Within feminist literature from the early 1970s to this day, assisted reproductive technologies have been largely known to divide, replace or eliminate biological motherhood. For example, while in the past biological motherhood was considered a continuous experience, in vitro fertilisation (IVF) and IVF using egg donation allowed a split between two biological mothers, one providing eggs (genetic mother) and the other one gestation (gestational mother). This split was considered irreparable: the genetic mother could not be also gestational, and vice versa. (...) On the contrary, this paper aims to show that assisted reproductive technologies may also have a constructive potential towards biological motherhood(s). To explain how it could be possible, two existing techniques are explored: the first is maternal spindle transfer, which allows a double genetic motherhood; the second is reciprocal effortless IVF, which supposedly enables a double gestational motherhood. While in the first part, these techniques are examined singularly, in the second part a feasible combination of them is speculated. The idea is that assisted reproductive technologies could ‘recombine’ genetic and gestational motherhood in two figures that include both, namely in two ‘complete’ biological mothers, both genetic and gestational. (shrink)

Dans le dernier quart du xix e siècle, l’ambition d’une philosophie scientifique inspire la Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt de Franz Brentano. Appelée à refonder sur des bases empiriques l’univers de l’être, cette forme nouvelle de psychologie réactualiserait ainsi, en un sens, un certain héritage de la métaphysique ancienne. Et Brentano parviendrait à assembler dans une même vision systématique les sources de la pensée grecque, en particulier aristotélicienne, et moderne. Mais peut-on vraiment considérer Brentano comme un aristotélicien en raison de son (...) projet psychologique? La question est bien connue et comme Franco Volpi, entre autres, le soutient, il semblerait que l’orientation épistémologique de la psychologie brentanienne ne trouve pas dans l’aristotélisme son véritable motif directeur. Une autre lecture est toutefois possible à nos yeux, si nous considérons qu’à aucun moment Brentano ne prétend faire de la psychologie un moyen pour revenir à Aristote. C’est notre hypothèse de recherche qui nous conduit à lire avec la plus grande attention le traité de 1867, Die Psychologie des Aristoteles : le recours à Aristote resterait alors nécessaire pour comprendre le projet d’une nouvelle psychologie qui n’oublie pourtant pas sa vocation métaphysique. (shrink)

It is widely held that all lies are assertions: the traditional definition of lying entails that, in order to lie, speakers have to assert something they believe to be false. It is also widely held that assertion contrasts with presupposition and, in particular, that one cannot assert something by presupposing it. Together, these views imply that speakers cannot lie with presuppositions—a view that Andreas Stokke has recently explicitly defended. The aim of this paper is to argue that speakers can lie (...) with presuppositions, and to discuss some of the implications this outcome has for current research on lying, assertion and presupposition. (shrink)

In Emanuel Adler's distinctive constructivist approach to international relations theory, international practices evolve in tandem with collective knowledge of the material and social worlds. This book - comprising a selection of his journal publications, a new introduction and three previously unpublished articles - points IR constructivism in a novel direction, characterized as 'communitarian'. Adler's synthesis does not herald the end of the nation-state; nor does it suggest that agency is unimportant in international life. Rather, it argues that what mediates between (...) individual and state agency and social structures are communities of practice, which are the wellspring and repositories of collective meanings and social practices. The concept of communities of practice casts new light on epistemic communities and security communities, helping to explain why certain ideas congeal into human practices and others do not, and which social mechanisms can facilitate the emergence of normatively better communities. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate Hilary Putnam’s conception of scientific realism by examining the so-called “no miracles argument.” According to a widespread reconstruction of his thought, Putnam has been moving from scientific realism, through internal realism to natural realism of common sense. Nonetheless, I show that, in fact, the American philosopher has always been a scientific realist. This notion needs however to be made clearer, because Putnam tends to move constantly on the razor’s edge between metaphysical realism and anti-realism. I (...) argue that Putnam’s mature conception of scientific realism can be thought of as “open realism,” insofar as it is the result of the combination of the acceptable intuitions of metaphysical realism, with conceptual relativity, natural realism and pragmatism. (shrink)

Pictures are notably absent from the current debate about how to define lying. Theorists in this debate tend to focus on linguistic means of communication and do not consider the possibility of lying with photographs, drawings and other kinds of pictures. The aim of this paper is to show that such a narrow focus is misguided: there is a strong case to be made for the possibility of lying with pictures and this possibility allows for insights concerning the question of (...) how lying should be defined. (shrink)

