Ordinary citizens are rarely charged with making consequential decisions in representative democracies. Almost all consequential decisions are delegated to elected representatives or political appointees. On what basis should we judge whether decisions should be placed in the hands of ordinary citizens or delegated to political elites? I argue that decision-making authority should be allocated in whatever way an assembly of randomly selected citizens would choose, given reasonable beliefs about the consequences of their possible choices. The standard I defend is a (...) variation of the principal-agent model of political representation, in which the people are viewed as a principal and officeholders as their agents. As it is usually formulated, the objectives of the people are defined by the preferences of the majority. I draw on this formulation in chapter 4 to explain why the majority might rationally prefer to delegate authority to a citizens’ assembly instead of an elected legislature and why they might rationally view citizens’ assemblies with distrust, when they are organized and administered by elites. But the standard formulation of the principal-agent model does not provide a coherent standard when the will of the majority is not well-defined. Several chapters on social choice theory explain this problem and why political theorists’ previous responses to it have been unconvincing. In light of this problem, I argue for a revisionary understanding of the principal-agent model, according to which the people and its will are identified not with the preferences of the majority but rather with the decisions of a citizens’ assembly. To motivate this approach I offer a critique of the recent literature on “epistemic democracy,” which describes an alternative form of justification for empowering ordinary citizens. Appeals to expertise and knowledge have historically figured prominently in justifications of political exclusion and hierarchy, but epistemic democrats put them to use in defending participatory forms of democratic politics. Epistemic democrats claim that decision processes in which inexpert, ordinary citizens participate can exhibit greater “collective wisdom” than elite- or expert-dominated decision-making. Chapters 2 and 3 explain why these arguments sit uncomfortably with the nature of disagreements in politics. (shrink)

In this article I argue that Outcomes-basedEducation is conceptually trapped in aninstrumentally justifiable view of education. Icontend that the notion of Outcomes-basedEducation is incommensurable with anon-instrumental justification of educationview as explained by RS Peters (1998). Theprocess of specifying outcomes in educationaldiscourse lends itself to manipulation andcontrol and thereby makes the idea ofOutcomes-based Education educationallyimpoverished. In this article an argument ismade for education through rational reflectionand imagination which can complement anOutcomes-based Education system for the reasonthat it finds expression in (...) a non-instrumentaljustifiable view of education. (shrink)

Victor Tadros’ The Ends of Harm is the most recent systematic attempt to defend the good old utilitarian justification of punishment. The attempt fails for a variety of reasons, which are here explored. First, the attempt presupposes an implausible account of human’s psychology. Second, the attempt confuses an attack on retributivism with an attack on certain criminal justice systems. Finally, Tadros admits that his justification of punishment is best seen as a mere step along the road to full-blown (...) abolitionism – and so he unwittingly admits the extraordinarily thin sense in which he could be said to be really attempting to justify punishment. (shrink)

Creativity is a popular but heterogeneous word in educational parlance these days. By looking at a selection of recent discourses that refer to creativity to sustain their positions, the paper suggests that two key themes emerge, both with questionable assumptions. Romantic individualists would return us to a naïve bygone age of authentic self-expression, while politicians and economists would use the term instrumentally by binding it to the future needs of the workforce without questioning substantive issues. Cultural theories of creativity indicate (...) pathways out. (shrink)

This paper aims to check some Nussbaum’s reviews, in Hiding from Humanity, about Mill’s conception of liberty. The analysis frame is given by constant tension between the utilitarian justification and the justification based on per se value of liberty. This article wants to support the following hypothesis: Millean liberty cannot be criticized for reducing its value to instrumental terms. On the contrary, in order to be loyal with Mill, liberty has a double justification: one based on (...) its utilitarianism and another based on its intrinsic value. We use Bernard Williams’s suggestion about the intrinsic value of human goods for supporting the latter. He proposed an important criterion to demonstrate the intrinsic value: coherent relation with other values and other human necessities. Finally, the article briefly exposes the problem of coherence in Millean utilitarianism. (shrink)

