La disparition en 1938 d’Ettore Majorana a suscité de très nombreuses reconstructions biographiques. Nous voudrions ici insister plutôt sur ses travaux scientifiques et tenter de saisir leur portée effective. Certains articles de Majorana ne furent compris qu’après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, notamment son dernier, rédigé en 1937, dans lequel il proposait une « théorie symétrique de l’électron et du positron ». Cette théorie pourrait s’appliquer aux particules fascinantes que sont les neutrinos, ainsi qu’à des particules aujourd’hui prédites par certains théoriciens.

A conclusion drawn after a conference devoted (in 1995) to the “arrow of time” was the following: “Indeed, it seems not a very great exaggeration to say that the main problem with “the problem of the direction of time” is to figure out exactly what the problem is supposed to be !” What does that mean? That more than 130 years after the work of Ludwig Boltzmann on the interpretation of irreversibility of physical phenomena, and that one century after Einstein’s (...) formulation of Special Relativity, we are still not sure what we mean when we talk of “time” or “arrow of time”. We shall try to show that one source of this difficulty is our tendency to confuse, at least verbally, time and becoming, i.e. the course of time and the arrow of time, two concepts that the formalisms of modern physics are careful to distinguish. (shrink)

Par habitude, par nécessité ou en raison de la faiblesse de notre intelligence dépassée par le tsunami des savoirs et des informations, nos façons ordinaires de nourrir la vie des idées consistent à la découper en secteurs, à la compartimenter en disciplines, à l'atomiser en petites spécialités étiquetées bien comme il faut. Il s'agira ici de suivre le chemin inverse, de briser les enclos, s'encanailler, provoquer des courts-circuits au petit bonheur la chance et, si possible, des étincelles. D'associer des éléments (...) trop souvent séparés dans les analyses : physique et philosophie, pensée et action, réalité et imagination, hasard et destin, infini mathématique et engagement existentiel, intelligence analytique et courage physique, Einstein et Rolling Stones, image et mirage, langage et impesanteur, raison et déraison... Mettons le nez dehors, inventons une chimie nouvelle, bâtissons des molécules littéraires à partir d'atomes disciplinaires! É. K."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

L’heure qu’il est, le temps qu’il fait, l’espace du souvenir ou de la prévision : de quelque côté qu’on l’aborde, par le passé, le futur ou le présent, le temps s’échappe et nous fuit. Il est sans matière et pourtant nous habitons en lui, nous sommes emportés par lui, comme tout ce qui existe. Etienne Klein, à la fois physicien et philosophe, propose ici quelques pistes pour cerner la plus immédiate et la plus difficile de toutes les questions.

La physique et la philosophie sont-elles deux genres de pensée différents? Oui, mais... Est-il si certain que la physique et la philosophie ne se percutent jamais? Elles partagent en tout cas une même ambition, celle d'augmenter et de perfectionner, chacune à sa façon, la "connaissance" au sens large. Cela ne suffit-il pas pour qu'elles aient matière à conversations? Dès lors qu'on la prend au sérieux, la physique nous écarte de nos pensées les plus ordinaires, secoue nos idées pourtant les plus (...) évidentes et inquiète nos certitudes. Certains de ses résultats modifient même les termes en lesquels certaines questions philosophiques se posent, par exemple à propos du temps, du vide, de la causalité, de la matière, du statut du réel. Dans cet essai de "philo-physique", Etienne Klein nous entraîne dans une aventure intellectuelle qui invite à "reconstruire la raison". (shrink)