In arguing against a supposed ambiguity, philosophers often rely on the zeugma test. In an application of the zeugma test, a supposedly ambiguous expression is placed in a sentence in which several of its supposed meanings are forced together. If the resulting sentence sounds zeugmatic, that is taken as evidence for ambiguity; if it does not sound zeugmatic, that is taken as evidence against ambiguity. The aim of this article is to show that arguments based on the second direction of (...) the test are misguided: ambiguous expressions, and in particular philosophically contested ones, do not reliably lead to zeugmaticity, so an absence of zeugmaticity provides no meaningful evidence for an absence of ambiguity. (shrink)

In the science and values literature, scholars have shown how science is influenced and shaped by values, often in opposition to the ‘value free’ ideal of science. In this paper, we aim to contribute to the science and values literature by showing that the relation between science and values flows not only from values into scientific practice, but also from (allegedly neutral) science to values themselves. The extant literature in the ‘science and values’ field focuses by and large on reconstructing, (...) post hoc, how values have influenced science; our reconstruction of the case studies, instead, aims to show that scientific concepts and methods _too, because of specific identifiable characteristics,_ can promote some values rather than (or at the expense of) others. We explain this bidirectional relation in analogy to debates on the normativity of technical artifacts and on feminist approaches in science, and we illustrate our claims with cases from the health sciences and machine learning. While our arguments in this paper also draw on post hoc reconstructions, we intend to show where, in the science in the making, we should engage not only with the question whether a practice is value-laden, but also how specific conceptual and methodological choices can influence values down the road. All in all, these considerations expand the ways in which philosophers can contribute to more value-aware scientific practices. (shrink)

Many recent definitions of lying are based on the notion of what is said. This paper argues that says-based definitions of lying cannot account for lies involving non-literal speech, such as metaphor, hyperbole, loose use or irony. It proposes that lies should instead be defined in terms of assertion, where what is asserted need not coincide with what is said. And it points to possible implications this outcome might have for the ethics of lying.

Intentionalism is the view that demonstratives, gradable adjectives, quantifiers, modals and other context‐sensitive expressions are intention‐sensitive: their semantic value on a given use is fixed by speaker intentions. The first aim of this paper is to defend Intentionalism against three recent objections, according to which speakers at least sometimes do not have suitable intentions when using supposedly intention‐sensitive expressions. Its second aim is to thereby shed light on the so far little‐explored question of which kinds of intentions can be semantically (...) relevant. (shrink)

The article begins with an effort to clarify and differentiate a variety of terms used by analysts in dealing with mentions of persons in conversation and other forms of talk-in-interaction — such terms as person-reference, identifying, describing, categorizing, and the like. This effort leads to the observation that `reference to persons' and `membership categorization' are quite distinct sets of practices, with most reference to persons not being done by membership categories, and most uses of membership categorization devices being in the (...) service of actions other than referring. Two interactional sequences whose analysis turns on a connection to talk earlier in the occasion are then examined; first, to establish what is going on interactionally without respect to the mentioning of persons, and then as exercises in examining the various ways person-reference and membership categorization can figure in a stretch of interaction. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Principles of Biomedical Ethics. By Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress.

Lying requires asserting a disbelieved proposition, that much is widely accepted in the debate on how to define lying. But what else is required? Does lying require a particular linguistic manner of expression, such as saying? Does the proposition asserted have to be false (and not merely disbelieved)? And does lying require an intention to deceive? The aim of this chapter is to provide an opinionated introduction to the debates on these questions that takes into account both theoretical considerations and (...) empirical data. (shrink)

In several recent papers and a monograph, Andreas Stokke argues that questions can be misleading, but that they cannot be lies. The aim of this paper is to show that ordinary speakers disagree. We show that ordinary speakers judge certain kinds of insincere questions to be lies, namely questions carrying a believed-false presupposition the speaker intends to convey. These judgements are robust and remain so when the participants are given the possibility of classifying the utterances as misleading or as deceiving. (...) The judgements contrast with judgements participants give about cases of misleading or deceptive behaviour, and they pattern with judgements participants make about declarative lies. Finally, the possibility of lying with non-declaratives is not confined to questions: ordinary speakers also judge utterances of imperative, exclamative and optative sentences carrying believed-false presuppositions to be lies. (shrink)