In his 1973 paper ?The Justification of Education? R.S. Peters aspired to give a non-instrumental justification of education. Ever since, his so-called ?transcendental argument? has been under attack and most critics conclude that it does not work. They have, however, thrown the baby away with the bathwater, when they furthermore concluded that Peters? justificatory project itself is futile. This article takes another look at Peters? justificatory project. As against a Kantian interpretation, it proposes an axiological-perfectionist interpretation to (...) bring out the permanent importance of this project and suggests some possible strategies for its successful execution. (shrink)

Law and Morality at War offers a broadly instrumentalist defense of the authority of the laws of war: these laws serve combatants by helping them come closer to doing what they have independent moral reason to do. We argue that this form of justification sets too low a bar. An authority’s directives are not binding, on instrumental grounds, if the subject could, within certain limits, adopt an alternative, and superior, means of conforming to morality’s demands. It emerges that (...) Haque’s argument fails to vindicate the law’s authority over all combatants. (shrink)

The most defensible justifications of war in the European intellectual tradition hold that war is instrumentally necessary for the maintenance of peace and order. An investigation of Ancient Chinese philosophical attitudes towards war calls this assumption into question. The closest parallel to an instrumental concept of war is found in the Legalist school, but historical experience in China has rejected this. The Confucian school, especially Mencius and Xunxi, insists that war is not instrumental in creating social order, but (...) derives from the prior establishing of cultural and political authority, and thus must be punitive in nature. Even the use of “punitive expeditions” is not instrumental, but rather demonstrative or performative in nature, for if coercive methods are necessary, the authority to use them is arguably absent. War for the Chinese, then, is not justified by the necessity for creating public order, but is in itself a sign of the failure to achieve such an order. This contrasts sharply with the views of the dominant Western thinkers on war, such as Michael Walzer, whose positions insist upon the instrumental necessity of armed force, even to the point of absurdity. The ancient Chinese position suggests that this necessity may be ungrounded. (shrink)

A basic conviction in moral non-cognitivism is: only hypothetical norms may be justified. Hartmut Kliemt argues for a moderate variant: there are only hypothetical justifications of norms whether the norms are hypothetical or categorical in kind. In this paper the con- cept of ‘hypothetical justification’ is analyzed. It is argued that hypothetical justifications are not of the kind that we should look for in normative ethics.

The paper deals with the correlation between the justification of morality and the justifi­cation of utilitarian normative ethics in the two treatises of Jeremy Bentham: An Intro­duction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation and Deontology. In the Introduction, the general requirement of morality (‘promote the good of others’) is considered justified because a) it is integrated into the structure of the principle of utility and only contingent to the concurring principles (the principle of asceticism and the principle of (...) sympathy and antipathy), b) the two concurring principles cannot withstand rational criticism, c) the list of principles is closed. There are two additional strategies to justify morality in the treatise. Bentham claims that the advantages of having a reputation of a trustworthy person are a sufficient reason to hold burdensome obligations. At the same time, he in­sists that an agent cannot persuade other people that her moral judgments are right unless these jugments are grounded in her recognition of the equal non-instrumental value of ev­ery person. In the Deontology, Bentham expands on the second strategy – the identifica­tion of moral virtue (duty) with the correctly understood personal interest of an agent. First, he proposes such a conception of moral virtue (duty) where sacrifices and efforts made by a person of prudence, probity, and beneficence are interpreted as the result of a clash among her own interests. Then, he demonstrates that the system of sanctions (sympathetic, religious, physical, moral, political) peculiar to human societies makes ad­vantages brought by breaches of prudence, probity, and beneficence illusory. (shrink)

This article has three interrelated aims. The first is to analyze the concept of grief; the second is to argue for the putative rationality of grief (against Donald Gustafson’s contention to the contrary); and the third is to offer a moral justification of grief along broadly Aristotelian lines as an intrinsically valuable trait of character—a virtue. With regard to this third and ultimate aim, I argue not only that grief plays an unappreciated positive role in our moral experiences but (...) flesh out a case for what exactly that positive moral role is. More precisely, I argue that grief is best justified as an Aristotelian desert-based emotional trait, incorporating two distinct desert-motivated desires, one specifically directed at the memory of the dead person as deserving of homage, the other more cosmically focusing on the general undeservingness of good people passing away. The argument goes against the grain of most previous instrumental justifications of grief and palpably violates David Konstan’s contention that grief involves “no reference to desert.”. (shrink)