De alledaagse leefwereld. Dingen die we zien en horen. De hedendaagse mens wordt opgeslokt door de consumptiecultuur van de markteconomie en verkeert haast permanent in een virtuele werkelijkheid. Individualisme. De liefdesrelatie als meest basale vorm van gemeenschap is hierdoor op de helling gekomen. Welke therapeutische perspectieven kunnen we verbinden aan de gestelde diagnose? We zijn aangewezen op een mentaliteitsverandering, die wordt bepaald door het ‘morele kapitaal’ waarmee een gemeenschap kan voortbestaan. De auteur opereert binnen de traditie die Montaigne en Kierkegaard (...) introduceren en waaiert voortdurend uit door geregeld zijn rol als dienende gastheer voor die van zoekende filosoof te verruilen. Hij laat tijdslijnen door elkaar lopen. Toch is sprake van intrinsieke ordening: ideeënimprovisaties worden weerspiegeld in een afwisseling tussen levende herinneringen en abstracte argumenten. Zo krijgt de alledaagsheid een filosofische lading. Kleine verhalen en anekdotes zijn nodig om grote verhalen een persoonlijk karakter te geven. Aldus ontstaat een collage, waarin niets is gelogen, maar alles is verzonnen. Een waargebeurde, fictieve levensgeschiedenis op grond van herinneringen, een portret waarin verslag wordt gedaan van een gedreven zoektocht naar zinvolheid. De lezer is genoodzaakt zich te laten meevoeren over hoofd- en zijwegen, bemodderde bospaden, drassige velden, gevaarlijke bochten, grillige slingerpaden, solide bruggen en wankele bruggetjes. (shrink)

The Meno, one of the most widely read of the Platonic dialogues, is seen afresh in this original interpretation that explores the dialogue as a theatrical presentation. Just as Socrates's listeners would have questioned and examined their own thinking in response to the presentation, so, Klein shows, should modern readers become involved in the drama of the dialogue. Klein offers a line-by-line commentary on the text of the Meno itself that animates the characters and conversation and carefully probes (...) each significant turn of the argument. "A major addition to the literature on the Meno and necessary reading for every student of the dialogue."--Alexander Seasonske, Philosophical Review "There exists no other commentary on Meno which is so thorough, sound, and enlightening."-- Choice Jacob Klein was a student of Martin Heidegger and a tutor at St. John's College from 1937 until his death. His other works include Plato's Trilogy: Theaetetus, the Sophist, and the Statesman, also published by the University of Chicago Press. (shrink)

In ”Skepticism,” Peter Klein distinguishes between the “Academic Skeptic” who proposes that we cannot have knowledge of a certain set of propositions and the “Pyrrhonian Skeptic” who refrains from opining about whether we can have knowledge. Klein argues that Academic Skepticism is plausibly supported by a “Closure Principle‐style” argument based on the claim that if x entails y and S has justification for x, then S has justification for y. He turns to contextualism to see if it can (...) contribute to the discussion between one who claims that we can have knowledge about some epistemically interesting class of propositions and the Academic Skeptic. He outlines the background of Pyrrhonian Skepticism, pointing out that the Pyrrhonist withholds assent concerning our knowledge‐bearing status because reason cannot provide an adequate basis for assent. He assesses three possible patterns of reasoning, and concludes that the Pyrrhonist view, that reason cannot resolve matters concerning the nonevident, is vindicated. (shrink)

In this paper, I first consider a famous objection that the standard interpretation of the Lockean account of diachronicity (i.e., one’s sense of personal identity over time) via psychological connectedness falls prey to breaks in one’s personal narrative. I argue that recent case studies show that while this critique may hold with regard to some long-term autobiographical self-knowledge (e.g., episodic memory), it carries less warrant with respect to accounts based on trait-relevant, semantic self-knowledge. The second issue I address concerns the (...) question of diachronicity from the vantage point that there are (at least) two aspects of self—the self of psychophysical instantiation (what I term the epistemological self) and the self of first person subjectivity (what I term the ontological self; for discussion, see Klein SB, The self and its brain, Social Cognition, 30, 474–518, 2012). Each is held to be a necessary component of selfhood, and, in interaction, they are appear jointly sufficient for a synchronic sense of self (Klein SB, The self and its brain, Social Cognition, 30, 474–518, 2012). As pertains to diachronicity, by contrast, I contend that while the epistemological self, by itself, is precariously situated to do the work required by a coherent theory of personal identity across time, the ontological self may be better positioned to take up the challenge. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the concept of cross-temporal personal identity (diachronicity). This particular form of identity has vexed theorists for centuries -- e.g.,how can a person maintain a belief in the sameness of self over time in the face of continual psychological and physical change? I first discuss various forms of the sameness relation and the criteria that justify their application. I then examine philosophical and psychological treatments of personal diachronicity(for example,Locke's psychological connectedness theory; the role of episodic memory) (...) and find each lacking on logical grounds, empirical grounds, or both. I conclude that to achieve a successful resolution of the issue of the self as a temporal continuant we need to draw a sharp distinction between the feeling of the sameness of one's self and the evidence marshaled in support of that feeling. (shrink)

