This article draws on historical material to examine the co-evolution of economic science and business education over the course of the twentieth century, showing that fields evolve not only through internal struggles but also through struggles taking place in adjacent fields. More specifically, we argue that the scientific strategies of business schools played an essential—if largely invisible and poorly understood—role in major transformations in the organization and substantive direction of social-scientific knowledge, and specifically economic knowledge, in twentieth century America. We (...) use the Wharton School as an illustration of the earliest trends and dilemmas (ca. 1900–1930), when business schools found themselves caught between their business connections and their striving for moral legitimacy in higher education. Next, we look at the creation of the Carnegie Tech Graduate School of Industrial Administration after World War II. This episode illustrates the increasingly successful claims of social scientists, backed by philanthropic foundations, on business education and the growing appeal of “scientific” approaches to decision-making and management. Finally, we argue that the rise of the Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago from the 1960s onwards (and its closely related cousin at the University of Rochester) marks the decisive ascendancy of economics, and particularly financial economics, in business education over the other behavioral disciplines. We document the key role of these institutions in diffusing “Chicago-style” economic approaches—offering support for deregulatory policies and popularizing narrowly financial understandings of the firm—that sociologists have described as characteristic of the modern neo liberal regime. (shrink)

Like nature itself, modern economic life is driven by relentless competition and unbridled selfishness. Or is it? Drawing on converging evidence from neuroscience, social science, biology, law, and philosophy, Moral Markets makes the case that modern market exchange works only because most people, most of the time, act virtuously. Competition and greed are certainly part of economics, but Moral Markets shows how the rules of market exchange have evolved to promote moral behavior and how exchange itself may make us more (...) virtuous. Examining the biological basis of economic morality, tracing the connections between morality and markets, and exploring the profound implications of both, Moral Markets provides a surprising and fundamentally new view of economics--one that also reconnects the field to Adam Smith's position that morality has a biological basis. Moral Markets, the result of an extensive collaboration between leading social and natural scientists, includes contributions by neuroeconomist Paul Zak; economists Robert H. Frank, Herbert Gintis, Vernon Smith, and Bart Wilson; law professors Oliver Goodenough, Erin O'Hara, and Lynn Stout; philosophers William Casebeer and Robert Solomon; primatologists Sarah Brosnan and Frans de Waal; biologists Carl Bergstrom, Ben Kerr, and Peter Richerson; anthropologists Robert Boyd and Michael Lachmann; political scientists Elinor Ostrom and David Schwab; management professor Rakesh Khurana; computational science and informatics doctoral candidate Erik Kimbrough; and business writer Charles Handy. (shrink)

With increasing public demand for ethical accountability, business schools are experiencing difficulty incorporating relevant training into their programmes. Rakesh Khurana, professor of organizational behaviour at Harvard Business School, has provided an historical account explaining how business schools initially promoted and then abandoned a specific professional identity for their students, which would have included a set of ethical values. It is possible to begin to revive this initial project by incorporating certain philosophical approaches to teaching ethics. The philosophies of (...) both Martin Heidegger and John Dewey can be used to steer such professional training. In combination, Heidegger’s existential demand for responsibility and Dewey’s pragmatic concern for the social environment provide pedagogical techniques and guidelines for successful instruction. (shrink)

This paper revisits the concept of autonomy and tries to elucidate the fundamental insight that freedom and law cannot be understood through their opposition, but rather have to be conceived of as conditions of one another. The paper investigates the paradigmatic Kantian formulation of this insight and discusses the diagnosis that the Kantian idea might give rise to a paradox in which autonomy reverts to arbitrariness or heteronomy. The paper argues that the fatal version of the paradox can be defused (...) if we avoid the legalistic model of autonomy and rather turn to the model of participation in a practice. This leads to a dialectical understanding of the idea of autonomy that preserves the insight that freedom and law are mutually conditioning and simultaneously reveals that they remain in irresolvable tension with one another. (shrink)

Purpose This study aims to explore the potential of mobile assistive technology as a vocational tool for blind workers. Specifically, it investigates: Can MAT-enabled BW to perform better at the workplace and will insight into MAT-enabled capabilities impact employer perception regarding BW employability. Design/methodology/approach Exploratory case study which draws on theories of fit to analyze observational and interview data at an organization familiar with employing, training and referring BW. Findings MAT can increase blind worker job fit, positively impacting their performance, (...) self-reliance and managerial perceptions regarding their employability. Research limitations/implications A conceptual framework is articulated which expands current literature on fit to better account for the assistive potential of mobile technology for differently abled workers. Practical implications The positive impact of MAT on managerial perceptions of BW fit and employability can inform the regimes of employers, job skills trainers, vocational rehabilitation specialists and policy makers. Social implications Insights on the use of MAT as a vocational tool can reduce the systemic workplace disenfranchisement of blind people. Originality/value This paper presents novel theory which accounts for the impact of MAT on the job fit of differently abled workers. (shrink)