The normative nature of scientific rationality is sometimes accounted for by the thesis that having theories which meet the criteria we apply is valuable to us in itself rather than as a means to an end. But given the experiential input to our beliefs and their practical role, it is apparent that we must evaluate the criteria to be used as rational means of pursuing predictive success. So we must seek a practical justification, in spite of the threat of (...) circularity. There is hope of achieving this via an exploration of options which may show that there is no reasonable alternative to the principles we use. (shrink)

According to instrumental proceduralism, political power is justified when it is the output of a reliable procedure. In this paper, I examine how procedures are supposed to confer normative properties. Based on this assessment, I conclude that many proceduralists set the reliability bar too low. Next, I motivate two additional requirements for instrumental procedures. I introduce the notion of “predictable” procedural failure and argue that in order for a procedure to confer legitimacy or other normative properties on its (...) output, it must not have failed predictably. Finally, I argue that even when procedures are highly reliable, it must not be the case that their failures fall disproportionately on certain people. The goal is to develop an instrumental proceduralism that is more sensitive to the failures of real institutions. (shrink)

I want to examine critically a certain strategy of moral justification which I shall call instrumentalism. By this I mean the view that a moral theory is rationally justified if the actions, life-plan, or set of social arrangements it prescribes can be shown to be the best means to the achievement of an agent's final ends, whatever these may be. Instrumentalism presupposes a commitment to what I shall call the Humean conception of the self. By this I mean a (...) certain way of conceiving the motivational and structural constituents of the self. Briefly, the self on this conception is motivated by its desires for states of affairs that are temporally or spatiotemporally external to the self. And it is structured by the normative requirements of instrumental rationality: The self is conceived as rationally coherent to the extent that theoretical reason calculates and schedules the satisfaction of as many of its desires as possible, with the minimum necessary costs. The motivational and structural elements of the Humean conception of the self combine to form a familiar explanatory model of human agency: We make sense of an agent's behavior by ascribing to her the desire to achieve the ends that she does in fact achieve, and the theoretically rational belief that, given the information and resources available to her, behaving as she did was the most efficient way to do so. I shall want to argue that to the extent that instrumentalism is successful in providing an objective justification of a moral theory - and I shall contend that it cannot be completely successful - it cannot provide a moral justification. But when we attempt to modify it so as to produce a specifically moral justification, we see that either it is impossible to do this, or else the Humean notion of instrumental rationality is doing no justificatory work. (shrink)

The major normative recommendations in the literature on food risk communication can be summarized in the form of seven practical principles for such communication: (1) Be honest and open. (2) Disclose incentives and conflicts of interest. (3) Take all available relevant knowledge into consideration. (4) When possible, quantify risks. (5) Describe and explain uncertainties. (6) Take all the public's concerns into account. (7) Take the rights of individuals and groups seriously. We show that each of these proposed principles can be (...) justified both in terms of more fundamental ethical principles and instrumentally in terms of the communicating agent's selfinterest. The mechanisms of this concordance of justifications are discussed. It is argued that the concordance is specific for areas such as food risks in which agents such as companies and public authorities are highly dependent on the public's trust and confidence. The implications of these findings both for moral philosophy and for practical food risk communication are discussed. (shrink)

In contemporary Western biomedical ethics, informed consent practices are commonly justified in terms of the intrinsic value of patient autonomy. James Stacey Taylor maintains that this conception of the moral grounding of medical informed consent is mistaken. On the basis of his reasoning to that effect, Taylor argues that medical informed consent is justified by the instrumental value of personal autonomy. In this article, I examine whether Taylor's justification of medical informed consent is plausible.

