Science is increasingly becoming automated. Tasks yet to be fully automated include the conjecturing, modifying, extending and testing of hypotheses. At present scientists have an array of methods to help them carry out those tasks. These range from the well-articulated, formal and unexceptional rules to the semi-articulated and variously understood rules-of-thumb and intuitive hunches. If we are to hand over at least some of the aforementioned tasks to machines, we need to clarify, refine and make formal, not to mention (...) computable, even the more obscure of the methods scientists successfully employ in their inquiries. The focus of this essay is one such less-than-transparent methodological rule. I am here referring to the rule that ad hoc hypotheses ought to be spurned. This essay begins with a brief examination of some notable conceptions of ad hoc-ness in the philosophical literature. It is pointed out that there is a general problem afflicting most such conceptions, namely the intuitive judgments that are supposed to motivate them are not universally shared. Instead of getting bogged down in what ad hoc-ness exactly means, I shift the focus of the analysis to one undesirable feature often present in alleged cases of ad hoc-ness. I call this feature the ‘monstrousness’ of a hypothesis. A fully articulated formal account of this feature is presented by specifying what it is about the internal constitution of a hypothesis that makes it monstrous. Using this account, a monstrousness measure is then proposed and somewhat sketchily compared with the minimum description length approach. (shrink)

In this article I review attempts to define the term “ad hoc hypothesis,” focusing on the efforts of, among others, Karl Popper, Jarrett Leplin, and Gerald Holton. I conclude that the term is unhelpful; what is “ad hoc” seems to be a judgment made by particular scientists not on the basis of any well-established definition but rather on their individual aesthetic senses. Further, a hypothesis considered ad hoc can apparently be retroactively declared non–ad hoc on the basis of subsequent data, (...) rendering the term meaningless. (shrink)

We examine physicists’ charge of ad hocness against the Higgs mechanism in the standard model of elementary particle physics. We argue that even though this charge never rested on a clear-cut and well-entrenched definition of “ad hoc”, it is based on conceptual and methodological assumptions and principles that are well-founded elements of the scientific practice of high-energy particle physics. We further evaluate the implications of the recent discovery of a Higgs-like particle at the CERN’s Large Hadron Collider for the charge (...) of ad hocness against the Higgs mechanism. (shrink)

What does it mean for a hypothesis to be ad hoc? One prominent account has it that ad hoc hypotheses have no independent empirical support. Others have viewed ad hoc judgements as subjective. Here I critically review both of these views and defend my own Coherentist Conception of Ad hocness by working out its conceptual and descriptive attractions.

This article examines a series of Schelling-like models of residential segregation, in which agents prefer to be in the minority. We demonstrate that as long as agents care about the characteristics of their wider community, they tend to end up in a segregated state. We then investigate the process that causes this and conclude that the result hinges on the similarity of informational states among agents of the same type. This is quite different from Schelling-like behavior and suggests that segregation (...) is an instance of macrobehavior that can arise from a wide variety of micromotives. (shrink)

The received view of an ad hochypothesis is that it accounts for only the observation(s) it was designed to account for, and so non-ad hocness is generally held to be necessary or important for an introduced hypothesis or modification to a theory. Attempts by Popper and several others to convincingly explicate this view, however, prove to be unsuccessful or of doubtful value, and familiar and firmer criteria for evaluating the hypotheses or modified theories so classified are characteristically available. These (...) points are obscured largely because the received view fails to adequately separate psychology from methodology or to recognise ambiguities in the use of ''ad hoc''. (shrink)

What is wrong with ad hoc hypotheses? Ever since Popper’s falsificationist account of adhocness, there has been a lively philosophical discussion about what constitutes adhocness in scientific explanation, and what, if anything, distinguishes legitimate auxiliary hypotheses from illicit ad hoc ones. This paper draws upon distinct examples from pseudoscience to provide us with a clearer view as to what is troubling about ad hoc hypotheses. In contrast with other philosophical proposals, our approach retains the colloquial, derogative meaning (...) of adhocness, and calls attention to the way in which the context of a theoretical move bears on the charge of adhocness. We also discuss the role of motivations implicit in the concept of adhocness, and the way ad hoc moves draw on theory-internal rationalizations. (shrink)

Karl Popper defines an ad hoc hypothesis as one that is introduced to immunize a theory from some (or all) refutation but which cannot be tested independently. He has also attempted to explicate ad hocness in terms of certain other allegedly undesirable properties of hypotheses or of the explanations they would provide, but his account is confused and mistaken. The first such property is circularity, which is undesirable; the second such property is reduction in empirical content, which need not (...) be. In the former case, I argue that non-circularity is in any event preferable to non-ad hocness as a necessary condition for a satisfactory explanation or an explanans, as the case may be, and I try to sort out various persistent errors surrounding this comparison. In the latter case, I suggest that Popper is barking up the wrong tree, that important scientific progress sometimes does consist in just such reductions in empirical content as he proscribes. This provides a further reason for not taking ad hoc hypotheses as Popper conceives them to pose the danger for science he believes they do. (shrink)

To date there seems to be no disciplined way of distinguishing between ad hoc hypotheses and legitimate auxiliary hypotheses. This is embarrassing not just for Popperian falsificationist scientific methodology, for the need for such a distinction seems an important part of scientific practice. Do scientists bother about ad hoc hypotheses at all? Did any towering figure in the history of science care about ad hoc hypotheses? Ironically, the answers to these questions seem to be “Yes” and (...) “No” in both cases. Inspired by Paglieri and Woods’ recent proposal for a theory of enthymeme based on the principle of parsimony, I propose to approach the problem of ad hoc hypothesis by interpreting it as a kind of enthymeme resolution. One reason for this interpretative strategy lies in its potential for understanding the pervasiveness and the longevity of the Aristotelian scientific methodology embedded in the scientific practice throughout the ages. (shrink)

I offer an account of ad hocness that explains why the adoption of an ad hoc auxiliary is accompanied by the disconfirmation of a hypothesis H. H must be conjoined with an auxiliary a′, which is improbable antecedently given H, while ~H does not have this disability. This account renders it unnecessary to require, for identifying ad hocness, that either a′ or H have a posterior probability less than or equal to 0.5; there are also other reasons for abandoning that (...) condition. I distinguish between formal ad hocness, which is bad in the probabilistic sense that it results in disconfirmation of H, and argumentative ad hocness, which actually involves bad reasoning on the part of a subject. The latter is what I call “not counting the cost.” This distinction allows us to see why the 0.5 condition appeared attractive in the first place. The concept of not counting the cost also has implications for other areas of research, including both a Bayesian concept of unfalsifiability and the classic epistemological question of the problem of the external world. (shrink)

