Hegels "Wissenschaft der Logik" stellt das Logische als selbstbezugliche, sich individuierende Form dar, in Bezug auf die sich die Frage nach einem Individuationsprinzip erubrigt. In seinem Opus magnum schliesst der Wiener Philosoph Franz Ungler die Hegel'sche Logik von dieser Einsicht her auf. Zugleich wird in einer intensiven Lekture der "Begriffslogik" gezeigt, dass im Hegel'schen Begriff des Begriffs die fundamentalphilosophischen Errungenschaften der Ontologie und der Transzendentalphilosophie eingeholt sind. Ungler gelingt auf diese Weise eine exemplarische Verlebendigung Hegel'schen Philosophierens.

El artículo pretende destacar la relevancia de la lógica dialéctica para el concepto de libertad. Al respecto, Ungler comienza señalando algunas dificultades fundamentales que surgen, tanto para la metafísica dogmática como para la filosofía trascendental de Kant en el concepto de libertad. Considerando la filosofía trascendental de Kant, Ungler enfatiza su visión revolucionaria de que la libertad ya no se entiende como una propiedad de una cosa sino más bien como una auto–relación. Sin embargo, el problema fundamental que (...) el concepto de libertad nos reclama, es pensar y, de este modo, resolver la contradicción irresuelta en Kant. Ungler apunta la solución de este problema, considerando los §§ 5–7 de los Fundamentos de la filosofía del derecho de Hegel. Finalmente, las observaciones críticas sobre las tendencias que prevalecen en la interpretación de la libertad demuestran la relevancia del concepto de libertad de Hegel. (shrink)

Dieser Band umfaßt alle Aufsätze des Wiener Philosophen Franz Ungler. Zur antiken Dialektik: Die Bestimmung der Freiheit durch Aristoteles enthält, daß er einerseits die Unvergleichlichkeit menschlicher Freiheit mit entelechialer Notwendigkeit sieht, andererseits das telos menschlicher Praxis in der eudaimonia analog dem natürlich Seienden ansetzen möchte. So ist Aristoteles in die Dialektik des Freiheitsbegriffes eingestiegen; allein diese ist von ihm nicht so betrachtet worden, daß sie systematische Gestalt annehmen konnte. Zur neuzeitlichen Dialektik: Neuzeitliche Transcendentalphilosophie hat den im Begriff der (...) Freiheit implizierten Anfang des philosophischen Systems als solchen gesetzt. Das bedingt ihrer selbst bewußte Dialektik, die sieht, daß das Prinzip des zu vermeidenden Widerspruchs den daseienden Widerspruch voraussetzt. Versuche, Freiheit als sogenannten widerspruchsfreien Begriff zu fassen, sind Bestrebungen, vor der Konkretheit ihres Begriffes in abstrakte, ideologische Vorstellungen zu flüchten. (shrink)

Der Wiener Philosoph Franz Ungler ist ein eminenter Vertreter jener von Robert Reininger und Erich Heintel grundgelegten „Wiener Schule“, deren Hauptanliegen die Aneignung und Vergegenwärtigung der systematischen Errungenschaften der philosophischen Tradition ist. Als einer der wenigen Dialektiker des 20. Jahrhunderts erblickt Ungler die gedankliche Herausforderung dabei darin, einerseits nicht hinter die Errungenschaften der Transzendentalphilosophie in naive Ontologien zurückzufallen, andererseits die Probleme der Transzendentalphilosophie einer haltbaren Lösung zuzuführen. Dazu leistete er in seiner außergewöhnlich reichhaltigen und lebendigen Lehre einen (...) bedeutsamen Beitrag. Diese aus dem Nachlass veröffentlichte Vorlesung widmet sich dem anspruchsvollen Werk des Frankfurter Philosophen Bruno Liebrucks , der im Ausgang von denselben systematischen Grundmotiven die Sprache sowie die Logik ins Zentrum seines Denkens stellt. Dabei eröffnet er neue Perspektiven auf die Sprache und auf die Logik, die sich von jenen des Mainstream des 20. Jahrhunderts deutlich abheben. Ungler entwickelt in dieser Vorlesung die Grundlinien von Liebrucks' Kant- und Hegel-Interpretation, wie sie in dessen Opus magnum "Sprache und Bewußtsein" gegeben werden. Als Propädeutik zu dieser anspruchsvollen Darstellung soll eine Einleitung zur Denkergestalt Unglers und zu Liebrucks‘ denkerischer Entwicklung sowie dessen Begriff der Sprache dienen. (shrink)