Broadly speaking, a naturalistic approach to epistemology seeks to explain human knowledge – and justification in particular – as a phenomenon in the natural world, in keeping with the tenets of naturalism. Naturalism is typically defined, in part, by a commitment to scientific method as the only legitimate means of attaining knowledge of the natural world. Naturalism is often thought to entail empiricism by virtue of this methodological commitment. However, scientific methods themselves may incorporate a priori elements, so empiricism (...) does not follow from the methodological commitments of naturalism alone. And given a suitably-naturalistic conception of the a priori, a priori forms of justification may be compatible with naturalism generally. A priori justification is, in principle, compatible with naturalism – and hence naturalistic epistemologies – if the a priori is understood in a way that is free of some of the inessential properties that have been associated with the concept. I argue that some of the more prominent strategies for accommodating normative notions within a naturalistic framework allow for the possibility of a priori justification. These include reliabilism, instrumental rationality, and nonfactualism about justification. A priori justification thus need not be seen as standing in opposition to all naturalistic epistemologies. It is only with nonnormative naturalistic epistemologies that a priori justification per se is incompatible, and this only because the notion of justification itself has no role to play within a nonnormative approach to epistemology. (shrink)

My goal in this paper is to advance a long-standing debate about the nature of moral rights. The debate focuses on the questions: In virtue of what do persons possess moral rights? What could explain the fact that they possess moral rights? The predominant sides in this debate are the status theory and the instrumental theory. I aim to develop and defend a new instrumental theory. I take as my point of departure the influential view of Joseph Raz, (...) which for all its virtues is unable to meet the challenge to the instrumentalist that I will address: the problem of justifying the enforcement of rights. I then offer a new instrumental theory in which duties are grounded on individuals’ interests, and individuals rights exist in virtue of the duties owed to them. I argue that my theory enables the instrumentalist to give the right sort of justification for enforcing rights. (shrink)

The protection of species ranks highly among environmentalist priorities, and many environmentalists expect the public to respect and support efforts to protect and rehabilitate endangered species. There are a range of instrumental and anthropocentric justifications for these attitudes, yet some environmentalists want more. It is unclear that more is to be had. In particular, it is challenging to justify some environmentalist attitudes without appealing to some version of the claim that species are intrinsically valuable. However, this has been a (...) notoriously difficult thesis to defend, and it is clearly not available to those who doubt the existence of species. In this paper, I show how a number of environmentalist commitments that appear to be about the value of species can be interpreted and defended in a way that is compatible with antirealism about species. According to my proposal, the proper target of environmentalists’ evaluative concern is the irreplaceable design that is embodied by the individuals that make up a (putative) species. This approach can capture and justify many environmentalist attitudes about the value of biological variety without attributing intrinsic value to species, or even requiring a place for species in our ontology. This enables environmentalists to effectively sidestep a number of puzzling issues surrounding the nature and value of species. (shrink)

I want to examine the implications of a metaphysical thesis which is presupposed in various objections to Rawls' theory of justice.Although their criticisms differ in many respects, they concur in employing what I shall refer to as the continuity thesis. This consists of the following claims conjointly: (1) The parties in the original position (henceforth the OP) are, and know themselves to be, fully mature persons who will be among the members of the well-ordered society (henceforth the WOS) which is (...) generated by their choice of principles of justice. (2) The OP is a conscious event among others, integrated (compatibly with the constraints on knowledge and motivation imposed on the parties) into the regular continuity of experience that comprises each of their ongoing constitutes lives. (3) The parties in the OP thus are, and regard themselves as, psychologically continuing persons, partially determined in personality and interests by prior experiences, capable of recollection and regret concerning the past, anticipation and apprehensiveness regarding the future, and so on. Although the continuity thesis as stated above is not at odds with any of the conditions that define the OP, its exegetical validity is a matter for discussion. I shall be concerned to argue that if it is indeed contained in or a consequence of Rawls' theory, then it casts into doubt the capacity of the OP to generate or justify any principles of justice at all. On the other hand, if the continuity thesis is viewed as dispensable and unnecessary to the Rawlsian enterprise, then Rawls is correct in maintaining the irrelevance of the question of personal identity to the construction of his moral theory. In this case, the contract-theoretic, instrumentalist justification for the two principles of justice (henceforth the 2PJ) needs to be supplanted by a modified conception of wide reflective equilibrium. The considerations that form the bulk of this discussion then may be understood as providing a rationale for Rawls' recent revisions in the model of justification on which his theory of justice rests, and for his increasing emphasis on us as moral mediators between the OP and the WOS. Now I want to consider the question of whether or not, given the textual evidence, anything like the continuity thesis is stated or implied by Rawls, and what problems for his theory, if any, turn on a positive or negative answer to this question. -/- . (shrink)

