Results for 'weakness of will'

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  1. Weakness of Will, Reasonability, and Compulsion.James R. Beebe - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4077-4093.
    Experimental philosophers have recently begun to investigate the folk conception of weakness of will (e.g., Mele in Philos Stud 150:391–404, 2010; May and Holton in Philos Stud 157:341–360, 2012; Beebe forthcoming; Sousa and Mauro forthcoming). Their work has focused primarily on the ways in which akrasia (i.e., acting contrary to one’s better judgment), unreasonable violations of resolutions, and variations in the moral valence of actions modulate folk attributions of weakness of will. A key finding that has (...)
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  2. Weakness of Will.Christine Tappolet - 2013 - In Hugh LaFolette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 4412-21.
    One difficulty in understanding recent debates is that not only have many terms been used to refer to weakness of will – “akrasia” and “incontinence” have often been used as synonyms of “weakness of will” – but quite different phenomena have been discussed in the literature. This is why the present entry starts with taxonomic considerations. The second section turns to the question of whether it is possible to freely and intentionally act against one’s better judgment.
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  3. Weakness of Will and Akrasia.Alfred Mele - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (3):391–404.
    Richard Holton has developed a view of the nature of weak-willed actions, and I have done the same for akratic actions. How well does this view of mine fare in the sphere of weakness of will? Considerably better than Holton’s view. That is a thesis of this article. The article’s aim is to clarify the nature of weak-willed actions. Holton reports that he is "trying to give an account of our ordinary notion of weakness of will" (...)
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  4. Weakness of Will and Rational Action.Robert Audi - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (3):270 – 281.
    Weakness of will has been widely discussed from at least three points of view. It has been examined historically, with Aristotle recently occupying centre stage. It has been analysed conceptually, with the question of its nature and possibility in the forefront. It has been considered normatively in relation to both rational action and moral character. My concern is not historical and is only secondarily conceptual: while I hope to clarify what constitutes weakness of will, I presuppose, (...)
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  5.  38
    Weakness of Will. The Limitations of Revealed Preference Theory.Aleksander Ostapiuk - 2022 - Acta Oeconomica 1 (72):1-23.
    The phenomenon of weakness of will – not doing what we perceive as the best action – is not recognized by neoclassical economics due to the axiomatic assumptions of the revealed preference theory (RPT) that people do what is best for them. However, present bias shows that people have different preferences over time. As they cannot be compared by the utility measurements, economists need to normatively decide between selves (short- versus long-term preferences). A problem is that neoclassical economists (...)
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  6. Weakness of Will and Practical Judgment.Robert Audi - 1979 - Noûs 13 (2):173-196.
    Weakness of will is a common phenomenon of human experience. But what is it? It has proved highly resistant to analysis, and even the accounts that seem to capture our intuitions about what weakness of will is raise problems about how it is possible. This is because these accounts seem inconsistent with some highly plausible principles about action. My aim here is to propose a new account of weakness of will and its relation to (...)
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  7. Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality.Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.) - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection, written by an excellent international team of philosophers, some well-established, some younger scholars, give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness and compulsion, the connection between evaluative (...)
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  8. Attributability, Weakness of Will, and the Importance of Just Having the Capacity.Jada Strabbing - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):289-307.
    A common objection to particular views of attributability is that they fail to account for weakness of will. In this paper, I show that the problem of weakness of will is much deeper than has been recognized, extending to all views of attributability on offer because of the general form that these views take. The fundamental problem is this: current views claim that being attributionally responsible is a matter of exercising whatever capacity that they take to (...)
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  9. Emotion, Weakness of Will, and the Normative Conception of Agency.Karen Jones - 2003 - In A. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 181-200.
    Empirical work on and common observation of the emotions tells us that our emotions sometimes key us to the presence of real and important reason-giving considerations without necessarily presenting that information to us in a way susceptible of conscious articulation and, sometimes, even despite our consciously held and internally justified judgment that the situation contains no such reasons. In this paper, I want to explore the implications of the fact that emotions show varying degrees of integration with our conscious agency—from (...)
