Plantinga defines S's belief as ‘privately rational if and only if it is probable on S's evidence’, and ‘publicly rational if and only if it is probable with respect to public evidence’, and he claims that ‘it is an immediate consequence of these definitions that all my basic beliefs are privately rational’. I made it explicitly clear in my review that on my account of a person's evidence (quoted and used by Plantinga) as ‘the content of his basic beliefs (weighted (...) by his degree of confidence in them)’, that is not the case. I emphasize ‘weighted by his degree of confidence in them’. I wrote explicitly: ‘for more or less any belief, however convinced you are of it initially, other evidence of which you are equally convinced could rend it overall improbable’. Put technically, in probabilistic terms, basic beliefs come to us with different degrees of prior probability varying with our degree of confidence in them, but a belief with a high prior probability can in the light of other beliefs of our current set have a lower posterior probability. If you continue to hold on to a basic belief when its probability on the total evidence is below half, that belief is not privately rational. Footnotes1 Note: This brief discussion arises out of Richard Swinburne's critical notice of Alvin Plantinga's Warranted Christian Belief (New York NY: Oxford University Press, 2000) and Plantinga's reply in Religious Studies, 37 (2001), 203–214, 215–222. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 173 ducente un monde interamente unificato dall'azione divina. Ma, come egli stesso ritiene di avere mostrato nell'altro sue libro, Le probl~raede l'ttre chezAristote, questo fu soltanto l'ideale di Aristotele, mentre la sua filosofia effettiva ne rimase infinitamente Iontana. L'etica di Aristotele si pu6 definire allora un umanesimo tragieo: umanesimo, in quanto presuppons la fiducia nell'uomo, nella sua ricerca e nella sua azione; tragieo, in quanto si costituisce (...) proprio nella distanza che separa l'uomo da Die: Aristotele invita l'uomo a volere tutto il possibile, ma solo il possibile, e a lasciare il resto agli dei (pp. 174-177). Nell'appendice, dedicata al tema dell'amieizia in Aristotele, I'A. mostra come anche questa virtfl, analogamente alla prudenza, sia espressione dell'imperfezione dell'uomo, il quale, non potendo trovare la propria felicit~ nella contemplazione e nelI'amore dise stesso, come Die, la cerca nel riconoscimento e nell'amore degli altri (pp. 179-183). Nel complesso si deve ammettere che lo studio dell'A. ~ il tentative pifl interessante e pih moderno che sia state fatto per collegare logicamente l'etica di Aristotele con la sua metafisica, e si deve riconoscere che tale tentative, nonostante qualche affermazione discutibile, ~ perfettamente riuseito. Esso infatti conserva all'etica aristotelica quel carattere di problematicit~ e di asistematicit~ che ne costituisce la pifi genuina natura e che altri tentativi analoghi finiscone invece inevitabilmente col sopprimere. Ci6 che rende possibile la sua riuscita b la nuova interpretazione della metafisica aristotelica, che I'A. ha sviluppato nella sua opera precedente ed in base alla quale anche la metafisica, come l'etica, lungi dal presentarsi come una costruzione sistematica e rigidamente dimostrativa, rivela una natura essenzialmente problematica. L'unica riserva di fondo che ritengo di dover muovere a tale interpretazione, ~ quella a cui he avuto occasione di accennare recensendo Le probl~me de l'$tre chez Aristote (cf. "Giornale di Metafisica", XVIII, 1963, 266-271), e cio~ che la problematicit~ della metafisica aristoteliea non significa rinunzia ad affermare con certezza razionale la trascendenza di Die, ma anzi si risolve proprio in questa affermazione, la quale, lungi dall'essere uno scacco o un insuccesso, 6, al contrario, la pifi esaltante delle certezze. Analogamente la problematicit~ dell'etica arlstotelica non significa rinunzia all'affermazione di un valore supreme, ma riconoscimento della sua necessitY, anche se l'uomo non giunger~, mai ad attuarlo. Come nella metafisica il sapere dell'uomo si risolve in definitiva nslla continua ricerca del sapere, cio~ nella consapevolezza dell'esistenza di un sapere superiore a quello puramente umano, cosi nell'etica la perfezione dell'uomo si risolve nella stessa aspirazione alla perfezione, cio~ nell'ineessante sforzo di autoperfezionarsi. Tale precisazione, a mio avviso, ~ necessaria, per evitare chela metafisica di Aristotele venga interpretata come una forma di scetticismo e la sua etica come una forma di relativismo. ENRICO BERTI Perugia, Italy Consolation ]or the Tribulations o] Israel (Consola~am as Tribula~oens de Israel). By Samuel Usque. Translated from the Portuguese by Martin A. Cohen. (Philadelphia: Jewish Publications Society of America, 1965. Pp. xiii + 354. $6.00.) This work, the first in a new scholarly series of translations of texts, is a fascinating document. It was probably written in Italy around 1550 and was first published in Portuguese in Ferrara in 1553. Although it was not widely read at the time, it was republished around the end of the sixteenth century in the Netherlands. By now it is a Portuguese classic, and a unique document in Jewish intellectual history. Usque, whose biography is almost unknown except for clues found in the Consola~am, was apparently a Portuguese New Christian (a forced convert) who fled during the persecutions of Judaizers by the Inquisition in the 1530's. He wandered in Europe and the Levant, visited Palestine, and settled down in Italy, probably in the entourage of Samuel Abravanel (the brother of Leon Ebreo), Dona Gracia Nasi (the aunt and mother-in-law of the Duke of Naxos), and Hercules of Este, the Duke of Ferrara. His book, addressed "to the gentlemen of the Diapora of Portugal" is a pastoral and a dialogue, dealing with Israel's fate. Writing just 174 HISTORY OF... (shrink)