Cet article a deux objectifs. Le premier est de montrer pourquoi l’argument instrumental en faveur de la démocratie est insuffisant pour justifier la délibération politique. Si notre but est l’optimisation du potentiel épistémique d’un régime politique, et que des approches agrégatives et inférentielles (sans délibération) atteignent cet objectif, alors nous ne pouvons plus justifier la délibération sur cette base. Ce problème peut être contourné en reprenant une distinction de Daniel Andler. Pour ce dernier, le groupe délibératif se distingue du (...) groupe agrégatif parce qu’il permet aux agents, par une occasion éducative informelle, de se responsabiliser. La délibération présente donc un potentiel épistémique supérieur, mais qui ne se limite pas à identifier la meilleure réponse dans un temps donné. Le second objectif de l’article est de montrer comme l’argument d’Andler fait le pont entre, d’une part, les théories de la justification publique et, d’autre part, les théories de la démocratie épistémique. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that, inPolitics I, Aristotle uses the method of his biological investigations and nine principles regarding causation and the working of nature known from his physics, psychology, and biology to demonstrate that the barbarians are natural slaves. His procedure is in line with his general way of thinking.

Democracy can be a means to independently valuable ends and/or it can be intrinsically (or non-instrumentally) valuable. One powerful non-instrumental defence of democracy is based on the idea that only it can publicly justify political authority. I contend that this is an argument about the reasonable acceptability of political authority and about the requirements of publicity and that satisfying these requirements has nothing to do with whether a society is democratic or not. Democracy, then, plays no role in publicly (...) justifying political authority. I also show that any non-instrumental defence of democracy must make claims about what justice requires and make several further claims that require substantial justification. (shrink)

This book provides the reader with a detailed and captivating account of the story where, for the first time, physicists ventured into proposing a new force of nature beyond the four known ones - the electromagnetic, weak and strong forces, and gravitation - based entirely on the reanalysis of existing experimental data. Back in 1986, Ephraim Fischbach, Sam Aronson, Carrick Talmadge and their collaborators proposed a modification of Newton's Law of universal gravitation. Underlying this proposal were three tantalizing pieces of (...) evidence: 1) an energy dependence of the CP (particle-antiparticle and reflection symmetry) parameters, 2) differences between the measurements of G, the universal gravitational constant, in laboratories and in mineshafts, and 3) a reanalysis of the Eötvos experiment, which had previously been used to show that the gravitational mass of an object and its inertia mass were equal to approximately one part in a billion. The reanalysis revealed that, contrary to Galileo's position, the force of gravity was in fact very slightly different for different substances. The resulting Fifth Force hypothesis included this composition dependence and also added a small distance dependence to the inverse-square gravitational force. Over the next four years numerous experiments were performed to test the hypothesis. By 1990 there was overwhelming evidence that the Fifth Force, as initially proposed, did not exist. This book discusses how the Fifth Force hypothesis came to be proposed and how it went on to become a showcase of discovery, pursuit and justification in modern physics, prior to its demise. In this new and significantly expanded edition, the material from the first edition is complemented by two essays, one containing Fischbach's personal reminiscences of the proposal, and a second on the ongoing history and impact of the Fifth Force hypothesis from 1990 to the present. <. (shrink)

