The essay proposes to use alienation as a heuristic and conceptual tool for the analysis of the impact of digital information and communication technologies (ICTs) on users. It follows a historical materialist understanding, according to which data can be considered as things produced in an industrial fashion. A representational interpretation, according to which data would merely reflect a given reality, is untenable. It will be argued instead to understand data as an additional layer which has a transformative impact on reality (...) as a whole. The analysis follows the early Marx in thinking of alienation as a structural condition which holds even if it is not experienced psychologically by users. Alienation means that the desire to express oneself and achieve social recognition, self-realization, and participation through the use of ICTs is incongruent to the inherent purposes and functions of these technologies. Digital platforms create the ideological illusion that users contribute to the production of data solely for their own gratification. Users, in turn, react to structural alienation either by internalizing it, in which case they may become enthusiastic data producers, or by imposing alienating conditions on other users. Finally, it will be shown that a strong notion of privacy is less suited to articulate concerns about the impact of ICTs because it expresses a desire for privilege and individual control which has become unfulfillable in the environment of data industries. The essay closes by showing some of the changes in institutional structures and behavior that could follow from the focus on alienation. (shrink)

In this work, Michael Steinmann provides a systematic reconstruction of Heidegger's thoughts on language, based on his early works on logic, on 'Being and Time' and 'On the Way to Language.

Was ein Gegenstand ist, in welcher Weise seine Gegenständlichkeit begegnet und worin deren Objektivität besteht, bleibt ein zentrales Thema zeitgenössischer Erkenntnistheorie. Deshalb erörtert der vorliegende Band den Begriff des Gegenständlichen im Hinblick auf die Themen Welt, Subjektivität, Personalität, Freiheit, Sprache, Interpretation und Wissenschaft, und dies geschieht im Spannungsfeld einer Neubewertung von Objektivität. Ausgangspunkt und Anlaß der Beiträge dieses Bandes ist ein neuerer Ansatz in der Hermeneutik, wie er von Günter Figal in seinem Werk 'Gegenständlichkeit' vorgelegt worden ist. Da die Reflexion (...) auf die Bedingungen, unter denen Gegenstände gegeben sind, nicht nur ein hermeneutisches Anliegen ist, sondern bereits im Deutschen Idealismus, im Neukantianismus und in der Phänomenologie (Husserl, Heidegger und Merleau-Ponty) ein zentrales Thema philosophischer Reflexion darstellt, ist der Band als sach- und richtungsübergreifender Dialog konzipiert. Mit Beiträgen von:Emil Angehrn, Damir Barbari¿c, Rudolf Bernet, David Espinet, Theodore D. George, Pavel Kouba, Birgit Recki, Friederike Rese, James Risser, John Sallis, Dennis Schmidt, Christian Sommer, Michael Steinmann, Tilo Wesche, Günter Zöller. (shrink)

Nietzsche unternimmt im Begriff des "individuellen Gesetzes" den Versuch, Individualität and Allgemeinheit so zusammenzudenken, daß die Gesetzlichkeit an die Selbstdeutung des Individuums gebunden bleibt. Dieser Begriff trägt jedoch eine innere Spannung in sich, auf die in verschiedener Weise reagiert werden kann. Der Beitrag zeigt dies zunächst am Gegensatz von Herren- und Sklavenmoral und an der Gesetzgebung des Manu . Beide sind individuelle Gesetze, die jedoch keinen Bestand haben können, weil die von ihnen Beherrschten eine allgemeinere, gerechtere Gesetzgebung einklagen. Dagegen geht (...) es dem freien Geist um Freiheit gegenüber sich selbst, um die Aufgabe, Individualität nicht neuerlich als allgemeine Eigenschaft zu fixieren. Simmels Idee des individuellen Gestzes basiert auf der Möglichkeit einer Versöhnung zwischen den Polen; das Individuum ist in den sozialen Rollen, die es einnimmt, es selbst. Die Spannung, die für Nietzsche besteht, wird dadurch aufgehoben.With the notion of an "individual law", Nietzsche tries to combine individuality and universality in a way that allows to conceive lawfulness under the perspective of the individual, and not in opposition to it. However, the notion of an individual law is characterized by a certain tension, which has led to different reactions. The paper illustrates this tension in regard to master versus slave morality. and the law of Manu . Both are individual laws which have been overcome because the ruled began to claim a more general, a more equitable legislation. On the other side, the free spirit is concerned with freedom from itself, its challenge is to see individuality not as a new general quality. Simmel's notion of the individual law is based on the possibility of a reconciliation between the opposites; the individual remains individual even in its general social roles. This means, however, that the tension manifest in Nietzsche is given up. (shrink)