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to assess the efforts made by Jordan in the direction of e‐governance and people's perception of corruption, trust, and e‐governance.Design/methodology/approachDesk research was conducted using secondary data sources followed by a field survey conducted with 412 sample respondents in three major cities of Jordan. Following the triangulation approach, the responses of university professors and the common people were also secured.FindingsThe Jordanian government's efforts towards e‐governance are commendable in the Middle East. However, there are certain impediments (...) that are witnessed in the form of the digital divide, corruption, social bottlenecks, the stage of democratization, the lack of marketing to stakeholders, and the citizen's lack of adoption of technology. Educated people are aware of the merit of e‐governance contrary to the uneducated ones and perceive that corruption in the Jordanian public sector is increasing.Research limitations/implicationsThe study mainly reflects the views of the educated people. The views of the uneducated ones are secured through basic interactions as they expressed their inability to respond to the questionnaires. Somehow, the respondents are not very open to freely share their opinions or have abstained from participation‐since they consider this a sensitive issue within the Jordanian cultural and political setup. Further, asking opinions of members of the public might not be the ideal way of judging the level of corruption, or changes in it.Originality/valuePeople's perception is that Jordan is affected by a low level of corruption and that its citizens lack awareness of e‐governance. To remedy this, its citizens need to be motivated to trust and to participate in the process of e‐governance and to increase their understanding of the tools and technologies available. (shrink)

Jharkhand is a tribal state having approximately 26 percent share of tribal people residing in the state. More than 90 percent of tribal population lives in rural areas. The original inhabitant of this land e.g., tribal peoples and non-tribe indigenous peoples earn their livelihoods in their own traditional ways of agriculture, domestication of cattle, collect minor forest product from their surrounding jungle and wages out themselves as laborers. The sudden spread of Covid-19 snatched away the rice bowl of these peoples (...) as well as the mediums of earning livelihoods; and they had been forced to live a miserable live e.g., hunger and poverty. This paper analyses the socio-economic impacts of Covid-19 on tribals and non-tribe indigenous people’s livelihood during the pandemic. (shrink)

I examine the foundations of a just society using the lens of decision theory. The conception of just society is from an individual’s viewpoint: where would I rather live if I have an equal chance of being any individual? Three alternative designs for a just society are examined. These are: laissez-faire, maximin and social minimum. Two assumptions about human nature clarify the distinction among three societies. The first assumption is that a representative individual’s utility function is concave. The second assumption (...) recognizes that redistribution to achieve equality reduces total wealth. A rational individual would prefer a society where one is free to maximize one’s expected utility. A social minimum that includes both the provision of essential human needs and equality of opportunity (education, healthcare, access to capital) for a flourishing life emerges as a candidate solution for the basic structure of society. (shrink)

In his 1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx famously claims that the human being is or has a ‘Gattungswesen.’ This is often understood to mean that the human being is a ‘species-being’ and is determined by a given ‘species-essence.’ In this chapter, I argue that this reading is mistaken. What Marx calls Gattungswesen is precisely not a ‘species-being,’ but a being that, in a very specific sense, transcends the limits of its own given species. This different understanding of the genus-character (...) of the human being opens up a new perspective on the naturalism of the early Marx. He is not informed by a problematic speciesist and essentialist naturalism, as is often assumed, but by a different form of naturalism which I propose to call ‘dialectical naturalism.’ The chapter starts (I) by developing Hegel’s account of genus which provides us with a useful background for (II) understanding Marx’s original notion of a genus-being and its practical, social, developmental character. In the last section, I show that (III) the actualization of our genus-being thus depends on the production of a specific type of ‘second nature’ that is at the heart of Marx’s dialectical naturalism. (shrink)

In normative decision theory, the weight of an uncertain event in a decision is governed solely by the probability of the event. A large body of empirical research suggests that a single notion of probability does not accurately capture peoples' reactions to uncertainty. As early as the 1920s, Knight made the distinction between cases where probabilities are known and where probabilities are unknown. We distinguish another case –- the unknowable uncertainty –- where the missing information is unavailable to all. We (...) propose that missing information influences the attractiveness of a bet contingent upon an uncertain event, especially when the information is available to someone else. We demonstrate that the unknowable uncertainty –- falls in preference somewhere in between the known and the known uncertainty. (shrink)