This article builds on contemporary debates about the doctrine of justification by faith alone to revisit the old question of the “nature of Protestantism”. Traditionally a core feature of Protestant theology, the doctrine of sola fide has been under assault for the past forty years, including within Protestant theology. This essay begins by showing that the major contemporary critique that sola fide bases salvation on a “legal fiction” misses the way that early Reformers like Luther and Melanchthon understood the (...) doctrine very substantially in terms of its pastoral power to “console” consciences. Attending to the theme of “consolation” reveals a psychological and affective realism close to the heart of the doctrine of justification by faith alone as it was originally understood. This article then shows that traditional Protestant critiques of the reliability of external mechanisms and instruments in the mediation of grace were shaped by the same orientation to psychological and affective factors that are evident in the doctrine of justification. Together, these observations suggest that “the nature of Protestantism” may be usefully understood in terms of a foundational prioritization of psychological and affective considerations over metaphysical considerations in theology. (shrink)

Consumer actions towards multinationals encompass not just expressions of dissatisfaction and ethical identity but also what are problematically termed ‘instrumental actions’ entailing perceived purposes and likely impacts. This term may seem inappropriate where insufficient information exists for instrumentally linking means to ends, yet we consider it useful for describing purposive consumer action in its subjective aspect because it reflects the psychological reality whereby complexity-reducing social constructions give consumer actions instrumentally rational form for purposes of meaningful understanding and justification. (...) This paper is particularly concerned to explore the complexities of cause and intention—particularly ethical intention—which are thus reduced. In particular, it considers complex interaction between individual ethical values, demographic factors and contexts of societal practice. It seeks to highlight primary antecedents among these interactants in order to guide both consumers and multinationals in their complexity-reducing social constructions to improve their fit to true causes and intentions. Study 1 involved 606 United Kingdom nationals, while study 2 involved 2561 individuals from 15 nations. Both sets of findings link higher personal income levels to propensity to engage in instrumental actions towards multinationals. Overwhelmingly, however, individual ethical values seem to matter most, irrespective of demographic or cultural contexts. These findings suggest that both consumers and multinationals engaged in ethical dialogue with consumers are best advised to articulate a universalising and not culturally or nationally bound ethical intelligence, which speaks directly to conscience within a global ethical discourse. (shrink)

To the normal reasons that we think can justify one in preferring something, x (namely, that x has objectively preferable properties, or has properties that one prefers things to have, or that x's obtaining would advance one's preferences), I argue that it can be a justifying reason to prefer x that one's very preferring of x would advance one's preferences. Here, one prefers x not because of the properties of x, but because of the properties of one's having the preference (...) for x. So-revising one's preferences is rational in paradoxical choice situations like Kavka's Deterrence Paradox. I then try to meet the following objections: that this is stoicist, incoherent, bad faith; that it conflates instrumental and intrinsic value, gives wrong solutions to the problems presented by paradoxical choice situations, entails vicious regresses of value justification, falsifies value realism, makes valuing x unresponsive to x's properties, causes value conflict, conflicts with other standards of rationality, violates decision theory, counsels immorality, makes moral paradox, treats value change as voluntary, conflates first- and second-order values, is psychologically unrealistic, and wrongly presumes that paradoxical choice situations can even occur. (shrink)

Should we grant rights to artificially intelligent robots? Most current and near-future robots do not meet the hard criteria set by deontological and utilitarian theory. Virtue ethics can avoid this problem with its indirect approach. However, both direct and indirect arguments for moral consideration rest on ontological features of entities, an approach which incurs several problems. In response to these difficulties, this paper taps into a different conceptual resource in order to be able to grant some degree of moral consideration (...) to some intelligent social robots: it sketches a novel argument for moral consideration based on social relations. It is shown that to further develop this argument we need to revise our existing ontological and social-political frameworks. It is suggested that we need a social ecology, which may be developed by engaging with Western ecology and Eastern worldviews. Although this relational turn raises many difficult issues and requires more work, this paper provides a rough outline of an alternative approach to moral consideration that can assist us in shaping our relations to intelligent robots and, by extension, to all artificial and biological entities that appear to us as more than instruments for our human purposes. (shrink)

