Results for 'Joel Sobel'

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  1.  9
    19 Olfaction: From Sniff to Percept.Moustafa Bensafi, Christina Zelano, Brad Johnson, Joel Mainland, Rehan Khan & Noam Sobel - 2004 - In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences Iii. MIT Press.
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  2.  19
    Putting Altruism in Context.Joel Sobel - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):275-276.
    I argue that Rachlin's notion of self-control is imprecise and not well suited to the discussion of altruism. Rachlin's broader agenda, to improve collective welfare by identifying behavioral mechanisms that increase altruism, neglects the fact that altruism is neither necessary nor sufficient for desirable social outcomes.
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  3. Logic, Ethics and All That Jazz: Essays in Honour of Jordan Howard Sobel.Lars-Göran Johansson, Jan Österberg, Rysiek Śliwiński & Jordan Howard Sobel (eds.) - 2009 - Dept. Of Philosophy, Uppsala University.
     
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  4. Taking Chances.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1994 - Cambridge University Press.
    J. Howard Sobel has long been recognized as an important figure in philosophical discussions of rational decision. He has done much to help formulate the concept of causal decision theory. In this volume of essays Sobel explores the Bayesian idea that rational actions maximize expected values, where an action's expected value is a weighted average of its agent's values for its possible total outcomes. Newcomb's Problem and The Prisoner's Dilemma are discussed, and Allais-type puzzles are viewed from the (...)
     
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  5. From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism.David Sobel - 2016 - Oxford University Press.
    David Sobel defends subjectivism about well-being and reasons for action: the idea that normativity flows from what an agent cares about, that something is valuable because it is valued. In these essays Sobel explores the tensions between subjective views of reasons and morality, and concludes that they do not undermine subjectivism.
     
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  6. Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1994 - Cambridge University Press.
    J. Howard Sobel has long been recognized as an important figure in philosophical discussions of rational decision. He has done much to help formulate the concept of causal decision theory. In this volume of essays Sobel explores the Bayesian idea that rational actions maximize expected values, where an action's expected value is a weighted average of its agent's values for its possible total outcomes. Newcomb's Problem and The Prisoner's Dilemma are discussed, and Allais-type puzzles are viewed from the (...)
     
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  7.  18
    Walls and Vaults: A Natural Science of Morals (Virtue Ethics According to David Hume).Jordan Howard Sobel - 2008 - Wiley.
    The work is a charitable study on what the internationally renowned presenter and author, Howard Sobel, views to be largely the truth about moral thought and talk. Discussions and observations from David Humes own writings oftentimes reinforce and elaborate the authors notions and there is an assertive attempt to weave logical thinking into the book. Applications to such mathematical concepts as game theory, decision-making, and conditionals are dispersed throughout so as to enlighten the theory behind the ideas.
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  8. Morality and Virtue: An Assessment of Some Recent Work in Virtue Ethics.David Copp & David Sobel - 2004 - Ethics 114 (3):514-554.
    This essay focuses on three recent books on morality and virtue, Michael Slote's 'Morals from Motives', Rosalind Hursthouse's 'On Virtue Ethics', and Philippa Foot's 'Natural Goodness'. Slote proposes an "agent-based" ethical theory according to which the ethical status of acts is derivative from assessments of virtue. Following Foot's lead, Hursthouse aims to vindicate an ethical naturalism that explains human goodness on the basis of views about human nature. Both Hursthouse and Slote take virtue to be morally basic in a way (...)
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  9. Varieties of Hedonism.David Sobel - 2002 - Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (2):240–256.
  10. Subjectivism and Idealization.David Sobel - 2009 - Ethics 119 (2):336-352.
  11. Full Information Accounts of Well-Being.David Sobel - 1994 - Ethics 104 (4):784-810.
  12. The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection.David Sobel - 2007 - Philosophers' Imprint 7 (8):1-17.