Diese Studie weist nach, dass Nietzsche ein konsistentes und vollstäauml;ndiges Konzept der Ethik entwickelt hat. Es umfasst eine Handlungstheorie, die Bestimmung eines Begriffs des Guten und die Anwendung auf einzelne Verhaltensweisen im Sinne der Kontextgebundenheit praktischer Philosophie. Bei der Rekonstruktion des Verfassers stehen weniger die einzelnen Werke als ihr systematischer Zusammenhang im Zentrum. Füuuml;r Nietzsche bleibt Autonomie ohne den Bezug auf ein Handlungsziel im Sinn des Guten unbestimmt. Dass er auf diese Weise eine Position der antiken Ethik aufgreift, zeigt ein (...) Vergleich mit Platon. Gleichzeitig will Nietzsche sich nicht einfach von neuzeitlichen Moralkonzepten abgrenzen. Ihm geht es um eine hermeneutische Reflexion, welchen Sinn moralische Forderungen für das Selbst haben. Im Gegensatz zur aktuellen Debatte um Konzepte äauml;sthetischer Lebenskunst, die sich auf Nietzsche als ihr vermeintliches Vorbild beruft, zeigt die Studie: Nietzsche ist ein genuin ethischer Denker. (shrink)

Philosophische Begriffe erlangen ihre Bedeutung intentional, als Abbreviaturen eines komplexeren Gedankengangs. Dies gilt auch für Martin Heidegger. Vom späten Denken her erscheint seine Begriffssprache in Sein und Zeit als metaphysisch. Kriterien hierfür sind die epistemische Bestimmbarkeit des Seins, seine apriorische Stellung und Absolutsetzung gegenüber dem Seienden sowie der Bezug auf Subjektivität. Dennoch ist es keineswegs notwendig, die Begriffe in genau diesem Sinn zu verstehen; vielmehr können sie zugleich als Hinweis auf ein anderes, nicht-metaphysisches Denken gelesen werden. Dies wirft die Frage (...) nach der Semantik philosophischer Begriffe auf. Das im Begriff Verstandene ist das Verstehen selbst, das in seinem Ursprung transparent gemacht werden soll. Die daraus resultierende Mehrdeutigkeit des Begriffs ist für Heidegger ein positives Phänomen, weil sie eine zunehmende Bedeutungsfüllung und damit die Annäherung an die Sachverhalte der Philosophie erlaubt. Was die Annäherung kriteriell leitet, ist die „Einfachheit“, d.h. Zusammengehörigkeit der schrittweise entfalteten Bedeutungsaspekte. (shrink)

