This paper investigates the influence of board network centrality on corporate social responsibility decoupling. CSR decoupling refers to the gap between corporate internal and external actions in CSR practices. Specifically, we measure CSR decoupling as the difference between corporate social disclosure and corporate social performance. This paper uses a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms during 2009–2018, takes the technical dimension score and content dimension score of RKS ratings as proxies of CSD and CSP, and obtains CSR decoupling as the (...) difference between CSD and CSP. Our results show that board network centrality is positively related to over-decoupling in the pre-adoption period of the new environmental law but negatively related to over-decoupling in the post-adoption period and centrality is not related to under-decoupling in the pre-adoption period but a significantly positive related in the post-adoption period. Our finding reveals a complex role of the board network in CSR practices in China. (shrink)

According to the received account of guilt in the philosophical literature, one cannot feel guilt unless one takes oneself to have done something morally wrong. But ordinary people feel guilt in many cases in which they do not take themselves to have done anything morally wrong. In this paper, I focus on one kind of guilt without perceived wrongdoing, guilt about being merely causally responsible for a bad state-of-affairs. I go on to present a novel account of guilt that explains (...) guilt about mere causal responsibility, according to which guilt represents part of the self as bound up with what is bad. (shrink)

Call "radical moral theorizing" the project of developing a moral theory that not only tries to conform to our existing moral intuitions, but also manifests various theoretical virtues: consistency, simplicity, explanatory depth, and so on. Many moral philosophers assume that radical moral theorizing does not require any particular metaethical commitments. In this paper, I argue against this assumption. The most natural justification for radical moral theorizing presupposes moral realism, broadly construed; in contrast, there may be no justification for radical moral (...) theorizing if moral anti-realism is true. (shrink)

本书是一本哲学自选文集,它收录了赵汀阳的《伦理学思路的改变》、《道德的维度或生活的维度》、《法律的道德余地》、《人之常情》等19篇文章。.

This paper compares tracking and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories generally do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds of theories. We conclude by suggesting that naturalistic considerations may in fact support phenomenal intentionality theories over tracking theories.

David Papineau’s _The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience_ is deep, insightful, refreshingly brisk, and very readable. In it, Papineau argues that sensory experiences are intrinsic and non-relational states of subjects; that they do not essentially involve relations to worldly facts, properties, or other items (though they do happen to correlate with worldly items); and that they do not have truth conditions simply in virtue of their conscious (i.e., phenomenal) features. I am in enthusiastic agreement with the picture as described so far. (...) But Papineau also argues that sensory experiences are in no interesting sense essentially representational and that what is responsible for their truth conditions is their correlations with the environment. Here, I disagree. Indeed, I think Papineau does not follow his arguments to their proper conclusions. For if sensory experiences are intrinsic, non-relational, and only contingently correlated with worldly conditions (as Papineau and I agree they are), then the phenomenal features of sensory states are representational in an important sense: they constitute what we think, perceptually experience, or otherwise entertain, making up how things seem to us from a first-person perspective. Because of this, the truth conditions of perceptual experiences cannot be entirely independent of their phenomenal features. They cannot merely be a matter of environmental correlations. If we follow Papineau’s arguments to their proper conclusions, we end up with a view much closer to a version of representationalism that Papineau dismisses, a view he calls “pure phenomenal intentionalism”. (shrink)

Background: In 2019, an outbreak of COVID-19 broke out in Hubei, China. Medical workers from all over the country rushed to Hubei and participated in the treatment and care of COVID-19 patients. These nurses, dedicated to their professional practice, volunteered to provide compassion and expert clinical care during the pandemic. As with other acts of heroism, the ethical dilemmas associated with working on the front line must be considered for future practice. Purpose: To explore the ethical dilemmas of frontline nurses (...) of Jiangsu Province in China during deployment to Wuhan to fight the novel coronavirus pneumonia, and to provide a basis for developing strategies to help nursing staff address personal and practice concerns in order to work more effectively during this pandemic and other disasters in the future. Research design and method: Using the phenomenological research method and the purpose sampling method, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 10 nurses, post-deployment to Wuhan, who had worked on the front line to fight the novel coronavirus. Ethical considerations: The research proposal was approved by the Research Ethic Committee of Yangzhou University, China. Findings: From the analysis of the interviews of the 10 participants, three main themes were identified: ethical dilemmas in clinical nursing, ethical dilemmas in interpersonal relationships, and ethical dilemmas in nursing management. Conclusion: During a quick response to public health emergencies, where nurses are deployed immediately as a call to action, the issues surrounding ethical dilemmas from several perspectives must be considered. This research suggests that a team approach to proactive planning and open communication during the emergency is an efficient and productive strategy to improve the nurses’ experience and sense of well-being. (shrink)

