Results for 'intentionality of mood'

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  1. Representationalism and the Intentionality of Moods.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1515-1526.
    It seems hard to comprehend how, during mood experience, the ‘inner’ meets the ‘outer’. The objective of this paper is to show that a currently popular attempt at providing a neat solution to that problem fails. The attempt comes under the heading of representationalism, according to which the phenomenal aspects of mood are exhausted by its representational content. I examine three accounts of intentionality developed within the representationalist camp, and I show that they incur phenomenological and metaphysical (...)
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    On the Intentionality of Moods.Jorge V. Arregui - 1996 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 70 (3):397-411.
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    On the Intentionality of Moods.Jorge V. Arregui - 1996 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 70 (3):397-411.
  4. The intentionality and intelligibility of moods.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):118-135.
    This article offers an account of moods as distinctive kinds of personal level affective-evaluative states, which are both intentional and rationally intelligible in specific ways. The account contrasts with those who claim moods are non-intentional, and so also arational. Section 1 provides a conception of intentionality and distinguishes moods, as occurrent experiential states, from other states in the affective domain. Section 2 argues moods target the subject’s total environment presented in a specific evaluative light through felt valenced attitudes (the (...)
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  5. The Intentional Structure of Moods.Uriah Kriegel - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19:1-19.
    Moods are sometimes claimed to constitute an exception to the rule that mental phenomena are intentional (in the sense of representing something). In reaction, some philosophers have argued that moods are in fact intentional, but exhibit a special and unusual kind of intentionality: they represent the world as a whole, or everything indiscriminately, rather than some more specific object(s). In this paper, I present a problem for extant versions of this idea, then propose a revision that solves the problem (...)
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  6. The rationality of mood.Constant Bonard - 2022 - In Christine Tappolet, Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (eds.), A Tribute to Ronald de Sousa.
    In this article, I argue that at least some moods are affective episodes whose main difference from emotions is that their intentional objects, qua intentional objects, are not consciously available. I defend this claim by exposing an experiment where affective responses – moods, I maintain – are elicited by subliminal pictures (§2). I then show how everyday kinds of moods can also be plausibly interpreted as emotion-like affects whose intentional object is not conscious (§3). In the final section (§4), I (...)
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  7. In Search for the Rationality of Moods.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2019 - In Laura Candiotto (ed.), The Value of Emotions for Knowledge. Springer Verlag. pp. 281-296.
    What it is about mood, as a specific type of affect, that makes it not easily amenable to standard models of rationality? It is commonly assumed that the cognitive rationality of an affective state is somehow depended upon how that state is related to what the state is about, its so called intentional object; but, given that moods do not seem to bear an intentional relation to an object, it is hard to see how they can be in the (...)
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  8. The Double Intentionality of Emotional Experience.Tom Cochrane - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1454-1475.
    I argue that while the feeling of bodily responses is not necessary to emotion, these feelings contribute significant meaningful content to everyday emotional experience. Emotional bodily feelings represent a ‘state of self’, analysed as a sense of one's body affording certain patterns of interaction with the environment. Recognising that there are two sources of intentional content in everyday emotional experience allows us to reconcile the diverging intuitions that people have about emotional states, and to understand better the long-standing debate between (...)
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  9. Emotions, moods, and intentionality.William Fish - 2005 - In William C. Fish (ed.), Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). Rodopi NY.
    Under the general heading of what we might loosely call emotional states, a familiar distinction can be drawn between emotions (strictly so-called) and moods. In order to judge under which of these headings a subject’s emotional episode falls, we advance a question of the form: What is the subject’s emotion of or about? In some cases (for example fear, sadness, and anger) the provision of an answer is straightforward: the subject is afraid of the loose tiger, or sad about England’s (...)
     
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  10. Emotions, moods, and intentionality.William C. Fish - 2005 - In Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). Rodopi NY.
    Under the general heading of what we might loosely call emotional states, a familiar distinction can be drawn between emotions (strictly so-called) and moods. In order to judge under which of these headings a subject’s emotional episode falls, we advance a question of the form: What is the subject’s emotion of or about? In some cases (for example fear, sadness, and anger) the provision of an answer is straightforward: the subject is afraid of the loose tiger, or sad about England’s (...)
