challenged closer to its own economic ground, a move considered somewhat unusual by many environmental ethicists. It argues that inside the economic definition of a "pure public good" resources already exist for challenging the privatization of environmental regulation. Publicly provided goods are goods that may not be traded as commodities, as determined by a public policy. (shrink)

Michael Oakeshott’s account of political economy is claimed to have found its ‘apotheosis under Thatcherism’. Against critics who align him with a preference for small government, this article points to Oakeshott’s stress on the indispensability of an infrastructure of government-provided public goods, in which individual agency and associative freedom can flourish. I argue that Oakeshott’s account of political economy invites a contestatory politics over three types of public goods, which epitomize the unresolvable tension he diagnosed between (...) nomocratic and teleocratic conceptions of the modern state. These three types are the system of civil law, the by-products of the operation of civil law and public goods which result from policies. The article concludes that Oakeshott offers an important corrective to political theories which favour either market mediation or radical democratic governance of the commons as self-sustaining modes of providing and enjoying goods. (shrink)

Abstract Mohism has long been misrepresented. Mo?tzu is usually called a utilitarian because he preached a universal love that must benefit. Yet Mencius, who pined the Confucian way of virtue (humaneness and righteousness) against Mo?tzu's way of benefit, basically borrowed Mo?tzu's thesis: that the root cause of chaos is this lack of love?except Mencius renamed it the desire for personal benefit. Yet Mo?tzu only championed ?benefit? to head off its opposite, ?harm?, specifically the harm done by Confucians who with good (...) intent (love) perpetuated rites that did people more harm than good. Mo?tzu wanted his universal love to be the public good that would actually do the public good (i.e. benefit the collective). And he derived this from Confucius? teaching of ?Love (all) men? and his Golden Rule: Render not what others would not desire. No man desires harm. As a critic of Confucian rites (especially the prolonged funeral), Mo?tzu worked to replace the blind custom of rites with his rational measure of ?rightness?: what is right must do good (i.e. benefit the intended recipient). It is not true that Mohists were ?joyless? ascetics; they would gladly celebrate a good harvest with wine and folk song?not expensive court music?with the people. Since Mohist discourse is ?public? (that is, accountable), it is also only proper that what is ?right? should be outer (means?end efficacy) and not inner as Mencius would insist. (shrink)

Cooperation towards public goods relies on credible threats of punishment to deter cheats. However, punishing is costly, so it remains unclear who incurred the costs of enforcement in our evolutionary past. Theoretical work suggests that human cooperation may be promoted if people believe in supernatural punishment for moral transgressions. This theory is supported by new work in cognitive psychology and by anecdotal ethnographic evidence, but formal quantitative tests remain to be done. Using data from 186 societies around the (...) globe, I test whether the likelihood of supernatural punishment—indexed by the importance of moralizing “high gods”—is associated with cooperation. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that humans have specific abilities for cooperation and culture that evolved since their split with their last common ancestor with chimpanzees. Many uncertainties remain, however, about the exact moment in the human lineage when these abilities evolved. This article argues that cooperation and culture did not evolve in one step in the human lineage and that the capacity to stick to long-term and risky cooperative arrangements evolved before properly modern culture. I present evidence that Homo heidelbergensis (...) became increasingly able to secure contributions form others in two demanding Paleolithic public good games (PPGGs): cooperative feeding and cooperative breeding. I argue that the temptation to defect is high in these PPGGs and that the evolution of human cooperation in Homo heidelberngensis is best explained by the emergence of modern-like abilities for inhibitory control and goal maintenance. These executive functions are localized in the prefrontal cortex and allow humans to stick to social norms in the face of competing motivations. This scenario is consistent with data on brain evolution that indicate that the largest growth of the prefrontal cortex in human evolution occurred in Homo heidelbergensis and was followed by relative stasis in this part of the brain. One implication of this argument is that subsequent behavioral innovations, including the evolution of symbolism, art, and properly cumulative culture in modern Homo sapiens , are unlikely to be related to a reorganization of the prefrontal cortex, despite frequent claims to the contrary in the literature on the evolution of human culture and cognition. (shrink)