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  10.  51
    Weakness of Will, Akrasia and the Neuropsychiatry of Decision-Making: An Interdisciplinary Perspective.Annemarie Kalis, Andreas Mojzisch, Sophie Schweizer & Stefan Kaiser - 2008 - Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral Neuroscience 8 (4):402-17.
    This article focuses on both daily forms of weakness of will as discussed in the philosophical debate and psychopathological phenomena as impairments of decision making. We argue that both descriptions of dysfunctional decision making can be organized within a common theoretical framework that divides the decision making process in three different stages: option generation, option selection, and action initiation. We first discuss our theoretical framework, focusing on option generation as an aspect that has been neglected by previous models. (...)
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  11.  38
    Weakness of Will From Plato to the Present.Tobias Hoffmann (ed.) - 2008 - Catholic University of America Press.
    This volume contains thirteen original essays on weakness of will by scholars of contemporary philosophy and the history of philosophy. It covers the major periods of Western philosophy.
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  12. Weakness of Will and the Free-Rider Problem.Jon Elster - 1985 - Economics and Philosophy 1 (2):231-265.
    The study of intrapersonal economic relations, or economics , is still at the programmatic stage. There is no generally accepted paradigm, or even as well-defined set of problems that constitute it as a subdiscipline within economics. Some questions are, however, emerging as foci of interest for a small but increasing number of writers, not just in economics, but also in psychology and philosophy. The writings of Thomas Schelling on self-management, of George Ainslie on self-control, and of Derik Parfit on personal (...)
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  13. Weakness of Will.Sarah Buss - 1997 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1):13–44.
    My chief aim is to explain how someone can act freely against her own best judgment. But I also have a second aim: to defend a conception of practical rationality according to which someone cannot do something freely if she believes it would be better to do something else. These aims may appear incompatible. But I argue that practical reason has the capacity to undermine itself in such a way that it produces reasons for behaving irrationally. Weakness of (...) is possible because it is possible to conclude that one has sufficient reason to reject the verdicts of one's own reason. (shrink)
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  14. Weakness of Will.Frank Jackson - 1984 - Mind 93 (369):1-18.
    I think that clear sense can be made of weakness of will in terms of agents' acting against the dictates of their reason; and that this can be done without becoming enmeshed in the faculties of the mind, and without denying what is right about Humean views about reason and desire. My starting point is, in fact, a Humean position about reason and desire.
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  15. Intention and Weakness of Will.Richard Holton - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):241.
    Philosophical orthodoxy identifies weakness of will with akrasia: the weak willed person is someone who intentionally acts against their better judgement. It is argued that this is a mistake. Weakness of will consists in a quite different failing, namely an over-ready revision of one's intentions. Building on the work of Bratman, an account of such over-ready revision is given. A number of examples are then adduced showing how weakness of will, so understood, differs from (...)
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  16. Weakness of Will.William Charlton - 1988 - Blackwell.
  17.  46
    Weakness of Will and Practical Judgement.Sarah Stroud - 2003/2007 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Clarendon Press. pp. 121.
    A practical judgement is one which enjoys an internal, necessary relation to subsequent action or intention, and which can serve as a sufficient explanation of such action or intention. Does the phenomenon of weakness of will show that deliberation does not characteristically issue in such practical judgements? The author argues that the possibility of akrasia does not threaten the view that we make practical judgements, when the latter thesis is properly understood. Indeed, the author suggests that the alleged (...)
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  18. Weakness of Will as Intention-Violation.Dylan Dodd - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):45-59.
    According to the traditional view of weakness of will, a weak-willed agent acts in a way inconsistent with what she judges to be best.1 Richard Holton has argued against this view, claiming that ‘the central cases of weakness of will are best characterized not as cases in which people act against their better judgment, but as cases in which they fail to act on their intentions’ (1999: 241). But Holton doesn’t think all failures to act on (...)