In his 1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx famously claims that the human being is or has a ‘Gattungswesen.’ This is often understood to mean that the human being is a ‘species-being’ and is determined by a given ‘species-essence.’ In this chapter, I argue that this reading is mistaken. What Marx calls Gattungswesen is precisely not a ‘species-being,’ but a being that, in a very specific sense, transcends the limits of its own given species. This different understanding of the genus-character (...) of the human being opens up a new perspective on the naturalism of the early Marx. He is not informed by a problematic speciesist and essentialist naturalism, as is often assumed, but by a different form of naturalism which I propose to call ‘dialectical naturalism.’ The chapter starts (I) by developing Hegel’s account of genus which provides us with a useful background for (II) understanding Marx’s original notion of a genus-being and its practical, social, developmental character. In the last section, I show that (III) the actualization of our genus-being thus depends on the production of a specific type of ‘second nature’ that is at the heart of Marx’s dialectical naturalism. (shrink)

PurposeWithin a larger mandate of reviewing the key global trends concerning consumer protection in the electronic commerce (e-commerce) literature, this study aims to study the legal framework concerning e-commerce and consumer protection in the Sultanate of Oman and to analyse the current regulations concerning e-commerce and consumer protection.Design/methodology/approachThis study followed the normative legal research approach and resorted to the desk research process to facilitate content analysis of literature containing consumer protection legislation and regulatory provisions in Oman in particular and the (...) rest of the world in general.FindingsThe study reveals that consumer protection initiatives in Oman are well entrenched for offline transactions, but are relatively new and limited for e-commerce. In spite of the promulgation of consumer protection laws, electronic transaction law and cybercrime law, consumer protection measures for e-commerce in Oman do not address a large number of the global concerns necessary to build consumer confidence and trust in the online environment.Research limitations/implicationsThere is a dearth of information concerning Oman on this topic in the extant literature. The research also witnessed the lack of empirical data on the issue of consumer protection and e-commerce in Oman that offer a detailed database of consumer complaints and associated outcomes.Practical implicationsThe mechanism of consumer protection in electronic transactions is not robust in many countries. Because of the lack of comprehensive and robust legislation, consumers remain vulnerable in the online contractual purchase process. Moving beyond the fragmented legislation, many countries are currently mulling an all-comprehensive e-commerce law, implications of this paper will help the policymakers in identifying the focus areas.Social implicationsConsumer protection is a burning global issue in this era of consumerism. It is important to build consumer trust, transparency and integrity of transactions to reduce the risk and uncertainties of purchase.Originality/valueConsumer protection studies conducted in the context of Oman, hitherto, deal more with data protection and dispute resolution mechanisms, and less with legal provisions, regulations and consumer confidence. The study shares newer insights based on a systematic review of legal and business databases. It is the first study of its kind in the context of Oman and the Middle East in general. (shrink)

It is a common saying that God created the universe and our planet ‘Earth’ on which we live, along with the notion that God also created human beings. There are variouswritten accounts of the mythical creation of man by God within mythological explanation in the form of a cultural system, which has been narrated in the form of folk tales, sagas, legends stories, and different types of myths; however, there isa piece of scientific shreds of evidence which contradict the idea (...) that we came on this planet as human beings. According to genomic studies, human evolution went through various stages of development throughout the course of time and space, from single cells to the complex human body.The genesis of modern humans hasalways been a topic of debate and investigation.In the present paper, the researchers wanted to study the evolution of modern humans through two different perspectives i.e. genomic view and mythical creation of man and the world.The primary backdrop of the present paper was the dialogues surrounding the genomic and the Adivasi worldview of their evolution.This paper is primarily based on the comparative study of Adivasi people’s view and genetic perspective on human evolution. The authors of this paper have focused on theAdivasis’s deep connection to nature and their evolutionary history. (shrink)