Das Problem, unter welchen Bedingungen eine Hypothese oder Theorienmodifikation als methodologisch akzeptabel gilt, wird in der wissenschaftstheoretischen Tradition als die Frage des Ad-Hoc-Charakters von Hypothesen diskutiert. Das gleichartige Problem tritt aber auch in Lakatos' Methodologie wissenschaftlicher Forschungsprogramme auf, welche von methodologisch zulässigen Theorienänderungen die Vorhersage 'neuer Tatsachen' verlangt. Über diesen Begriff der neuen Tatsache und damit der Adäquatheitsbedingungen für wissenschaftliche Erklärungen hat sich eine weitgefächerte Debatte entsponnen. In diesem Papier wird der Versuch unternommen, die Forderung der unabhängigen Testbarkeit einer Hypothese, (...) welche im Rahmen der Diskussion des Ad-hoc-Charakters von Hypothesen eine wichtige Rolle spielt, auch für die Frage der Spezifizierung von 'neuen Tatsachen' fruchtbar zu machen. Ich argumentiere zugunsten der Bedingung, daß eine Hypothese als methodologisch akzeptabel gelten sollte, wenn sie zumindest zwei unabhängige Tatsachen erklärt. Ein derartiger Ansatz verlangt die Kennzeichnung dessen, was als 'eine Tatsache' zu gelten hat. Die Schwierigkeit einer derartigen Kennzeichnung ist ein notorisches Problem jedes Kriteriums, das auf unabhängige Testbarkeit zielt. Eine Klärung dieses Problems wird über das Konzept der empirischen Generalisierung versucht. Als 'eine Tatsache' im methodologischen Sinne gilt demnach ein gesetzmäßiger Zusammenhang zwischen zwei Meßgrößen. Dies erlaubt weiterführend eine Klärung des Problems, was methodologisch als 'ein Experiment' zu werten ist, d. h. was als Reproduktion desselben und was als andersartiges Experiment gelten soll. Mit Hilfe dieser Klärungen wird unter anderem der Ad-hoc-Charakter der Lorentzschen Kontraktionshypothese sowie das Problem der Gleich- oder Verschiedenartigkeit von Michelson-Morley- und Kennedy-Thorndike-Experiment untersucht. (shrink)

This paper examines the standard Bayesian solution to the Quine–Duhem problem, the problem of distributing blame between a theory and its auxiliary hypotheses in the aftermath of a failed prediction. The standard solution, I argue, begs the question against those who claim that the problem has no solution. I then provide an alternative Bayesian solution that is not question-begging and that turns out to have some interesting and desirable properties not possessed by the standard solution. This solution opens the (...) way to a satisfying treatment of a problem concerning ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses. (shrink)

Popper's account of refutation is the linchpin of his famous view that the method of science is the method of conjecture and refutation. This thesis critically examines his account of refutation, and in particular the practice he deprecates as avoiding a refutation. I try to explain how he comes to hold the views that he does about these matters; how he seeks to make them plausible; how he has influenced others to accept his mistakes, and how some of the ideas (...) or responses to Popper of such people are thus similarly mistaken. I draw some distinctions necessary to the provision of an adequate account of the so-called practice of avoiding a refutation, and try to rid the debate about this practice of at least one red herring. I analyse one case of 'avoiding' a refutation in detail to show how the rationality of scientific practice eludes both Popper and many of his commentators. Popper's skepticism about contingent knowledge prevents him from providing an acceptable account of contingent refutation, and so his method is really the method of conjecture and conjecture. He cannot do without the concepts of knowledge and refutation, however, if his account of science is to be plausible or persuasive, and so he equivocates between, amongst other things, refutation as disproof and refutation as the weaker notion of discorroboration. I criticise David Stove's account of this matter, in particular to show how he misses this point. An additional advantage Popper would secure from this equivocation is that if refutations were mere discorroborations they would be easier to achieve, and hence more common in science, than is the case. On Popper's weak notion of refutation, it would be possible to refute true theories since corroboration does not entail truth. There are two other related doctrines Popper holds about refutation which, if accepted, make some refutations seem easier to obtain than is the case. I call these doctrines 'Strong Popperian Falsificationism' (SPF) and 'Weak Popperian Falsificationism' (WPF). SPF is the false doctrine that if a prediction from some theory is refuted then that theory is refuted. Popper does not always endorse SPF. In particular, when confronted with a counterexample to it, he retreats to WPF, which is the false doctrine that if a prediction from some theory is refuted then that theory is prima facie refuted. WPF , or even SPF, can seem plausible if one has in mind predictions derived from theories in strong or conclusive tests of those theories, which I suggest Popper characteristically does. v Popper is disposed to describe any such case of predictive failure which does not lead to the refutation of the theory concerned as one in which that refutation has been avoided. To reinforce his portrayal of the refutation, or the attempted refutation, of major scientific theories as the rational core of scientific practice, Popper treats the so-called practice of avoiding a refutation as untypical of science, and much so-called avoidance he dismisses as unscientific or pseudo-scientific. I argue that his notion of avoiding a refutation is incoherent. Popper is further driven to believe that such avoidance is possible, however, because he conflates sentences with propositions and propositions with propositional beliefs. Also, he wishes to avoid being saddled with the relativisim that is a consequence of his weak account of refutation as discorroboration. Popper believes that ad hoc hypotheses are the most important of the unscientific means of avoiding a refutation. I argue that his account of such hypotheses is also incoherent, and that several hypotheses thought to be ad hoc in his sense are not. Such hypotheses appear to be so largely because of Popper's use of rhetoric and partly because these hypotheses are unacceptable for other reasons. I conclude that to know that a hypothesis is ad hoc in Popper's sense does not illuminate scientific practice. Popper has also attempted to explicate ad hocness in terms of some undesirable, or allegedly undesirable, properties of hypotheses or the explanations they would provide. The first such property is circularity, which is undesirable; the second such property is reduction in empirical content, which is not. In the former case I argue that non-circularity is clearly preferable to non-ad hocness as a criterion for a satisfactory explanation or explanans, as the case may be, and in the latter case that Popper is barking up the wrong tree. Some cases of so-called avoidance are obviously not unscientific. The discovery of Neptune from a prediction based on the reasonable belief that there were residual perturbations in the motion of Uranus is an important case in point, and one that is much discussed in the literature. The manifest failure of astronomers to account for Uranus's motion did not lead to the refutation of Newton's law of gravitiation, yet significant scientific progress obviously did result. Retreating to WPF, Popper claims that Newton's law was prima facie refuted. In general, astronomers have never shared this view, and they are correct in not doing so. I argue that the law of gravitation would have been prima facie refuted only if there had been good reason at the time to believe as false what is true, namely, that an unknown trans-Uranian planet was the cause of those Uranian residuals. Knowledge of the trans-Uranian region was then so slight that it was merely a convenient assumption, one which there was little reason to believe was false, that the known influences on Uranus's motion were the only such influences. I conclude that in believing vi or supposing that it was this assumption that was false, rather than the law of gravitation, Leverrier and Adams, the co-predictors of Neptune, were acting rationally and intelligently. Popper's commentators offer a variety of accounts of the alleged practice of avoiding a refutation, and of this case in particular. I analyse a sample of their accounts to show how common is the acceptance of some of Popper's basic mistakes, even amongst those who claim to reject his falsificationism, and to display the effects on their accounts of this acceptance of his mistakes. Many commentators recognize that anomalies are typically dealt with by changes in the boundary conditions or in other of the auxiliary propositions employed. Where many still go wrong, however, is in retaining the presupposition of WPF which encouraged Popper to hold the contradictory view about anomalies in the first place. Thus Imre Lakatos and others, for example, have developed a 'siege mentality' about major scientific theories; they see them as under continual threat of refutation from anomalies, and so come to believe that dogmatism is essential in science if such theories are to survive as they do. I examine various such doomed attempts to reconcile Popper with the history of science. It is a common failure in this literature to conflate or to fail to see the need to distinguish a belief from a supposition, and an epistemic reason from a pragmatic reason. I argue that only if one does draw these distinctions can one give an adequate account of how anomalies are rationally dealt with in science. The other important strand in Popper's thinking about 'avoidance' of refutation which has seriously misled some of his commentators is his unfounded belief in the dangers of ad hoc hypotheses. I examine the accounts that a sample of such commentators provide of the trans-Uranian planet hypotheses of Leverrier and Adams. These commentators imply or assert what Popper only hints at, namely, that there is something fishy about this hypothesis. I provide a further defence of the rationality of entertaining this hypothesis at the time. I conclude with a few remarks about Popper's dilemma in respect of scientific practice and his long standing emphasis on refutations. (shrink)

