This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
51 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 51
  1. L. E. Akeley (1925). The Problem of the Specious Present and Physical Time: The Problem Generalized. Journal of Philosophy 22 (21):561-573.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Holly Andersen (2014). The Development of the ‘Specious Present’ and James’ Views on Temporal Experience. In Dan Lloyd Valtteri Arstila (ed.), Subjective Time: the philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of temporality. MIT Press. 25-42.
    This chapter examines the philosophical discussion concerning the relationship between time, memory, attention, and consciousness, from Locke through the Scottish Common Sense tradition, in terms of its influence on James' development of the specious present doctrine. The specious present doctrine is the view that the present moment in experience is non punctate, but instead comprises some nonzero amount of time; it contrasts with the mathematical view of the present, in which the divide between past and future is merely a point (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Holly Andersen & Rick Grush (2009). A Brief History of Time-Consciousness: Historical Precursors to James and Husserl. Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (2):277-307.
    William James’ Principles of Psychology, in which he made famous the ‘specious present’ doctrine of temporal experience, and Edmund Husserl’s Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, were giant strides in the philosophical investigation of the temporality of experience. However, an important set of precursors to these works has not been adequately investigated. In this article, we undertake this investigation. Beginning with Reid’s essay ‘Memory’ in Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, we trace out a line of development of ideas about (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Jiri Benovsky (2013). The Present Vs. The Specious Present. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):193-203.
    This article is concerned with the alleged incompatibility between presentism and specious present theories of temporal experience. According to presentism, the present time is instantaneous (or, near-instantaneous), while according to specious present theories, the specious present is temporally extended—therefore, it seems that there is no room in reality for the whole of a specious present, if presentism is true. It seems then that one of the two claims—presentism or the specious present theory—has to go. I shall argue that this kind (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Jiri Benovsky (2012). The Speed of Thought. Experience of Change, Movement, and Time : A Lockean Account. Locke Studies 12:85-109.
    This paper is about our experience of change and movement, and thus about our experience of time – at least under the reasonable assumption that we (can only) experience time by having experiences of change. This assumption is shared by Locke, whose view on temporal experience, expounded in Book II, Chap.14 of his Essay, will be the main focal point of my paper. Some of the most influential accounts of temporal experience embrace the notion of a "specious present" as an (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Gustav Bergmann (1960). Duration and the Specious Present. Philosophy of Science 27 (January):39-47.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Evander Bradley McGilvary (1914). Time and the Experience of Time. Philosophical Review 23 (2):121-145.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Berit O. Brogaard (1999). Mead's Temporal Realism. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 35 (3):563 - 593.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. James McKeen Cattell (1886). The Time It Takes to See and Name Objects. Mind 11 (41):63-65.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. C. T. K. Chari (1951). Some Metaphysical Questions About the Doctrine of the 'Specious Present'. Philosophical Quarterly (India) 23 (October):129-138.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Barry Dainton (2012). Self-Hood and the Flow of Experience. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):161-200.
    Analytic philosophy in the 20 th century was largely hostile territory to the self as traditionally conceived, and this tradition has been continued in two recent works: Mark Johnston’s Surviving Death , and Galen Strawson’s Selves . I have argued previously that it is perfectly possible to combine a naturalistic worldview with a conception of the self as a subject of experience , a thing whose only essential attribute is a capacity for unifi ed and continuous experience. I argue here (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Barry Dainton (2011). Time, Passage and Immediate Experience. In Craig Callender (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press. 382.
  13. Barry Dainton (2008). Sensing Change. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):362-384.
    We can anticipate what is yet to happen, remember what has already happened, but our immediate experience is confined to the present, the here and now. So much seems common sense. So much so that it is no surprise to see Thomas Reid, that pre-eminent champion of common sense in philosophy, advocating precisely this position.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Barry Dainton (2008). The Experience of Time and Change. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):619-638.
    Can we directly experience change? Although some philosophers have denied it, the phenomenological evidence is unambiguous: we can, and do. But how is this possible? What structures or features of consciousness render such experience possible? A variety of very different answers to this question have been proposed, answers which have very different implications for the nature of consciousness itself. In this brief survey no attempt is made to engage with the often complex (and sometimes obscure) literature on this topic. Instead, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Barry F. Dainton (2004). Precis of Stream of Consciousness. Psyche 10 (1).
    That our ordinary everyday experience exhibits both unity and continuity is uncontroversial, and on the face of it utterly unmysterious. At any moment we have some conscious awareness of both the world about us, as revealed through our perceptual experiences, and our own inner states.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Barry F. Dainton (2000). Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience. Routledge.
    Stream of Consciousness is about the phenomenology of conscious experience. Barry Dainton shows us that stream of consciousness is not a mosaic of discrete fragments of experience, but rather an interconnected flowing whole. Through a deep probing into the nature of awareness, introspection, phenomenal space and time consciousness, Dainton offers a truly original understanding of the nature of consciousness.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. H. A. C. Dobbs (1951). The Relation Between the Time of Psychology and the Time of Physics Part I. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2 (6):122-141.