The dominance of agency theory can reduce our collective scope to analyse private equity in all its diversity and depth. We contribute to theorisation of private equity by developing a contrasting perspective that draws on a rich tradition of virtue ethics. In doing so, we juxtapose 'private equity' with 'public good' to develop points of rhetorical and analytical contrast. We develop a typology differentiating various forms of private equity, and focus on the 'take private' form. These takeovers are where (...) private equity funds are used to buy all a firm's publicly listed shares. Take private deals reduce reporting requirements and lessen the amount of public scrutiny a firm comes under. They allow greater control of a firm's assets and resources but also have effects in terms of the wider social fabric. The 'public good' and virtue ethics offer an alternative basis for theorisation of these deals. This provides a needed contrast to accounts of private equity based on agency theory. (shrink)

The provision of public goods is generally assumed to require compulsion by the state. Individuals may want them, but they have no incentive to contribute voluntarily to their production. David Schmidtz proposes ?assurance contracts? as a way around the problem of ?wasted? contributions. However, such contracts do not eliminate the incentive to free ride on public goods. Empirical evidence suggests that enforced contributions may be a more effective way of combatting this problem than assurance contracts. More (...) generally, we need to investigate different kinds of moral motivation to see how they may elicit voluntary contributions of public goods. (shrink)

The commons have emerged as a key notion and underlying experience of many efforts around the world to promote justice and democracy. A central question for political theories of the commons is whether the visions of social order and regimes of political economy they propose are complementary or opposed to public goods that are backed up by governmental coordination and compulsion. This essay argues that the post-Marxist view, which posits an inherent opposition between the commons as a sphere (...) of inappropriable usage and statist public infrastructure, is mistaken, because justice and democracy are not necessarily furthered by the institution of inappropriability. I articulate an alternative pluralist view based on James Tully’s work, which discloses the dynamic interplay between public and common modes of provision and enjoyment, and their civil and civic orientations respectively. Finally, the essay points to the Janus-faced character of the commons and stresses the co-constitutive role of public goods and social services for just and orderly social life while remaining attentive to the dialectic of empowerment and tutelage that marks provision by government. (shrink)

This comment on Professor ter Meulen's paper, "Solidarity and Justice in Health Care," offers additional perspectives on solidarity's importance for health. Noting the findings of social epidemiology, the paper explains that health has important public good dimensions. It is both non-rivlalrous because one person's health does not diminish another's, and it is largely determined by non-excludable access goods, including social networks, social determinants, and public health efforts. The public good dimension of health underscores the mutual dependence (...) and shared stake that people have with respect to health, and highlights the importance of coming together in solidarity for the sake of health. This is not to say that solidarity cannot also foster exclusionary tendencies; however, the recognition of mutual dependency with respect to health can foster an inclusive solidarity for the health of all people. (shrink)

The paper addresses issues of scientific conduct regarding relations between science and the media, relations between scientists and journalists, and attitudes towards the public at large. In the large and increasing body of literature on scientific conduct and misconduct, these issues seem underexposed as ethical challenges. Consequently, individual scientists here tend to be left alone with problems and dilemmas, with no guidance for good conduct. Ideas are presented about how to make up for this omission. Using a practical, ethical (...) approach, the paper attempts to identify ways scientists might deal with ethical public relations issues, guided by a norm or maxim of openness. Drawing on and rethinking the CUDOS codification of the scientific ethos, as it was worked out by Robert K. Merton in 1942, we propose that this, which is echoed in current codifications of norms for good scientific conduct, contains a tacit maxim of openness which may naturally be extended to cover the public relations of science. Discussing openness as access, accountability, transparency and receptiveness, the argumentation concentrates on the possible prevention of misconduct with respect to, on the one hand, sins of omission—withholding important information from the public—and, on the other hand, abuses of the authority of science in order to gain publicity. Statements from interviews with scientists are used to illustrate how scientists might view the relevance of the issues raised. (shrink)

Stephen Gardiner argues that geoengineering does not meet the “canonical technical definition” of a global public good, and that it is misleading to frame geoengineering as a public good. A public good is something that is nonrival and nonexcludable. Contrary to Gardiner’s claims, geoengineering meets both of these criteria. Framing geoengineering as a public good is useful because it allows commentators to draw on the existing economic, philosophical, and social scientific literature on the governance of (...) class='Hi'>public goods. (shrink)