Barring some civilisation-ending natural or man-made catastrophe, future scientists will likely incorporate fully fledged artificially intelligent agents in their ranks. Their tasks will include the conjecturing, extending and testing of hypotheses. At present human scientists have a number of methods to help them carry out those tasks. These range from the well-articulated, formal and unexceptional rules to the semi-articulated rules-of-thumb and intuitive hunches. If we are to hand over at least some of the aforementioned tasks to artificially intelligent agents, (...) we need to find ways to make explicit and ultimately formal, not to mention computable, the more obscure of the methods that scientists currently employ with some measure of success in their inquiries. The focus of this talk is a problem for which the available solutions are at best semi-articulated and far from perfect. It concerns the question of how to conjecture new hypotheses or extend existing ones such that they do not save phenomena in gerrymandered or ad hoc ways. This talk puts forward a fully articulated formal solution to this problem by specifying what it is about the internal constitution of the content of a hypothesis that makes it gerrymandered or ad hoc. In doing so, it helps prepare the ground for the delegation of a full gamut of investigative duties to the artificially intelligent scientists of the future. (shrink)

Karl Popper (1902-1994) was one of the most influential philosophers of science of the 20th century. He made significant contributions to debates concerning general scientific methodology and theory choice, the demarcation of science from non-science, the nature of probability and quantum mechanics, and the methodology of the social sciences. His work is notable for its wide influence both within the philosophy of science, within science itself, and within a broader social context. Popper’s early work attempts to solve the problem of (...) demarcation and offer a clear criterion that distinguishes scientific theories from metaphysical or mythological claims. Popper’s falsificationist methodology holds that scientific theories are characterized by entailing predictions that future observations might reveal to be false. When theories are falsified by such observations, scientists can respond by revising the theory, or by rejecting the theory in favor of a rival or by maintaining the theory as is and changing an auxiliary hypothesis. In either case, however, this process must aim at the production of new, falsifiable predictions. While Popper recognizes that scientists can and do hold onto theories in the face of failed predictions when there are no predictively superior rivals to turn to. He holds that scientific practice is characterized by its continual effort to test theories against experience and make revisions based on the outcomes of these tests. By contrast, theories that are permanently immunized from falsification by the introduction of untestable ad hoc hypotheses can no longer be classified as scientific. Among other things, Popper argues that his falsificationist proposal allows for a solution of the problem of induction, since inductive reasoning plays no role in his account of theory choice. Along with his general proposals regarding falsification and scientific methodology, Popper is notable for his work on probability and quantum mechanics and on the methodology of the social sciences. Popper defends a propensity theory of probability, according to which probabilities are interpreted as objective, mind-independent properties of experimental setups. Popper then uses this theory to provide a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, though its applicability goes beyond this specific case. With respect to the social sciences, Popper argued against the historicist attempt to formulate universal laws covering the whole of human history and instead argued in favor of methodological individualism and situational logic. Table of Contents 1. Background 2. Falsification and the Criterion of Demarcation a. Popper on Physics and Psychoanalysis b. Auxiliary and Ad Hoc Hypotheses c. Basic Sentences and the Role of Convention d. Induction, Corroboration, and Verisimilitude 3. Criticisms of Falsificationism 4. Realism, Quantum Mechanics, and Probability 5. Methodology in the Social Sciences 6. Popper’s Legacy 7. References and Further Reading a. Primary Sources b. Secondary Sources -/- . (shrink)

A common intuition about evidence is that if data x have been used to construct a hypothesis H, then x should not be used again in support of H. It is no surprise that x fits H, if H was deliberately constructed to accord with x. The question of when and why we should avoid such “double-counting” continues to be debated in philosophy and statistics. It arises as a prohibition against data mining, hunting for significance, tuning on the signal, and (...) ad hoc hypotheses, and as a preference for predesignated hypotheses and “surprising” predictions. I have argued that it is the severity or probativeness of the test—or lack of it—that should determine whether a double-use of data is admissible. I examine a number of surprising ambiguities and unexpected facts that continue to bedevil this debate. (shrink)

We have seen that proofs of soundness of (Boolean) DS, EFQ and of ABS — and hence the legitimation of these inferences — can be achieved only be appealing to the very form of reasoning in question. But this by no means implies that we have to fall back on classical reasoning willy-nilly. Many logical theories can provide the relevant boot-strapping. Decision between them has, therefore, to be made on other grounds. The grounds include the many criteria familiar from the (...) philosophy of science: theoretical integrity (e.g., paucity of ad hoc hypotheses), adequacy to the data (explaining the data of inference —all inferences, not just those chosen from consistent domains!) and so on. This paper has not attempted to address these issues in general. All it demonstrates is that the charge that a dialetheist solution to the semantic paradoxes can be maintained only by making some intelligible notion ineffable cannot be made to stick. The dialetheist has a coherent position, endorsing the T-scheme, but rejecting DS, EFQ (even Boolean DS and EFQ) and ABS. And any argument to the effect that the relevant notions are both ineffable and intelligible begs the question. The case against consistent “solutions” to the semantic paradoxes therefore remains intact. (shrink)

In this paper I comment on a recent paper by [Scerri, E., & Worrall, J. . Prediction and the periodic table. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 32, 407–452.] about the role temporally novel and use-novel predictions played in the acceptance of Mendeleev’s periodic table after the proposal of the latter in 1869. Scerri and Worrall allege that whereas temporally novel predictions—despite Brush’s earlier claim to the contrary—did not carry any special epistemic weight, use-novel predictions did indeed contribute to (...) the acceptance of the table. Although I agree with their first claim, I disagree with their second. In order to spell out my disagreement, I not only revisit Scerri and Worrall’s interpretation of crucial historical evidence they have cited in support of the ‘heuristic account’ of use-novel predictions, but I also criticise the latter on general grounds.Keywords: Periodic table; Dmitri Mendeleev; Noble gases; Use-novel predictions; Heuristic account; Ad hoc hypotheses. (shrink)

The fallibility and corrigibility of experimental results, and of the confirmation or refutation based on those results, is illustrated in the 1930's history of Fermi's theory of decay. Early results favored the competing theory of Konopinski and Uhlenbeck. It was found that there were experimental difficulties along with an incorrect theoretical comparison. When the experiments were corrected and the proper theoretical calculations made, the evidence favored Fermi and refuted Konopinski and Uhlenbeck. The relevance of known evidence for confirmation and the (...) value of ad hoc hypotheses is also discussed. (shrink)

I confront Feyerabend's position and critical rationalism in order to have a foundation or starting point for my (historical) investigation. The main difference of his position towards falsificationism is the belief that different theories cannot be discussed rationally. Feyerabend is convinced that Galilei's observations with the telescope in the historical context of the Copernican revolution supports his criticism. In particular, he argues that the Copernican theory was supported by deficient hypotheses, and falsifications were disposed by ad hoc hypotheses (...) and propaganda. Furthermore, he claims that his philosophy of science reconstructs Galilei's defence of the Copernican theory. He introduces a central principle of his position (the principle of tenacity) in order to justify a research strategy of not eliminating falsified theories. He tries to show that the tenacious defence of a theory corresponds to Galilei's defence of the Copernican theory. Remarkably, Feyerabend's approach to explain the development of science earns an important support from his interpretation of Galilei's observations. On this basis I give a falsificationist interpretation of Galilei's observations with the telescope, and oppose this interpretation to Feyerabend's. From a falsificationist perspective, auxiliary hypotheses compete during the Copernican revolution which can (with some effort) be critically discussed. Then I analyse the historical case in order to test Feyerabend's interpretation of the Copernican revolution. Inter alias I investigate thoroughly whether Galilei, as Feyerabend claims, immunised falsifications of the Copernican theory by the introduction of ad hoc hypotheses. The investigation considers Galilei's explanation of Venus' phases, his establishment of the irradiation hypothesis, the explanation of the telescope's functionality, and the role of the reproducibility of the observations with the telescope. Finally I provide a rational reconstruction of Galilei's falsification of the Ptolemaic theory. The formalisation shows that Galilei was not a cautious critical rationalist, but a very confident scientist using the method of falsification. (shrink)

Summary The first systematic studies on the velocity of chemical reactions (now called reaction rates) were published in the 1850s and 1860s. Inquiring about the course of chemical change, their authors established empirical equations on the basis of their measurement results. But these laws, which represented reaction velocities as proportional to the actual concentration of the reagents, could not be given a physical foundation. The chemists themselves regarded their propositions as mere ad hoc hypotheses. In 1867 Leopold Pfaundler formulated (...) a qualitative theory of chemical processes based on Clausius's version of the kinetic gas theory (and more specifically on his theory of evaporation), and on Saint-Claire Deville's investigations of dissociation processes. Pfaundler's theory was based on farreaching analogies: between evaporation and dissociation; between the gaseous state and the activated state; and between evaporation- and chemical-equilibrium. Four points of Pfaundler's theory must be regarded as essential: (1) the reduction of chemical change to randomly occurring molecular collisions, only showing regularities in great numbers according to the laws of probability; (2) the idea that molecules are in different states of internal and external motion, which determines whether a collision results in a reaction; (3) the view of the reaction step as a transition from internal to external motion and vice versa; and (4) the introduction of a new molecular-kinetic definition of chemical affinity as the maximum of internal motion. With these assumptions, Pfaundler provided the empirical rate equations with a new statistical interpretation and a physical Justification. (shrink)

I propose a qualitative Bayesian account of explanatory goodness that is analogous to the Bayesian account of incremental confirmation. This is achieved by means of a complexity criterion according to which an explanation h is good if the reduction in the complexity of the explanandum e brought about by h (the explanatory gain) is greater than the additional complexity introduced by h in the context of e (the explanatory cost). To illustrate the account, I apply it in the context of (...) ad hoc hypotheses. (shrink)

The institutions we create shape many of the activities we engage insofar as they are pervasive entities in our society. In an era full of new technologies, including the semantic web, there is a movement toward sound conceptual modeling for socio-technical solutions applied to government institutions. To develop these complex solutions, one needs to deepen the ontological status of entities in the institutional domain, because literature is full of ambiguous and ad-hoc hypotheses about distinctions between public and private corporations. (...) We believe we can find better explanations for such distinctions in the interdisciplinary field of library a information science. Within an ongoing semantic web project, we focus on a study case of official documents. First, we analyze theories about public and private corporations, seeking a reliable on‘tological distinction between them; then, by focusing on documents produced by each type of corporation, we hope to provide a well-founded analysis. Second, we adopt the aforementioned theories and the new analysis as recommendations for the improvement for the access and understanding of public documents, through appropriate classification of them within government information systems. This project, ultimately, aims to maximize the transparency of public government documents by favoring retrieval and comprehension by a society with plenty of automated information systems. (shrink)

Sober has reconstructed the biological design argument in the framework of likelihoodism, purporting to demonstrate that it is defective for intrinsic reasons. We argue that Sober’s restriction on the introduction of auxiliary hypotheses is too restrictive, as it commits him to rejecting types of everyday reasoning that are clearly valid. Our account shows that the design argument fails, not because it is intrinsically untestable but because it clashes with the empirical evidence and fails to satisfy certain theoretical desiderata (in (...) particular, unification). Likewise, Sober’s critique of the arguments from imperfections and from evil against design is off the mark. (shrink)