Der Gedanke, der sich in der modernen Idee der Autonomie verdichtet, ist ein doppelter: Die Figur der Autonomie enthält zugleich eine neue Auffassung von Normativität und eine eigene Konzeption von Freiheit. Dem Gedanken der Autonomie zufolge ist ein Gesetz, das wahrhaft normativ ist, eines, als dessen Urheber wir uns selbst betrachten können; und eine Freiheit, die im vollen Sinne wirklich ist, drückt sich in Gestalt eben solcher selbstgegebener Gesetze aus. Die Idee der Autonomie artikuliert so die Einsicht, dass man Freiheit (...) und Gesetz nicht durch ihre Entgegensetzung bestimmen kann, sondern durcheinander erläutern muss. Wirkliche Freiheit ist nicht Freiheit von Gesetzen, sondern Freiheit in Gesetzen; verbindliche Normen sind nicht das, was Freiheit äußerlich beschränkt, sondern das, was Freiheit innerlich verwirklicht. Die Idee der Autonomie, die für die moderne praktische Philosophie seit Rousseau und Kant grundlegend ist, zielt so darauf, Freiheit und Verbindlichkeit in einem Zuge zu artikulieren: durch die Form selbstgegebener Gesetze. Mit Beiträgen von Robert Brandom, Judith Butler, Thomas Khurana, Christoph Menke, Terry Pinkard und Sebastian Rödl. (shrink)

While living a life based on universal principles is well accepted by many, the reality of living acts as a great detriment to those who want to centre their lives on these timeless truths. Further, institutional mechanisms and work environments do not conform in general to such principle-centred living. The agents of the state, especially those in the police, have to work under tremendous obstacles and pressures from within and without, and often get a bad reputation, sometimes undeservingly. Moreover their (...) value systems may also degrade in these environments, a direction that requires to be altered by the ‘guardians of the law’. It is important to bring about alignment of values and ethical perceptions of state administrators with some universal laws. The Buddhist practice of vipassana mediation can play a significant role in such transformations, as is evident from the responses from Delhi Police personnel who underwent vipassana in one of their training programmes. Vipassana has made significant differences in the lives and perceptions of these trainees—both at the professional and personal level. This paper introduces these concepts and cites evidences from the feedback sheets of trainees to recommend worldwide adoption of such practices for those who occupy seats of power and responsibility. The feedback shows positive and very encouraging trends in all dimensions—work related, humanitarian, family and self—in other words, in professional, personal and deep inner lives. (shrink)

Von einem Leben der Freiheit zu sprechen hat eine doppelte Bedeutung. Auf der einen Seite legt diese Wendung nahe, dass schon dem Leben das Merkmal der Freiheit zukommt. Zum anderen deutet der Ausdruck darauf hin, dass die Freiheit ein ihr eigenes Leben besitzen mag. In diesem doppelten Genitiv wird so ein Übergang angedeutet von der Freiheit, die dem Leben als solchem zukommt, zu dem eigenen Leben, das die Freiheit führt. Inwiefern aber ist schon das Leben frei und inwiefern besitzt auch (...) die Freiheit immer noch ein Leben? Warum mag es unserem Verständnis der Freiheit und des Lebens dienen, ihren inneren Zusammenhang zu begreifen? Und in welchem Sinne genau sind Leben und Freiheit aufeinander zu beziehen? -/- Die folgenden Überlegungen werden drei aufeinander bezogene Weisen erläutern, in denen Freiheit und Leben in einem wesentlichen Zusammenhang stehen: (1) Freiheit ist ein Vermögen, das sich nur in lebenden Wesen herausbilden kann. (2) Um die Form der Freiheit zu verstehen, müssen wir die Form des Lebens verstehen. (3) Um die Wirklichkeit der Freiheit zu begreifen, müssen wir verstehen, inwiefern die Freiheit ein Leben eigener Art gewinnt. In diesem Sinne sind wir auf den Lebensbegriff verwiesen, um die Genese, die Form und die Wirklichkeit der Freiheit zu verstehen. Um diese drei Gedanken zu entwickeln, wendet sich dieses Buch zwei Autoren zu, die zwar als Philosophen der Freiheit geläufig sind, wohl aber kaum als »Lebensphilosophen« gelten können: Kant und Hegel. (shrink)

Pricing drives three of the most important elements of firm success: revenue and profits, customer behavior and firm image. This book provides an introduction to the basic principles for thinking clearly about pricing. Unlike other marketing books on pricing, the authors use a more analytic approach and relate ideas to the basic principles of microeconomics. Rakesh Vohra and Lakshman Krishnamurthi also cover three areas in greater depth and provide more insight than may be gleaned from existing books: 1) the (...) use of auctions, 2) price discrimination and 3) pricing in a competitive environment. (shrink)