The paper discusses one of the later texts by Jacques Derrida. The text allows Derrida to be interpreted as a thinker of advanced modernity. Systematically it is possible to read modernity via the image of overcoming, which may be understood both in the sense of progress and restoration. The question Derrida asks is this: how can the potential of freedom to overcome be preserved without succumbing to teleology that informs it? The answer lies in the notion of future, which as (...) the simply uncontrollable cannot be situated in any history. However, Derrida‘s attempt to normatively fill the uncontrollable future by relying on Kant‘s practical philosophy and legitimise it as a form of the mind fails. The notion remains empty, as can be shown by setting the boundary against Nietzsche. Nietzsche‘s notion of Übermensch hints at modernity as a future that liberates it from the pressure of history. Nietzsche reflects the figure of overcoming without impoverishing it the way Derrida does.Der Beitrag diskutiert einen der späten Texte von Jacques Derrida. Der Text erlaubt es, Derrida als einen Denker der fortgeschrittenen Moderne zu interpretieren. Systematisch lässt sich die Moderne durch die Figur der Überwindung lesen, die sowohl im Sinne des Fortschritts als der Restauration verstanden werden kann. Derridas Frage lautet: Wie kann das Freiheitspotenzial der Überwindung beibehalten werden, ohne der in ihr liegenden Teleologie anheimzufallen? Eine Antwort ergibt sich durch den Begriff einer Zukunft, die als das schlechthin Unverfügbare in keiner Geschichte mehr situiert werden kann. Allerdings misslingt Derridas Versuch, diese unverfügbare Zukunft in Anlehnung an Kants praktische Philosophie normativ aufzuladen und als eine Form der Vernunft auszuweisen. Der Begriff bleibt leer, wie in Abgrenzung zu Nietzsche gezeigt werden kann. In Nietzsches Begriff des Übermenschen entwirft sich die Moderne auf eine Zukunft, die sie aus dem Zwang der Geschichte befreit. Nietzsche reflektiert die Figur der Überwindung, ohne sie, wie Derrida, zu entleeren.U prilogu se diskutira jedan od kasnijih tekstova Jacquesa Derride. Tekst dopušta interpretirati Derridu kao mislioca uznapredovale moderne. Sistematski je moguće modernu čitati kroz figuru prevladavanja, koja se može razumjeti u smislu napretka kao i restauracije. Derridino pitanje glasi: kako se može očuvati potencijal slobode prevladavanja, a da se ne podlegne teleologiji koja leži u njemu? Odgovor se nadaje u pojmu budućnosti, koja se kao ono jednostavno neovladljivo ne može više situirati ni u jednoj povijesti. No, propada Derridin pokušaj da tu neovladljivu budućnost normativno ispuni u osloncu na Kantovu praktičku filozofiju i legitimira je kao formu uma. Pojam ostaje prazan, kako se može pokazati u razgraničenju spram Nietzschea. U Nietzscheovu pojmu nadčovjeka nabacuje se moderna kao budućnost, koja je oslobađa prisile povijesti. Nietzsche reflektira figuru prevladavanja, a da je ne osiromašuje poput Derride. (shrink)

The paper concerns the uncertainty in current propositions for the regulation of tissue donation. It focuses mainly on two statements issued in Germany. The scope of the paper is to give a systematic approach to ethical problems coming up in this field. Both statements try to maintain the idea of positive autonomy in regard to tissue donation, but their attempt eventually is forced to fail. Different procedures are proposed that most often are not practicable (because a truly “informed” consent is (...) impossible, or because optional models tend to overwhelm donors). Blanket consent is also proposed, but this form of consent cannot be seen as an expression of self-determination. Under the pretence of autonomy, donors are left alone with the task to control scientific research and to have their personal and property rights respected. Following this rather weak position of autonomy, in one statement there is a clear tendency to place the intrinsic value of research over the autonomy of the donor. In order to avoid this conclusion, autonomy has to be more than individual decision making. It has to be embedded in social and institutional rules which support and protect individual choice. If the benefits of research are supposed to lead to a common good and to satisfy public interests, then research has to be controlled through public institutions. Autonomy does not exclude institutional support, as institutional support is the only way to take the autonomy of donors seriously. (shrink)