In this slim but excessively priced volume, Paul Horwich attempts "to exhibit a unified approach to philosophy of science, based on the concept of subjective probability... by offering new treatments of several problems... and... by providing a more complete probabilistic account of scientific methods and assumptions than has been given before". Starting with the view that beliefs are not all-or-nothing matters but rather are susceptible to varying degrees of intensity, and interpreting this via a modified Bayesian use of subjective probability, (...) Horwich treats well-known puzzles in philosophy of science by considering the following topics: accommodation of data, statistical evidence, severe tests, surprising predictions, paradox of confirmation, the "grue" problem, simplicity, ad hoc hypotheses, diverse evidence, prediction vs. accommodation, desirability of further evidence, and realism vs. instrumentalism. Preceding treatment of these topics is an acceptance of the Bayesian principle that "the degrees of belief of an ideally rational person conform to the mathematical principles of probability theory" and a treatment of probability theory and its various standard interpretations which comprises a quarter of the text. (shrink)

There is abundant evidence of contextual variation in the use of “S knows p.” Contextualist theories explain this variation in terms of semantic hypotheses that refer to standards of justification determined by “practical” features of either the subject’s context (Hawthorne & Stanley) or the ascriber’s context (Lewis, Cohen, & DeRose). There is extensive linguistic counterevidence to both forms. I maintain that the contextual variation of knowledge claims is better explained by common pragmatic factors. I show here that one is (...) variable strictness. “S knows p” is commonly used loosely to implicate “S is close enough to knowing p for contextually indicated purposes.” A pragmatic account may use a range of semantics, even contextualist. I use an invariant semantics on which knowledge requires complete justification. This combination meets the Moorean constraint as well as any linguistic theory should, and meets the intuition constraint much better than contextualism. There is no need for ad hoc error theories. The variation in conditions of assertability and practical rationality is better explained by variably strict constraints. It will follow that “S knows p” is used loosely to implicate that the condition for asserting “p” and using it in practical reasoning are satisfied. (shrink)

It has been pointed out that Gettier case scenarios have deviant realizations and that deviant realizations raise a difficulty for the logical analysis of thought experiments. Grundmann and Horvath have shown that it is possible to rule out deviant realizations by suitably modifying the scenario of a Gettier-style thought experiment. They hypothesize further that the enriched scenario corresponds to the way expert epistemologists implicitly interpret the original one. However, no precise account of this implicit enrichment is offered, which makes the (...) proposal somewhat ad hoc. Drawing on pragmatic theory, I argue that the content of Grundmann and Horvath’s modified scenario corresponds to the default interpretation of the original scenario and that epistemological expertise is not required to access the deviance-proof interpretation. This Default Interpretation proposal offers thus a more general and independently motivated solution to the Problem of Deviant Realizations. (shrink)

A Bayesian network (BN) is a graphical model of uncertainty that is especially well suited to legal arguments. It enables us to visualize and model dependencies between different hypotheses and pieces of evidence and to calculate the revised probability beliefs about all uncertain factors when any piece of new evidence is presented. Although BNs have been widely discussed and recently used in the context of legal arguments, there is no systematic, repeatable method for modeling legal arguments as BNs. Hence, (...) where BNs have been used in the legal context, they are presented as completed pieces of work, with no insights into the reasoning and working that must have gone into their construction. This means the process of building BNs for legal arguments is ad hoc, with little possibility for learning and process improvement. This article directly addresses this problem by describing a method for building useful legal arguments in a consistent and repeatable way. The method complements and extends recent work by Hepler, Dawid, and Leucari (2007) on object-oriented BNs for complex legal arguments and is based on the recognition that such arguments can be built up from a small number of basic causal structures (referred to as idioms). We present a number of examples that demonstrate the practicality and usefulness of the method. (shrink)

Das Problem, unter welchen Bedingungen eine Hypothese oder Theorienmodifikation als methodologisch akzeptabel gilt, wird in der wissenschaftstheoretischen Tradition als die Frage des Ad-Hoc-Charakters von Hypothesen diskutiert. Das gleichartige Problem tritt aber auch in Lakatos' Methodologie wissenschaftlicher Forschungsprogramme auf, welche von methodologisch zulässigen Theorienänderungen die Vorhersage 'neuer Tatsachen' verlangt. Über diesen Begriff der neuen Tatsache und damit der Adäquatheitsbedingungen für wissenschaftliche Erklärungen hat sich eine weitgefächerte Debatte entsponnen. In diesem Papier wird der Versuch unternommen, die Forderung der unabhängigen Testbarkeit einer Hypothese, (...) welche im Rahmen der Diskussion des Ad-hoc-Charakters von Hypothesen eine wichtige Rolle spielt, auch für die Frage der Spezifizierung von 'neuen Tatsachen' fruchtbar zu machen. Ich argumentiere zugunsten der Bedingung, daß eine Hypothese als methodologisch akzeptabel gelten sollte, wenn sie zumindest zwei unabhängige Tatsachen erklärt. Ein derartiger Ansatz verlangt die Kennzeichnung dessen, was als 'eine Tatsache' zu gelten hat. Die Schwierigkeit einer derartigen Kennzeichnung ist ein notorisches Problem jedes Kriteriums, das auf unabhängige Testbarkeit zielt. Eine Klärung dieses Problems wird über das Konzept der empirischen Generalisierung versucht. Als 'eine Tatsache' im methodologischen Sinne gilt demnach ein gesetzmäßiger Zusammenhang zwischen zwei Meßgrößen. Dies erlaubt weiterführend eine Klärung des Problems, was methodologisch als 'ein Experiment' zu werten ist, d. h. was als Reproduktion desselben und was als andersartiges Experiment gelten soll. Mit Hilfe dieser Klärungen wird unter anderem der Ad-hoc-Charakter der Lorentzschen Kontraktionshypothese sowie das Problem der Gleich- oder Verschiedenartigkeit von Michelson-Morley- und Kennedy-Thorndike-Experiment untersucht. (shrink)

L’objectif de ce texte est double: expliquer certaines limitations des approches traditionnelles du succès des théories, et esquisser un critère pour l’évaluation comparative des succès empiriques d’une théorie. On insiste sur les points suivants: a) la supériorité de la prédiction sur l’adaptation, b) la résolution des anomalies non-réfutantes et c) l’utilisation limitée d’hypothèses ad hoc. Après une première partie consacrée à lever les ambiguïtés de l’expression « succès d’une théorie », la deuxième partie traite de quelques-unes des principales lacunes des (...) approches conséquentialistes traditionnelles du succès des théories. Enfin, dans la dernière section, on esquisse le critère de succès empirique d’une théorie et on donne quelques éléments pour renforcer ce critère. (shrink)

L’objectif de ce texte est double: expliquer certaines limitations des approches traditionnelles du succès des théories, et esquisser un critère pour l’évaluation comparative des succès empiriques d’une théorie. On insiste sur les points suivants: a) la supériorité de la prédiction sur l’adaptation, b) la résolution des anomalies non-réfutantes et c) l’utilisation limitée d’hypothèses ad hoc. Après une première partie consacrée à lever les ambiguïtés de l’expression « succès d’une théorie », la deuxième partie traite de quelques-unes des principales lacunes des (...) approches conséquentialistes traditionnelles du succès des théories. Enfin, dans la dernière section, on esquisse le critère de succès empirique d’une théorie et on donne quelques éléments pour renforcer ce critère. (shrink)

Many philosophers agree that there is an epistemic norm governing action. However, they disagree on what this norm is. It has been observed that the word ‘know’ is prominent in ordinary epistemic evaluations of actions. Any opponent of the knowledge norm must provide an explanation of this fact. Gerken has recently proposed the most developed explanation. It invokes the hypothesis that, in normal contexts, knowledge-level warrant is frequently necessary and very frequently sufficient (Normal Coincidence), so that knowledge-based assessments would be (...) a good heuristic for practical reasoning and epistemic evaluations of action. In this paper, I raise three problems for this approach. First, I argue that Normal Coincidence is ad hoc: it relies on an unsupported frequency hypothesis that we should expect to be false given the warrant account that Gerken also endorses. Second, I argue that, in any case, Normal Coincidence is insufficient to support the hypothesis that knowledge-based evaluation of action constitutes a good heuristic. Third, I consider three other hypotheses close to Normal Coincidence apparently more likely to support the heuristic hypothesis, but I argue that they seem even more ad hoc than Normal Coincidence. (shrink)

All of us, including scientists, make judgments about what is true or false, probable or improbable. And in the process, we frequently appeal to concepts such as evidential support or explanation. Bayesian philosophers of science have given illuminating formal accounts of these concepts. This paper aims to follow in their footsteps, providing a novel formal account of various additional concepts: the likelihood-prior trade-off, successful accommodation of evidence, ad hocness, and, finally, consilience—sometimes also called “unification”. Using these accounts, I also provide (...) a new Bayesian analysis of how someone such as Charles Darwin hypothetically could have reasoned in favor of evolution over special creationism. Lastly, I explore how these accounts relate to other topics and accounts in philosophy, and I chart out some areas for further research. (shrink)

Both paleobiology and investigations of ‘major evolutionary transitions’ are intimately concerned with the macroevolutionary shape of life. It is surprising, then, how little studies of major transitions are informed by paleontological perspectives and. I argue that this disconnect is partially justified because paleobiological investigation is typically ‘phenomena-led’, while investigations of major transitions are ‘theory-led’. The distinction turns on evidential relevance: in the former case, evidence is relevant in virtue of its relationship to some phenomena or hypotheses concerning those phenomena; (...) in the latter, evidence is relevant in virtue of providing insights into, or tests of, an abstract body of theory. Because paleobiological data is by-and-large irrelevant to the theory which underwrites the traditional conception of major transitions, it is of limited use to that research program. I suggest that although the traditional conception of major transitions is neither ad-hoc or problematically incomplete, its promise of providing unificatory explanations of the transitions is unlikely to be kept. Further, examining paleobiological investigations of mass extinctions and organogenesis, I further argue that whether or not transitions in paleobiology count as ‘major’ turns on how we conceive of major transitions ; although major transitions potentially have a unified theoretical basis, recent developments suggest that investigations are becoming increasingly phenomena-led; adopting phenomena-led investigations maximizes the evidence available to paleobiologists. (shrink)

My criticisms of parapsychology are neither based on its subject matter per se, nor simply on a charge of sloppy research, but rather on the whole pattern of theory and research in this domain. The lack of a positive definition of psi, the use of ad hoc principles such as psi-missing and the experimenter psi effect to account for failures to confirm hypotheses, and the failure to produce a single phenomenon that can be replicated by neutral investigators are among (...) the major problems that keep parapsychology outside regular science. Glicksohn and I agree that anomalous experiences should be investigated. (shrink)

Both advocates and opponents of the fine-tuning argument treat multiple universes with a selection effect as a legitimate hypothesis to explain the life-permitting values of the constants in our universe. I argue that, except where there is specific relevant prior information, the occurrence of multiple instances of a low-likelihood causal process should not be treated as an alternative hypothesis to a higher-likelihood causal process. Since an ’ad hoc’ hypothesis can be invented to give high likelihood to any evidence, we must (...) provide some epistemic rationale other than similar likelihood for comparing two hypotheses. (shrink)

Considered in its historical context, conventionalism is quite different from the way in which it has been caricatured in more recent philosophy of science, that is, as a conservative philosophy that allows the preservation of theories through arbitrary ad hoc stratagems. It is instead a liberal outgrowth of Comtean positivism, which broke with the Reidian interpretation of the Newtonian tradition in France and defended a role for hypotheses in the sciences. It also has roots in the social contract political (...) philosophy of Renouvier, who explicitly drew the analogy between conventions in political life and the conventional acceptance of hypotheses in the sciences, and conceived a philosophy that permits scientists to set aside foundational worries and explore new ideas. Although Poincaré and Renouvier may have hesitated to accept certain then recent developments in mathematics and the sciences such as non-Euclidean geometries, this conservatism cannot necessarily be attributed to their conventionalism. It may instead reflect the engineering background they shared with Comte, which emphasizes practical applications. Although Renouvier and Poincaré may have seen no practical use for these new ideas, unlike Comte they did not prohibit others from pursuing them, reflecting conventionalism’s more liberal attitude toward recent developments in the sciences. (shrink)

Progress has become a suspect concept in evolutionary biology, not the least because the core concepts of neo-Darwinism do not support the idea that evolution is progressive. There have been a number of attempts to account for directionality in evolution through additions to the core hypotheses of neo-Darwinism, but they do not establish progressiveness, and they are somewhat of an ad hoc collection. The standard account of fitness and adaptation can be rephrased in terms of information theory. From this, (...) an information of adaptation can be defined in terms of a fitness function. The information of adaptation is a measure of the mutual information between biota and their environment. If the actual state of adaptation lags behind the state of optimal adaptation, then it is possible for the information of adaptation to increase indefinitely. Since adaptations are functional, this suggests the possibility of progressive evolution in the sense of increasing adaptation. Keywords: evolution, information, adaptation, fitness, entropy, progress.. (shrink)