Once we shift the intension of the concept of wage-labour from juridical attributes of negative ownership and contractual freedom to the actual performance of capital-positing labour, the extension of the concept – the cases that fall under it – changes as well. Once the concept of wage-labour is intensively re-defined as capital-positing labour, it becomes evident that the history and the geographical scope of wage-labour have not been well understood. This shift in the intension of the concept of wage-labour also (...) disjoins the association between capitalism and freedom. (shrink)

Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results (...) from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design. (shrink)

In diesem Buch verbindet Thomas Khurana eine innovative Neubeschreibung des zentralen Konzepts der Psychoanalyse mit wesentlichen Elementen neuerer Theorien des Sozialen. In drei originellen Studien zu Freud, Lacan und Luhmann wird die These vorgestellt, dass sich der Begriff des Unbewussten nur dann in seiner erschließenden Kraft entfalten kann, wenn das Unbewusste nicht mehr substantialistisch verstanden wird.

Der Gedanke, der sich in der modernen Idee der Autonomie verdichtet, ist ein doppelter: Die Figur der Autonomie enthält zugleich eine neue Auffassung von Normativität und eine eigene Konzeption von Freiheit. Dem Gedanken der Autonomie zufolge ist ein Gesetz, das wahrhaft normativ ist, eines, als dessen Urheber wir uns selbst betrachten können; und eine Freiheit, die im vollen Sinne wirklich ist, drückt sich in Gestalt eben solcher selbstgegebener Gesetze aus. Die Idee der Autonomie artikuliert so die Einsicht, dass man Freiheit (...) und Gesetz nicht durch ihre Entgegensetzung bestimmen kann, sondern durcheinander erläutern muss. Wirkliche Freiheit ist nicht Freiheit von Gesetzen, sondern Freiheit in Gesetzen; verbindliche Normen sind nicht das, was Freiheit äußerlich beschränkt, sondern das, was Freiheit innerlich verwirklicht. Die Idee der Autonomie, die für die moderne praktische Philosophie seit Rousseau und Kant grundlegend ist, zielt so darauf, Freiheit und Verbindlichkeit in einem Zuge zu artikulieren: durch die Form selbstgegebener Gesetze. -/- Mit Beiträgen von Robert Brandom, Judith Butler, Thomas Khurana, Christoph Menke, Terry Pinkard und Sebastian Rödl. (shrink)

In this introductory paper, I discuss the second-personal approach to ethics and the theory of recognition as two accounts of the fundamental sociality of the human form of life. The first section delineates the deep affinities between the two approaches. They both put a reciprocal social constellation front and center from which they derive the fundamental norms of moral and social life and a social conception of freedom. The second section discusses three points of contrast between the two approaches: The (...) accounts differ in that the second-personal approach opts for a narrower conception of recognition focusing on mutual moral accountability, whereas recognition theory suggests a broader conception including relations of love, respect, and esteem. Secondly, the accounts differ as to how they conceive of the interrelation of the I-thou and the I-We relationship. Finally, they differ with regard to the way they think of struggles for recognition. Whereas the second-personal approach suggests that we can understand struggles on the basis of a transcendental infrastructure of second-personal address, the theory of recognition considers norms of recognition as themselves constituted by dialectical social struggles. The paper closes with a reflection on the ways in which both approaches can help us understand the social vulnerability of the human form of life. (shrink)

In his 1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx famously claims that the human being is or has a ‘Gattungswesen.’ This is often understood to mean that the human being is a ‘species-being’ and is determined by a given ‘species-essence.’ In this chapter, I argue that this reading is mistaken. What Marx calls Gattungswesen is precisely not a ‘species-being,’ but a being that, in a very specific sense, transcends the limits of its own given species. This different understanding of the genus-character (...) of the human being opens up a new perspective on the naturalism of the early Marx. He is not informed by a problematic speciesist and essentialist naturalism, as is often assumed, but by a different form of naturalism which I propose to call ‘dialectical naturalism.’ The chapter starts (I) by developing Hegel’s account of genus which provides us with a useful background for (II) understanding Marx’s original notion of a genus-being and its practical, social, developmental character. In the last section, I show that (III) the actualization of our genus-being thus depends on the production of a specific type of ‘second nature’ that is at the heart of Marx’s dialectical naturalism. (shrink)

This chapter investigates the Kantian idea that a rational life is a life of “mere form”—a life in which a “mere form” is the force or spring of action. I start by developing Kant’s practical notion of life—the capacity to be the cause of what one represents. In a second step, I investigate the way in which Kant characterizes a rational life—the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws and to determine ourselves by the mere form of (...) a practical rule. In the third section, I point to some of the attractions and some of the problems of such an account. I close by considering a Hegelian alternative: the notion that a rational life is not the life of “mere,” but of “absolute form.”. (shrink)