The use of Big Data—however the term is defined—involves a wide array of issues and stakeholders, thereby increasing numbers of complex decisions around issues including data acquisition, use, and sharing. Big Data is becoming a significant component of practice in an ever-increasing range of disciplines; however, since it is not a coherent “discipline” itself, specific codes of conduct for Big Data users and researchers do not exist. While many institutions have created, or will create, training opportunities to prepare people to (...) work in and around Big Data, insufficient time, space, and thought have been dedicated to training these people to engage with the ethical, legal, and social issues in this new domain. Since Big Data practitioners come from, and work in, diverse contexts, neither a relevant professional code of conduct nor specific formal ethics training are likely to be readily available. This normative paper describes an approach to conceptualizing ethical reasoning and integrating it into training for Big Data use and research. Our approach is based on a published framework that emphasizes ethical reasoning rather than topical knowledge. We describe the formation of professional community norms from two key disciplines that contribute to the emergent field of Big Data: computer science and statistics. Historical analogies from these professions suggest strategies for introducing trainees and orienting practitioners both to ethical reasoning and to a code of professional conduct itself. We include two semester course syllabi to strengthen our thesis that codes of conduct can be harnessed to support the development of ethical reasoning in, and a sense of professional identity among, Big Data practitioners. (shrink)

According to the received account of guilt in the philosophical literature, one cannot feel guilt unless one takes oneself to have done something morally wrong. But ordinary people feel guilt in many cases in which they do not take themselves to have done anything morally wrong. In this paper, I focus on one kind of guilt without perceived wrongdoing, guilt about being merely causally responsible for a bad state-of-affairs. I go on to present a novel account of guilt that explains (...) guilt about mere causal responsibility, according to which guilt represents part of the self as bound up with what is bad. (shrink)

Germany is at the leading edge of European reflection on the nature and requirements of ethical business. Two scholars in the field provide a survey of the main lines of discussion in the current German business ethics scene, and discuss three important books which are helping set the scene for further developments. Prof. Dr. Horst Steinmann holds the Chair for Business Administration and Management at the University of Erlangen‐Nürnberg, Lange Gasse 20, D‐90403 Nürnberg, and Dipl.‐Hdl. Brigitte Kustermann is research (...) assistant to the same chair. (shrink)

Recent initiatives in Germany illustrate how major companies have changed their attitudes towards a critical public ‐ and thereby have improved their economic and ethical performance. Prof. Dr. Horst Steinmann and Dipl.‐Kfm. Ansgar Zerfaß belong to the University of Erlangen‐Nürnberg, Germany.

The fact that Gilbert Ryle and J.L. Austin seem to disagree about the ordinary use of words such as ‘voluntary’, ‘involuntary’, ‘voluntarily’, and ‘involuntarily’ has been taken to cast doubt on the methods of ordinary language philosophy. As Benson Mates puts the worry, ‘if agreement about usage cannot be reached within so restricted a sample as the class of Oxford Professors of Philosophy, what are the prospects when the sample is enlarged?’ (Mates, Inquiry 1:161–171, 1958, p. 165). In this chapter, (...) we evaluate Mates’s criticism alongside Ryle’s and Austin’s specific claims about the ordinary use of these words, assessing these claims against actual examples of ordinary use drawn from the British National Corpus (BNC). Our evaluation consists in applying a combination of methods: first aggregating judgments about a large set of samples drawn from the corpus, and then using a clustering algorithm to uncover connections between different types of use. In applying these methods, we show where and to what extent Ryle’s and Austin’s accounts of the use of the target terms are accurate as well as where they miss important aspects of ordinary use, and we demonstrate the usefulness of this new combination of methods. At the heart of our approach is a commitment to the idea that systematically looking at actual uses of expressions is an essential component of any approach to ordinary language philosophy. (shrink)

Our aim in this paper is to present the distinct ways in which Wolff, Baumgarten, and Kant understand the relationship between necessitation, constraint, and reluctant action in an effort to illustrate the subtle ways in which their conceptions of obligation differ from each another. Whereas Wolff conceives of natural or moral obligation as incompatible with constraint, Baumgarten holds that constraint and reluctant action are, in some instances, compatible with natural obligation. Kant departs from Baumgarten by conceiving of obligation as necessarily (...) involving constraint: as Kant’s reply to Schiller’s famous objection reveals, obligation must take on the character of constraint to reluctant action on account of the fact that human beings possess inclinations that always threaten to impel them in directions that oppose morality. (shrink)