White LEDs, which have been widely used in the urban street lighting, are increasingly applied to replace traditional HPS lamps with a lower CCT. Generally, studies on the CCT of street lighting focus on providing safe functional lighting for vehicle drivers. However, it is still unknown how the street light color can affect pedestrians’ perception and preferences with respect to lighting levels and ambient temperature.In this study, a wide range of CCTs was measured for urban street lighting in Beijing, China, (...) for example. And the transition from traditional HPS lamps to LEDs lacks a reference street lighting standard for CCT. The study aims to conduct a cross-sensory test to evaluate urban street lighting with multiple combinations of CCT values and illuminance levels according to pedestrians’ visual perception and psychological preferences.A total of 18 night street lighting scenes with six CCT values and three illuminance levels were first selected in Beijing city, and then HDR videos of these scenes were taken from the view of pedestrians to conduct psychological experiments in an indoor environment with three ambient temperatures. A total of 77 university students were invited to assess videos of the 18 lighting scenes in terms of seven factors, such as lighting brightness, color temperature sensation, light color preference, sense of safety, recognition, comfort, and overall preference. Several key findings were achieved as follows. The CCT of urban street lighting can have significant effects on the visual psychological perceptions of participants. There was a significant interaction between CCT, illuminance, and ambient temperature on the visual psychological performances of participants. The higher ambient temperature will deliver the higher level of overall preference for the street lighting with medium and high CCT, and the perception of warmer light color. There was a strong correlation found between participants’ light color preference, comfort, and overall preferences. (shrink)

本书将马克思主义与科学社会主义置于“当代诠释学的视野”加以解读、追问和探寻,试图在新时代地平线上构建一个当代诠释学与马克思主义相融通的视域。.

本书收录“关于命运的知识”、“从知识眼光到创作眼光”、“一个或所有问题”、“千年观念故事”、“理解20世纪的精神财富”等19篇文章。.

Propositionalism is the view that all intentional states are propositional states, which are states with a propositional content, while objectualism is the view that at least some intentional states are objectual states, which are states with objectual contents, such as objects, properties, and kinds. This paper argues that there are two distinct ways of understanding propositionalism and objectualism: (1) as views about the deep nature of the contents of intentional states, and (2) as views about the superficial character of the (...) contents of intentional states. I argue that we should understand the views in the second way. I also argue that the propositionalism debate is fairly independent from debates over the deep nature of intentionality, and that this has implications for arguments for propositionalism and objectualism from claims about the nature of intentional content. I close with a short discussion of how related points apply to the debate over singular content. (shrink)

The most pressing worry for panpsychism is arguably the combination problem, the problem of intelligibly explaining how the experiences of microphysical entities combine to form the experiences of macrophysical entities such as ourselves. This chapter argues that the combination problem is similar in kind to other problems of mental combination that are problems for everyone: the problem of phenomenal unity, the problem of mental structure, and the problem of new quality spaces. The ubiquity of combination problems suggests the ignorance hypothesis, (...) the hypothesis that we are ignorant of certain key facts about mental combination, which allows the panpsychist to avoid certain objections based on the combination problem. (shrink)