Much has been written about how Foucault's archaeology of the modern episteme, emerging from early 19th-century Europe, was curiously divorced from its context of colonialism. Media archaeology, as Foucault's legacy, has also remained rather geopolitically insular and race agnostic in its epistemological reverse engineering of media modernity. Using screenwriting history as a case study, this article demonstrates how bringing decolonial thinking and media archaeology together can challenge linear narratives of modernity/coloniality in media history. The article connects two seemingly disparate histories (...) of archival absence and human obsolescence to reveal the construction of an elusive screenwriting modernity that has historically obscured parallel scripting practices and pre-existing scribal traditions. (shrink)

Plagiarism is growing at rampant rate due to available internet and the growing tendency of wrong practices of hiding the undocumented or documented sources. In academic institutions, plagiarism poses a threat to both students and instructors that ultimately leads to common plagiarism undetected, lost grants or public resources with over all poor quality. A step-by-step approach is proposed to avoid plagiarism for students by correct paraphrasing and quoting the words, sentences and paragraphs piece by piece to give the appropriate credit (...) to the author with existing work of its original author. This approach will avoid the parallel or reproduction of material inappropriately used in any way . Several examples are cited from documented websites of leading universities and institutions to make new freshman students aware of plagiarism and methods to avoid it. (shrink)

BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE: Evidence based medicine is the present backbone of rational and objective, modern medical problem solving and is a meeting ground for quantitative and qualitative researchers alike as it culminates into applying the fruits of clinical research to the individual patient. A systematic enquiry into the evolving paradigms in EBM is a need of the hour. AIMS AND METHODS: A qualitative enquiry examining the impact of different methodologies in EBM and their role in generating meaning interpretable at individual (...) levels. RESULTS: Present day outcome based research deals less with patients as individuals than as populations. Evidence based medicine struggles to apply the fruits of population based research to individuals who are often not as predictable as linear quantitative research would like them to be. The present EBM literature neglects a lot of events it doesn't believe to be statistically significant and perhaps here is an area that needs to be improved on - it assumes that because associations are demonstrated between interventions and outcomes in RCTs/meta-analysis, these associations are linear and causal in the real world. While they may be demonstrated repeatedly in highly controlled environments, in the real 'uncontrolled' world of clinical practice with real people, their validity breaks down. CONCLUSIONS: One needs to make the EBM standard model patient-individual (a projection of collective patient event data) resemble the real human individual patient so that optimal EBM individual data that matches our query can be easily and quickly spotted from the dense jungle of information that has grown over the years. This hints at rethinking our entire research methodology and modifying it to suit the needs of the individual patient. (shrink)

For post-Kantian philosophy, “life” is a transitory concept that relates the realm of nature to the realm of freedom. From this vantage point, the living seems to have the double character of being both already and not yet free: Compared with the external necessity of dead nature, the living already seems to exhibit a basic type of spontaneity and normativity that on the other hand still has to be superseded on the path to the freedom and normativity of spirit. The (...) contributions in the third volume of the series Freedom and Law take their departure from Hegel in order to investigate the extent to which we need figures and concepts of the living to understand the genesis and structure of theoretical and practical self-determination. In these analyses, Hegel’s philosophy reveals itself as a thinking not restricted to a mere opposition between the determinations of life and the freedom of spirit, but rather conceives of a freedom that realizes itself in and through life: a freedom of life. (shrink)

Although theFull-accesshypothesis accounts for a range of empirical generalizations of L2A, it underrepresents the role of language transfer in the construction of the L2 grammar. We suggest the possibility that linguistic principles which constrain the L2 grammar are available both directly from UG and via the L1, a logical hypothesis which Epstein et al. do not consider.

