Primary substance for Aristotle is either the individual or form. These same two possibilities are the leading candidates for the source of unity in a substance.Thus, if we could determine what is responsible for the unity of a substance, we may well have located primary substance also. I consider the following possiblesources of the unity of form and matter in a substance:1) The unifier is a connector external to form and matter. (This connector may be itself a form, matter, or (...) a relation that is neither formal nor material.)2) There is no need for a unifier because form and matter are simply conceptual ways of understanding a single, already-unified, concrete being.3) The unifier is an inherent aspect of form or matter.I proceed by a process of elimination and conclude that substantial form is both what unifies a substance and the better candidate for primary substance. (shrink)

Primary substance for Aristotle is either the individual or form. These same two possibilities are the leading candidates for the source of unity in a substance.Thus, if we could determine what is responsible for the unity of a substance, we may well have located primary substance also. I consider the following possiblesources of the unity of form and matter in a substance:1) The unifier is a connector external to form and matter. (This connector may be itself a form, matter, or (...) a relation that is neither formal nor material.)2) There is no need for a unifier because form and matter are simply conceptual ways of understanding a single, already-unified, concrete being.3) The unifier is an inherent aspect of form or matter.I proceed by a process of elimination and conclude that substantial form is both what unifies a substance and the better candidate for primary substance. (shrink)

I will defend a principle at work in Thomas Aquinas’s argument that the human intellect must be immaterial in order to know material things in SummaTheologica, Ia, q.75, a.2. Thomas relies on the position that whatever knows certain things would be impeded in this knowledge if it contained in itself thesesame things. Thus, if humans can, in principle, know all material things, then the intellect cannot be material. The position that a material intellect would be limited in knowledge of material (...) things is perhaps the most controversial part of the argument. I will articulate a version of this argument and argue that two objections to Thomas’s argument, offered by Norman Kretzmann and Robert Pasnau, fail, due in large part to a misunderstanding of proper objects of cognition. (shrink)

I first demonstrate that certain process philosophers and Aquinas hold extremely similar notions of evil. Whitehead and Hartshorne parallel Aquinas in understanding evil as relational, as a conflict of goods, and as a necessary element in a larger good. On this last point, process philosophers contend that traditional theists must either reject the claim of God’s omnipotence or admit that an omnipotent God would be responsible for evil, including moral evil. I respond that Aquinas’s distinction between physical and moral evil (...) moves beyond the process position and avoids the conclusion that God’s omnipotence must be abandoned. I argue that the process position does not take proper account of Aquinas’s claim that the cause of evil is a negation and the initial criticism relies on a distinction between moral and physical evil that process philosophy cannot make. (shrink)

I will defend a principle at work in Thomas Aquinas’s argument that the human intellect must be immaterial in order to know material things in SummaTheologica, Ia, q.75, a.2. Thomas relies on the position that whatever knows certain things would be impeded in this knowledge if it contained in itself thesesame things. Thus, if humans can, in principle, know all material things, then the intellect cannot be material. The position that a material intellect would be limited in knowledge of material (...) things is perhaps the most controversial part of the argument. I will articulate a version of this argument and argue that two objections to Thomas’s argument, offered by Norman Kretzmann and Robert Pasnau, fail, due in large part to a misunderstanding of proper objects of cognition. (shrink)

Clarembald of Arras is recognized primarily as a capable but uncreative alumnus of the school of Chartres, and not without some reason, as George and Fortin note in the opening of their introduction. Clarembald was a student of Thierry of Chartres and Hugh of St. Victor in a rather thoroughgoing sense—his written work often relies heavily on his teachers and focuses exclusively on topics on which Thierry had already written. Nonetheless, George and Fortin suggest that a closer reading of Clarembald’s (...) texts will reveal him to be a more careful and important thinker than is presently appreciated. (shrink)

In recent decades, some feminists have turned to the writings of Hannah Arendt in order to propose a truly emancipatory ethic of care or to find the principles that could lead to the political institutionalization of care. Nevertheless, the feminist interpretations of Hannah Arendt are particularly contrasted. According to Sophie Bourgault, this recourse to Hannah Arendt is deeply problematic, mainly because of her strong distinction between the private and public spheres. This article discusses the relevance of using Arendt’s concepts to (...) think about the institutionalization of care by Joan Tronto. Indeed, the most recent analyses developed on the politics of care are shaped by Arendt’s concepts such as power, amor mundi or by her conception of politics as a relationship. (shrink)