    THIS paper seeks to elucidate the phenomenon known in psychology as 'the specious present,' by postulating a two-dimensional theory of the extensional aspects of time. On this theory, the usual logical and psychological difficulties, encountered in current accounts of this phenomenon, can be resolved. For, when there are two dimensions of time, the same event may be without extension in one of these dimensions ('transition-time'), while it is nevertheless finitely extended in the other of these dimensions ('phase-time'); so that in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Patrick K. Dooley (2006). William James's "Specious Present" and Willa Cather's Phenomenology of Memory. Philosophy Today 50 (5):444-449.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Knight Dunlap (1911). Rhythm and the Specious Present. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 8 (13):348-354.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Richard M. Gale (1997). From the Specious to the Suspicious Present: The Jack Horner Phenomenology of William James. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 11 (3):163-189.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Shaun Gallagher (2003). Sync-Ing in the Stream of Experience Sync-Ing in the Stream of Experience: Time-Consciousness in Broad, Husserl, and Dainton. Psyche 9 (10).
    By examining Dainton's account of the temporality of consciousness in the context of long-running debates about the specious present and time consciousness in both the Jamesian and the phenomenological traditions, I raise critical objections to his overlap model. Dainton's interpretations of Broad and Husserl are both insightful and problematic. In addition, there are unresolved problems in Dainton's own analysis of conscious experience. These problems involve ongoing content, lingering content, and a lack of phenomenological clarity concerning the central concept of overlapping (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Shaun Gallagher (2003). Sync-Ing in the Stream of Experience. Psyche 9 (10).
    about the specious present and time consciousness in both the Jamesian and the phenomenological traditions, I raise critical objections to his overlap model. Dainton's interpretations of Broad and Husserl are both insightful and problematic. In addition, there are unresolved problems in Dainton's own analysis of conscious experience. These problems involve ongoing content, lingering content, and a lack of phenomenological clarity concerning the central concept of overlapping experiences.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. John R. Gregg, Time Consciousness and the Specious Present.
    Roger Penrose, in _The Emperor's New Mind_ (1989), writes about the way Mozart perceived music. Mozart did not play a piece in his mind in real time, or even speeded up, but could hold it before him all at once. We all do this, although usually for much shorter riffs than entire symphonies. I have argued that the all-at-onceness of our thoughts and perceptions is at least as inexplicable as what it is like to see red; I think the aural/temporal (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Holly K. Andersen Rick Grush (2009). A Brief History of Time-Consciousness: Historical Precursors to James and Husserl. Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (2):pp. 277-307.
    William James' Principles of Psychology , in which he made famous the "specious present" doctrine of temporal experience, and Edmund Husserl's Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins were giant strides in the philosophical investigation of the temporality of experience. However, an important set of precursors to these works has not been adequately investigated. In this article, we undertake this investigation. Beginning with Reid's essay "Memory" in Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man , we trace out a line of development of (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Edmund G. Husserl (1991). On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917). Translated by John Barnett Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
  26. William James (1886). The Perception of Time. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 20 (4):374 - 407.
  27. Sean D. Kelly (forthcoming). Time and Experience. In A. Brooks & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences. Cambridge.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Sean D. Kelly (2005). Temporal Awareness. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  29. Sean D. Kelly (2005). The Puzzle of Temporal Experience. In Andrew Brook (ed.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 208--238.
    There you are at the opera house. The soprano has just hit her high note – a glassshattering high C that fills the hall – and she holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds the note for such a long time that after a while a funny thing happens: you no longer seem only to hear it, the note as it is currently sounding, that glass-shattering high C that is loud and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Julian Kiverstein (2010). Making Sense of Phenomenal Unity: An Intentionalist Account of Temporal Experience. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):155-181.
    Our perceptual experiences stretch across time to present us with movement, persistence and change. How is this possible given that perceptual experiences take place in the present that has no duration? In this paper I argue that this problem is one and the same as the problem of accounting for how our experiences occurring at different times can be phenomenally unified over time so that events occurring at different times can be experienced together. Any adequate account of temporal experience must (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Laurence J. Lafleur (1942). The Specious Present. Personalist 23:407-415.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Geoffrey Lee (2014). Temporal Experience and the Temporal Structure of Experience. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (3).
    I assess a number of connected ideas about temporal experience that are introspectively plausible, but which I believe can be argued to be incorrect. These include the idea that temporal experiences are extended experiential processes, that they have an internal structure that in some way mirrors the structure of the apparent events they present, and the idea that time in experience is in some way represented by time itself. I explain how these ideas can be developed into more sharply defined (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. J. D. Mabbott (1955). The Specious Present. Mind 64 (July):376-383.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. J. D. Mabbott (1951). Our Direct Experience of Time. Mind 60 (April):153-167.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Evander Bradley McGilvary (1914). Time and the Experience of Time. Philosophical Review 23 (2):121-145.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Neil McKinnon (2003). Presentism and Consciousness. Australian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):305-323.
    The presentist view of time is psychologically appealing. I argue that, ironically, contingent facts about the temporal properties of consciousness are very difficult to square with presentism unless some form of mind/body dualism is embraced.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. William James Quotes Mozart, Time Consciousness and the Specious Present.