The paper argues that Kant’s distinction between pure and empirical apperception cannot be interpreted as distinguishing two self-standing types of self-knowledge. For Kant, empirical and pure apperception need to co-operate to yield substantive self-knowledge. What makes Kant’s account interesting is his acknowledgment that there is a deep tension between the way I become conscious of myself as subject through pure apperception and the way I am given to myself as an object of inner sense. This tension remains problematic in the (...) realm of theoretical cognition but can be put to work and made productive in terms of practical self-knowledge. (shrink)

In this chapter, I consider the relation of the three major spheres of ethical life that Hegel distinguishes – family, civil society, and the state – and analyse their contribution to the constitution of the "second nature" of objective spirit. Family and civil society are both analyzed by Hegel as ways of taking up and transforming our given nature such that a second ethical nature can be produced. Where the family helps bring forth such a second nature by means of (...) “education” (Erziehung), civil society does so by means of “cultural formation” (Bildung). As I show in sections (I) and (II), these processes are characterised by Hegel as steps of an actualization of freedom insofar they liberate us from our given nature without suppressing it and bring forth a second nature that gives freedom the consistency of living reality. However, while these processes constitute forms of liberation, they are at the same time forms of social subjection, involving discipline and normalization, the subjection to the will of another, and the adaption to the given necessities of the social world. Therefore, the completion of the process of liberation seems to require a third sphere that allows individuals to relate, collectively and politically, to the second nature thus produced. In order for the second nature of spirit to be a self-constitutive actualization of freedom, ethical life thus requires a specific political dimension that I turn to in section (III). While this political process is only possible on the basis of the republican infrastructures of family and civil society, it at the same time calls these infrastructures into question. Although Hegel himself does not develop this dimension properly, his conception of second nature points towards the desideratum of a politics of second nature. I will close the discussion of this political dimension in section (IV) by pointing out the general and diagnostic dimensions that such a politics of second nature can help us elaborate. (shrink)

Khurana distinguishes different ways in which Derrida’s deconstruction can be understood as an attempt at transforming the transcendental question. Derrida’s essay “Cogito and the History of Madness” might lead us to the assumption that Derrida’s primary interest lies in a move of radicalization: in identifying conditions that are even more fundamental or basic than the conditions of the acts of our theoretical and practical cognition that transcendental philosophy has highlighted. He suggests, however, that instead of a mere radicalization, Derrida’s (...) decisive move in the transformation of the transcendental question resides rather in complicating the way we understand these conditions of possibility: (i) in an attempt to reveal conditions of the possibility of a certain type of act as being simultaneously the conditions of the impossibility of the purity of this act (a project that is sometimes termed “quasi-transcendental”); and (ii) an attempt to complicate the distinction between empirical and transcendental conditions (an investigation that is sometimes called “ultra-transcendental”). (shrink)

»Latenz« bezeichnet als spezifischer Modus des Verborgenseins und der Wirksamkeit aus dem Verborgenen eine ebenso alte wie virulente Figur. Das Wirken des Begriffs selbst jedoch geschieht bezeichnenderweise oft fast unbemerkt und wie aus dem Verborgenen: Nicht nur sucht man vergebens nach einer umfassenden Theorie der Latenz, auch im Einzelnen sind detaillierte Klärungen zur Struktur oder Verwendungsweise der mit Latenz verbundenen Begrifflichkeit die Ausnahme. »Latenz« taucht vielmehr fast ausschließlich als operativer Begriff auf, der einen Teil seiner spezifischen Wirksamkeit womöglich gerade seinem (...) unthematisierten, ›latenten‹ Charakter verdankt – der Ovid’schen Devise entsprechend, dass die Kunstfertigkeit darin bestehe, die ihr eigene Technik zu verbergen: ars adeo latet arte sua. (shrink)

In normative decision theory, the weight of an uncertain event in a decision is governed solely by the probability of the event. A large body of empirical research suggests that a single notion of probability does not accurately capture peoples' reactions to uncertainty. As early as the 1920s, Knight made the distinction between cases where probabilities are known and where probabilities are unknown. We distinguish another case –- the unknowable uncertainty –- where the missing information is unavailable to all. We (...) propose that missing information influences the attractiveness of a bet contingent upon an uncertain event, especially when the information is available to someone else. We demonstrate that the unknowable uncertainty –- falls in preference somewhere in between the known and the known uncertainty. (shrink)

Der Gedanke, der im Folgenden artikuliert und entfaltet werden soll, besagt, dass Sinn und Gedächtnis in einem internen Zusammenhang stehen. Das heißt näherhin: Sinn ist gedächtnishaft, und Gedächtnis ist nur richtig zu verstehen, wenn es von der zeitlichen Tiefenstruktur des Sinns aus expliziert wird. Die Weise, in der dieser Gedanke ausgeführt und begründet werden soll, ist eine systematische Entwicklung in zwei Zügen: Zum einen gilt es, die basale und implizite Gedächtnishaftigkeit des Sinns zu charakterisieren; zum anderen werden Formen des expliziten (...) Gedächtnisses auf dieser Grundlage neu verstanden und als Reflexionsfiguren der Zeitlichkeit des Sinns ausgewiesen. Die Absicht, die ich dabei verfolge, ist eine doppelte: die irreduzible, in der jüngeren Sprachphilosophie auffällig ignorierte Zeitlichkeit des Sinns ins Licht zu setzen; die Bedeutung und den Wert von Formen des Gedächtnisses zu erschließen, die auch Teilen der jüngeren kulturwissenschaftlichen Diskussion als defizient oder irrelevant erscheinen. (shrink)