Recent philosophical discussions construe disagreement as epistemically unsettling. On learning that a peer disagrees, it is said, you should suspend judgment, lower your credence, or dismiss your peer’s conviction as somehow flawed, even if you can neither identify the flaw nor explain why you think she is the party in error. Philosophers do none of these things. A distinctive feature of philosophy as currently practiced is that, although we marshal the strongest arguments we can devise, we do not expect others (...) to agree. Nor are we dismayed then they do not. Through a survey of familiar professional practices, I argue that philosophy rightly revels in responsible disagreement. This discloses important and perhaps surprising facets of the epistemology of philosophy. (shrink)

In exploring skilled performance in Contact Improvisation, we utilize an enactive ethnographic methodology combined with an interdisciplinary approach to examine the question of how skill develops in CI. We suggest this involves the development of subtleties of awareness of intra- and interkinaesthetic attunement, and a capacity for interkinaesthetic negative capability—an embodied interpersonal ‘not knowing yet’—including an ease with being off balance and waiting for the next shift or movement to arise, literally a ‘playing with’ balance, falling, nearly falling, momentum and (...) gravity. We draw on insights from an interdisciplinary approach, including from a developmental perspective concerning the experience of dyadic interpersonal embodied skill development in both infancy and CI. Building on Ravn and Høffding’s definition of expertise in improvisation as an “oscillatory process of assuming and relinquishing agency” we propose that a key aspect of expertise in CI involves oscillation between levels and processes of interkinaesthetic sense of agency. These interdisciplinary insights also elucidate limitations within current conceptualisations of sense of agency, including the relationship between sense of agency and sense of control. (shrink)

I argue that models enable us to understand reality in ways that we would be unable to do if we restricted ourselves to the unvarnished truth. The point is not just that the features that a model skirts can permissibly be neglected. They ought to be neglected. Too much information occludes patterns that figure in an understanding of the phenomena. The regularities a model reveals are real and informative. But many of them show up only under idealizing assumptions.

In this chapter, we discuss a specific kind of progress that occurs in most branches of economics today: progress involving the repeated use of mathematical models. We adopt a functional account of progress to argue that progress in economics occurs through the use of what we call “common recipes” and model templates for defining and solving problems of relevance for economists. We support our argument by discussing the case of 20th century business cycle research. By presenting this case study in (...) detail, we show how model templates are not only reapplied to different phenomena. We also show how scientists first develop them and how, once they are considered less useful, they are replaced with new ones. Finally, our case also illustrates that it is not only the mathematical structure that is reused but that such reuse also requires a shared conceptual vision of the core properties of the phenomenon to be studied. If that vision is no longer shared among economists, a model template can become useless and has to be replaced, sometimes against resistance, with a different one. (shrink)

Do environmental policy statements accurately represent corporate commitment to environmental sustainability? Because companies are not required by law to publish environmental policy statements or to verify that these statements are true using independent third parties, external stakeholders often wonder when a published commitment to a policy translates into actual policy implementation. The authors analyzed two independent databases to predict the circumstances under which large, leading-edge corporations in industry sectors will commit to and/or implement proactive corporate environmental policies and when it (...) is unlikely they will do so. The authors found that commitment to specific environmental policies does not vary greatly between industry sectors; however, policy implementation does. (shrink)

Elaborates the author’s conception of plasticity by proposing a new way of thinking through Heidegger’s writings on change.

An analysis of Hippolytus' Refutation of All Heresies, to discover his practices and motivations in preserving and quoting extracts from Greek Philosophy, in particular his important contribution to our knowledge of Presocratic Philosophy. The work argues that such sources must be read as embedded texts, and that fragments must not be extracted and treated in isolation from the quoting authority whose interests and knowledge are important in interpreting the material.

Stoic work on ambiguity represents one of the most innovative, sophisticated and rigorous contributions to philosophy and the study of language in western antiquity. This book is both a comprehensive survey of the often difficult and scattered sources, and an attempt to locate Stoic material in the rich array of contexts, ancient and modern, which alone can guarantee full appreciation of its subtlety, scope and complexity. The comparisons and contrasts which this book constructs will intrigue not just classical scholars, and (...) philosophers, but also logicians, theoretical linguists, communication theorists and historians of grammar and of literary theory. The Stoics on Ambiguity is designed to be intelligible to readers with no Greek or Latin. (shrink)