In this work we try to study theories of causation based upon causal processes and causal interactions in the context of classical and quantum physics. Our central aim is to find out whether such causal theories are compatible with the world picture suggested by contemporary theories of physics. In the first part, we review, compare and try to place among more general taxonomical schemes, the causal theories by Russell (the causal lines approach), Reichenbach (mark method, probabilistic causality and the principle (...) of common cause), Salmon (mark method, structure, invariant and conserved quantities approaches) and Dowe (conserved quantity theory). In the second part of the work, we deal with some problems that process theories of causation face whenever one tries to define, rigorously, causal concepts (e.g. “causal process” or “conjunctive common cause”) in the context of classical relativistic physical theories (van Dam – Wigner particle theory, the free Klein-Gordon field, classical electromagnetic theory) as well as quantum theories (algebraic relativistic quantum field theory). In this vein, special attention has been given to the locality problem in physical theories as it emerges from the structure of local classical the quantum theories (semantic locality), the relation between global and local conditions for physical systems (global and local determinism) as well as the problem of action at a distance, which is of central importance for the theories of causation under examination (Bell’s inequalities, EPR paradox, Reeh-Schlieder theorem and local independence conditions). We argue for three different theses: first, there are physical theories in the context of which it is impossible even to formulate the necessary physical hypotheses that allow us to define basic causal concepts and causal principles; second, there are physical theories which allow us to formulate these hypotheses only ad hoc; finally, in some cases it is necessary to revise basic causal principles and concepts bequeathed by the philosophical tradition. (shrink)

Gothic cathedrals like Chartres were built in a discontinuous process by groups of masons using their own local knowledge, measures, and techniques. They had neither plans nor knowledge of structural mechanics. The success of the masons in building such large complex innovative structures lies in the use of templates, string, constructive geometry, and social organization to assemble a coherent whole from the messy heterogeneous practices of diverse groups of workers. Chartres resulted from the ad hoc accumulation of the work of (...) many men. (shrink)

Many philosophers agree that there is an epistemic norm governing action. However, they disagree on what this norm is. It has been observed that the word ‘know’ is prominent in ordinary epistemic evaluations of actions. Any opponent of the knowledge norm must provide an explanation of this fact. Gerken has recently proposed the most developed explanation. It invokes the hypothesis that, in normal contexts, knowledge-level warrant is frequently necessary and very frequently sufficient (Normal Coincidence), so that knowledge-based assessments would be (...) a good heuristic for practical reasoning and epistemic evaluations of action. In this paper, I raise three problems for this approach. First, I argue that Normal Coincidence is ad hoc: it relies on an unsupported frequency hypothesis that we should expect to be false given the warrant account that Gerken also endorses. Second, I argue that, in any case, Normal Coincidence is insufficient to support the hypothesis that knowledge-based evaluation of action constitutes a good heuristic. Third, I consider three other hypotheses close to Normal Coincidence apparently more likely to support the heuristic hypothesis, but I argue that they seem even more ad hoc than Normal Coincidence. (shrink)

Wireless ad hoc communication on the nanoscale will require thinking outside of the traditional radio spectrum. New applications will utilize new forms of wireless communication channels. For example, nanoscale communication will enable precise mechanisms for directly interacting with cells in vivo. Information may be sent to and from specific cells within the body, allowing detection and healing of diseases on the cellular scale. From a medical standpoint, the use of current wireless techniques to communicate with implants is unacceptable for many (...) reasons, including bulky size, inability to use magnetic resonance imaging after implantation, potential radiation damage, surgical invasiveness, need to recharge/replace power, post-operative pain and long recovery times, and reduced quality of life for the patient. Better, more humane in vivo implant communication is needed. Development of both biological and engineered nanomachines is progressing; such machines will need to communicate [1]. Unfortunately, networking vast collections of nanoscale sensors and robots using current techniques, including wireless techniques, is not possible without communication mechanisms that exceed nanoscale volumes. (shrink)

Imagine two urns, each with a thousand beads - in one all the beads are blue while in the other only one of the thousand is blue. If one of these urns is pushed forward (based on the toss of a fair coin) and the single bead then randomly drawn from it is blue, we must infer that it is a thousand times more probable that the urn pushed forward is the purely blue one. The hypothesis that this was instead (...) the urn with only one blue bead would require that the occurrence of the evidence, the blue bead being drawn, was something improbable - and it is improbable that something improbable is what has occurred. Next consider an example of only one urn with no prior description. By the same reasoning as above, if all the first beads randomly drawn are blue, it is becoming more and more probable that the beads in the urn are generally blue. (Otherwise something improbable would be happening in another colour not appearing; and what’s improbable is improbable.) It is therefore probable also that the next bead drawn will be blue. This is induction. As Hume would have said, we could not know a priori, given this evidence, that the next bead will be blue. But, as he overlooked, we can know a priori, given this evidence, that it is probable that the next bead will be blue. In neither urn example has the belief regarding the beads been formed as a Humean habit of expectation after many observations of beads. (In the first case there is only one observation. The second could be modified to have all the beads drawn out at once.) Rather the belief is a product of a priori reasoning about probability. Next imagine that a coin has been tossed a thousand times and landed heads every time. There was a fair and a loaded coin. According to the same reasoning, it is overwhelmingly more probable that the coin used was the loaded one. For that the fair coin had so landed is most improbable. The hypothesis that there is no external world makes the orderliness in my current experience improbable - much like getting all heads with a fair coin. (Uncaused sensation would most probably be chaotic.) The most probable hypothesis is that of things like those we believe in causing this orderliness - as the coin’s being loaded would have caused all heads. The hypothesis that my experience has been made to take this pattern by a Cartesian malicious demon or by scientists controlling my brain in a vat can only falsely seem to make the character of the experience probable by sneaking in an inherently improbable ad hoc specification that this sort of pattern of experience was that which they were aiming at producing - like an ad hoc specification that the fair coin was one that by chance landed heads all thousand times. We may thus reject such hypotheses as improbable. So this is the problem of induction solved and scepticism answered through a priori reasoning. (shrink)

Facebook and other social networking sites allow observation of others’ interactions that in normal, offline life would simply be undetectable. Drawing on this specific property, the theory of social learning, and the most direct implications of emotional contagion, our pilot experiment aimed to test whether the exposure to others’ grateful interactions on Facebook enhances users’ felt gratitude, expressed gratitude, and their subjective well-being. For the threefold purpose, we created ad hoc Facebook groups in which the exposure to some accomplices’ exchange (...) of grateful messages for 2 weeks was experimentally manipulated and users’ felt/expressed gratitude and well-being were consequently assessed. Results partially supported both hypotheses. Observing others’ exchange of grateful posts/comments on Facebook appeared to enhance participants’ in-person expression of gratitude, but not their direct and subjective experiences of gratitude. Similarly, exposure to others’ grateful messages improved some components of subjective well-being, such as satisfaction with life, but not negative and positive affect. Taken together, however, our preliminary findings suggest for the first time that social networking sites may actually amplify the spreading of gratitude and its benefits. Implications of our results for professionals and future research in the field of health, education, and social media communication are discussed. (shrink)