It is, by now, a well-established thesis that one major path that runs from Kant, through Fichte and Schelling, up to Hegel is defined by the conception of freedom as autonomy. It is less known and has been less frequently the object of study that from Kant to Hegel a new idea of life takes shape as well. Even less taken into account is the fact that these two paths from Kant to Hegel might be systematically intertwined. If the notion (...) of life in German Idealism is discussed at all, it has been discussed mostly in dealing with the philosophies of nature and biology of Kant and his successors. This framing is, of course, not wrong in itself; yet to my mind we can only fully account for the thought of what is living and the new interest that the idealist philosophies of nature actually deserve if we regard life as a practical notion. For the idealists, life is, as Fichte has it, an “analogue of freedom in nature,” and it describes the one form of object we can encounter in nature that possesses a kind of unity and organization that comes close to the unity and the organization of spirit. In various accounts of German Idealism, life is not only regarded as an analogue of a self-grounded order, but figures furthermore as a precondition of the actuality of freedom: It is in being alive that we might become free. How exactly this is so is of course not only a very complicated issue but also a contested one among Kant and his successors. In order to outline at least two basic approaches to relating ‘life’ and ‘autonomy,’ I would like to present a sketch of a reading of Kant, in whose works the analogy of life and autonomy first manifests itself, and of Hegel, who has to my mind most fully developed the potential of this constellation. (shrink)

Gegen die verbreitete Vorstellung, dass Negativität im Interesse von mehr Selbstverwirklichung, Produktivität und Positivität überwunden oder be-grenzt werden muss, eröffnet dieser Band eine andere Perspektive. Er geht den verschiedenen Formen des Negativen in Kunst, Recht und Politik nach, um zu zeigen, dass es nicht allein eine Negativität gibt, die dem Gelingen im Weg steht oder zu dessen sicher beherrschtem Mittel wird. Die Beiträge des Bandes erweisen Negativität vielmehr als eine Kraft der Befreiung, die ein Gelingen anderer Art ermöglicht.

Das Wort "Ereignis" (evenement) figuriert in den Texten Derridas von Husserls Wegin die Geschichte am Leitfaden der Geometrie (Derrida 1987; frz. Orig.: 1962) bis hin zu seinen jüngsten Texten (vgl. z.B. Derrida 2001a) in sehr unterschiedlicher Weise, mal beiläufig, mal mit Gewicht, mal als attackierte, mal als heranzitierte oder auch deutlich in Anspruch genommene Kategorie. Nichts liegt näher als der Versuch, das eigentliche Ereignis-Denken Derridas auf eine bestimmte Gruppe von Texten, eine bestimmte Phase seines Werkes zu beschränken. Schon die Form (...) der besonderen textuellen Konfiguration, die die Signatur Derridas trägt, spricht allerdings gegen ein solches Vorgehen: Es handelt sich um eine Konfiguration von Texten, die durch Insistenz und Rekurrenz gekennzeichnet ist, in diesem Sinne eher eine "durchlaufende" Kette bildet und dabei zugleich durch das laufende auf sich Zurückkommen die früheren Glieder der Kette in ein jeweils neues Licht setzt. Jenseits dieses allgemeinen Arguments spricht gegen eine Beschränkung auf einen vermeintlich homogenen Ausschnitt aus Derridas Werk zudem die spezifische Hypothese, dass die Besonderheit des Ereignisses bei Derrida darin liegt, dass es eine Reihe von Oppositionen auf spezifische Weise durchstreicht, die zum Teil eher zwischen Texten als in einer frontalen Aussage Derridas durchquert werden. Daher nehme ich in diesem Beitrag, in der textuellen Kette Derridas zurück- und vorlaufend, eine Reihe von Bestimmungsmomenten des Ereignisses auf, ohne mich auf eine Phase oder ein vorab begrenztes Feld bezogener Begriffe zu beschränken. (shrink)