    Consequentialism, many philosophers have claimed, asks too much of us to be a plausible ethical theory. Indeed, the theory's severe demandingness is often claimed to be its chief flaw. My thesis is that as we come to better understand this objection, we see that, even if it signals or tracks the existence of a real problem for Consequentialism, it cannot itself be a fundamental problem with the view. The objection cannot itself provide good reason to break with Consequentialism, because it (...)
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  13.  78
    Strength of Early Visual Adaptation Depends on Visual Awareness.Randolph Blake, Duje Tadin, Kenith V. Sobel, Tony A. Raissian & Sang Chul Chong - 2006 - Pnas Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 103 (12):4783-4788.
  14.  76
    Desires, Motives, and Reasons: Scanlon's Rationalistic Moral Psychology.David Copp & David Sobel - 2002 - Social Theory and Practice 28 (2):243-76.
  15.  88
    Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action.David Sobel - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):218.
    These days, just about every philosophical debate seems to generate a position labeled internalism. The debate I will be joining in this essay concerns reasons for action and their connection, or lack of connection, to motivation. The internalist position in this debate posits a certain essential connection between reasons and motivation, while the externalist position denies such a connection. This debate about internalism overlaps an older debate between Humeans and Kantians about the exclusive reason-giving power of desires. As we will (...)
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  16.  16
    Self-Doubts and Dutch Strategies.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):56 – 81.
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  17. Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action.David Sobel - 2001 - Ethics 111 (3):461-492.
  18.  23
    Bayes and Blickets: Effects of Knowledge on Causal Induction in Children and Adults.Thomas L. Griffiths, David M. Sobel, Joshua B. Tenenbaum & Alison Gopnik - 2011 - Cognitive Science 35 (8):1407-1455.
    People are adept at inferring novel causal relations, even from only a few observations. Prior knowledge about the probability of encountering causal relations of various types and the nature of the mechanisms relating causes and effects plays a crucial role in these inferences. We test a formal account of how this knowledge can be used and acquired, based on analyzing causal induction as Bayesian inference. Five studies explored the predictions of this account with adults and 4-year-olds, using tasks in which (...)
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  19. Utilitarianism and Past and Future Mistakes.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1976 - Noûs 10 (2):195-219.
  20. Well-Being as the Object of Moral Consideration.David Sobel - 1998 - Economics and Philosophy 14 (2):249.
    The proposal I offer attempts to remedy the inadequacies of exclusive focus on well-being for moral purposes. The proposal is this: We should allow the agent to decide for herself where she wants to throw the weight that is her due in moral reflection, with the proviso that she understands the way that her weight will be aggregated with others in reaching a moral outcome. I will call this the "autonomy principle." The autonomy principle, I claim, provides the consequentialist's best (...)
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  21. Do the Desires of Rational Agents Converge?David Sobel - 1999 - Analysis 59 (3):137–147.
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  22. Pain for Objectivists: The Case of Matters of Mere Taste.David Sobel - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):437 - 457.
    Can we adequately account for our reasons of mere taste without holding that our desires ground such reasons? Recently, Scanlon and Parfit have argued that we can, pointing to pleasure and pain as the grounds of such reasons. In this paper I take issue with each of their accounts. I conclude that we do not yet have a plausible rival to a desire-based understanding of the grounds of such reasons.
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  23. Partition-Theorems for Causal Decision Theories.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (1):70-93.
    Two partition-theorems are proved for a particular causal decision theory. One is restricted to a certain kind of partition of circumstances, and analyzes the utility of an option in terms of its utilities in conjunction with circumstances in this partition. The other analyzes an option's utility in terms of its utilities conditional on circumstances and is quite unrestricted. While the first form seems more useful for applications, the second form may be of theoretical importance in foundational exercises. Comparisons are made (...)
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  24.  51
    On the Subjectivity of Welfare.David Sobel - 1997 - Ethics 107 (3):501-508.