    . . . and I spread it out broader and clearer, and at last it gets almost finished in my head, even when it is a long piece, so that I can see the whole of it at a single glance in my mind, as if it were a beautiful painting of a handsome human being; in which way I do not hear it in my imagination at all as a succession - the way it must come later - but (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Clement W. K. Mundle (1954). How Specious is the 'Specious Present'? Mind 63 (January):26-48.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Gerald E. Myers (1971). William James on Time Perception. Philosophy of Science 38 (September):353-360.
    James argued that time is a sensation, and the main point of this paper is to deny that claim. The concept of the specious present is explained, indicating how it clarifies the concept of "the present moment." But neither it nor an argument used by Mach and James show time to be a sensation. The analysis presented here requires distinguishing concepts of sensation from concepts of temporal relations. James' view is really a theory that time-as-duration is sensed. But this assumes (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Thomas Natsoulas (1993). The Stream of Consciousness: William James's Specious Present. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 12:367-385.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Ian Phillips (2010). Perceiving Temporal Properties. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):176-202.
    Philosophers have long struggled to understand our perceptual experience of temporal properties such as succession, persistence and change. Indeed, strikingly, a number have felt compelled to deny that we enjoy such experience. Philosophical puzzlement arises as a consequence of assuming that, if one experiences succession or temporal structure at all, then one experiences it at a moment. The two leading types of theory of temporal awareness—specious present theories and memory theories—are best understood as attempts to explain how temporal awareness is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Ian Phillips (2009). Experience and Time. Dissertation, UCL
    We are no less directly acquainted with the temporal structure of the world than with its spatial structure. We hear one word succeeding another; feel two taps as simultaneous; or see the glow of a firework persisting, before it finally fizzles and fades. However, time is special, for we not only experience temporal properties; experience itself is structured in time. -/- Part One articulates a natural framework for thinking about experience in time. I claim (i) that experience in its experiential (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Gilbert Plumer (1985). The Myth of the Specious Present. Mind 94 (373):19-35.
    The doctrine of the specious present holds that sensation at an instant encompasses objects as they are over an interval. Now there actually is intersubjective agreement with respect to past, present, and future determinations, and it is a necessary condition for legitimately postulating them as objective. I argue that the specious present doctrine would make this actuality an impossibility, and that the data on which the doctrine is based do not in fact support it.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Susan Pockett (2003). How Long is Now? Phenomenology and the Specious Present. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (1):55-68.
    The duration of “now” is shown to be important not only for an understanding of how conscious beings sense duration, but also for the validity of the phenomenological enterprise as Husserl conceived it. If “now” is too short, experiences can not be described before they become memories, which can be considered to be transcendent rather than immanent phenomena and therefore inadmissible as phenomenological data. Evidence concerning (a) the objective duration of sensations in various sensory modalities, (b) the time necessary for (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Sean Enda Power (2012). The Metaphysics of the 'Specious' Present. Erkenntnis 77 (1):121-132.
    The doctrine of the specious present, that we perceive or, at least, seem to perceive a period of time is often taken to be an obvious claim about perception. Yet, it also seems just as commonly rejected as being incoherent. In this paper, following a distinction between three conceptions of the specious present, it is argued that the incoherence is due to hidden metaphysical assumptions about perception and time. It is argued that for those who do not hold such assumptions, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Sean Enda Power (2010). Complex Experience, Relativity and Abandoning Simultaneity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):231-256.
    Starting from the special theory of relativity it is argued that the structure of an experience is extended over time, making experience dynamic rather than static. The paper describes and explains what is meant by phenomenal parts and outlines opposing positions on the experience of time. Time according to he special theory of relativity is defined and the possibility of static experience shown to be implausible, leading to the conclusion that experience is dynamic. Some implications of this for the relationship (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Oliver Rashbrook (2013). The Continuity of Consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):611-640.
    : In this paper I discuss two puzzles that concern the sense in which consciousness can be described as ‘continuous’. The first puzzle arises out of recent work by Dainton and Tye, both of whom appear to oscillate between ascribing the property of ‘continuity’ to the stream of experience, and ascribing it to the objects of experience. The second puzzle concerns the notion that the stream of consciousness could be in some sense unreal or illusory—a puzzle stemming from the thought (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Oliver Rashbrook (2012). Broad's Accounts of Temporal Experience. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1 (5).
    Two extremely detailed accounts of temporal experience can be found in the work of C. D. Broad. These accounts have been subject to considerable criticism. I argue that, when we look more carefully at Broad’s work, we find that much of this criticism fails to find its target. I show that the objection that ultimately proves troubling for Broad stems from his commitment to two principles: i) the Thin-PSA, and ii) the ‘Overlap’ claim. I use this result to demonstrate that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. E. M. Rubenstein (2000). Experiencing the Future: Kantian Thoughts on Husserl. Idealistic Studies 30 (1):61-77.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Bertrand Russell (1915). On the Experience of Time. The Monist 25 (2):212-233.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 51