Moods and emotions are sometimes thought to be counterexamples to intentionalism, the view that a mental state's phenomenal features are exhausted by its representational features. The problem is that moods and emotions are accompanied by phenomenal experiences that do not seem to be adequately accounted for by any of their plausibly represented contents. This paper develops and defends an intentionalist view of the phenomenal character of moods and emotions on which emotions and some moods represent intentional objects as having sui (...) generis affective properties, which happen to be uninstantiated, and at least some moods represent affective properties not bound to any objects. (shrink)

Over the past few decades, the dominant approach to explaining intentionality has been a naturalistic approach, one appealing only to non-mental ingredients condoned by the natural sciences. Karen Neander’s A Mark of the Mental (2017) is the latest installment in the naturalist project, proposing a detailed and systematic theory of intentionality that combines aspects of several naturalistic approaches, invoking causal relations, teleological functions, and relations of second-order similarity. In this paper, we consider the case of perceptual representations of colors, which (...) is a challenging case for Neander’s theory. This case will brings out a general methodological concern with Neander’s and other naturalistic theories: these theories generally rest on the assumption that the mental intentionality we are acquainted with in everyday life—the phenomenon exhibited by desires for cups of coffee, perceptual experiences of dogs playing in yards, and thoughts about the weather—is the very same kind of phenomenon that cognitive science studies under labels such as “mental representation” and, in some cases, “information processing.” This assumption is dubious, as the case of Neander’s theory illustrates. (shrink)

Debate about cognitive science explanations has been formulated in terms of identifying the proper level(s) of explanation. Views range from reductionist, favoring only neuroscience explanations, to mechanist, favoring the integration of multiple levels, to pluralist, favoring the preservation of even the most general, high-level explanations, such as those provided by embodied or dynamical approaches. In this paper, we challenge this framing. We suggest that these are not different levels of explanation at all but, rather, different styles of explanation that capture (...) different, cross-cutting patterns in cognitive phenomena. Which pattern is explanatory depends on both the cognitive phenomenon under investigation and the research interests occasioning the explanation. This reframing changes how we should answer the basic questions of which cognitive science approaches explain and how these explanations relate to one another. On this view, we should expect different approaches to offer independent explanations in terms of their different focal patterns and the value of those explanations to partly derive from the broad patterns they feature. (shrink)

As disenchantment began to be recognized as a recurring, never-ending process in recent scholarship, “When Jupiter Meets Saturn” argues that Aby Warburg and Karl Sudhoff’s debate on Reformation astrological medicine provided a new theory of the emergence of modern science and rationality. Drawing on their encounter and divergence in interwar Germany, especially their curatorial collaboration for the 1911 Internationale Hygiene-Ausstellung, the article shows that Warburg and Sudhoff generated completely opposite historical evaluations of astrological medicine using the very same materials. Approaching (...) history as healers, they developed different ways of seeing from medical epistemologies and brought out entangled temporalities from images. (shrink)

本书包括社会建构论与科学社会研究的转向、科学知识社会学的学术实践、双重黑箱:传统社会学的科学观等。.

本书分为五个部分,包括:西方哲学总论;西方哲学史研究;现代西方哲学研究;中西哲学和文化的比较;“大哲学”的观念。.

Levels of organization and their use in science have received increased philosophical attention of late, including challenges to the well-foundedness or widespread usefulness of levels concepts. One kind of response to these challenges has been to advocate a more precise and specific levels concept that is coherent and useful. Another kind of response has been to argue that the levels concept should be taken as a heuristic, to embrace its ambiguity and the possibility of exceptions as acceptable consequences of its (...) usefulness. In this chapter, I suggest that each of these strategies faces its own attendant downsides, and that pursuit of both strategies (by different thinkers) compounds the difficulties. That both kinds of approaches are advocated is, I think, illustrative of the problems plaguing the concept of levels of organization. I end by suggesting that the invocation of levels may mislead scientific and philosophical investigations more than it informs them, so our use of the levels concept should be updated accordingly. (shrink)