The most distinctive features of public goods are usually understood to be the difficulty of excluding potential beneficiaries and the fact that one appropriator’s benefits do not diminish the amount of benefits left for others. Yet, because of these properties (non-excludability and non-rivalry), public goods cause market failures and contribute to problems of collective action. This article aims to portray public goods in a different light. Following a recent reassessment of public goods (...) in political philosophy, this contribution argues that public goods are particularly suitable for sustaining a well-ordered society. Public goods contribute to social inclusion, they support the generation of the public, and they strengthen a shared sense of citizenship. This article scrutinizes these functions of public goods and offers a discussion of the interventionist thesis which states that governments should sustain public goods. (shrink)

Language use is a public good. Those using a common language receive benefits that are non-excludable and non-rival. And as more people speak the same language, the greater these benefits are. Sometimes individuals make a conscious decision to learn a language other than their native language in order to receive these benefits, and thereby incur costs. This paper is an attempt to determine how we should share the costs among all beneficiaries. I argue against Van Parijs’s proposal for this, (...) and instead argue that an approach found in the work of Gauthier is preferable. A general lesson to be drawn from this paper is that the correct principle for distributing the costs of public goods will depend on whether we think the good in question is required by justice or not. Where Van Parijs went wrong, I claim, was in thinking that a cross-border common language is required by justice. (shrink)

"--Daniel Brudney, University of Chicago "The fund of information Geuss brings into his discussion of the ancients, and the verve and charm with which it is all presented, make the central chapters of this book particularly engaging.

This book presents a theoretical treatment of externalities, public goods, and club goods. The new edition updates and expands the discussion of externalities and their implications, coverage of asymmetric information, underlying game-theoretic formulations, and intuitive and graphical presentations. Aimed at well-prepared undergraduates and graduate students making a serious foray into this branch of economics, the analysis should also interest professional economists wishing to survey recent advances in the field. No other single source for the range of materials (...) explored is currently available. Topics investigated include Nash equilibrium, Lindahl equilibria, club theory, preference-revelation mechanism, Pigouvian taxes, the commons, Coase Theorem, and static and repeated games. The authors use mathematical techniques only as much as necessary to pursue the economic argument. They develop key principles of public economics that are useful for subfields such as public choice, labor economics, economic growth, international economics, environmental and natural resource economics, and industrial organization. (shrink)

This article presents a new classroom experiment in order to illustrate and initiate discussion on the public good provision of prevention of dangerous anthropogenic climate change. The classroom game aids students’ understanding of the difficulty associated with funding public goods; the role of fairness in climate change negotiations; the risks associated with catastrophic climate change impact; and the free riding concept. The classroom game has been played in various business, economics and political science courses. Feedback received from (...) students indicates a rewarding learning experience. (shrink)

In this article I seek to address some misunderstandings in arguments about same sex-marriage. I do this by evaluating several views on homosexuality and marriage. My central aim is to show that a rejection of same-sex marriage does not depend upon the view that homosexual acts are immoral or disordered. Rather, one must examine sexual acts in light of public goods that are at stake. I also argue that the Christian understanding of marriage and sexuality offers more than (...) a set of prohibitions against certain sexual acts. Rather, it offers reasonable principles by which to evaluate the relationship between sexual acts and the public good. (shrink)

We investigate the effect of priming on pro-social behaviour in a setting where there is a clear financial incentive to free ride. By activating the concept of cooperation among randomly selected individuals, we explore whether it is possible to positively influence people’s voluntary contributions to the public good. Our findings indicate that cooperative priming increases contributions in a one-shot public goods game from approximately 25–36 % compared with the non-primed group. The results call for further explorations of (...) the role of priming in economic behaviours in general. (shrink)

A community faces the obligation of providing an indivisible public good that each of its members is able to provide at a certain cost. The solution is to rely on the member who can provide the public good at the lowest cost, with a due compensation from the other members. This problem has been studied in a non-cooperative setting by Kleindorfer and Sertel. They propose an auction mechanism that results in an interval of possible individual contributions whose lower (...) bound is the equal division. Here, instead we take a cooperative stand point by modelling this problem as a cost sharing game that turns out to be a ‘reverse’ airport game whose core is shown to have a regular structure. This enables an easy calculation of the nucleolus that happens to define the upper bound of the Kleindorfer–Sertel interval. The Shapley value instead is not an appropriate solution in this context because it may imply compensations to non-providers. (shrink)

A recent controversy concerning the pricing of drugs and other technological innovations funded by public dollars raised profound moral and social questions, questions the bioethics community has long overlooked.

In recent decades, constituenciesserved by land-grant agricultural research haveexperienced significant demographic and politicalchanges, yet most research institutions have not fullyresponded to address the concerns of a changingclientele base. Thus, we have seen continuingcontroversies over technologies produced by land-grantagricultural research. While a number of scholars havecalled for a more participatory agricultural scienceestablishment, we understand little about the processof enhancing and institutionalizing participation inthe US agricultural research enterprise. We firstexamine some of the important issues surroundingcitizen participation in science and technologypolicy. We then (...) review and assess variousinstitutional mechanisms for participation that havebeen implemented in diverse settings by institutionsof science and technology. Based on evidence from theexperiences of these institutions, we argue that acloser approximation of the ‘public good’ can beachieved by encouraging the participation of thefullest range possible of constituents as an integralpart of the process of setting research priorities. (shrink)

Universities have flourished in the modern era as central public institutions and bases for critical thought. They are currently challenged by a variety of social forces and undergoing a deep transformation in both their internal structure and their relationship to the rest of society. Critical theorists need to assess this both in order to grasp adequately the social conditions of their own work and because the transformation of universities is central to a more general intensification of social inequality, privatization (...) of public institutions, and reorganization of the relation of access to knowledge. This is also a pivotal instance for asking basic questions about the senses in which the university is or may be ‘public’: (1) where does its money come from? (2) who governs? (3) who benefits? and (4) how is knowledge produced and circulated? (shrink)

Axelrod (The evolution of cooperation, 1984) and others explain how cooperation can emerge in repeated 2-person prisoner’s dilemmas. But in public good games with anonymous contributions, we expect a breakdown of cooperation because direct reciprocity fails. However, if agents are situated in a social network determining which agents interact, and if they can influence the network, then cooperation can be a viable strategy. Social networks are modelled as graphs. Agents play public good games with their neighbours. After each (...) game, they can terminate connections to others, and new connections are created. Cooperative agents do well because they manage to cluster with cooperators and avoid defectors. Computer simulations demonstrate that group formation and exclusion are powerful mechanisms to promote cooperation in dilemma situations. This explains why social dilemmas can often be solved if agents can choose with whom they interact. (shrink)

Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Books, Inc.

Abstract:The kind of commitment to moral rules that characterizes effective interaction between persons in among others places, manufacturing and commercial settings is characteristically treated by economists and game theorists as a public good, the securing of which requires the expenditure of scarce resources on surveillance and enforcement mechanisms. Alternatively put, the view is that, characteristically, rational persons cannot voluntarily guide their choices by rules, but can only be goaded into acting in accordance with such rules by the fear of (...) social and formal sanctions. On this way of thinking, rational individuals are condemned to having to settle for the “second-best” results that are thereby implied. This conclusion rests not only on an appeal to a consequentialist perspective, but also a separability principle. Against this, it is argued that consequentialism itself offers a basis for the rejection of the separability principle, and a defense of the thesis that, for a wide range of realistic cases, being disposed to voluntarily guide one’s choice by rules (on the condition that others can be expected to do so as well) is a necessary condition of engaging in rational interaction.Most people do not trust most other people, unmonitored, to honor obligations completely. Because of this they use substantial amounts of resources to specify the details of agreements, and to police them. Use of these resources … could be greatly reduced, if transacting parties would agree to honor the spirit of their agreement and simply shake hands. The resource saving to the two parties combined, from substituting this mode of “enforcing” agreements to those currently used, is clear. Why, then, does not this more efficient mode of transacting drive out the more costly methods through the normal competitive process? … The underlying rationale for this … is that it is privately profitable to engage in some degree of “cheating” on agreements, and to use resources to disguise this fact. — M. W. Reder, “The Place of Ethics in the Theory of Production”. (shrink)