  25. Infallible Predictors.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (1):3-24.
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  26.  74
    On the Evidence of Testimony for Miracles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1987 - Philosophical Quarterly 37 (147):166-186.
    A BAYESIAN ARTICULATION OF HUME’S VIEWS IS OFFERED BASED ON A FORM OF THE BAYES-LAPLACE THEOREM THAT IS SUPERFICIALLY LIKE A FORMULA OF CONDORCET’S. INFINITESIMAL PROBABILITIES ARE EMPLOYED FOR MIRACLES AGAINST WHICH THERE ARE ’PROOFS’ THAT ARE NOT OPPOSED BY ’PROOFS’. OBJECTIONS MADE BY RICHARD PRICE ARE DEALT WITH, AND RECENT EXPERIMENTS CONDUCTED BY AMOS TVERSKY AND DANIEL KAHNEMAN ARE CONSIDERED IN WHICH PERSONS TEND TO DISCOUNT PRIOR IMPROBABILITIES WHEN ASSESSING REPORTS OF WITNESSES.
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  27.  30
    Notes on Decision Theory: Old Wine in New Bottles.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (4):407 – 437.
  28.  30
    Circumstances and Dominance in a Causal Decision Theory.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1985 - Synthese 63 (2):167 - 202.
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  29. Subjectivism and Blame.David Sobel - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 149-170.
    My favorite thing about this paper is that I think I usefully explicate and then mess with Bernard Williams's attempt to explain how his internalism is compatible with our ordinary practices of blame. There are a surprising number of things wrong with Williams's position. Of course that leaves my own favored subjectivism in a pickle, but still...
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  30. The Limits of the Explanatory Power of Developmentalism.David Sobel - 2010 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (4):517-527.
    Richard Kraut's neo-Aristotelian account of well-being, Developmentalism, aspires to explain not only which things are good for us but why those things are good for us. The key move in attempting to make good on this second aspiration involves his claim that our ordinary intuitions about what is good for a person can be successfully explained and systematized by the idea that what benefi ts a living thing develops properly that living thing's potentialities, capacities, and faculties. I argue that Kraut's (...)
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  31.  21
    The HIPAA Paradox: The Privacy Rule That's Not.Richard Sobel - 2007 - Hastings Center Report 37 (4):40-50.
    : HIPAA is often described as a privacy rule. It is not. In fact, HIPAA is a disclosure regulation, and it has effectively dismantled the longstanding moral and legal tradition of patient confidentiality. By permitting broad and easy dissemination of patients’ medical information, with no audit trails for most disclosures, it has undermined both medical ethics and the effectiveness of medical care.
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  32.  96
    Pleasure as a Mental State.David Sobel - 1999 - Utilitas 11 (2):230.
    Shelly Kagan and Leonard Katz have offered versions of hedonism that aspire to occupy a middle position between the view that pleasure is a unitary sensation and the view that pleasure is, as Sidgwick put it, desirable consciousness. Thus they hope to offer a hedonistic account of well-being that does not mistakenly suppose that pleasure is a special kind of tingle, yet to offer a sharp alternative to desire-based accounts. I argue that they have not identified a coherent middle position.
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  33.  21
    Expected Utilities and Rational Actions and Choices.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1983 - Theoria 49 (3):159-183.
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  34.  9
    Maximization, Stability of Decision, and Actions in Accordance with Reason.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (1):60-77.
    Rational actions reflect beliefs and preferences in certain orderly ways. The problem of theory is to explain which beliefs and preferences are relevant to the rationality of particular actions, and exactly how they are relevant. One distinction of interest here is between an agent's beliefs and preferences just before an action's time, and his beliefs and preferences at its time. Theorists do not agree about the times of beliefs and desires that are relevant to the rationality of action. Another distinction (...)
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  35. Parfit's Case Against Subjectivism.David Sobel - 2011 - In Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 6. Oxford University Press.