Science is the study of our world, as it is in its messy reality. Nonetheless, science requires idealization to function—if we are to attempt to understand the world, we have to find ways to reduce its complexity. Idealization and the Aims of Science shows just how crucial idealization is to science and why it matters. Beginning with the acknowledgment of our status as limited human agents trying to make sense of an exceedingly complex world, Angela Potochnik moves on to (...) explain how science aims to depict and make use of causal patterns—a project that makes essential use of idealization. She offers case studies from a number of branches of science to demonstrate the ubiquity of idealization, shows how causal patterns are used to develop scientific explanations, and describes how the necessarily imperfect connection between science and truth leads to researchers’ values influencing their findings. The resulting book is a tour de force, a synthesis of the study of idealization that also offers countless new insights and avenues for future exploration. (shrink)

The behavior of somatic stem cells is regulated by their niche. Interaction between hematopoietic stem cells (HSCs) and their niches are a representative model to understand stem cell‐niche interplay. Here, we provide an overview of crosstalk between HSCs and their niches in bone marrow and extramedullary organs following the life journey of HSCs from emergence, development, maturation until aging. We highlight the unique differences of HSC niches in different life stages within various organs focusing on recent literature to propose new (...) speculations and hypotheses. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to analyze the relationship between psychology and modern art design education in colleges, and to provide the basis for improving the quality of art education in colleges. Based on the relevant theory, the characteristics of educational psychology and art psychology and the correlation between them were analyzed from the angle of art education. According to the characteristics of college students' psychological development, the significance of art psychology-related courses was analyzed. Through the form of questionnaire, (...) a total of 200 students were randomly selected from Xi'an Academy of Fine Arts and Xi'an University of Science and Technology, respectively. A total of 400 questionnaires were issued, and 382 valid questionnaires were recovered. The results show that almost all students in two colleges think pedagogy and educational psychology are the theoretical basis for art teachers, while less than one-third of students in Xi'an University of Science and Technology think that art psychology is the theoretical basis for art teachers. The difference between the students' aesthetic and life values in the two colleges is significant. In the 15 directions of life values, there are significant differences in five directions: spirit—material, enrichment—emptiness, enthusiasm—apathy, hope—despair, and dedication—acceptance. It shows that the psychological and values of college students are changeable, and the educators should pay attention to the education in the related fields of psychology. This exploration was conducted based on educational psychology, which is of great significance for improving the educational level of art psychology in colleges and enable students to form correct aesthetic standards and life values. (shrink)

This paper argues that there are two distinct kinds of senses, immediate senses and reflective senses. Immediate senses are what we are immediately aware of when we are in an intentional mental state, while reflective senses are what we understand of an intentional mental state's (putative) referent upon reflection. I suggest an account of immediate and reflective senses that is based on the phenomenal intentionality theory, a theory of intentionality in terms of phenomenal consciousness. My focus is on the immediate (...) and reflective senses of thoughts and the concepts they involve, but it also applies to other mental instances of intentionality. (shrink)

According to Lynne Rudder Baker’s Practical Realism, we know that we have beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes independent of any scientific investigation. Propositional attitudes are an indispensable part of our everyday conception of the world and not in need of scientific validation. This paper asks what is the nature of the attitudes such that we may know them so well from a commonsense perspective. I argue for a self-ascriptivist view, on which we have propositional attitudes in virtue of ascribing (...) them to ourselves. On this view, propositional attitudes are derived representational states, deriving their contents and their attitude types from our self-ascriptions. (shrink)

This paper examines the role existence plays in measurement validity. I argue that existing popular theories of measurement and of validity follow a correspondence framework, which starts by assuming that an entity exists in the real world with certain properties that allow it to be measurable. Drawing on literature from the sociology of measurement, I show that the correspondence framework faces several theoretical and practical challenges. I suggested the validity-first framework of measurement, which starts with a practice-based validation process as (...) the basis for a measurement theory, and only posits objective existence when it is scientifically useful to do so. (shrink)