Glucagon-like peptide-1 (GLP-1) receptor agonists, such as semaglutide, and dual GLP-1 and glucose-dependent insulinotropic polypeptide (GIP) receptor agonists, such as tirzepatide, have been found to be effective for treating obesity and diabetes, significantly reducing weight and the risk or predicted risk of adverse cardiovascular events. There is a global shortage of these medications that could last several years and raises questions about how limited supplies should be allocated. We propose a fair-allocation framework that enables evaluation of the ethics of current (...) practices and could guide governments, professional societies, and physicians in allocation decisions. (shrink)

What is the content of a sentence in context? A proposition, says the standard propositional view accepted in much of semantics. A set of propositions, says the hitherto little-explored view of Semantic Pluralism. The aim of this book is to motivate, develop and defend Semantic Pluralism. To achieve this aim, the book puts forward two arguments against Contextualism, the most popular propositional theory. It spells out two versions of Semantic Pluralism: Flexible Pluralism, which takes many expressions to be context-sensitive, and (...) Strong Pluralism, which denies that context-sensitivity is widespread. And it shows how Pluralists can reply to several objections that have been lodged against non-propositional semantic theories. (shrink)

This paper defends stage theory against the argument from diachronic counting. It argues that stage theorists can appeal to quantifier domain restriction in order to accommodate intuitions about diachronic counting sentences. Two approaches involving domain restriction are discussed. According to the first, domains of counting are usually restricted to stages at the time of utterance. This approach explains intuitions in many cases, but is theoretically costly and delivers wrong counts if diachronic counting is combined with fission or fusion. On the (...) second approach, domains of counting are usually restricted in an indeterminate way, so as to include at most one member of any maximal class of counterpart-interrelated stages (with respect to a certain utterance). This view can accommodate all the relevant intuitions about counting sentences, and it fits well with a new stage-theoretic view of reference that allows speakers to refer to both present and past stages. (shrink)

Adler and Barnett demonstrate how changes occurring in international politics create the nostalgia of security communities, a concept made prominent by Karl Deutsch nearly forty years ago.

Sometimes speakers try to lie and inadvertently assert something true. Subjectivists about lying hold that such speakers are lying despite telling the truth. Objectivists hold that such speakers are not lying: they try to lie but fail. The first aim of this paper is to point to novel cases supporting subjectivism that do not involve speakers inadvertently asserting something true. Its second aim is to use these and other cases to explore the distinction between lying and trying to lie. Which (...) factors can thwart an attempt at lying? In which situations do we judge that a speaker has tried to lie but failed? Attending to these questions not only offers insights into the act of lying, but also helps to scrutinise the objectivist strategy of explaining away intuitions about apparent cases of lying while telling the truth. (shrink)

In several recent papers, Daniel Deasy has argued that the presentism–eternalism debate is unclear and should be abandoned. According to Deasy, there is no way of spelling out the predicate ‘is present’ that leads to a satisfactory definition of presentism: on some interpretations, presentism turns out to be compatible with eternalism, on others, it is clearly false or unacceptable for other reasons. The aim of this paper is to show that this line of argument should be resisted: if the predicate (...) ‘is present’ is spelled out in terms of where things are located, the result is a definition of presentism that is neither compatible with eternalism nor clearly false. There is thus no need to abandon the debate between presentists and eternalists. (shrink)

Simonet, Emanuel Nicolas Cortes Atul Gawande's book Being Mortal: Illness, Medicine, and What Matters in the End, draws upon both anecdotal stories and literary sources to highlight the importance of honest discussions as the end of life approaches. These discussions are particularly significant for older persons and terminally ill patients. Gawande believes that these discussions could be facilitated by more in-depth and focussed communication between the healthcare professional and the patient. Respecting the patient's values and priorities, and promoting a sense (...) of wellbeing and dignity are critical for quality care. (shrink)

Simonet, Emanuel Nicolas Cortes Negative portrayals of older persons in Australian culture have led to ageist attitudes and behaviours towards them. For the older person, this can result in self-deprecation, which in turn leads to poorer health, diminished wellbeing, and reduced mental ability. It can also negatively affect an older person's motivation to be an active member of society, resulting in a sense of isolation. Ageism also disregards the positive economic and social contributions that older persons make to the wider (...) community. Drawing on both secular and Catholic viewpoints, this article seeks to recognise, challenge, and move to overcome ageism and age discrimination in Australia. (shrink)

Simonet, Emanuel Nicolas Cortes A Voice at the Table: An Integrated Model for Pastoral Care in Aged Mental Health, written by Rosemary Kelleher with Olga Yastrubetskaya, describes a practical model for integrating pastoral care practitioners into multidisciplinary teams within aged mental health services. While highlighting the importance of spiritual care within healthcare, the book also emphasises the need for pastoral care practitioners to have the essential skills and knowledge vital to being significant members of the multidisciplinary team. This article offers (...) a concise review of a most valuable resource. (shrink)

Four ethical values — maximizing benefits, treating equally, promoting and rewarding instrumental value, and giving priority to the worst off — yield six specific recommendations for allocating medical resources in the Covid-19 pandemic: maximize benefits; prioritize health workers; do not allocate on a first-come, first-served basis; be responsive to evidence; recognize research participation; and apply the same principles to all Covid-19 and non–Covid-19 patients.