The paper, which retains a hypothetical character, argues that Spinoza's propositions referring to God (or involving the use of the name ‘God’, essentially in the Ethics), can be read in a fruitful manner apart from any pre-established hypothesis concerning his own ‘theological preferences’, as definite descriptions of three ‘ideas of God’ which have the same logical status: one (akin to Jewish Monotheism) which identifies the idea of God with the idea of the Law, one (akin to a heretic ‘Socinian’ version (...) of Christianity) which identifies it with the idea of Human Love, and one (akin to a form of Cosmotheism, rather than ‘Pantheism’) which identifies it with Nature. Evidence of this analytic tripartition can be found in the letter of the texts themselves. If accepted (at least as a thought experiment), it would carry three interesting consequences: 1) to renew our understanding of the theory of the ‘three kinds of knowledge’, which have obvious affinities with the three possible ways of understanding the idea of God; 2) to emphasize the critical move associated by Spinoza with each of the three ideas of God (passing from an anthropomorphic legislator to an impersonal command, passing from an imaginary community of similarities to a practical community of singularities, and passing from a teleological and harmonious idea of nature to a causal, even conflictual, idea of its infinite power); 3) to locate the essential ethical and political questions associated with religion on the ‘vectors’ which lead from one idea to another, and represent themselves practical conatus: obedience, utility, order. It is also assumed that such a reading enhances the relevance of Spinoza's philosophy with respect to contemporary debates about religion and secularism. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that much of the confusion and mystery surrounding the concept of "self" can be traced to a failure to appreciate the distinction between the self as a collection of diverse neural components that provide us with our beliefs, memories, desires, personality, emotions, etc (the epistemological self) and the self that is best conceived as subjective, unified awareness, a point of view in the first person (ontological self). While the former can, and indeed has, been extensively (...) studied by researchers of various disciplines in the human sciences, the latter most often has been ignored -- treated more as a place holder attached to a particular predicate of interest (e.g., concept, reference, deception, esteem, image, regulation, etc). These two aspects of the self, I contend, are not reducible -- one being an object (the epistemological self) and the other a subject (the ontological self). Until we appreciate the difficulties of applying scientific methods and analysis to what cannot be reduced to an object of inquiry without stripping it of its essential aspect (its status as subject), progress on the "self", taken as a pluralistic construct, will continue to address only one part of the problems we face in understanding this most fundamental aspect of human experience. (shrink)

Note: Paper to appear in special issue of the journal Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice, on the evolution of consciousness //// The explanatory challenge of sentience is known as the “hard problem of consciousness”: How does subjective experience arise from physical objects and their relations? Despite some optimistic claims, the perennial struggle with this question shows little evidence of imminent resolution. In this article I focus on the “why” rather than on the “how” of sentience. Specifically, why did (...) sentience evolve in organic lifeforms? From an evolutionary perspective this question can be framed: “What adaptive problem(s) did organisms face in their evolutionary past and how were those challenges met? I argue that sentience was a critical component of the adaptive solution (i.e., adopting an agentic stance) to increasingly complex and unpredictable demands placed on vertebrates approximately 500 million years ago (the so-called Cambrian explosion). One consequence of taking an agentic stance is that it freed the organism from its neural moorings, positioning it within phenomenal space outside its brain. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for the importance of treating mental experience on its own terms. In defense of “experiential realism” I offer a critique of modern psychology’s all-too-frequent attempts to effect an objectification and quantification of personal subjectivity. The question is “What can we learn about experiential reality from indices that, in the service of scientific objectification, transform the qualitative properties of experience into quantitative indices?” I conclude that such treatment is neither necessary for realizing, nor sufficient for capturing, (...) subjectively given states (such as perception, pain, imagery, fear, thought, memory) – that is, for understanding many of the principle objects of psychological inquiry. A “science of mind” that approaches its subject matter from a third-person perspective should, I contend, be treated with a healthy amount of informed skepticism. (shrink)