     
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  11.  86
    Moods in Layers.Achim Stephan - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1481-1495.
    The goal of this paper is to examine moods, mostly in comparison to emotions. Nearly all of the features that allegedly distinguish moods from emotions are disputed though. In a first section I comment on duration, intentionality, and cause in more detail, and develop intentionality as the most promising distinguishing characteristic. In a second section I will consider the huge variety of moods, ranging from shallow environmentally triggered transient moods to deep existential moods that last much longer. I (...)
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  12. Stein on Forms of Affective Intentionality.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - 2024 - In Anna Tropia & Daniele De Santis (eds.), Rethinking Intentionality, Person and the Essence: Aquinas, Scotus, Stein. Brill.
    According to Brentano and his followers, there is a genuine affective mode of intentional reference which consists in presenting the targeted objects imbued with value as being good or bad, and as inviting us to adopt a pro- or contra-attitude toward them. Let us call this view “the affective intentionality thesis”. In Brentano’s version of this thesis, not only do strictly affective phenomena such as feelings and emotions exhibit a sui generis affective intentionality, but so do conative ones, (...)
     
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  13. Affect without object: moods and objectless emotions.Carolyn Price - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):49-68.
    Should moods be regarded as intentional states, and, if so, what kind of intentional content do they have? I focus on irritability and apprehension, which I examine from the perspective of a teleosemantic theory of content. Eric Lormand has argued that moods are non-intentional states, distinct from emotions; Robert Solomon and Peter Goldie argue that moods are generalised emotions and that they have intentional content of a correspondingly general kind. I present a third model, on which moods are regarded, not (...)
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  14. Moods: From Diffusivness to Dispositionality.Alex Grzankowski & Mark Textor - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    The view that moods are dispositions has recently fallen into disrepute. In this paper we want to revitalise it by providing a new argument for it and by disarming an important objection against it. A shared assumption of our competitors (intentionalists about moods) is that moods are “diffuse”. First, we will provide reasons for thinking that existing intentionalist views do not in fact capture this distinctive feature of moods that distinguishes them from emotions. Second, we offer a dispositionalist alternative that (...)
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  15. Intentionalism about Moods.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):126-136.
    According to intentionalism, phenomenal properties are identical to, supervenient on, or determined by representational properties. Intentionalism faces a special challenge when it comes to accounting for the phenomenal character of moods. First, it seems that no intentionalist treatment of moods can capture their apparently undirected phenomenology. Second, it seems that even if we can come up with a viable intentionalist account of moods, we would not be able to motivate it in some of the same kinds of ways that intentionalism (...)
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  16.  1
    Emotion Regulation Versus Mood Regulation.Samuel Meyers & Maya Tamir - forthcoming - Emotion Review.
    Emotions and moods have been distinguished in the literature. If they are distinct, we may expect emotion regulation and mood regulation to be distinct too. We show that although emotion regulation and mood regulation are considered theoretically distinct, they are often confounded empirically. We review characteristics proposed to distinguish emotions from moods by different theoretical approaches to emotion. We also review challenges to these propositions, suggesting that one valid distinction involves intentionality. Building on the above, we discuss (...)
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  17. The Contemporary Relevance of On the Problem of Empathy.Ingrid Vendrell Ferran - 2024 - In Timothy A. Burns (ed.), Edith Stein's on the Problem of Empathy: A Companion. Lexington Books.
    Written more than a hundred years ago, Stein’s On the Problem of Empathy is, today more than ever, essential reading material for anyone interested in social cognition. In this book – which still inspires current research – Stein provides a systematic account of the empathic experience. Stein’s view of empathy as a process, and her understanding of its main forms and functions in presenting the other as a spiritual being, provide valuable insights on the intersubjective nature of the human being. (...)
     
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  18. Confucian Theory of Concretizing Intentionality: the Metaphysical Implication of Xi Ci Shan in Zhouyi.Hai-Ming Wen - 2008 - Modern Philosophy 3:121-126.