    I argue that Parfit's On What Matters does not make a compelling case against subjective accounts of reasons for action.
     
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  36.  39
    Utilitarianisms: Simple and General.J. Howard Sobel - 1970 - Inquiry 13 (1-4):394 – 449.
    If we overlook no consequences when we assess the act, and no relevant features when we generalize, can it matter whether we ask 'What would happen if everyone did the same?' instead of 'What would happen if this act were performed?'? David Lyons has argued that it cannot. Two examples are here articulated to show that it can. The first turns on the way consequences are identified and assessed and in particular on the treatment accorded 'threshold consequences'. The second example (...)
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  37.  47
    Blackburn's Problem: On its Not Insignificant Residue.Jordan Howard Sobel - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):361-383.
    Moral properties would supervene upon non-moral properties and be conceptually autonomous. That, according to Simon Blackburn, would make them if not impossible at least mysterious, and evidence for them best explained by theorists who say they are not real. In fact moral properties would not challenge in ways Blackburn has contended. There is, however, something new that can be gathered from his arguments. What would the supervenience of moral properties and their conceptual autonomy from at least total non-moral properties entail (...)
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  38.  41
    Defenses and Conservative Revisions of Evidential Decision Theories: Metatickles and Ratificationism.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1988 - Synthese 75 (1):107 - 131.
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  39. Introduction.David Sobel & Steven Wall - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
  40.  52
    On the Storeyed Revenge of Strengthened Liars, and the Contrary Finality of No-Proposition Resolutions.Jordan Howard Sobel - manuscript
    “To this day, partiality approaches to the paradox have been dogged by the so-called ‘Strengthened Liar’. .... The Strengthened Liar observes that if we follow a partiality theorist and declare the Liar sentence* neither true nor false (or failing to express a proposition,. or suffering from some sort of grave semantic defect), then the paradox is only pushed back. For we can go on to conclude that whatever this status may be, it implies that the Liar sentence is not true. (...)
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  41.  4
    Maximizing, Optimizing, and Prospering.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1988 - Dialogue 27 (02):233-.
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  42.  23
    Reply to Robertson.David Sobel - 2003 - Philosophical Papers 32 (2):185-191.
    Philosophical Papers Vol.32(2) 2003: 185-191.
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  43.  53
    Pascalian Wagers.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1996 - Synthese 108 (1):11 - 61.
    A person who does not have good intellectual reasons for believing in God can, depending on his probabilities and values for consequences of believing, have good practical reasons. Pascalian wagers founded on a variety of possible probability/value profiles are examined from a Bayesian perspective central to which is the idea that states and options are pragmatically reasonable only if they maximize subjective expected value. Attention is paid to problems posed by representations of values by Cantorian infinities. An appendix attends to (...)
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  44. Review of Mark Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions[REVIEW]David Sobel - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (4).
    I assess Schroeder's book Slaves of the Passions and isolate some grounds for concerns about the overall position.
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  45.  8
    Utilitarianism and Cooperation.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1985 - Dialogue 24 (01):137-.
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  46.  13
    Cyclical Preferences and World Bayesianism.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (1):42-73.
    An example shows that 'pairwise preferences' (certain hypothetical choices) can cycle even when rational. General considerations entail that preferences tout court (certain relations of actual valuations) cannot cycle. A world-bayesian theory is explained that accommodates these two kinds of preference, and a theory for rational actions that would have them maximize and be objects of ratifiable choices. It is observed that choices can be unratifiable either because of troublesome credences or because of troublesome preferences. An appendix comments on a third (...)
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  47.  28
    Utilitarian Principles for Imperfect Agents.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1982 - Theoria 48 (3):113-126.
  48.  13
    Everyone's Conforming to a Rule.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (3):375 - 387.
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  49.  10
    Constrained Maximization.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1991 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):25 - 51.
  50.  13
    Straight Versus Constrained Maximization.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1993 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):25 - 54.
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