Hegels Denken ist keineswegs von bloß historischem Interesse, sondern erweist sich stets von neuem als gegenwartsrelativ systematisch faszinierend. Dies gilt in besonderem Maße für jenes Werk, das für gründlichstes und systematisch anspruchsvollstes Denken unserer Tradition steht: die "Wissenschaft der Logik". Diese Logik ist keine weltlose, sondern schlechthin überall, wo wir auch leben und hinblicken, ist sie ausgebreitet wirklich und gegenständlich - in organischen Bildungen, Gefühlen, Meinungen, Institutionen, Kunstwerken, religiösen Formen, bis hin zu Konstrukten und Zahlen. Alles Natürliche und Geistige ist (...) eine realphilosophisch zu fassende Wirklichkeitsweise von Logischem. Dieser nachzuspüren wird in den Beiträgen dieses Bandes unternommen. Beiträge von Johannes Berchtold, Leo Dorner, Max Gottschlich, Friedrich Grimmlinger, Leo Hemetsberger, Thomas Sören Hoffmann, Heimo Hofmeister, Michael Höfler, Hans-Dieter Klein, Wilhelm Lütterfelds, Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Urs Richli, Josef Simon, Michael Wladika, Kurt Walter Zeidler. (shrink)

Unlike the first English translation in 1974, this edition contains the text corresponding to Brentano's original 1874 edition.

When one thinks—knows, believes, imagines—that something is the case, one’s thought has a topic: it is about something, towards which one’s mind is directed. What is the logic of thought, so understood? This book begins to explore the idea that, to answer the question, we should take topics seriously. It proposes a hyperintensional account of the propositional contents of thought, arguing that these are individuated not only by the set of possible worlds at which they are true, but also by (...) their topic: what they are about. The book then builds epistemic, doxastic, probabilistic, and conditional logics based on this view. It applies them to issues ranging from dogmatism, scepticism, and epistemic fallibilism, to imagination and suppositional reasoning, belief revision, framing effects, and the acceptability of indicative conditionals. (shrink)

We propose a new account of indicative conditionals, giving acceptability and logical closure conditions for them. We start from Adams’ Thesis: the claim that the acceptability of a simple indicative equals the corresponding conditional probability. The Thesis is widely endorsed, but arguably false and refuted by empirical research. To fix it, we submit, we need a relevance constraint: we accept a simple conditional 'If φ, then ψ' to the extent that (i) the conditional probability p(ψ|φ) is high, provided that (ii) (...) φ is relevant for ψ. How (i) should work is well-understood. It is (ii) that holds the key to improve our understanding of conditionals. Our account has (i) a probabilistic component, using Popper functions; (ii) a relevance component, given via an algebraic structure of topics or subject matters. We present a probabilistic logic for simple indicatives, and argue that its (in)validities are both theoretically desirable and in line with empirical results on how people reason with conditionals. (shrink)

First published in 1969. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

I present a formal theory of the logic and aboutness of imagination. Aboutness is understood as the relation between meaningful items and what they concern, as per Yablo and Fine’s works on the notion. Imagination is understood as per Chalmers’ positive conceivability: the intentional state of a subject who conceives that p by imagining a situation—a configuration of objects and properties—verifying p. So far aboutness theory has been developed mainly for linguistic representation, but it is natural to extend it to (...) intentional states. The proposed framework combines a modal semantics with a mereology of contents: imagination operators are understood as variably strict quantifiers over worlds with a content-preservation constraint. (shrink)