Do the meanings of the innumerable fetish-signs appearing in recent artworks depend on the senders' intentions? Is the meaning of postfeminist glamour the celebration of femininity that its practitioners tout to counter ersatz macho posturing? To fully examine and clarify these and other issues involving gender, postcolonial, and artistic otherness, this book argues for a more adequate view of performativity than presently available from speech-act theory and certain strains of linguistic pragmatics. In drawing simultaneously on Charles Sander Peirce’s pragmatic analysis (...) of signs, Freudian and post-Freudian psychoanalytic inquiry, and radical feminist thought, the concern of Beyond Fetishism is with the ethical and aesthetic import of the psychopragmatics resulting from this intermingling. (shrink)

This chapter argues that olfactory experiences represent either everyday objects or ad hoc olfactory objects as having primitive olfactory properties, which happen to be uninstantiated. On this picture, olfactory experiences reliably misrepresent: they falsely represent everyday objects or ad hoc objects as having properties they do not have, and they misrepresent in the same way on multiple occasions. One might worry that this view is incompatible with the plausible claim that olfactory experiences at least sometimes justify true beliefs about the (...) world. This chapter argues that there is no such incompatibility. Since olfactory experiences reliably misrepresent, they can lead to true and justified beliefs about putatively smelly objects. (shrink)

Whether or not quantum physics can account for molecular structure is a matter of considerable controversy. Three of the problems raised in this regard are the problems of molecular structure. We argue that these problems are just special cases of the measurement problem of quantum mechanics: insofar as the measurement problem is solved, the problems of molecular structure are resolved as well. In addition, we explore one consequence of our argument: that claims about the reduction or emergence of molecular structure (...) cannot be settled independently of the choice of a particular resolution to the measurement problem. Specifically, we consider how three standard putative solutions to the measurement problem inform our under- standing of a molecule in isolation, as well as of chemistry’s relation to quantum physics. (shrink)

本书作者从哲学的角度把复杂性问题概括为五个方面,一一论述其内容,从中引出哲学结论,并以这些哲学结论来纠正、补充、丰富和发展辩证唯物主义的若干原理。.

本书概括了发展社会主义市场经济条件下军人道德品质的主要特点;提出了发展社会主义市场经济条件下军人道德品质培养的主要矛盾是军人道德品质现有水平和培养目标之间的矛盾;揭示了发展社会主义市场经济条件下军人道 德品质培养的基本规律。在以上研究成果的基础上,本文提出了发展社会主义市场经济条件下军人道德品质培养的基本思路和对策。.

A number of philosophers have recently argued that we should interpret the debate over moral responsibility as a debate over the conditions under which it would be “fair” to blame a person for her attitudes or conduct. What is distinctive about these accounts is that they begin with the stance of the moral judge, rather than that of the agent who is judged, and make attributions of responsibility dependent upon whether it would be fair or appropriate for a moral judge (...) to react to the agent in various (negative) ways. This is problematic, I argue, because our intuitions about whether and when it would be fair to react negatively to another are sensitive to a host of considerations that appear to have little or nothing to do with an agent’s responsibility or culpability for her attitudes or behavior. If this is correct, then theories which make attributions of responsibility dependent upon the appropriateness of our reactions as moral judges will turn out to be fundamentally misguided. (shrink)

本书的思想创新和理论力度颇有古代哲学家气度,作者认为伦理学只有幸福和公正两个基本问题,并且声称发现了关于幸福和公正的最好理论,并提出了著名的“无立场”哲学方法论。.

Weak judgmentalism of emotions posits that emotions necessarily involve judgments. However, a standard critique of weak judgmentalism is that it cannot adequately account for the rationality of recalcitrant emotions, which persist despite the agent holding beliefs that conflict with them. This leads to the seemingly counter-intuitive conclusion that recalcitrant emotions are as irrational as logical mistakes. In response to this critique, I make two arguments. First, I distinguish between low-level and high-level beliefs, and argue that having two beliefs with contrary (...) contents at different levels can be rational to some extent. Therefore, weak judgmentalism can explain why recalcitrant emotions are not as irrational as logical mistakes. Second, I argue that recalcitrant emotions involve mental conflicts, while normal emotions do not. By framing the issue in this way, weak judgmentalism can also explain why recalcitrant emotions are not as rational as normal emotions. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIt has recently become fashionable among those who write on questions of moral responsibility to distinguish two different concepts, or senses, of moral responsibility via the labels ‘responsibility as attributability’ and ‘responsibility as accountability’. Gary Watson was perhaps the first to introduce this distinction in his influential 1996 article ‘Two Faces of Responsibility’ , but it has since been taken up by many other philosophers. My aim in this study is to raise some questions and doubts about this distinction and (...) to argue that it has led to confusion rather than clarification in debates over moral responsibility. In place of the attributability/accountability distinction, I propose that there is a single concept of moral responsibility underlying our actual moral practices. This core notion of moral responsibility, which I call ‘responsibility as answerability’, is well positioned to explain thos.. (shrink)

