PhilPapers is currently in read-only mode while we are performing some maintenance. You can use the site normally except that you cannot sign in. This shouldn't last long.
philosophical research online
New this week: 788
||Debates on the ontology of concepts focus on what sorts of things they are. There are roughly three major positions on concept ontology. The first is that concepts are abstrata: non-psychological entities such as properties or Fregean senses. The second is that concepts are mental representations or some other type of psychological entities. The third is that concepts are abilities of some kind, such as the ability to recognize their instances.
Jobs in this area
Andrew W. Mellon Postdoctoral Fellowship in the Humanities
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Philosophy
- Asuncion Alvarez (2006). On Peacocke's Theory of Concepts. In E. Di Nucci & C McHugh (eds.), Content, Consciousness, and Perception: Essays in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge Scholars Press
- Nicholas M. Asher (1988). Semantic Competence, Linguistic Understanding, and a Theory of Concepts. Philosophical Studies 53 (January):1-36.
- Alex Barber (1998). The Pleonasticity of Talk About Concepts. Philosophical Studies 89 (1):53-86.
- Jacob Beck (forthcoming). Sense, Mentalese, and Ontology. Protosociology.
- Robert Briscoe (2014). Review of Christopher Gauker, Words and Images: An Essay on the Origin of Ideas, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. [REVIEW] Mind 123 (491):902-096.
- Dennis Earl (2006). Concepts and Properties. Metaphysica 7 (1):67-85.
- Łukasz Kosowski (2010). Noema and Thinkability : An Essay on Husserl's Theory of Intentionality. Ontos Verlag.
- Elisabetta Lalumera (2010). Concepts Are a Functional Kind. Comment on Machery's Doing Without Concepts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):217-18.
- Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence, Concepts. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (2007). The Ontology of Concepts: Abstract Objects or Mental Representations? Noûs 41 (4):561-593.
- María G. Navarro (1999). Review of 'Historia y hermenéutica' by José Luis Villacañas and Faustino Oncina. [REVIEW] Logos: Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica:249-251.
- Christopher Peacocke (1991). The Metaphysics of Concepts. Mind 100 (399):525-46.
- David Pereplyotchik (2011). Why Believe in Demonstrative Concepts? Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):636-638.
- Pierre Poirier & Guillaume Beaulac (2011). Le véritable retour des définitions. Dialogue 50 (1):153-164.
- Edward E. Smith (1989). Three Distinctions About Concepts and Categorization. Mind and Language 4 (1-2):57-61.
- Edward E. Smith & L. Douglas (1981). Categories and Concepts. Harvard University Press.
- Robert Sokolowski (1987). Exorcising Concepts. Review of Metaphysics 40 (March):451-463.
- Ernest Sosa (1993). Abilities, Concepts, and Externalism. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press
- John Sutton (2004). Are Concepts Mental Representations or Abstracta? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):89-108.
- Mark Wilson (2006). Wandering Significance: An Essay on Conceptual Behavior. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Edward N. Zalta (2001). Fregean Senses, Modes of Presentation, and Concepts. Philosophical Perspectives 15 (s15):335-359.
- Edward N. Zalta (2000). A (Leibnizian) Theory of Concepts. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 3:137-183.
Using PhilPapers from home?
Create an account to enable off-campus access through your institution's proxy server.
Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it: