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Results for 'Robin Jacob'
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- Editorial: The Potential of School-Based Interventions That Target Executive Function.Robin Jacob, Tyler W. Watts & Antje von Suchodoletz - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
- Dewey for Artists by Mary Jane Jacob.Alex Robins - 2020 - The Pluralist 15 (1):108-111.Mary Jane Jacob, the author of Dewey for Artists, is neither a philosopher nor an artist, but a renowned curator who came to the writings of Dewey in the course of her work. For many years, Jacob has organized exhibitions championing artists who make social practice art, including Rirkrit Tiravanija, Thomas Hirschhorn, and Theaster Gates, to name a few who appear in this book. Their art is not primarily about making objects but is instead about producing social interactions (...)
- Metalinguistic Agnosticism, Religious Fictionalism and the Reasonable Believer.Jacob Hesse - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (3):197-202.With the position, he labels as “new” or “metalinguistic agnosticism” Robin LePoidevin can avoid some problems with which fictionalists about religious language are confronted. Religious fictionalism is a position according to which all religious claims[1] are considered to be false when taken at face value. But because fictionalists about religious language think that certain religious worldviews have pragmatic benefits, they interpret several claims in such worldviews as true in fiction. This enables them to gain pragmatic benefits because they live (...)
- The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, 8th edition.Raja Halwani, Jacob M. Held, Natasha McKeever & Alan G. Soble (eds.) - 2022 - Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.This is the 8th edition of the book, with eight new essays to the volume. Table of contents: Are We Having Sex Now or What? (Greta Christina); Sexual Perversion (Thomas Nagel); Plain Sex (Alan Goldman); Sex and Sexual Perversion (Robert Gray); Masturbation and the Continuum of Sexual Activities (Alan Soble); Love: What’s Sex Got to Do with It? (Natasha McKeever); Is “Loving More” Better? The Values of Polyamory (Elizabeth Brake); What Is Sexual Orientation? (Robin Dembroff); Sexual Orientation: What Is (...)Export citation
Bookmark - Reply to Deng, Hesse and Gäb.Robin Le Poidevin - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (3):203-213.I am very grateful to Natalja, Jacob and Sebastian for their kind attention to my paper, and for their many insights on this topic, which have materially helped me get clearer about some of the issues. All the points of disagreement are constructive and it has been both a pleasure and an education to engage with them. I’m also happy to note some points of agreement, too! Here I attempt to reply to some of the objections.
- Proceedings of the 4th World Conference on Research Integrity: Brazil, Rio de Janeiro. 31 May - 3 June 2015.Lex Bouter, Melissa S. Anderson, Ana Marusic, Sabine Kleinert, Susan Zimmerman, Paulo S. L. Beirão, Laura Beranzoli, Giuseppe Di Capua, Silvia Peppoloni, Maria Betânia de Freitas Marques, Adriana Sousa, Claudia Rech, Torunn Ellefsen, Adele Flakke Johannessen, Jacob Holen, Raymond Tait, Jillon Van der Wall, John Chibnall, James M. DuBois, Farida Lada, Jigisha Patel, Stephanie Harriman, Leila Posenato Garcia, Adriana Nascimento Sousa, Cláudia Maria Correia Borges Rech, Oliveira Patrocínio, Raphaela Dias Fernandes, Laressa Lima Amâncio, Anja Gillis, David Gallacher, David Malwitz, Tom Lavrijssen, Mariusz Lubomirski, Malini Dasgupta, Katie Speanburg, Elizabeth C. Moylan, Maria K. Kowalczuk, Nikolas Offenhauser, Markus Feufel, Niklas Keller, Volker Bähr, Diego Oliveira Guedes, Douglas Leonardo Gomes Filho, Vincent Larivière, Rodrigo Costas, Daniele Fanelli, Mark William Neff, Aline Carolina de Oliveira Machado Prata, Limbanazo Matandika, Sonia Maria Ramos de Vasconcelos & Karina de A. Rocha - 2016 - Research Integrity and Peer Review 1 (Suppl 1).Table of contentsI1 Proceedings of the 4th World Conference on Research IntegrityConcurrent Sessions:1. Countries' systems and policies to foster research integrityCS01.1 Second time around: Implementing and embedding a review of responsible conduct of research policy and practice in an Australian research-intensive universitySusan Patricia O'BrienCS01.2 Measures to promote research integrity in a university: the case of an Asian universityDanny Chan, Frederick Leung2. Examples of research integrity education programmes in different countriesCS02.1 Development of a state-run “cyber education program of research ethics” in (...)No categories
- Non-Ideal Epistemology.Robin McKenna - 2023 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.Robin McKenna argues that we need to make space for an approach to epistemology that avoids the idealizations typical of the field. He applies this approach to topics in applied and social epistemology, such as what to do about science denial, whether we should try to be intellectually autonomous, and what our obligations are to other inquirers.
- Persuasion and Epistemic Paternalism.Robin McKenna - 2020 - In Guy Axtell & Amiel Bernal (eds.), Epistemic Paternalism: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield International. pp. 91-106.Many of us hold false beliefs about matters that are relevant to public policy such as climate change and the safety of vaccines. What can be done to rectify this situation? This question can be read in two ways. According to the descriptive reading, it concerns which methods will be effective in persuading people that their beliefs are false. According to the normative reading, it concerns which methods we are permitted to use in the service of persuading people. Some effective (...)
- Topics.Robin Aristotle & Smith - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Robin Smith & Aristotle.them. Though Aristotle does not say so, presumably the questioner who conceals in this way must be prepared, when challenged, to show that the conclusion...
- Value, Obligation, and Meta-Ethics.Robin Attfield (ed.) - 1995 - BRILL.This work defends an interrelated set of theses in value-theory, normative ethics and meta-ethics. The three Parts correspond to these three areas. Part One (Value) defends a biocentric theory of moral standing, and then the coherence and objectivity of belief in intrinsic value, despite recent objections. Intrinsic value is located in the flourishing of living creatures; specifically, a neo-Aristotelian, species-relative account is supplied of wellbeing or flourishing, in terms of the development of the essential capacities of one's species. There follows (...)
- The trouble with science.Robin Ian MacDonald Dunbar - 1996 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Science is not a great way to make money, or these days, even a job. But there are great riches in it, and in this book too. Tim Bradford, 'New Scientist'.
- He/She/They/Ze.Robin Dembroff & Daniel Wodak - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.In this paper, we defend two main claims. The first is a moderate claim: we have a negative duty to not use binary gender-specific pronouns he or she to refer to genderqueer individuals. We defend this with an argument by analogy. It was gravely wrong for Mark Latham to refer to Catherine McGregor, a transgender woman, using the pronoun he; we argue that such cases of misgendering are morally analogous to referring to Angel Haze, who identifies as genderqueer, as he (...)
- Descriptive Descriptive Names.Robin Jeshion - 2004 - In Marga Reimer & Anne Bezuidenhout (eds.), Descriptions and beyond. New York: Oxford University Press.
- An essay on metaphysics.Robin George Collingwood - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Rex Martin.
- An Intrapersonal Addition Paradox.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Ethics 129 (2):309-343.I present a new argument for the repugnant conclusion. The core of the argument is a risky, intrapersonal analogue of the mere addition paradox. The argument is important for three reasons. First, some solutions to Parfit’s original puzzle do not obviously generalize to the intrapersonal puzzle in a plausible way. Second, it raises independently important questions about how to make decisions under uncertainty for the sake of people whose existence might depend on what we do. And, third, it suggests various (...)
- On the application of formal principles to life science data: A case study in the Gene Ontology.Jacob Köhler, Anand Kumar & Barry Smith - 2004 - In Köhler Jacob, Kumar Anand & Smith Barry (eds.), Proceedings of DILS 2004 (Data Integration in the Life Sciences), (Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics 2994). Springer. pp. 79-94.Formal principles governing best practices in classification and definition have for too long been neglected in the construction of biomedical ontologies, in ways which have important negative consequences for data integration and ontology alignment. We argue that the use of such principles in ontology construction can serve as a valuable tool in error-detection and also in supporting reliable manual curation. We argue also that such principles are a prerequisite for the successful application of advanced data integration techniques such as ontology-based (...)
- Asymmetries in the Value of Existence.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):126-145.According to asymmetric comparativism, it is worse for a person to exist with a miserable life than not to exist, but it is not better for a person to exist with a happy life than not to exist. My aim in this paper is to explain how asymmetric comparativism could possibly be true. My account of asymmetric comparativism begins with a different asymmetry, regarding the (dis)value of early death. I offer an account of this early death asymmetry, appealing to the (...)
- Hopes, Fears, and Other Grammatical Scarecrows.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):63-105.The standard view of "believes" and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “S believes that p” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p; this proposition is the referent of the complement clause "that p." On this view, we would expect the clausal complements of propositional attitude verbs to be freely intersubstitutable with their corresponding proposition descriptions—e.g., "the proposition that p"—as (...)
- How Much Gender is Too Much Gender?Robin Dembroff & Daniel Wodak - 2021 - In Rebecca Mason (ed.), Hermeneutical Injustice. Routledge. pp. 362-376.We live in a world saturated in both racial and gendered divisions. Our focus is on one place where attitudes about these divisions diverge: language. We suspect most everyone would be horrified at the idea of adding race-specific pronouns, honorifics, generic terms, and so on to English. And yet gender-specific terms of the same sort are widely accepted and endorsed. We think this asymmetry cannot withstand scrutiny. We provide three considerations against incorporating additional race-specific terms into English, and argue that (...)
- The Role of Situations in Generalized Quantifiers.Robin Cooper - 1996 - In Shalom Lappin (ed.), The handbook of contemporary semantic theory. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell Reference. pp. 65--86.
- Normative Reasons as Reasons Why We Ought.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):459-484.I defend the view that a reason for someone to do something is just a reason why she ought to do it. This simple view has been thought incompatible with the existence of reasons to do things that we may refrain from doing or even ought not to do. For it is widely assumed that there are reasons why we ought to do something only if we ought to do it. I present several counterexamples to this principle and reject some (...)
- Interests Contextualism.Robin McKenna - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (4):741-750.In this paper I develop a version of contextualism that I call interests contextualism. Interests contextualism is the view that the truth-conditions of knowledge ascribing and denying sentences are partly determined by the ascriber’s interests and purposes. It therefore stands in opposition to the usual view on which the truth-conditions are partly determined by the ascriber’s conversational context. I give an argument against one particular implementation of the usual view, differentiate interests contextualism from other prominent versions of contextualism and argue (...)
- A fixed-population problem for the person-affecting restriction.Jacob M. Nebel - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2779-2787.According to the person-affecting restriction, one distribution of welfare can be better than another only if there is someone for whom it is better. Extant problems for the person-affecting restriction involve variable-population cases, such as the nonidentity problem, which are notoriously controversial and difficult to resolve. This paper develops a fixed-population problem for the person-affecting restriction. The problem reveals that, in the presence of incommensurable welfare levels, the person-affecting restriction is incompatible with minimal requirements of impartial beneficence even in fixed-population (...)
- Real Talk on the Metaphysics of Gender.Robin Dembroff - 2018 - Philosophical Topics 46 (2):21-50.Gender classifications often are controversial. These controversies typically focus on whether gender classifications align with facts about gender kind membership: Could someone really be nonbinary? Is Chris Mosier really a man? I think this is a bad approach. Consider the possibility of ontological oppression, which arises when social kinds operating in a context unjustly constrain the behaviors, concepts, or affect of certain groups. Gender kinds operating in dominant contexts, I argue, oppress trans and nonbinary persons in this way: they marginalize (...)
- 'Yep, I'm Gay': Understanding Agential Identity.Robin Dembroff & Cat Saint-Croix - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:571-599.What’s important about ‘coming out’? Why do we wear business suits or Star Trek pins? Part of the answer, we think, has to do with what we call agential identity. Social metaphysics has given us tools for understanding what it is to be socially positioned as a member of a particular group and what it means to self-identify with a group. But there is little exploration of the general relationship between self-identity and social position. We take up this exploration, developing (...)
- Escaping the Natural Attitude About Gender.Robin Dembroff - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):983-1003.Alex Byrne’s article, “Are Women Adult Human Females?”, asks a question that Byrne treats as nearly rhetorical. Byrne’s answer is, ‘clearly, yes’. Moreover, Byrne claims, 'woman' is a biological category that does not admit of any interpretation as (also) a social category. It is important to respond to Byrne’s argument, but mostly because it is paradigmatic of a wider phenomenon. The slogan “women are adult human females” is a political slogan championed by anti-trans activists, appearing on billboards, pamphlets, and anti-trans (...)
- Utils and Shmutils.Jacob M. Nebel - 2021 - Ethics 131 (3):571-599.Matthew Adler's Measuring Social Welfare is an introduction to the social welfare function (SWF) methodology. This essay questions some ideas at the core of the SWF methodology having to do with the relation between the SWF and the measure of well-being. The facts about individual well-being do not single out a particular scale on which well-being must be measured. As with physical quantities, there are multiple scales that can be used to represent the same information about well-being; no one scale (...)
- Cisgender Commonsense and Philosophy's Transgender Trouble [Chinese].Robin Dembroff - 2020 - TSQ 3 (7).Chinese translation by Zhuanxu Xu. Analytic philosophy has transgender trouble. In this paper, I explore potential explanations for this trouble, focusing on the notion of 'cisgender commonsense' and its place in philosophical methodology.
- But if the syllogistic is the most brilliant part of Aristotle's.Robin Smith - 1995 - In Jonathan Barnes (ed.), The Cambridge companion to Aristotle. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 27.
- How to Think like an Atheist.Robin Isomaa - 2024 - Approaching Religion 14 (2):132-151.Atheism has had a strong presence on YouTube since its founding in the mid-2000s, which coincided with the rise of the new atheism movement, and lay atheists were quick to use the platform to spread new atheist ideas. Drawing from a sample of sixty-five atheist YouTube channels located and observed through online ethnographic methods, this article views YouTube videos as educational resources for atheists. It investigates different types of educational videos and ways of thinking about science, philosophy, and religion that (...)No categories
- Choosing Character: Responsibility for Virtue and Vice.Jonathan A. Jacobs - 2001 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.Are there key respects in which character and character defects are voluntary? Can agents with serious vices be rational agents? Jonathan Jacobs answers in the affirmative. Moral character is shaped through voluntary habits, including the ways we habituate ourselves, Jacobs believes. Just as individuals can voluntarily lead unhappy lives without making unhappiness an end, so can they degrade their ethical characters through voluntary action that does not have establishment of vice as its end. Choosing Character presents an account of ethical (...)
- An introduction to philosophy of education.Robin Barrow - 1982 - New York: Routledge. Edited by R. G. Woods.In the 4th edition of this best-selling textbook, the authors introduce students to the business of philosophizing, thereby inducting them into the art of reasoning and analyzing key concepts in education. This introductory text, continuously in print for more than thirty years, is a classic in its field. It shows, first and foremost, the importance of philosophy in educational debate and as a background to any practical activity such as teaching. What is involved in the idea of educating a person (...)
- What is My Role in Changing the System? A New Model of Responsibility for Structural Injustice.Robin Zheng - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4):869-885.What responsibility do individuals bear for structural injustice? Iris Marion Young has offered the most fully developed account to date, the Social Connections Model. She argues that we all bear responsibility because we each causally contribute to structural processes that produce injustice. My aim in this article is to motivate and defend an alternative account that improves on Young’s model by addressing five fundamental challenges faced by any such theory. The core idea of what I call the “Role-Ideal Model” is (...)
- Kant on Arrogance and Self-Respect.Robin S. Dillon - 2003 - In Cheshire Calhoun (ed.), Setting the moral compass: essays by women philosophers. pp. 191-216.Arrogance is traditionally regarded as among the worst of human vices. Kant’s discussion of one kind of arrogance as a violation of the categorical moral duty to respect other persons gives familiar support for this view. However, I argue that what Kant says about the ways in which another kind of arrogance is opposed to different kinds of self-respect reveals how profoundly vicious arrogance can be. As a failure of self-respect, arrogance is the Ur-Vice that corrupts moral agency and rational (...)
- Rank-Weighted Utilitarianism and the Veil of Ignorance.Jacob M. Nebel - 2020 - Ethics 131 (1):87-106.Lara Buchak argues for a version of rank-weighted utilitarianism that assigns greater weight to the interests of the worse off. She argues that our distributive principles should be derived from the preferences of rational individuals behind a veil of ignorance, who ought to be risk averse. I argue that Buchak’s appeal to the veil of ignorance leads to a particular way of extending rank-weighted utilitarianism to the evaluation of uncertain prospects. This method recommends choices that violate the unanimous preferences of (...)
- The Epistemic Import of Affectivity: A Husserlian Account.Jacob Martin Rump - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):82-104.I argue that, on Husserl's account, affectivity, along with the closely related phenomenon of association, follows a form of sui generis lawfulness belonging to the domain of what Husserl calls motivation, which must be distinguished both (1) from the causal structures through which we understand the body third-personally, as a material thing; and also (2) from the rational or inferential structures at the level of deliberative judgment traditionally understood to be the domain of epistemic import. In effect, in addition to (...)
- Respect.Robin S. Dillon - 2006 - In Donald M. Borchert (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2nd edition. vol. 3. Thomson Gale.
- Yinyang: The Way of Heaven and Earth in Chinese Thought and Culture.Robin R. Wang - 2012 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.The concept of yinyang lies at the heart of Chinese thought and culture. The relationship between these two opposing, yet mutually dependent, forces is symbolized in the familiar black and white symbol that has become an icon in popular culture across the world. The real significance of yinyang is, however, more complex and subtle. This brilliant and comprehensive analysis by one of the leading authorities in the field captures the richness and multiplicity of the meanings and applications of yinyang, including (...)
- Strong dictatorship via ratio-scale measurable utilities: a simpler proof.Jacob M. Nebel - forthcoming - Economic Theory Bulletin.Tsui and Weymark (Economic Theory, 1997) have shown that the only continuous social welfare orderings on the whole Euclidean space which satisfy the weak Pareto principle and are invariant to individual-specific similarity transformations of utilities are strongly dictatorial. Their proof relies on functional equation arguments which are quite complex. This note provides a simpler proof of their theorem.
- Moral Criticism and Structural Injustice.Robin Zheng - 2021 - Mind 130 (518):503-535.Moral agency is limited, imperfect, and structurally constrained. This is evident in the many ways we all unwittingly participate in widespread injustice through our everyday actions, which I call ‘structural wrongs’. To do justice to these facts, I argue that we should distinguish between summative and formative moral criticism. While summative criticism functions to conclusively assess an agent's performance relative to some benchmark, formative criticism aims only to improve performance in an ongoing way. I show that the negative sanctions associated (...)No categories
- Perception is Analog: The Argument from Weber's Law.Jacob Beck - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (6):319-349.In the 1980s, a number of philosophers argued that perception is analog. In the ensuing years, these arguments were forcefully criticized, leaving the thesis in doubt. This paper draws on Weber’s Law, a well-entrenched finding from psychophysics, to advance a new argument that perception is analog. This new argument is an adaptation of an argument that cognitive scientists have leveraged in support of the contention that primitive numerical representations are analog. But the argument here is extended to the representation of (...)
- Anscombe's Relative Bruteness.Jacob Sparks - 2020 - Philosophical News 18:135-145.Ethical beliefs are not justified by familiar methods. We do not directly sense ethical properties, at least not in the straightforward way we sense colors or shapes. Nor is it plausible to think – despite a tradition claiming otherwise – that there are self-evident ethical truths that we can know in the way we know conceptual or mathematical truths. Yet, if we are justified in believing anything, we are justified in believing various ethical propositions e.g., that slavery is wrong. If (...)
- Feminist Approaches to Virtue Ethics.Robin S. Dillon - 2018 - In Nancy E. Snow (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Virtue. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 377-397.
- Choosing character: responsibility for virtue and vice.Jonathan A. Jacobs - 2001 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.Jacobs' interpretation is developed in contrast to the overlooked work of Maimonides, who also used Aristotelian resources but argued for the possibility of ...
- Zeno Beach.Jacob Rosen - 2020 - Phronesis 65 (4):467-500.On Zeno Beach there are infinitely many grains of sand, each half the size of the last. Supposing Aristotle denied the possibility of Zeno Beach, did he have a good argument for the denial? Three arguments, each of ancient origin, are examined: the beach would be infinitely large; the beach would be impossible to walk across; the beach would contain a part equal to the whole, whereas parts must be lesser. It is attempted to show that none of these arguments (...)
- The Meaning of ‘Race’.Robin O. Andreasen - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (2):94-106.
- A compositional situation semantics for attitude reports.Robin Cooper & Jonathan Ginzburg - 1996 - In Jerry Seligman & Dag Westerstahl (eds.), Logic, Language and Computation. Center for the Study of Language and Inf. pp. 1--151.
- Democratizing civil disobedience.Robin Celikates - 2016 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 42 (10):982-994.The goal of this article is to show that mainstream liberal accounts of civil disobedience fail to fully capture the latter’s specific characteristics as a genuinely political and democratic practice of contestation that is not reducible to an ethical or legal understanding either in terms of individual conscience or of fidelity to the rule of law. In developing this account in more detail, I first define civil disobedience with an aim of spelling out why the standard liberal model, while providing (...)
- A Higher Dimension of Consciousness: Constructing an empirically falsifiable panpsychist model of consciousness.Jacob Jolij - manuscriptPanpsychism is a solution to the mind-body problem that presumes that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of reality instead of a product or consequence of physical processes (i.e., brain activity). Panpsychism is an elegant solution to the mind-body problem: it effectively rids itself of the explanatory gap materialist theories of consciousness suffer from. However, many theorists and experimentalists doubt panpsychism can ever be successful as a scientific theory, as it cannot be empirically verified or falsified. In this paper, I present (...)
- Marking the Perception–Cognition Boundary: The Criterion of Stimulus-Dependence.Jacob Beck - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):319-334.Philosophy, scientific psychology, and common sense all distinguish perception from cognition. While there is little agreement about how the perception–cognition boundary ought to be drawn, one prominent idea is that perceptual states are dependent on a stimulus, or stimulus-dependent, in a way that cognitive states are not. This paper seeks to develop this idea in a way that can accommodate two apparent counterexamples: hallucinations, which are prima facie perceptual yet stimulus-independent; and demonstrative thoughts, which are prima facie cognitive yet stimulus-dependent. (...)
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