    Since the "Book of Changes" began, the ancient philosopher has been pursuing the mastery of mind and the world changes, trying to grasp the mind and the world of the intersection of the germinal "few." Therefore, the pursuit of traditional Chinese metaphysics of mind and matter can be regarded as homologous to the heart through heterogeneous material theory. Revealed through the things on the mind from the "copulative" metaphysical implication began to study the real mind and matter blend of process (...)
     
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  19. The Case Against Representationalism About Moods.Amy Kind - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. New York, New York: Routledge.
    According to representationalism, the phenomenal character of a mental state reduces to its intentional content. Although representationalism seems plausible with respect to ordinary perceptual states, it seems considerably less plausible for states like moods. Here the problem for representationalism arises largely because moods seem to lack intentional content altogether. In this paper, I explore several possible options for identifying the intentional content of moods and suggest that none of them is wholly satisfactory. Importantly, however, I go on to argue that (...)
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  20. Emotions and Moods in Husserl’s Phenomenology.Denis Fisette - 2021 - In Hanne Jacobs (ed.), The Husserlian Mind. New Yor, NY: Routledge. pp. 220-231.
    In this study, I will first introduce Husserl’s analysis in Studien zur Struktur des Bewußtseins by emphasizing the reasons that motivate these analyses on descriptive psychology and their status in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology in the late Freiburg period. I will then focus on the structure of acts, with particular emphasis on three aspects stressed by Husserl in Studien: intentionality, the taxonomy of acts, and Brentano’s principle of the Vorstellungsgrundlage. The last three parts of this study outline the characteristic features (...)
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  21. Distinctions between emotion and mood.Andrew M. Lane, Christopher Beedie & Peter C. Terry - 2005 - Cognition and Emotion 19 (6):847-878.
    Most academics agree that emotions and moods are related but distinct phenomena. The present study assessed emotion-mood distinctions among a non-academic population and compared these views with distinctions proposed in the literature. Content analysis of responses from 106 participants identified 16 themes, with cause (65% of respondents), duration (40%), control (25%), experience (15%), and consequences (14%) the most frequently cited distinctions. Among 65 contributions to the academic literature, eight themes were proposed, with duration (62% of authors), intentionality (41%), (...)
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  22.  36
    Social Facts and Collective Intentionality. Philosophische Forschung / Philosophical research.Georg Meggle (ed.) - 2002 - Dr. Haensel-Hohenhausen.
    Social Facts and Collective Intentionality is a combination of terms that refers to a new field of basic research. Written mainly in the mood and by means of analytical philosophy, at the very heart of this new approach is conceptual explication of all the various versions of social facts and collective intentionality and its ramifications. This approach tackles the topics of traditional social philosophy using new conceptual methods, including techniques of formal logic, computer simulations, and artificial intelligence. (...)
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  23.  34
    Moved by Masses? Shared Moods and Their Impact on Immoral Behavior.Eva Weber-Guskar - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1663-1679.
    It is often suggested that people in large groups behave and act differently than when they are alone. More precisely, it is an often-repeated claim that they tend to act in a morally problematic or plainly reprehensible way. Still, a fully satisfying explanation has not yet been given for why this is the case. In this paper, I suggest that the phenomenon of shared moods may play a crucial role here. In order to explicate and support this thesis, first, I (...)
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  24. Intentionality, Value Disclosure and Constitution: Stein´s Model.Ingrid Vendrell Ferran - 2017 - In Dermot Moran & Elisa Magrì (eds.), Empathy, Sociality, and Personhood: Essays on Edith Stein’s Phenomenological Investigations. Cham: Springer Verlag.
    This article provides an analysis of the phenomenology of affectivity underlying the work of Edith Stein. Taking as point of departure two of her works, The problem of Empathy (1917) and Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities (1922), the paper focuses on the idea that emotions fulfil a cognitive function: they make us accessible the realm of values. The argument of the paper is developed in two sections. The first section offers an overview of Stein’s main theses about emotions, feelings, (...)
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  25.  8
    Distinctions between emotion and mood.Christopher Beedie, Peter Terry & Andrew Lane - 2005 - Cognition and Emotion 19 (6):847-878.