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  19. Weakness of Will.Sarah Stroud - 2008 - In Edward Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
     
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  20. Addiction and Weakness of Will.Lubomira Radoilska - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    Mental conflict not always amounts to weakness of will. Irresistible motives not always speak of addiction. This book proposes an integrated account of what singles out these phenomena: addiction and weakness of will are both forms of secondary akrasia. By integrating these two phenomena into a classical conception of akrasia as poor resolution of an unnecessary conflict – valuing without intending while intending without valuing – the book makes an original contribution to central issues in moral (...)
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  21.  9
    Weakness of Will as Intention‐Violation.Dylan Dodd - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):45-59.
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  22. Skepticism About Weakness of Will.Gary Watson - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (3):316-339.
    My concern in this paper will be to explore and develop a version of nonsocratic skepticism about weakness of will. In my view, socratism is incorrect, but like Socrates, I think that the common understanding of weakness of will raises serious problems. Contrary to socratism, it is possible for a person knowingly to act contrary to his or her better judgment. But this description does not exhaust the common view of weakness. Also implicit in (...)
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  23.  94
    Weakness of Will, Commensurability, and the Objects of Deliberation and Desire.David Wiggins - 1979 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 79:251 - 277.
  24.  49
    Weakness of Will in Renaissance and Reformation Thought.Risto Saarinen - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    In addition to considering the work of a broad range of Renaissance authors (including Petrarch, Donato Acciaiuoli, John Mair, and Francesco Piccolomini), Risto ...
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  25. Non-Psychological Weakness of Will: Self-Control, Stereotypes, and Consequences.Mathieu Doucet & John Turri - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3935-3954.
    Prior work on weakness of will has assumed that it is a thoroughly psychological phenomenon. At least, it has assumed that ordinary attributions of weakness of will are purely psychological attributions, keyed to the violation of practical commitments by the weak-willed agent. Debate has recently focused on which sort of practical commitment, intention or normative judgment, is more central to the ordinary concept of weakness of will. We report five experiments that significantly advance our (...)
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  26.  20
    XV—Weakness of Will Commensurability, and the Objects of Deliberation and Desire.David Wiggins - 1979 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 79 (1):251-278.
  27. Weakness of Will and Motivational Internalism.Voin Milevski - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2):44-57.
    The unconditional version of motivational internalism says that if an agent sincerely judges that to φ in circumstances C is the best option available to her, then, as a matter of conceptual necessity, she will be motivated to φ in C. This position faces a powerful counterargument according to which it is possible for various cases of practical irrationality to completely defeat an agent’s moral motivation while, at the same time, leaving her appreciation of her moral reasons intact. In (...)
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  28.  57
    Weakness of Will.Gwynneth Matthews - 1966 - Mind 75 (299):405-419.
    'Backsliding', 'weakness of, will', ' moral weakness', '"lack of self-restraint', 'lack of self-control'. Do all these have the same meaning ? Is there a philosophical problem here, and if so, what precisely is it? How is an account of what happens in cases to which these terms apply related to the meaning of the words, and to the philosophical problem? These are the questions which I shall try to discuss in this paper.
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  29.  55
    Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. [REVIEW]Christian Miller - 2004 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (2):242-245.
    This volume is a collection of papers, all but one of which were presented at a conference on the same topic at the University of Montreal in 2001. The editors have also added a brief introduction, half of which is devoted to a very quick overview of some of the relevant background literature on weakness of will and practical irrationality, while the other half summarizes the main claims of each of the papers in the volume.
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  30.  55
    Backsliding: Understanding Weakness of Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2012 - Oup Usa.
    People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do. Mele draws on work in social and developmental psychology and in psychiatry to motivate a view of human behavior in which both backsliding and overcoming the temptation to backslide are explicable.
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  31.  69
    Weakness of Will, the Background, and Chinese Thought.Chris Fraser - 2008 - In Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy. pp. 313–33.
    This essay applies John Searle’s account of weakness of will to explore the classical Chinese problem of weak-willed action. Searle’s discussion focuses on the shortcomings of the Western classical model of rationality in explaining weakness of will, so he naturally says little about the practical ethical problem of overcoming weak-willed action, the focus of the relevant Chinese texts. Yet his theory of action, specifically his notion of the Background, suggests a compelling approach to the practical issue, (...)