In this article, we propose the Fair Priority Model for COVID-19 vaccine distribution, and emphasize three fundamental values we believe should be considered when distributing a COVID-19 vaccine among countries: Benefiting people and limiting harm, prioritizing the disadvantaged, and equal moral concern for all individuals. The Priority Model addresses these values by focusing on mitigating three types of harms caused by COVID-19: death and permanent organ damage, indirect health consequences, such as health care system strain and stress, as well as (...) economic destruction. It proposes proceeding in three phases: the first addresses premature death, the second long-term health issues and economic harms, and the third aims to contain viral transmission fully and restore pre-pandemic activity. -/- To those who may deem an ethical framework irrelevant because of the belief that many countries will pursue "vaccine nationalism," we argue such a framework still has broad relevance. Reasonable national partiality would permit countries to focus on vaccine distribution within their borders up until the rate of transmission is below 1, at which point there would not be sufficient vaccine-preventable harm to justify retaining a vaccine. When a government reaches the limit of national partiality, it should release vaccines for other countries. -/- We also argue against two other recent proposals. Distributing a vaccine proportional to a country's population mistakenly assumes that equality requires treating differently situated countries identically. Prioritizing countries according to the number of front-line health care workers, the proportion of the population over 65, and the number of people with comorbidities within each country may exacerbate disadvantage and end up giving the vaccine in large part to wealthy nations. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that tests for semantic context-sensitivity are of no help in the debate between semantic contextualists and minimalists. Two kinds of context-sensitivity tests are discussed: Cappelen & Lepore's says-that tests and Cappelen & Hawthorne's agreement-based tests. It is shown that Cappelen & Lepore's tests are unreliable because they are based on unstable data. Then it is argued that although the data of Cappelen & Hawthorne's tests is more reliable, contextualists and minimalists alike can (...) explain this data. The paper ends by pointing to ways in which the debate might be moved forward without context-sensitivity tests. (shrink)

This book is divided in two parts, the first of which shows how, beyond paleontology and systematics, macroevolutionary theories apply key insights from ecology and biogeography, developmental biology, biophysics, molecular phylogenetics, and even the sociocultural sciences to explain evolution in deep time. In the second part, the phenomenon of macroevolution is examined with the help of real life-history case studies on the evolution of eukaryotic sex, the formation of anatomical form and body-plans, extinction and speciation events of marine invertebrates, hominin (...) evolution and species conservation ethics. The book brings together leading experts, who explain pivotal concepts such as Punctuated Equilibria, Stasis, Developmental Constraints, Adaptive Radiations, Habitat Tracking, Turnovers, (Mass) Extinctions, Species Sorting, Major Transitions, Trends, and Hierarchies – key premises that allow macroevolutionary epistemic frameworks to transcend microevolutionary theories that focus on genetic variation, selection, migration and fitness. Along the way, the contributing authors review ongoing debates and current scientific challenges; detail new and fascinating scientific tools and techniques that allow us to cross the classic borders between disciplines; demonstrate how their theories make it possible to extend the Modern Synthesis; present guidelines on how the macroevolutionary field could be further developed; and provide a rich view of just how it was that life evolved across time and space. In short, this book is a must-read for active scholars and, because the technical aspects are fully explained, it is also accessible for non-specialists. Understanding evolution requires a solid grasp of above-population phenomena. Species are real biological individuals, and abiotic factors impact the future course of evolution. Beyond observation, when the explanation of macroevolution is the goal, we need both evidence and theory that enable us to explain and interpret how life evolves at the grand scale. (shrink)

Simonet, Emanuel Nicolas Cortes Victoria's new Mental Health Act 2014 came into operation on 1st July 2014. Corresponding with international standards, the new Act aims to strengthen the human rights of persons with mental illness. This is supported by the inclusion of a recovery framework which promotes a collaborative treatment approach, procedures that reduce the duration of compulsory treatment, as well as better mental health service oversight and safeguards. This article analyses and highlights these reforms from a human rights perspective.