We need to understand the impossible. Francesco Berto and Mark Jago start by considering what the concepts of meaning, information, knowledge, belief, fiction, conditionality, and counterfactual supposition have in common. They are all concepts which divide the world up more finely than logic does. Logically equivalent sentences may carry different meanings and information and may differ in how they're believed. Fictions can be inconsistent yet meaningful. We can suppose impossible things without collapsing into total incoherence. Yet for the leading philosophical (...) theories of meaning, these phenomena are an unfathomable mystery. To understand these concepts, we need a metaphysical, logical, and conceptual grasp of situations that could not possibly exist: Impossible Worlds. This book discusses the metaphysics of impossible worlds and applies the concept to a range of central topics and open issues in logic, semantics, and philosophy. It considers problems in the logic of knowledge, the meaning of alternative logics, models of imagination and mental simulation, the theory of information, truth in fiction, the meaning of conditional statements, and reasoning about the impossible. In all these cases, impossible worlds have an essential role to play. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson has defended the claim that the semantics of the indicative ‘if’ is given by the material conditional. Putative counterexamples can be handled by better understanding the role played in our assessment of indicatives by a fallible cognitive heuristic, called the Suppositional Procedure. Williamson’s Suppositional Conjecture has it that the Suppositional Procedure is humans’ primary way of prospectively assessing conditionals. This paper raises some doubts on the Suppositional Procedure and Conjecture.

Tractatus 4.024 inspired the dominant semantics of our time: truth-conditional semantics. Such semantics is focused on possible worlds: the content of p is the set of worlds where p is true. It has become increasingly clear that such an account is, at best, defective: we need an ‘independent factor in meaning, constrained but not determined by truth-conditions’ (Yablo 2014, p. 2), because sentences can be differently true at the same possible worlds. I suggest a missing comment which, had it been (...) included in the Tractatus, would have helped semantics get this right from the start. This is my 4.0241: ‘Knowing what is the case if a sentence is true is knowing its ways of being true’: knowing a sentence’s truth possibilities and what we now call its topic, or subject matter. I show that the famous ‘fundamental thought’ that ‘the “logical constants” do not represent’ (4.0312) can be understood in terms of ways-based views of meaning. Such views also help with puzzling claims like 5.122: ‘If p follows from q, the sense of “p” is contained in the that of “q”’, which are compatible with a conception of entailment combining truth-preservation with the preservation of topicality, or of ways of being true. (shrink)

Unification was originally introduced in automated deduction and term rewriting, but has recently also found applications in other fields. In this article, we give a survey of the results on unification obtained in two closely related, yet different, application areas of unification: description logics and modal logics.

Modal Meinongianism—the version of Meinongianism invented by Graham Priest—presupposes that we can think about absolute impossibilities. I defend the view that we can, by tidying up a couple of loose ends in Priest’s arguments to this effect from his book Towards Non-Being.

Pets are truly great companions. Some individuals feel that owning a pet can help them prepare for a growing family by giving them a taste of what it would be like to have children. This study also looks into the psychological well-being and life experiences of LGBT fur parents. Employing the Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, the findings of this study were: (1) With the presence of fur babies, participants had the ease to overcome stressful events, especially the ones that affect their (...) mental health. With these, they have the desire to take care of their fur babies under all circumstances because they see their fur babies as family members. Fur babies are excellent sources of motivation, confidence, and happiness for fur parents. They are treated as family members because they contribute to the mental and emotional aspects of fur parents. Moreover, the majority of respondents valued their pets far more than their actual family members, however, some didn't spend as much time with their relatives and friends. This study comes to the conclusion that a stronger bond with one's dog was also linked to higher anxiety about being unloved and rejected by family members and people surrounding us, which was linked to a heavier impact on one's psychological well-being. In reality, fur parents, especially LGBT parents, offer their fur babies a lot of love and attention compared to other things. (shrink)

A Logical Introduction to Probability and Induction starts with elementary logic and uses it as basis for a philosophical discussion of probability and induction. Throughout the book results are carefully proved using the inference rules introduced at the beginning. The textbook is suitable for undergraduate courses in philosophy and logic.