The epistemic position of an agent often depends on their position in a larger network of other agents who provide them with information. In general, agents are better off if they have diverse and independent sources. Sullivan et al. [19] developed a method for quantitatively characterizing the epistemic position of individuals in a network that takes into account both diversity and independence; and presented a proof-of-concept, closed-source implementation on a small graph derived from Twitter data [19]. This paper reports on (...) an open-source reimplementation of their algorithm in Python, optimized to be usable on much larger networks. In addition to the algorithm and package, we also show the ability to scale up our package to large synthetic social network graph profiling, and finally demonstrate its utility in analyzing real-world empirical evidence of ‘echo chambers’ on online social media, as well as evidence of interdisciplinary diversity in an academic communications network. (shrink)

This book is the most comprehensive and rigourous critique of the ways disciplinary boundaries still inhibit knowledge-production and integration.

**** A reprint of Gilson's estimable book of 1936 (Sheed and Ward) (endorsed by BCL3). These 20 lectures were delivered as Gifford Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

«Etienne Gilson laissait à sa mort, en septembre 1978, le manuscrit d'un ouvrage largement inédit dont il avait achevé la préparation dix ans plus tôt, à en croire l'indication marginale "janvier 1968" qui figure sur la table des matières, complète et paginée. Ce volume posthume qu'Etienne Gilson avait intitulé malicieusement Constantes philosophiques de l'être comporte huit chapitres, inédits pour moitié, tandis que les autres reprennent sous une forme parfois assez différente et généralement plus développée la matière d'essais publiés (...) séparément de 1952 à 1967. La composition des textes ainsi rassemblés s'échelonne donc sur une quinzaine d'années sans qu'on puisse toujours dater avec précision la rédaction des quatre chapitres jusqu'à présent inédits. Ce qui est sûr en tout cas, c'est que, comme l'auteur le souligne lui-même dans sa Préface, tous ont été conçus dans la perspective d'un recueil d'ensemble, qui s'est constitué progressivement et comme de lui-même. Le présent ouvrage, beaucoup plus doctrinal qu'historique, se situe par ailleurs dans le prolongement direct des réflexions que le grand historien avait d'abord développées dans l'Etre et l'Essence. L'auteur y poursuit en particulier, à la faveur d'une mise en perspective de l'ensemble de la tradition philosophique occidentale, un débat déjà engagé dans les appendices de la seconde édition de l'Etre et l'Essence, en 1962 ; débat qui porte sur ce que Gilson nomme ici "la nouvelle philosophie de l'être". S'interrogeant en philosophe "sur les données de l'histoire", l'historien demande à présent : "qu'y a-t-il de nouveau dans les aventures de l'être?", la nouveauté tenant pour l'essentiel au "cas Heidegger". Par où l'historien de la pensée médiévale n'ajoute pas simplement une pièce nouvelle au dossier déjà volumineux de l'interprétation thomiste de la Seinsfrage, mais contribue, à sa façon, à la position de la question de la structure ontothéologique de la métaphysique.» -- Page 4 de la couverture. (shrink)

Neural engineers and clinicians are starting to translate advances in electrodes, neural computation, and signal processing into clinically useful devices to allow control of wheelchairs, spellers, prostheses, and other devices. In the process, large amounts of brain data are being generated from participants, including intracortical, subdural and extracranial sources. Brain data is a vital resource for BCI research but there are concerns about whether the collection and use of this data generates risk to privacy. Further, the nature of BCI research (...) involves understanding and making inferences about device users’ mental states, thoughts, and intentions. This, too, raises privacy concerns by providing otherwise unavailable direct or privileged access to individuals mental lives. And BCI-controlled prostheses may change the way clinical care is provided and the type of physical access caregivers have to patients. This, too, has important privacy implications. I In this chapter we examine several of these privacy concerns in light of prominent views of the nature and value of privacy. We argue that increased scrutiny needs to be paid to privacy concerns arising from Big Data and decoding of mental states, but that BCI research may also provide opportunity for individuals to enhance their privacy. (shrink)

With his usual lucidity, Etienne Gilson addresses the idea that "art is the making of beauty for beauty's own sake." By distinguishing between aesthetics, which promotes art as a form of knowledge, and philosophy, which focuses on the presence of the artist's own talent or genius, Gilson maintains that art belongs to a different category entirely, the category of "making." Gilson's intellectually stimulating meditation on the relation of beauty and art is indispensable to philosophers and artists alike.