Using data collected at two phases, this study examines why and how ethical leadership behavior influences employees’ evaluations of organization-focused justice, i.e., procedural justice and distributive justice. By proposing ethical leaders as moral agents of the organization, we build up the linkage between ethical leadership behavior and the above two types of organization-focused justice. We further suggest trust in organization as a key mediating mechanism in the linkage. Our findings indicate that ethical leadership behavior engenders employees’ trust in their employing (...) organization, which in turn promotes their justice perceptions toward the organization. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed, and some directions for future research are suggested. (shrink)

Recently, a number of philosophers have begun to question the commonly held view that choice or voluntary control is a precondition of moral responsibility. According to these philosophers, what really matters in determining a person’s responsibility for some thing is whether that thing can be seen as indicative or expressive of her judgments, values, or normative commitments. Such accounts might therefore be understood as updated versions of what Susan Wolf has called “real self views,” insofar as they attempt to ground (...) an agent’s responsibility for her actions and attitudes in the fact (when it is a fact) that they express who she is as a moral agent. As such, they seem to be open to some of the same objections Wolf originally raised to such accounts, and in particular to the objection that they cannot license the sorts of robust moral assessments involved in our current practices of moral responsibility. My aim in this paper is to try to respond to this challenge, by clarifying the kind of robust moral assessments I take to be licensed by (at least some) non-volitional accounts of responsibility and by explaining why these assessments do not in general require the agent to have voluntary control over everything for which she is held responsible. I also argue that the limited applicability of the distinction between “bad agents” and “blameworthy agents” on these accounts is in fact a mark in their favor. (shrink)

Philosophers traditionally recognize two main features of mental states: intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. To a first approximation, intentionality is the aboutness of mental states, and phenomenal consciousness is the felt, experiential, qualitative, or "what it's like" aspect of mental states. In the past few decades, these features have been widely assumed to be distinct and independent. But several philosophers have recently challenged this assumption, arguing that intentionality and consciousness are importantly related. This article overviews the key views on the relationship (...) between consciousness and intentionality and describes our favored view, which is a version of the phenomenal intentionality theory, roughly the view that the most fundamental kind of intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)

The predominant view is that a study using health data is observational research and should require individual consent unless it can be shown that gaining consent is impractical. But recent arguments have been made that citizens have an ethical obligation to share their health information for research purposes. In our view, this obligation is sufficient ground to expand the circumstances where secondary use research with identifiable health information is permitted without explicit subject consent. As such, for some studies the Institutional (...) Review Board/Research Ethics Committee review process should not assess the practicality of gaining consent for data use. Instead the review process should focus on assessing the public good of the research, public engagement and transparency. (shrink)

International research, sponsored by for-profit companies, is regularly criticised as unethical on the grounds that it exploits research subjects in developing countries. Many commentators agree that exploitation occurs when the benefits of cooperative activity are unfairly distributed between the parties. To determine whether international research is exploitative we therefore need an account of fair distribution. Procedural accounts of fair bargaining have been popular solutions to this problem, but I argue that they are insufficient to protect against exploitation. I argue instead (...) that a maximin principle of fair distribution provides a more compelling normative account of fairness in relationships characterised by extreme vulnerability and inequality of bargaining potential between the parties. A global tax on international research would provide a mechanism for implementing the maximin account of fair benefits. This model has the capacity to ensure fair benefits and thereby prevent exploitation in international research. (shrink)