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  32. What is Wrong with Weakness of Will?Alison Mcintyre - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (6):284-311.
    Many would say that unlike other failures of practical rationality, which can be difficult to recognize, weakness of will wears its rational defect on its sleeve. Whenever we judge that it would be best not to do x, while intentionally doing x without relinquishing this judgment, we condemn quite explicitly the intention on which we act. This observation gives rise to the attractive idea that weak-willed agents indict themselves of irrationality as they fail to comply with their own (...)
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  33.  61
    Weakness of Will.Lubomira V. Radoilska - unknown
    Weakness of will, or akrasia, is an exciting issue at the heart of moral psychology and the philosophy of mind and action. This articleoffers a problem-centered guide to the relevant literature in contemporary analytic philosophy with reference to the main classical texts. The topics covered include: contemporary versus classical conceptions of akrasia, the possibility of weakness of will and its significance within instrumental and substantive theories of practical rationality, the nature of akratic actions and akratic attitudes, (...)
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  34.  49
    Weakness of Will and Character.Thomas Hill - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (2):93-115.
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  35. Weakness of Will and Divisions of the Mind.Edmund Henden - 2004 - European Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):199–213.
    Some authors have argued that, in order to give an account of weakness of the will, we must assume that the mind is divisible into parts. This claim is often referred to as the partitioning claim. There appear to be two main arguments for this claim. While the first is conceptual and claims that the notion of divisibility is entailed by the notion of non-rational mental causation (which is held to be a necessary condition of weakness of (...)
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  36. Weakness of Will.Geoffrey Mortimore - 1971 - New York: St Martin's Press.
  37. What is the Difference Between Weakness of Will and Compulsion?August Gorman - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-16.
    Orthodoxy holds that the difference between weakness of will and compulsion is a matter of the resistibility of an agent’s effective motivation, which makes control-based views of agency especially well-equipped to distinguish blameworthy weak-willed acts from non-blameworthy compulsive acts. I defend an alternative view that the difference between weakness and compulsion instead lies in the fact that agents would upon reflection give some conative weight to acting on their weak-willed desires for some aim other than to extinguish (...)
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  38.  88
    Weakness of Will From Plato to the Present (Review).Petter Korkman - 2009 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (3):pp. 466-467.
    Weakness of will denotes a phenomenon that many would regard as forming part of everyday human experience. I hate to admit to it, but I do sometimes reprimand my children more harshly than I think I should, and similar situations occur daily. This could be an example of weakness of will or incontinence: I will to be constructive and provide a model of calm interaction, but fail to do so because my will is weak (...)
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  39. Inverse Akrasia and Weakness of Will.Richard Holton - manuscript
    The standard account of weakness of will identifies it with akrasia, that is, with action against one's best judgment. Elsewhere I have argued that weakness of will is better understood as over-readily giving up on one's resolutions. Many cases of weak willed action will not be akratic: in over-readily abandoning a resolution an agent may well do something that they judge at the time to be best. Indeed, in so far as temptation typically gives rise (...)
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  40. Rational Capacities, Resolve, and Weakness of Will.Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield - 2010 - Mind 119 (476):907 - 932.
    In this paper we present an account of practical rationality and weakness of will in terms of rational capacities. We show how our account rectifies various shortcomings in Michael Smith's related theory. In particular, our account is capable of accommodating cases of weak-willed behaviour that are not `akratic', or otherwise contrary to the agent's better judgement. Our account differs from Smith's primarily by incorporating resolve: a third rational capacity for resolute maintenance of one's intentions. We discuss further two (...)
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  41.  3
    Weakness of Will and Time Preference.Naoyuki Shiono - 2008 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 16 (1-2):37-55.
  42.  38
    Weakness of Will and the Measurement of Freedom.Nicolas Côté - 2020 - Ethics 130 (3):384-414.