According to a subjectivist theory, normative reasons are grounded in facts about our desires. According to an instrumentalist theory, reasons are grounded also in facts about the relevant means to desired objects. These are distinct theories. The widespread tendency to conflate the normativity of subjective and instrumentalist precepts obscures two facts. First, instrumentalist precepts incorporate a subjective element with an objective one. Second, combining these elements into a single theory of normative reasons requires explaining how and why they are to (...) be combined. I argue that the most plausible justification for combining the two elements—which appeals to a theory of well‐being—exposes the inadequacy of the instrumentalist theory: The grounds required to justify the instrumentalist combination are also grounds for the normativity of prudential precepts and with them practical reasons that may have no internal connection to an agent's conative, motivational states. (shrink)

El presente trabajo aborda el problema de la justificación de la normatividad de los imperativos instrumentales. Husserl critica la pretensión kantiana de justificar la fuerza normativa de este tipo de requerimientos de racionalidad con recurso a un mero análisis semántico de lo que significa querer un fin. La constitución genética de la noción de medio y, derivadamente, de los imperativos instrumentales supondría, por el contrario, la cooperación de actos lógicos y afectivos, y sólo a partir de su convergencia se volvería (...) comprensible la estructura funcional de la razón volitiva, en cuanto facultad referible a intenciones prácticas con pretendida eficacia causal. The paper addresses the problem of the justification of the normativity of instrumental imperatives. Husserl criticizes the Kantian attempt to justify the normative force of this type of rationality requirements through a mere semantic analysis of what willing an end means. The genetic constitution of the concept of means and, derivatively, of instrumental imperatives, would, on the contrary, involve the cooperation of logical and emotional acts. Thus, the paper argues that the functional structure of volitional reason becomes intelligible only on the basis of the convergence of those two elements, insofar as it is a faculty that can be referred to practical intentions with alleged causal eficacy. (shrink)

The present study examined how the pre-war debate of the US decision to invade Iraq (in March 2003) was discursively constructed in the US/British mainstream newspaper opinion/editorial (op/ed) argumentation. Drawing on theoretical insights from critical discourse analysis and argumentation theory, I problematised the fallacious discussion used in the pro-war op/eds to build up a ‘moral/legal case’ for war on Iraq based on adversarial (rather than dialogical) argumentation. The proponents of war deployed ‘instrumental rationality’ (ends-justify-means reasoning), ‘ethical necessity’ (Bush’s ‘Preemption (...) Doctrine’) and ‘humanitarian virtue’ (the bombing of Iraq to ‘save’ Iraqis from Saddam’s pestilent tyranny) to justify the pending invasion of Iraq. Their arguments intertextually resonated with Bush administration’s ‘war on terror’ rhetoric in a way that created a form of indexical association through ‘recontextualisation’. The type of arguments marshalled by the pro-war op/ed commentators uncritically bolstered the set of US official ‘truth claims’ and ‘presuppositions’. (shrink)

With the prevalence of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) increasing in western societies, questions of the ethical justification of these alternative health care approaches and practices have to be addressed. In order to evaluate philosophical reasoning on this subject, it is of paramount importance to identify and analyse possible arguments for the ethical justification of CAM considering contemporary biomedical ethics as well as more fundamental philosophical aspects. Moreover, it is vital to provide adequate analytical instruments for this task, (...) such as separating ‘CAM as belief system’, and ‘CAM as practice’, Findings show that beneficence and non-maleficence are central issues for an ethical justification of CAM as practice, while freedom of thought and religion are central to CAM as belief system. Many justification strategies have limitations and qualifications that have to be taken into account. Singularly descriptive premises in an argument often prove to be more problematic than universal ethical principles. Thus, non-ethical issues related to a general philosophical underpinning - e.g. epistemology, semantics, and ontology - are highly relevant for determining a justification strategy, especially when strong metaphysical assumptions are involved. Even if some values are shared with traditional biomedicine, axiological differences have to be considered as well. Further research should be done about specific CAM positions. These could be combined with applied qualitative social research methods. (shrink)