In a world surrounded by smart objects from sensors to automated medical devices, the ubiquity of ‘smart’ seems matched only by its lack of clarity. In this article, we use our discussions with expert stakeholders working in areas of implantable medical devices such as cochlear implants, implantable cardiac defibrillators, deep brain stimulators and in vivo biosensors to interrogate the difference facets of smart in ‘implantable smart technologies’, considering also whether regulation needs to respond to the autonomy that such artefacts carry (...) within them. We discover that when smart technology is deconstructed it is a slippery and multi-layered concept. A device’s ability to sense and transmit data and automate medicine can be associated with the ‘sting’ of autonomy being disassociated from human control as well as affecting individual, group, and social environments. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe negativity bias is the tendency for individuals to give greater weight, and often exhibit more rapid and extreme responses, to negative than positive information. Using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott illusory memory paradigm, the current study sought to examine how the negativity bias might affect both correct recognition for negative and positive words and false recognition for associated critical lures, as well as how trait neuroticism might moderate these effects. In two experiments, participants studied lists of words composed of semantic associates of (...) an unpresented word. Half of the lists were comprised of positive words and half were comprised of negative words. As expected, individuals remembered negative list words better than positive list words, consistent with a negativity bias in correct recognition. When tested immediately, individuals also exhibited greater false memory for negative versus positive critical lures. When tested after a 24-hr delay... (shrink)

Exemplification is the relation of an example to whatever it is an example of. Goodman maintains that exemplification is a symptom of the aesthetic: although not a necessary condition, it is an indicator that symbol is functioning aesthetically. I argue that exemplification is as important in science as it is in art. It is the vehicle by which experiments make aspects of nature manifest. I suggest that the difference between exemplars in the arts and the sciences lies in the way (...) they exemplify. Density and repleteness are characteristic of aesthetic exemplars but not of scientific ones. (shrink)

Uses arguments from Dharmakirti to construct an attack on Sellars' idea of an ideal scientific image.

The ability to distinguish between our own actions and those of an external agent is a fundamental component of normal human social interaction. Both low- and high-level mechanisms are thought to contribute to the sense of movement agency, but the contribution of each is yet to be fully understood. By applying small and incremental perturbations to realistic visual feedback of the limb, the influence of high-level action intentions and low-level motor predictive mechanisms were dissociated in two experiments. In the first, (...) participants were induced to claim agency over movements that were subject to large perturbations and to deny agency over self-produced unperturbed movements despite the application of motor corrections by low-level mechanisms. A control experiment confirmed that if reaches met with their intended goal then they were more likely to be attributed to the agent, regardless of the discrepancy between the actual and seen positions of the limb. (shrink)

Sanford Goldberg’s account of epistemic coverage constitutes a special case of Douglas Walton’s view that epistemic closure arises from dialectical argument. Walton’s pragmatic version of epistemic closure depends on dialectical norms for closing an argument, and epistemic coverage operates at the limits of argument closure because it minimizes dialectical exchange. Such closure works together with a shared hypothetical consideration to justify dismissal of surprising claims.

This book examines the philosophical foremothers of women’s philosophy and explores what their work may have to offer modern theorizing in feminist ethics. Through such writers as Catharine Macaulay, Mary Wollstonecraft, and George Eliot, Gardner interprets a varied selection of moral philosophers in an attempt both to contribute to our understanding of their work, and perhaps even to encourage other philosophers to interpretive work of their own. She also looks into the reasons such forms as novels, letters, and poetry have (...) often been assigned non-philosophical status, while they seem to be prevalent in the work of women philosophers from the history of philosophy. (shrink)

Three major strategies exist for the protection of endangered habitat and species: (1) land acquisition programs, (2) government legislation and regulatory agencies, and (3) "stewardship" programs that are voluntary and community-based. While all of these strategies have merit, we suggest that stewardship holds particular advantages and should be considered more often as a strategy of first choice. In this article, we examine the Municipal Wetland Stewardship program of Newfoundland, a popular and successful Canadian policy for the local protection of wetlands. (...) Important issues are at stake: competing philosophical foundations for managerial ecology, the value of "local ecological knowledge," principles of community-based conservation, the question of whether stewardship empowers local communities or controls them from afar, and ethical conflicts around American colonialism, hunting, and ecotourism. The results suggest that despite some potentially problematic ironies, the Newfoundland program provides a model for a public policy aimed both at the pragmatics of biophysical sustainability and at the ideals of environmental ethics, social justice, and democratic politics. (shrink)