The COVID-19 pandemic has helped to clarify the fair and equitable allocation of scarce medical resources, both within and among countries. The ethical allocation of such resources entails a three-step process: (1) elucidating the fundamental ethical values for allocation, (2) using these values to delineate priority tiers for scarce resources, and (3) implementing the prioritisation to faithfully realise the fundamental values. Myriad reports and assessments have elucidated five core substantive values for ethical allocation: maximising benefits and minimising harms, mitigating unfair (...) disadvantage, equal moral concern, reciprocity, and instrumental value. These values are universal. None of the values are sufficient alone, and their relative weight and application will vary by context. In addition, there are procedural principles such as transparency, engagement, and evidence-responsiveness. Prioritising instrumental value and minimising harms during the COVID-19 pandemic led to widespread agreement on priority tiers to include health-care workers, first responders, people living in congregate housing, and people with an increased risk of death, such as older adults and individuals with medical conditions. However, the pandemic also revealed problems with the implementation of these values and priority tiers, such as allocation on the basis of population rather than COVID-19 burden, and passive allocation that exacerbated disparities by requiring recipients to spend time booking and travelling to appointments. This ethical framework should be the starting point for the allocation of scarce medical resources in future pandemics and other public health conditions. For instance, allocation of the new malaria vaccine among sub-Saharan African countries should be based not on reciprocity to countries that participated in research, but on maximally reducing serious illness and deaths, especially among infants and children. (shrink)

Simonet, Emanuel Nicolas Cortes Christine Bryden is a survivor of dementia and has been a passionate advocate for persons with dementia for more than 20 years. She has written 4 books. Her latest 2 books - Before I Forget and Nothing About Us, Without us! - give an insider's perspective into the lived experience of a person with dementia. This article provides a review of these 2 books which detail Christine Bryden's life story, and in doing so, highlight some of (...) the key messages expressed by the author. These key messages include examining the various misconceptions about persons with dementia, the required care for persons with dementia, as well as the need for building a dementia-friendly society. (shrink)

Simonet, Emanuel Nicolas Cortes; Herbert, Dilinie The Caroline Chisholm Centre for Health Ethics1 was established through the collaboration of private catholic hospitals in Victoria, namely: Cabrini Health, Calvary Health Care Bethlehem, Caritas Christi Hospice, Mercy Hospital for Women, Mercy Werribee Hospital, Mercy Palliative Care, St John of God Health Care, St Vincent's Hospital Melbourne, and St Vincent's Private Hospital Melbourne. Our role is to develop, review and respond to policies and procedures affecting Catholic Health Care; provide educational resources and formation (...) in ethics and offer ethics consultation and advisement. The Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin is our quarterly publication that reports on ethical issues arising in health care as well as literature reviews of pertinent research topics that effect national and international interests. (shrink)

Simonet, Emanuel Nicolas Cortes Advance care planning is a significant and important process of end-of-life care. It provides the opportunity for persons to express their medical treatment preferences prior to losing the capacity to decide for themselves. It also allows for the appointment of substituted decision maker to make medical decisions for persons who have lost capacity. Whilst advance care planning can be beneficial when it is used effectively, the legislative framework surrounding advance care planning is complex and confusing. This (...) brief article will summarise advance care planning, its current legislative framework in Victoria and how proposed recommendations offered by the Inquiry into end of life choices may simplify advance care planning. (shrink)

Simonet, Emanuel Nicolas Cortes Victoria's new Powers of Attorney Act 2014 came into operation on 1 September 2015. Following recommendations by the Victorian Parliament Law Reform Committee, changes have been introduced in the new Act to simplify the process of making an enduring power of attorney. Reforms include the addition of a section on capacity, the introduction of a supportive attorney role distinct from the enduring power of attorney role, and the enhancement of safeguards. This article analyses how the new (...) Powers of Attorney Act 2014 empowers persons with impaired decision-making capacity and also strengthens the mechanisms which protect them from abuse. (shrink)

In his 2012 book God in the Age of Science? A Critique of Religious Reason Herman Philipse argues that all known deductive versions of the cosmological argument are untenable. His strategy is to propose a few objections to two classical deductive cosmological arguments. The first argument is from the impossibility of there being contingent entities that are the sufficient cause for the existence of a contingent entity. The second argument is from the impossibility of there being an infinite causal regress. (...) In this article I argue that Philipse’s attempt to write off all deductive cosmological arguments fails. (shrink)