The clash between Galileo and the Catholic Inquisition has been discussed, studied, and written about for many decades. The scientific, theological, political, and social implications have all been carefully analysed and appreciated in all their interpretative fruitfulness. The relatively recent trend in this kind of scholarship however seems to have underestimated the fact that Galileo in this debate, as in his earlier debates, showed a particular style marked by overconfidence. If we keep in mind the Lakatosian account of scientific development, (...) it is of course perfectly understandable that scientists at times stick to their convictions by producing auxiliary hypotheses as buffers against contrary evidence. And elements of this are detectable in the arguments of both Galileo and his opponents. But one still needs to ask: To what extent did Galileo depend on auxiliary hypotheses? How insecure did they render his position? And how ad hoc were they? These are important questions because Galileo’s particular way of dealing with auxiliary hypotheses can throw light on the broader question of when and how auxiliary hypotheses are needed within scientific practice in general. It can even indicate some way of conceiving degrees of ad hocness. In this paper, I explore this issue by comparing two important debates in which Galileo was involved: one about the nature of water and buoyancy, the other about cosmology. I revisit not only the scientific content of these debates but also the cultural context in which they took place, especially their dependence on patronage and their theological repercussions. The results indicate that scholarship on Galileo can still be useful in clarifying currently relevant aspects of scientific practice, and is thus still far from its expiry date. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Psychopathy, Other-Regarding Moral Beliefs, and Responsibility”Jennifer Radden (bio)Fields’s line of reasoning may be summarized, though to do so is to lose much that is nice, and important, in the details. He begins by distinguishing the kind of disorder we are dealing with. Psychopathy is a personality disorder: an unchanging, trait-based condition, not a mental disease or illness. Then he asks why we might judge the presence of (...) psychopathy to vitiate moral and legal responsibility, and answers that psychopathy must reflect some kind of disability. It has been hypothesized (by Duff) that this disability concerns moral understanding, but Fields offers an alternative account. Rather than lacking moral understanding, he argues, the psychopath is disabled in that he cannot form other-regarding moral beliefs. A very convincing argument is then made to persuade us that such a disability would—or should—constitute an excuse.Much of this reasoning is unassailable, and Fields’s careful and systematic approach is impressive. Yet I am left with a lingering concern. He has not convinced me that the psychopath is incapable of forming instead of merely disinclined to form the required sort of moral beliefs. And rather than furthering or supporting his incapacity explanation, Cleckley’s example of Milt undermines it.Maybe the example of Milt’s callousness is the place to start, although whether this is as strong an example as Fields and Cleckley seem to think of psychopathy, is questionable. It is a rather underdescribed example, certainly. We are told that this is the unvarying pattern of Milt’s behavior. Indeed, it has to be to fit the clinical definition of psychopathy as a trait-based character disorder rather than a short-lived “out of character” response. And yet Milt has reached driving age and his mother is still naive enough to expect he’ll pick her up! We need to know more. If mother hasn’t grasped Milt’s dispositional traits yet, why not? Perhaps these traits are not so unvarying and entrenched after all. Or mother is colluding, or denying? Perhaps the understanding between mother and son contained meanings not apparent in the bald clinical description provided by Cleckley. There may be more to this story than meets the eye.So I’m not sure that the example successfully illustrates the clinical definition of psychopathy. But let’s say it does. If we accept the story as we are told it, there remains a gap in the reasoning. That Milt lacks the capacity to form such (other regarding) beliefs, and to harbor guilt feelings as Fields asserts, would explain his irresponsible [End Page 287] behavior—why he “so easily gives way to whims, even though he knows that to do so is to leave his mother... stranded”(p. 33).An incapacity to form other-regarding beliefs may explain this behavior, true. But so equally might being someone given to whims. After all Milt might just have the personality trait, also long established and unchanging, that he gives in to whims more often than most. This is what people sometimes mean when they attribute impulsiveness. And impulsiveness is not only a rather common trait; as it happens it is also one associated with this particular disorder (among others).Fields recognizes the type of explanation which refers to the presence of an unthought out impulse to act, a whim explanation. But he fails to give this kind of explanation its due, using it only selectively and arbitrarily. If, as Field establishes, it is more coherent to think that Milt’s initial offer to his mother was a matter of whim—rather than evidence of the other-regarding belief that one ought to concern oneself with the welfare of one’s parents—then there is no reason to suppose that his failure to follow through and pick her up was not also a whim. This second whim represents an equally satisfactory (simple, plausible, explanatory, not ad hoc ) explanation: Milt might have come to pick up his mum but he whimfully chose not to.And this is a separate and distinct explanation from the one Fields proposes in terms of incapacity. A whim is not (immediate) evidence of incapacity... (shrink)

The Report of the Ad Hoc Adivisory Group on the Operation of NHS Research Ethics Committees has resulted in a strange mixture of the timid, the revolutionary, and the bizarre.The Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Operation of NHS Research Ethics Committees is a curious document.1 The remit of the review was focused on the workings and effectiveness of NHS research ethics committees and the multicentre committees ). The Group was primarily set up in response to a (...) series of complaints from medical researchers about the new research governance regime in the UK as a result of the Clinical Trials Directive2 and the Governance Arrangements for NHS Research Ethics Committees.3 The opportunity was also taken to consider the role of research ethics committees in a wider context, and take account of recent developments in relation to the ethics review of social care research,4 student projects,5 as well as recent legislation such as the Human Tissue Act,6 and the Mental Capacity Act.7 However, the resulting report is a strange mixture of the timid, the revolutionary, and the bizarre.A good example of the report’s timidity is its reluctance to propose fundamental change to the process of review or seriously limit the type of research that requires REC review. To its credit AHAG does suggest that some research ‘especially surveys and many studies on NHS staff, could normally be conducted safely without a requirement for REC review’ .1 This is, of course, to be welcomed. However, the report ultimately seems dismissive of the general complaint from researchers that the current process is inappropriately uniform. For example, in section 3.2, it is argued that the ‘common perception that the NHS REC system is dominated …. (shrink)

Recent work in relevance-theoretic pragmatics develops the idea that understanding verbal utterances involves processes of ad hoc concept construction. The resulting concepts may be narrower or looser than the lexical concepts which provide the input to the process. Two of the many issues that arise are considered in this paper: (a) the applicability of the idea to the understanding of metaphor, and (b) the extent to which lexical forms are appropriately thought of as encoding concepts.