What is the relation between small-scale collaborative plans and the execution of those plans within interactive contexts? I argue here that joint attention has a key role in explaining how shared plans and shared intentions are executed in interactive contexts. Within singular action, attention plays the functional role of enabling intentional action to be guided by a prior intention. Within interactive joint action, it is joint attention, I argue, that plays a similar functional role of enabling the agents to act (...) in a collaborative way such that their actions are rationally guided by a prior shared intention. This understanding of joint attention – as having a key functional role of enabling the rational guidance of joint intentional action by a prior shared intention – allows for an alternative understanding of the kind of minimal cooperation that infants can engage in. On this understanding, infants’ capacity to engage in joint actions is already an incipient capacity to engage in rational and intentional joint actions, albeit a capacity that is necessarily scaffolded by an adult rational co-partner. (shrink)

An Essay on Human Action seeks to provide a comprehensive, detailed, enlightening, and (in its detail) original account of human action. This account presupposes a theory of events as abstract, proposition-like entities, a theory which is given in the first chapter of the book. The core-issues of action-theory are then treated: what acting in general is (a version of the traditional volitional theory is proposed and defended); how actions are to be individuated; how long actions last; what acting intentionally is; (...) what doing one thing by doing another is; what basic action is; and what omitting to do something is. Attention is also given to the concepts of causation, intention, volition, deciding, choosing, and trying. Finally, a libertarian account of free action is tentatively proposed and defended. (shrink)

This a clear and concise introduction to Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard.ichael Watts uses Kierkegaard's own writings to introduce his theoriesbout living a truthfu; and spiritual life, while explaining the enormousnfluence of the philosopher's personal life on his work and beliefs. As theounder of 20th century existentialism, and the first philosopher to definehe idea of angst, Kierkegaard's profound influence on modern life is clearlyefined in accessible terms in this guide for students and general readers.

While leading through goals is usually associated with a task-oriented leadership style, the present work links goal setting to transformational leadership. A longitudinal field study was conducted to investigate the influence of transformational leadership on followers’ job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and proactive behavior via goal attributes. Findings indicate that transformational leaders influence the extent to which followers evaluate organizational goals as important and perceive them as attainable. Multiple mediation analysis revealed that these goal attributes transmit the effect of transformational leadership (...) on followers’ job attitudes and proactive behavior. However, goal importance and goal attainability seem to be of differential importance for the different outcomes. (shrink)

Opponents of medically assisted dying have long appealed to ‘slippery slope’ arguments. One such slippery slope concerns palliative care: that the introduction of medically assisted dying will lead to a diminution in the quality or availability or palliative care for patients near the end of their lives. Empirical evidence from jurisdictions where assisted dying has been practiced for decades, such as Oregon and the Netherlands, indicate that such worries are largely unfounded. The failure of the palliation slope argument is nevertheless (...) instructive with respect to how slippery slope arguments can be appraised without having to await post-facto evidence regarding the effects of a proposed change in public policy. Close attention in particular to the norms operative in a given institution and how changes to policy will interact with those norms enable slippery slopes to be credibly appraised. (shrink)

What is the relation between joint attention and common knowledge? On the one hand, the relation seems tight: the easiest and most reliable way of knowing something in common with another is for you and that other to be attentively aware of what you are together experiencing. On the other hand, they couldn’t seem further apart: joint attention is a mere perceptual phenomena that infants are capable of engaging in from nine months of age, whereas common knowledge is a cognitive (...) phenomenon involving (so it seems) complex, overlapping metarepresentational states that require the kind of sophisticated mindreading skills that developmental psychology has shown to be beyond the capabilities of young children. In 'The Shared World: Perceptual Common Knowledge, Demonstrative Communication, and Shared Social Space', Axel Seemann attempts, inter alia, to makensense of this conundrum. (shrink)