In contrast to liberal, Christian and other pacifist ethics and to just war theory, a range of 20th-century thinkers sought to normalize the role of violence in politics. This article examines the justificatory strategies of Weber, Sorel, Schmitt, Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty and Fanon. They each engage in justificatory argument, deploying arguments for violence from instrumentality, from necessity and from virtue. All of these arguments raise problems of validity. However, we find that they are reinforced by the representation of violence in terms (...) of a specific aesthetic, either tragedy or sublimity, and by certain rhetorical textual strategies. We conclude that the persuasive force of these arguments for violence rests as much, if not more, on aesthetics and rhetoric, as it does on argument. (shrink)

In the long-running debate on the interest of the dead, Joan C. Callahan argues against such interests and although Søren Holm for practical reasons is prepared to consider posthumous interests, he does not see any moral basis to support such interests. He argues that the whole question is irresolvable, yet finds privacy interests where Tutankhamen is concerned. Callahan argues that there can be reasons to hold on to the fiction that there are posthumous interests, namely if it is comforting for (...) the living and instrumental for society. Thus, despite arguing against the position that the dead have any interests or for any moral basis for such interests, these “interests” are still taken into consideration in the end. This shows the unsatisfactory basis of their positions and indicates the tenacity of the moral intuition that the dead can have moral claims on the living. One example of a posthumous interest is the interest in one’s good name. Here we argue that it is an interest of moral significance. This implies that if individuals restrict use of their sample when they are still alive, those restrictions apply after their death. Further, it implies that one should be concerned with the reputation of historic persons. Research that defeats these interests calls for justification. We have suggested two lines of thinking along which such a discussion could go: investigating the truth-value of the good name and the relevance of bringing it into possible disrepute. (shrink)

As Kant claimed in the Groundwork, and as the idea has been developed by Korsgaard 1997, Bratman 1987, and Broome 2002. This formulation is agnostic on whether reasons for ends derive from our desiring those ends, or from the relation of those ends to things of independent value. However, desire-based theorists may deny, against Hubin 1999, that their theory is a combination of a principle of instrumental transmission and the principle that reasons for ends are provided by desires. Instead, (...) they may say, there is just one principle, a principle of, if you will, instrumental transmutation: if one desires the end, then one has reason to take the means. See the discussion of General Production, in section 8, for a doubt about this. (shrink)

Em tempos de aceleração, de competição consigo mesmo e de uma linguagem instrumental e pragmática para se falar da educação, qual seria o valor de uma justificativa estética da existência em se tratando da formação de professores? Tendo tal problemática como motivadora, objetivamos, com este estudo, levantar a discussão acerca da relação entre literatura e docência, procurando aproximá-las de modo não utilitário, mas com vistas à estética da existência. Como um modo de resistência, optamos por perguntar pela formação de (...) professores pautada pelo exercício do pensamento, pela problematização dos valores e pelo cuidado consigo e com os demais. A partir disso, utilizamo-nos da pesquisa com inspiração arquegenealógica em Foucault, nos debruçando sobre autores que abordam ou a literatura ou a docência como possibilidades de entendimentos outros que não os conteudistas. Assim, tomamos a literatura, com inspiração nos estudos foucaultianos para problematizar a constituição docente. Mais especificamente, buscamos, nos estudos sobre a genealogia da subjetivação, a leitura, e a escrita tomadas como práticas possíveis do cuidado de si, quando da investigação de Foucault na Antiguidade greco-romana, especialmente nos primeiros séculos da nossa era. Todavia, não se trata de uma aplicação conceitual anacrônica, mas de tomarmos esse ferramental para pensar o que estamos nos tornando no presente, quais são os modos contemporâneos de dominação e quais são as possibilidades, em brechas, de criação de uma estilística da existência. Sendo um ensaio teórico, operamos com a literatura como possibilidade de dobra na linguagem tida como verdade, que poderia funcionar não fora da linguagem, mas fora da ordem do discurso. Seguindo essa perspectiva, entendemos que ela pode não ter apenas a função de revelar outra verdade, ser um passatempo, informar ou transmitir um saber, mas pode funcionar como uma prática de si num exercício de pensamento que problematiza o que estamos fazendo com nossa vida e com a vida dos demais no presente. Palavras-chave: Literatura. Docência. Práticas de si. Foucault. (shrink)

You should be specific, but also explain the context and relevance of the term. (Each ID is worth 5 points).