    Most academics agree that emotions and moods are related but distinct phenomena. The present study assessed emotion-mood distinctions among a non-academic population and compared these views with distinctions proposed in the literature. Content analysis of responses from 106 participants identified 16 themes, with cause (65% of respondents), duration (40%), control (25%), experience (15%), and consequences (14%) the most frequently cited distinctions. Among 65 contributions to the academic literature, eight themes were proposed, with duration (62% of authors), intentionality (41%), (...)
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  26.  24
    The Experience of Grace in Relation to Rahner’s Philosophy of the Heart.Joseph A. Dinoia - 1992 - Philosophy and Theology 7 (2):165-183.
    The correct understanding of the concept of heart in Rahner consists in a recognition that the highest performance of a finite spirit comprises affective, cognitive, and volitional consciousness in a functional union that could be called the heart-mind. Rather than privilege cognition and volition and then consider feelings and moods as separate and purely subjective phenomena, we must recognize the intentionality of certain higher affective responses, i.e., those that have become integrated into the highest operational synthesis of a person (...)
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    The Experience of Grace in Relation to Rahner’s Philosophy of the Heart.Andrew Tallon - 1992 - Philosophy and Theology 7 (2):165-183.
    The correct understanding of the concept of heart in Rahner consists in a recognition that the highest performance of a finite spirit comprises affective, cognitive, and volitional consciousness in a functional union that could be called the heart-mind. Rather than privilege cognition and volition and then consider feelings and moods as separate and purely subjective phenomena, we must recognize the intentionality of certain higher affective responses, i.e., those that have become integrated into the highest operational synthesis of a person (...)
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  28. Temporality and Boredom.Victor Biceaga - 2006 - Continental Philosophy Review 39 (2):135-153.
    In this paper, I argue that Heidegger’s phenomenological investigation of boredom offers important clues for better understanding the notoriously difficult notion of non-objectifying intentionality (Längsintentionalität). I begin by examining Husserl’s account of the aporetic nature of self-temporalization and I claim that a discussion of moods can further clarify the relation between Längsintentionalität and the absolute time-constituting consciousness. Although Husserl himself broached the problem of the intentionality of moods, it was Heidegger who gave us a full-blown account of it. (...)
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  29. On the Subject Matter of Phenomenological Psychopathology.Anthony Vincent Fernandez & Allan Køster - 2018 - In Giovanni Stanghellini, Matthew Broome, Anthony Vincent Fernandez, Paolo Fusar-Poli, Andrea Raballo & René Rosfort (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 191–204.
    “On the Subject Matter of Phenomenological Psychopathology” provides a framework for the phenomenological study of mental disorders. The framework relies on a distinction between (ontological) existentials and (ontic) modes. Existentials are the categorial structures of human existence, such as intentionality, temporality, selfhood, and affective situatedness. Modes are the particular, concrete phenomena that belong to these categorial structures, with each existential having its own set of modes. In the first section, we articulate this distinction by drawing primarily on the work (...)
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  30.  37
    Melancholic depression. A hermeneutic phenomenological account.Francesca Brencio & Valeria Bizzari - 2022 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 13 (2):94-107.
    _Abstract_: The overarching aim of this paper is to provide a comprehensive account of melancholic depression from the perspective of hermeneutic phenomenology. More specifically, we propose that this condition should be interpreted as an alteration in the intentional arc that affects corporeality, temporality, and spatiality, rather than as a mood disorder. In fact, classifying melancholic depression as a mood disorder seems a particularly poor choice; the mood disorder is not a cause but a consequence of a primary (...)
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  31.  83
    An anti‐essentialist view of the emotions.Joel J. Kupperman - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):341-351.
    Emotions normally include elements of feeling, motivation, and also intentionality; but the argument of this essay is that there can be emotion without feeling, emotion without corresponding motivation, and emotion without an intentional relation to an object such that the emotion is (among other things) a belief about or construal of it. Many recent writers have claimed that some form of intentionality is essential to emotion, and then have created lines of defence for this thesis. Thus, what look (...)
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  32.  18
    Affectivity in mental disorders: an enactive-simondonian approach.Enara García - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-28.