We ordinarily suppose that there is a difference between having and failing to exercise a rational capacity on the one hand, and lacking a rational capacity altogether on the other. This is crucial for our allocations of responsibility. Someone who has but fails to exercise a capacity is responsible for their failure to exercise their capacity, whereas someone who lacks a capacity altogether is not. However, as Gary Watson pointed out in his seminal essay ’Skepticism about Weakness of Will’, the (...) idea of an unexercised capacity is much more difficult to make sense of than it initially appears. The aim of ’Rational Capacities’ is to provide the needed explication of this idea. (shrink)

The 9th Annual Conference of the European Business Ethics Network (EBEN) will be hosted by a national EBEN network, Deutsches Netzwerk Wirtschaftsethik (DNWE), in cooperation with a business partner, Deutsche Lufthansa AG. Far beyond the generous support which Lufthansa is providing to organize the event, the company itself stands as a symbol for the conference theme, Working Across Cultures in the Europe of Tomorrow. Working across cultures is part of their everyday business, since Lufthansa operates with 58,000 employees in over (...) 100 subsidiaries all over the world. The authors are members of the EBEN 1996 Programme Committee and represent the host institutions of the conference. Albert Löhr is member of the EBEN Executive Committee, Horst Steinmann is Chairman of the German network of EBEN, Deutsches Netzwerk Wirtschaftsethik. (shrink)

The problem with authenticity—the idea of being “true to one’s self”—is that its somewhat checkered reputation garners a complete range of favorable and unfavorable reactions. In educational settings, authenticity is lauded as one of the top two traits students desire in their teachers. Yet, authenticity is criticized for its tendency towards narcissism and self-entitlement. So, is authenticity a good or a bad thing? The purpose of this article is to develop an intimate understanding of authenticity by investigating its current interpretation (...) and criticisms, its struggle with narcissism and relation to freedom. Examining authenticity as multilayered self-exploration reveals a composite of understanding, care, and acceptance. While a side current of acceptable tension shifts our understanding of authenticity from the security of self-determination to the messy interplay involved in being “true to one’s self” and being “in-the-world”. (shrink)

Drawing on work of the past decade, this volume brings together articles from the philosophy, history, and sociology of science, and many other branches of the biological sciences. The volume delves into the latest theoretical controversies as well as burning questions of contemporary social importance. The issues considered include the nature of evolutionary theory, biology and ethics, the challenge from religion, and the social implications of biology today (in particular the Human Genome Project).

Ethical debates about assisted dying typically assume that only medical professionals should be able to provide patients with assisted dying. This assumption partially rests on the unstated principle that assisted dying providers may not be motivated by pecuniary considerations. Here I outline and defend a mixed provider model of assisted dying provision that contests this principle. Under this model, medically competent non-physician professionals could receive fees for providing assisted dying under the same terms and conditions as physicians can in those (...) juris- dictions where medically assisted dying is lawful. The mixed provider model blunts objections to assisted dying rooted in supposed clashes with medical values. In addition to generating a market likely to expand access to assisted dying, the mixed provider model would not create markets that are unjust because they are “noxious” in Satz’ sense or because they raise “semiotic” concerns about the value of human life. (shrink)

The third edition of a work that defines the field of cognitive neuroscience, with extensive new material including new chapters and new contributors.

Discussions of the nature or possibility of moral expertise have largely proceeded in atheoretical terms, with little attention paid to whether moral expertise depends on theoretical knowledge of morality. Here I argue that moral expertise is more theory-dependent than is commonly recognized: Moral expertise consists, at least in part, in knowledge of the correct or best moral theory, and second, that knowledge of moral theory is essential to moral experts dispensing expert counsel to non-experts. Moral experts would not be moral (...) experts absent knowledge of moral theory, nor could they play the testimonial role we would expect them to play in moral inquiry and deliberation absent such knowledge. (shrink)

I show that the common reading of Thomson, that she argues by analogy for the conclusion that abortion is permissible, is mistaken. The correct reading of Thomson is that she argues by counterexample, showing that arguments against abortion are unsound. The remainder of the paper highlights the lessons learned from Thomson once we read her aright.