Why Democracy Needs Public Goods provides arguments for a new theoretical perspective in favor of public goods. Kallhoff details the benefits of public goods for any democratic state: they contribute to social inclusion, help generate the public forum, and foster national identity. These arguments are supplemented by reconsidering major counter-arguments against this approach, both from political theory and from theories on public finance. Political philosophers, political theorists, and political economists will benefit most (...) from this perspective. (shrink)

In the context of economics, the distinction between ‘the public’ and ‘the private’ has been paralleled with the distinction of ‘public policy’ on the one hand and the ‘private market’ on the other...

I argue that if science is to be a public good, it must be made one. Neither science nor any other form of knowledge is naturally a public good. And given the history of science policy in the twentieth century, it would be reasonable to conclude that science is in fact what economists call a ‘club good’. I discuss this matter in detail in two contexts: (1) current UK efforts to create a version of the US DARPA that (...) would focus on projects of larger, long-term societal interests – i.e. beyond the interests of the academic specialities represented in, say, the US NSF; (2) what I call the ‘organized hypocrisy’ involved in presenting science as a public good through the so-called ‘peer review’ process. (shrink)

Recent discussions of genomics and international justice have adopted the concept of ‘global public goods’ to support both the view of genomics as a benefit and the sharing of genomics knowledge across nations. Such discussion relies on a particular interpretation of the global public goods argument, facilitated by the ambiguity of the concept itself. Our aim in this article is to demonstrate this by a close examination of the concept of global public goods with (...) particular reference to its use in the context of genomic databases. We contend that the argument for construing genomics as a global public good depends on seeing it as a natural good by focusing on features intrinsic to genomics knowledge. We shall argue that social and political arrangements are relevant and that recognising this opens the door to construing the use of global public goods language as a strategic one. (shrink)

The evolution and maintenance of cooperation in human and animal societies challenge various disciplines ranging from evolutionary biology to anthropology, social sciences, and economics. In social interactions, cooperators increase the welfare of the group at some cost to themselves whereas defectors attempt to free ride and neither provide benefits nor incur costs. The problem of cooperation becomes even more pronounced when increasing the number of interacting individuals. Punishment and voluntary participation have been identified as possible factors to support cooperation and (...) prevent cheating. Typically, punishment behavior is unable to gain a foothold in a population, while volunteering alone can efficiently prevent deadlocks in states of mutual defection but is unable to stabilize cooperation. The combined effects of the two mechanisms have surprisingly different consequences in finite and infinite populations. Here we provide a detailed comparison of the two scenarios and demonstrate that driven by the inherent stochasticity of finite populations, the possibility to abstain from social interactions plays a pivotal role, which paves the way for the establishment of cooperation and punishment. (shrink)

The article Public goods and procreation, written by Jonathan Anomaly, was originally published electronically on the publisher’s internet portal (currently SpringerLink) on 10 December 2014 without open access.

George Mason University, USA It has been suggested that the production of public goods through a government involves a circularity problem. Since government itself is a public good, how can we use government to produce other public goods? Several solutions to this supposed circularity are offered. Government is a unique kind of public good with some potentially self-generating and self-supporting features. The public goods theory of government remains intact, and this enterprise helps (...) shed some light on the special features of government. Key Words: public goods • theory of the state • free riders • circularity problem. (shrink)

Abstract:The discussion of the global economy and worldwide expansion of the capitalist and market economic system barely deals with the topic of public goods, although they are of paramount importance precisely in this international setting. Fortunately, the theory of public economics systematically developed the central concept of the public good with its far-reaching implications so that this knowledge can be applied also to global issues. In order to treat these often vaguely discussed issues, a typology of (...) international relations is proposed. These and other considerations prepare the way to ask the question about the implied ethos. Because a common and sustainable ethos for public goods in the global economy is of great relevance and high urgency, both religious and non-religious ethical traditions are called for making their necessary contributions to this foundation. (shrink)