    This article argues for a novel approach to the measurement of freedom of choice, on which the availability of an option is a matter of degree, rather than a bivalent matter of being either available or not. This approach is motivated by case studies involving weakness of will, where deficiencies in willpower seem to impair individual freedom by making certain alternatives much harder to pursue. This approach is perfectly general, however: its graded analysis of option availability can be (...)
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  43.  30
    Weakness of Will as a Species of Executive Cowardice.Christine Swanton - 1991 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):123 - 140.
    In this paper, I am concerned to show that a wide and interesting range of phenomena commonly described as ‘weakness of will’ should be understood as manifesting a defect of what I shall call ‘executive cowardice’ rather than a strong kind of irrationality. More specifically, I claim that such cases should not be understood as an irrational bypassing of an all-things-considered judgment about the thing to do—a view succinctly described by Peacocke thus: The akrates is irrational because although (...)
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  44.  81
    XI. Emotion, Weakness of Will, and the Normative Conception of Agency1: Karen Jones.Karen Jones - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:181-200.
    Empirical work on and common observation of the emotions tells us that our emotions sometimes key us to the presence of real and important reason-giving considerations without necessarily presenting that information to us in a way susceptible of conscious articulation and, sometimes, even despite our consciously held and internally justified judgment that the situation contains no such reasons. In this paper, I want to explore the implications of the fact that emotions show varying degrees of integration with our conscious agency—from (...)
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  45. Jackson on Weakness of Will.Christopher Cordner - 1985 - Mind 94 (374):273-280.
    I begin with a resume ofJ ackson's position. I shall follow this with some counter- examples; and end with a diagnosis of why the problems with Jackson's account arise. In objecting to Jackson's account I am not presupposing the truth of one or other particular account of akrasia. What I am supposing is that unless we recognize some kind of conflict of mind as engaged at the time of action, we are not speaking of akrasia. I hive argued that Jackson, (...)
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  46.  29
    Weakness of Will in Aristotle's Ethics.Theodore Scaltsas - 2016 - Philosophical Inquiry 40 (1-2):30-37.
  47. Weakness of Will, the Background, and Chinese Thought.Kai-Yee Wong & Chris Fraser - 2008 - In Bo Mou (ed.), Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagemen. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers. pp. 313-333.
    This essay applies John Searle’s account of weakness of will to explore the classical Chinese problem of weak-willed action. Searle’s discussion focuses on the shortcomings of the Western classical model of rationality in explaining weakness of will, so he naturally says little about the practical ethical problem of overcoming weak-willed action, the focus of the relevant Chinese texts. Yet his theory of action, specifically his notion of the Background, suggests a compelling approach to the practical issue, (...)
     
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  48.  47
    Autonomy, Self-Control and Weakness of Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2002 - In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.
    This article defends a nonstandard position on free will that is based on three topics linked to contemporary debates about free will: autonomy, self-control, and weakness of will. It argues that autonomy, and hence also free will, requires more than self-control, including ideal self-control. It considers the additional conditions required, showing how contemporary discussions of autonomy are intertwined with debates about free will. These additional conditions for genuine autonomy do not require us to choose (...)
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  49.  78
    Weakness of Will in Aristotle’s Ethics.Theodore Scaltsas - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):375-382.
    I argue that in "en", Aristotle allows not only for weak akrasia but also for "strong akrasia". In weak akrasia, The agent makes only a "nominal" choice according to the right principle, While in strong akrasia he/she makes a "real" choice, But still acts against it. I show that, Although aristotle does not give a detailed account of strong akrasia, Such an account can be reconstructed on the basis of the analyses and examples of choice and akratic behaviour provided by (...)
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  50. Akrasia and Ordinary Weakness of Will.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2012 - Tópicos 43:25-50.
    In this article, I develop an Aristotelian account of akrasia as a primary failure of intentional agency in contrast to a phenomenon I refer to as ‘ordinary weakness of will’: I argue that ordinary weakness of will is best understood as a secondary failure of intentional agency, that to tackle akrasia.
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