Our homes are where we live and play, and for those making positive vegan choices, it's important for our domestic spaces to be environmentally friendly and cruelty-free. This book provides practical advice and inspiration to everyone who is building or renovating and wants a home that both supports their lifestyle and benefits the planet. Topics include making intelligent choices on appliances and creating butterfly-friendly gardens. With ideas, tips, and guidelines for every aspect of home design, readers will see how easy (...) it is to make smart choices and create a beautiful, safe space for living. (shrink)

In this paper I argue, controversially, that Plato's Meno anticipates Wittgenstein's critique of essentialism. Plato is usually read as an essentialist of the very kind that Wittgenstein was challenging, and the Meno in particular is usually taken as evidence that Plato thought that to know something you must be able to define it, and that if you can't define it you can't investigate any other questions on the topic. I suggest instead that Plato shows Socrates proposing such a position (much (...) as Wittgenstein's imaginary interlocutor might do), only to have it knocked down by what happens in the dialogue. Plato shows that one knows a concept when one can apply it in practice, or, for virtue, when one typically chooses to act in certain ways, passes certain judgements and so on. It turns out, then, that one who claims to "know what virtue is" need not give necessary and sufficient conditions for it. (shrink)

Teaching is not testimony. Although both convey information, they have different uptake requirements. Testimony aims to impart information and typically succeeds if the recipient believes that informationon account of having been told by a reliable informant. Teaching aims to equip learners to go beyond the information given—to leverage that information to broaden, deepen, and critique their current understanding of a topic. Teaching fails if the recipients believe the information only because it is what they have been told.

This paper reports on a survey of auditors in New Zealand which investigates the nature of the moral judgements they make on a series of problems with ethical dimensions. The framework adopted for this purpose is developed from earlier work which identifies a range of ethical principles which may be involved in business ethical decision‐making. Auditors responded to a questionnaire which posed, firstly, several questions about the context of their ethical decision‐making, and secondly, a series of vignettes elaborating problematical dilemmas (...) which required the selection of one of four possible responses. Data was analysed to determine whether or not it confirmed previous findings in suggesting a predominant ethical orientation for auditors. The results were correlated with demographic variables in order to determine whether or not age, gender, position in firm and size of employee firm were significantly correlated to ethical response. The survey results, on the whole, confirmed the ethical orientation suggested by previous findings, but there were some unexpected results in three out of the ten vignettes examined. Although some correlations were found between the demographic variables and subject responses, the evidence of this survey does not strongly suggest a consistent significant correlation. (shrink)

L’article présente les activités éditoriales du mathématicien Albert Châtelet (1883-1960), dont résulte une bibliographie particulièrement étendue par les types de publics auxquels elle s’adresse. Il montre la part importante prise par le mathématicien dans la vie des éditions Bourrelier et précise les objectifs poursuivis par Châtelet à travers la publication de manuels scolaires en mettant en évidence la manière dont ce travail a consolidé son engagement en faveur de la pédagogie et de l’enseignement scientifique.

Pythagoreans dominated the political scene in southern Italy for nearly a century in the late 6th to 5th century BC. What was the secret of their political success and can their political, social and economic policies be assessed in the customary terms with which historians try to analyse ancient societies? I argue that they cannot, and that the Pythagorean approach to politics was sui generis, and successful because it was based on ideas, not force or popular demagogy.

This article first examines pervasive present‐day attitudes toward humility before turning to Thomas Aquinas and Zhu Xi for their more positive treatments of this disposition. It then considers their ideas about how humility is related to our human limitations, before surveying how they think it should be expressed in our relationships with our neighbours. The article looks at what Thomas and Zhu have to say about excessive pride in rulers before closing in the Conclusion with some thoughts about the viability (...) of humility as a virtue for the strong, and its especial importance in contemporary politics. (shrink)

In chapter 7 of the third book of De anima Aristotle is concerned with the activity of the intellect, which, here as elsewhere in the work, he explores by developing parallels with his account of sense-perception. In this chapter his principal interest appears to be the notion of judgement, and in particular intellectual judgements about the value of some item on a scale of good and bad. In this paper I shall argue, firstly that there is in fact a coherent (...) structure and focus to this chapter, which has therefore unjustly been criticized as disorganized or corrupt; and secondly that, in the light of such a coherent understanding of the chapter as a whole, we can resolve the difficulties in interpreting the central passage concerned with cross-modal perceptual judgements, and thereby also throw some further light on the related passages in the second chapter of De anima 3, which had been directly concerned with that topic. (shrink)