    Several enactive-phenomenological perspectives have pointed to affectivity as a central aspect of mental disorders. Indeed, from an enactive perspective, sense-making is an inherently affective process. A question remains on the role of different forms of affective experiences (i.e., existential feelings, atmospheres, moods, and emotions) in sense-making and, consequently, in mental disorders. This work elaborates on the enactive perspective on mental disorders by attending to the primordial role of affectivity in the self-individuation process. Inspired by Husserl’s genetic methodology and Simondonian philosophy (...)
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  33.  35
    The Bodily Texture of Phantasy.Jagna Brudzińska - 2017 - Gestalt Theory 39 (1):64-78.
    Summary In opposition to the traditional empiricist understanding of phantasy as a copy of perception and therefore as a weakened form of experience, this paper interprets phantasy as an independent and creative modus of consciousness that is responsible for the individuation of the subject. The article reconstructs Husserl’s approach to phantasy as a specific kind of intentional operation as well as its relationship with mood-intentionality, bodily-kinesthetic expressivity and with hyletic anticipation as a structure of sensibility. In this way, (...)
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  34.  21
    Kant and the Reorientation of Aesthetics: Finding the World.Joseph J. Tinguely - 2017 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge.
    This book argues that the philosophical significance of Kant’s aesthetics lies not in its explicit account of beauty but in its implicit account of intentionality. Kant’s account is distinct in that feeling, affect, or mood must be operative within the way the mind receives the world. Moreover, these modes of receptivity fall within the normative domain so that we can hold each other responsible for how we are "struck" by an object or scene. Joseph Tinguely composes a series (...)
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  35. Religious Emotion as a Form of Religious Experience.Ingrid Vendrell Ferran - 2019 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 33 (1):78-101.
    This article argues that religious emotions are variations of general emotions that we already know from our everyday life, which nevertheless exhibit specific features that enable us to think of them as forming a coherent subclass. The article claims that there is an experience of joy, sorrow, regret, fear, and so on that is specifically religious. The aim is to develop an account that specifies what makes them “religious.” The argument is developed in three stages. The first section develops a (...)
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  36.  38
    Does Loving Longer Mean Loving More? On the Nature of Enduring Affective Attitudes.Aaron Ben-Ze’ev - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1541-1562.
    This article provides a conceptual map of the affective terrain while focusing on enduring positive affective attitudes, such as love and happiness. The first section of the article examines the basic characteristics of affective attitudes, i.e., intentionality, feeling, and dispositionality, and classifies the various affective attitudes accordingly. An important distinction in this regard is between acute, extended, and enduring affective attitudes. Then a discussion on the temporality of affective attitudes is presented. The second section discusses major mechanisms that enable (...)
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  37. Brain, Emotions and the Development of Intentional Feelings.Vincent Shen - 2005 - Philosophy and Culture 32 (10):119-135.
    Includes emotional and affective feelings. Mood builds on the human organism's body, but you must turn to the development of affective experience of the body. I did not last for more than the physical body Zhumo, this article from the mood in the body discussed the rise of the body, to significant problems of the body by the body to experience over the body, as well as the physical body plays in the emotional life of role, will be (...)
     
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  38. The intentionality of sensation: A grammatical feature.Elizabeth Anscombe - 1962 - In Ronald Joseph Butler (ed.), Analytic Philosophy. Oxford, England: Blackwell.
     
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  39. Towards a computational theory of mood.Laura Sizer - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):743-770.
    Moods have global and profound effects on our thoughts, motivations and behavior. To understand human behavior and cognition fully, we must understand moods. In this paper I critically examine and reject the methodology of conventional ?cognitive theories? of affect. I lay the foundations of a new theory of moods that identifies them with processes of our cognitive functional architecture. Moods differ fundamentally from some of our other affective states and hence require distinct explanatory tools. The computational theory of mood (...)
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  40. The intentionality of human action.George M. Wilson - 1980 - Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
    CHAPTER ONE Introduction Twenty-five years ago it was pretty widely held among Anglo- American philosophers that it was sheer confusion to suppose that an ...
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  41. The intentionality of intention and action.John R. Searle - 1979 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):253 – 280.
    This article presents a sketch of a theory of action. It does so by locating the relation of intention to action -vithin a general theory of Intentionality. It introduces a distinction between ptiorintentions and intentions in actions; the concept of the experience of acting; and the thesis that both prior intentions and intentions in action are causally self-referential. Each of these is independently motivated, but together they allow suggested solutions to several outstanding problems within action theory (deviant causal chains, (...)
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  42.  76
    Intentionality of perceptual experience.B. Yoon - 2000 - Erkenntnis 52 (3):339-355.
  43. A perceptual theory of moods.Mauro Rossi - 2019 - Synthese 198 (8):7119-7147.
    The goal of this paper is to offer a new theory of moods, according to which moods are perceptual experiences that represent undetermined objects as possessing specific evaluative properties. I start by listing a series of features that moods are typically taken to possess and claim that a satisfactory theory of moods must be able either to explain why moods genuinely possess these features or to explain these appearances away in a non-ad hoc way. I show that my account provides (...)
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  44. The Intentionality of Pleasures.Olivier Massin - 2013 - In Denis Fisette & Guillaume Fréchette (eds.), Themes from Brentano. New York, NY: Editions Rodopi. pp. 307-337.
    This paper defends hedonic intentionalism, the view that all pleasures, including bodily pleasures, are directed towards objects distinct from themselves. Brentano is the leading proponent of this view. My goal here is to disentangle his significant proposals from the more disputable ones so as to arrive at a hopefully promising version of hedonic intentionalism. I mainly focus on bodily pleasures, which constitute the main troublemakers for hedonic intentionalism. Section 1 introduces the problem raised by bodily pleasures for hedonic intentionalism and (...)
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  45. The intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionality.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 2002 - In David John Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 520--533.
    What is the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality? A common picture in recent philosophy of mind has been that the phenomenal aspects and the intentional aspects of mentality are independent of one another. According to this view, the phenomenal character of certain mental states or processes”states for which there is "something it is like" to undergo them—is not intentional. Examples that are typically given of states with inherent phenomenal character are sensations, such as pains, itches, and color sensations. This (...)
     
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  46.  47
    The Intentionality of Intention and Action.John R. Searle - 1980 - Cognitive Science 4 (1):47-70.
    Cognitive Science is likely to make little progress in the study of human behavior until we have a clear account of what a human action is. The aim of this paper is to present a sketch of a theory of action. I will locate the relation of intention to action within a general theory of Intentionality. I will introduce a distinction between prior intentions and intentions in actions; the concept of the experience of acting; and the thesis that both (...)
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  47.  80
    The intentionality of formal systems.Ard Van Moer - 2006 - Foundations of Science 11 (1-2):81-119.
    One of the most interesting and entertaining philosophical discussions of the last few decades is the discussion between Daniel Dennett and John Searle on the existence of intrinsic intentionality. Dennett denies the existence of phenomena with intrinsic intentionality. Searle, however, is convinced that some mental phenomena exhibit intrinsic intentionality. According to me, this discussion has been obscured by some serious misunderstandings with regard to the concept ‘intrinsic intentionality’. For instance, most philosophers fail to realize that it (...)
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  48. The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 2002 - In David John Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 520--533.
  49.  89
    Stimmung : exploring the aesthetics of mood.Robert Sinnerbrink - unknown
    Few cinephiles would deny the importance of mood in film, yet the aesthetics of mood are curiously overlooked today. On the one hand, mood is an essential dimension of cinema: we define certain genres, for example, by suggesting the moods they evoke. On the other hand, words frequently fail us when we try to articulate such moods in a more abstract or analytical vein. I offer in this essay some critical reflections on the significance of mood, (...)
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  50.  7
    The intentionality of intention and action.John R. Searle - 1980 - Cognitive Science 4 (1):47-70.
    Cognitive Science is likely to make little progress in the study of human behavior until we have a clear account of what a human action is. The aim of this paper is to present a sketch of a theory of action. I will locate the relation of intention to action within a general theory of Intentionality. I will introduce a distinction between prior intentions and intentions in actions; the concept of the experience of acting; and the thesis that both (...)
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