Äußerliche Argumente für die Behauptung, daß es gar keiner Beweise für das Dasein Gottes bedürfe . . . Leichtigkeit, mit der die Kinder den Glauben an Gott annehmen, und Übereinstimmung aller Völker in ihm deuten darauf, daß er priori ...

This essay explores Aristotle’s conception of the active intellect or nous poiētikos. The earliest, medieval, and most recent interpretations of this concept are discussed. It is argued that even Aristotle’s immediate disciples disagreed in their conception of the active intellect, nor was there any more unanimity in the Middle Ages. According to Trendelenburg, the difficulty of the Aristotelian doctrine lies in the fact that the nous is sometimes said to be so intimately connected with the other faculties of the soul (...) that it appears to be incapable of existing without them. When it is viewed the highest nous, as nous poiētikos, it is separated from the rest of human nature and contrasted with it as something higher and its ruler. (shrink)

Den 1905 gefaßten Plan einer Gesamtdarstellung der Aristotelischen Lehre brachte Brentano nicht mehr zur Ausführung. Die hier erstmals veröffentlichten Vorarbeiten aus den Jahren 1908 bis 1911 für die Abhandlung »Aristoteles und seine Weltanschauung« bieten einen detaillierten Einblick in das Aristoteles-Bild des späten Brentano.

Ein befreundeter Physiologie machte mich jüngst mit einem überraschenden Falle optischer Täuschung bekannt, der - ich erfrug nicht durch wen - erst kürzlich, ohne Beigabe eines Erklärungsgrundes, veröffentlicht worden war.

Dans son ouvrage de 1874, repris et complété en 1911, puis augmenté à nouveau par une série d’appendices tardifs, dans l’édition procurée par Oscar Kraus, en 1924, Brentano n’est pas seulement celui qui ouvre le dossier très complet des questions psychologiques débattues dans l’après-Kant et jusqu’à la fin du XIXe siècle, dans l’espace intellectuel germanique, mais aussi et principalement anglophone; pas seulement celui qui, à la faveur de la redéfinition, à la fois très ancienne et novatrice, des phénomènes psychiques, caractérisés (...) par l’inexistence intentionnelle de leur objet immanent, ouvre la voie à un nouveau développement de la psychologie, ni rationnelle, ni expérimentale, mais proprement empirique, celle-là même qui se transformera ensuite en psychologie descriptive, puis phénoménologie; par la diversité de son « École », dont on mesure mieux aujourd’hui le rayonnement et la fécondité , par la richesse et le rayonnement de sa propre pensée en philosophie morale, théorie de la connaissance, logique, ontologie, Brentano est enfin reconnu en France – comme c’est déjà le cas depuis longtemps dans beaucoup de pays anglosaxons – comme une figure majeure, après Bolzano, de l’histoire de la philosophie autrichienne et comme un puissant interlocuteur encore présent dans les débats les plus contemporains en philosophie de l’esprit ou en ontologie. (shrink)

This note is a sequel to Huber. It is shown that obeying a normative principle relating counterfactual conditionals and conditional beliefs, viz. the royal rule, is a necessary and sufficient means to attaining a cognitive end that relates true beliefs in purely factual, non-modal propositions and true beliefs in purely modal propositions. Along the way I will sketch my idealism about alethic or metaphysical modality.

In this brief note I show how to model conceptual change, logical learning, and revision of one's beliefs in response to conditional information such as indicative conditionals that do not express propositions.

Kroedel has proposed a new solution, the permissibility solution, to the lottery paradox. The lottery paradox results from the Lockean thesis according to which one ought to believe a proposition just in case one’s degree of belief in it is sufficiently high. The permissibility solution replaces the Lockean thesis by the permissibility thesis according to which one is permitted to believe a proposition if one’s degree of belief in it is sufficiently high. This note shows that the epistemology of belief (...) that results from the permissibility thesis and the epistemology of degrees of belief is empty in the sense that one need not believe anything, even if one’s degrees of belief are maximally bold. Since this result can also be achieved by simply dropping the Lockean thesis, or by replacing it with principles that are logically stronger than the permissibility thesis, the question arises what the permissibility solution is a solution of. (shrink)