Kant’s discussion of the highest good is subject to continuous disagreement between the proponents of two interpretations of this concept. According to the secular interpretation, Kant conceived of the highest good as a political ideal which can be realized through human agency alone, albeit only from the Critique of the Power of Judgement onwards. By way of contrast, proponents of the theological interpretation find Kant’s treatment of the highest good in his later works to be wholly coherent with the discussions (...) of this concept found in the second Critique. In their view, however, Kant never conceived of the highest good as a political ideal, and some go as far as to argue that it is the work of God alone. In this article, I defend a theologico-political account of the highest good that avoids the pitfalls of both readings. (shrink)

Western European liberal democracies have recently enacted laws that prohibit the diffusion of fake news on social media. Yet, many consider that such laws are incompatible with freedom of expression. In this paper, I argue that democratic governments have strong pro tanto reasons to prohibit fake news, and that doing so is compatible with free speech. First, I show that fake news disrupts a mutually beneficial form of epistemic dependence in which members of the public are engaged with journalists. Second, (...) I contend that laws against fake news enhance rather than thwart personal autonomy. If these suggestions are plausible, then the same considerations about truth and autonomy that underpin the value of free speech give us reasons to prohibit fake news. (shrink)

In this classic work, the eminent Catholic philosopher Étienne Gilson deals with one of the most important and perplexing metaphysical problems: the relation between our notion of God and demonstrations of his existence. Gilson examines Greek, Christian, and modern philosophy as well as the thinking that has grown out of our age of science in this fundamental analysis of the problem of God. “[I] commend to another generation of seekers and students this deeply earnest and yet wistfully gentle little essay (...) on the most important of all metaphysical—and existential—questions.... The historical sweep is breathtaking, the one-liners arresting, and the style, both intellectual and literary, altogether engaging.” —Jaroslav Pelikan, from the foreword “We have come to expect from the pen of M. Gilson not only an accurate exposition of the thought of the great philosophers, ancient and modern, but what is of much more importance and of greater interest, a keen and sympathetic insight into the reasons for that thought. The present volume does not fail to fulfill our expectations. It should be read by every Christian thinker.” —Ralph O. Dates, _America_. (shrink)

The important work, exquisitely translated by Mark Wauck, brings the essential elements of philosophy into view as a cohesive, readily understandable, and erudite structure, and does so rigorously in the best tradition of St. Thomas.

Prägender Denker für die Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften. Das Handbuch präsentiert den aktuellen Diskussionsstand zu Werk und Wirkung Theodor W. Adornos. Es beleuchtet zentrale Fragestellungen des wegweisenden Philosophen und bietet inhaltliche und methodische Werkzeuge zur Auseinandersetzung mit seinen Schriften. Über 40 Beiträger lassen die verschiedenen Zugangsweisen in der Beschäftigung mit Adorno deutlich werden. So kommt der spezifisch interdisziplinäre Charakter des Adornoschen Philosophierens hervorragend zum Ausdruck.

If citizens are to make enlightened collective decisions, they need to rely on true factual beliefs, but misinformation impairs their ability to do so. Although some cases of misinformation are deliberate and amount to propaganda, cases of inadvertent misinformation are just as problematic in affecting the beliefs and behavior of democratic citizens. A review of empirical evidence suggests that this is a serious problem that cannot entirely be corrected by means of deliberation.

Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.

First published in French in 2010, _Equaliberty_ brings together essays by Étienne Balibar, one of the preeminent political theorists of our time. The book is organized around _equaliberty_, a term coined by Balibar to connote the tension between the two ideals of modern democracy: equality and liberty. He finds the tension between these different kinds of rights to be ingrained in the constitution of the modern nation-state and the contemporary welfare state. At the same time, he seeks to keep rights (...) discourse open, eschewing natural entitlements in favor of a deterritorialized citizenship that could be expanded and invented anew in the age of globalization. Deeply engaged with other thinkers, including Arendt, Rancière, and Laclau, he posits a theory of the polity based on social relations. In _Equaliberty_ Balibar brings both the continental and analytic philosophical traditions to bear on the conflicted relations between humanity and citizenship. (shrink)