La théorie économique marxiste rend compte des rapports entre capitalisme et violence à l’aide notamment du concept d’accumulation primitive. Cet article se propose de montrer comment ce concept s’est construit et étoffé en analysant trois étapes : d’abord son élaboration initiale par Karl Marx (l’accumulation primitive comme préhistoire du capital), ensuite une première extension par Rosa Luxemburg (l’accumulation primitive comme mouvement actuel d’extension géographique de la logique du capital du centre vers la périphérie), et enfin une seconde extension par David (...) Harvey (l’accumulation primitive comme mouvement de recolonisation « intérieure » et d’« accumulation par dépossession »). L’article propose d’articuler ces trois étapes à partir de la dialectique entre droit et violence telle que l’a problématisée le philosophe Walter Benjamin (2018). Codes JEL : B14, B24, B5. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 31.2 (2001) 9-34 [Access article in PDF] Of Blackface and Paranoid KnowledgeRichard Wright, Jacques Lacan, and the Ambivalence of Black Minstrelsy Mikko Tuhkanen Only the subject—the human subject, the subject of the desire that is the essence of man—is not, unlike the animal, entirely caught up in this imaginary capture. He maps himself in it. How? In so far as he isolates the function of the mask and (...) plays with it. Man, in effect, knows how to play with the mask as that beyond which there is the gaze. —Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-AnalysisThere is a danger of corrosion of the self in this pretense, and surely a rending of integrity. How, and when does one call upon the real self to dispel the make-believe and claim humanity and dignity?... It was just possible that the trick had been too perfect; legerdemain had undone itself in a disappearance act where the self had vanished, but also the incantation to call it back again. —Nathan Irvin Huggins, Harlem RenaissanceIn late November 1998, a teacher in New York City's Public School 75 introduced an acclaimed children's book called Nappy Hair to her third-grade students as extracurricular reading material. The book, written by Carolivia Herron, is a transcript of a piece of oral history passed on in the author's family. It tells the story of a black girl with "the kinkiest, the nappiest, the fuzziest, the most screwed up, squeezed up, knotted up, tangled up, twisted up [...] hair you've ever seen in your life" [Herron, unnumbered pages]. According to the author, the book aims to celebrate racial diversity and encourage pride in black children. Some parents of the (mostly black) pupils saw it differently, however. In the days following the introduction of the book, photocopies of parts of the book were circulated among the parents, some of whom were enraged when they saw what they considered demeaning, stereotypical, and "racially insensitive" depictions of black people. A meeting was called with parents and school officials. Threats were made by the parents, and the 27-year-old teacher, a white woman, was put on desk duty while an investigation was launched. Even though the school ended up backing the teacher, she refused to return to the classroom, citing fears for her own safety [see Holloway, "School"; "Teacher"; "Threatened"; "Unswayed"].The incident received a fair amount of commentary, including a New York Times op-ed article by Jill Nelson. In the article, Nelson argues that what the Nappy Hair controversy illustrates is not the racial insensitivity of the white teacher or the school [End Page 9] system—as the black parents argued—but that the "barriers to [...] self-esteem are perpetuated not by the white community but by the black one." For Nelson, the black community remains overly sensitive about certain representations of blackness. She suggests that such attitudes may have their origin in slavery and in the adoption of the valorization of white physical features by African descendants from their masters. In this, she follows critics such as Kobena Mercer, who writes in "Black Hair/Style Politics" that "black people's hair has been historically devalued as the most visible stigmata of blackness, second only to skin" [101]. Inevitably, representations such as those at stake in the classroom controversy find their historical background in minstrelsy: "In the minstrel stereotype of Sambo [...] the 'frizzy' hair of the character is an essential part of the iconography of inferiority. In children's books and vaudeville minstrelsy, the 'woolly' hair is ridiculed, just as aspects of black people's speech were lampooned in both popular music hall and the nineteenth-century novel as evidence of the 'quaint folkways' and 'cultural backwardness of the slaves'" [102]. Nelson concludes: "Too many African-Americans," she writes, "have internalized and passed down these beliefs, as if proximity to whiteness inherently enhances our worth."Nelson's reading of the controversy is neither incorrect nor adequate. Certainly, the parents' outrage with the book—more precisely, with the... (shrink)

How do we know ourselves? When it comes to our states of mind, it might seem that self-knowledge enjoys a privilege: I know what I'm thinking because I have immediate access to my mind. Inspired by Sartre, two American philosophers, Richard Moran and Charles Larmore, have argued that this idea fails to account for our singular relationship with our own minds. In addition to knowing ourselves through theoretical reflection, we are also capable of practical reflection. We can answer the (...) question of what we think in a practical way: through a decision or a commitment, rather than a self-interpretation. But what is the relationship between these two types of self-reflection? What should we do when they conflict? This book seeks to answer these questions. In so doing, it shows the importance of another path to self-knowledge hitherto left aside by analytic authors: phenomenological reflection on our experience of the world. -/- Comment se connaît-on soi-même ? Concernant nos états d’esprit, il peut sembler que la connaissance de soi jouisse d’un privilège : je sais ce que je pense parce que j’ai un accès immédiat à mon esprit. S’inspirant de Sartre, deux philosophes américains, Richard Moran et Charles Larmore, ont soutenu que cette idée ne rend pas compte de notre rapport singulier à notre propre esprit. En plus de se connaître par une réflexion théorique, on est aussi capable d’une réflexion pratique. On peut répondre de façon pratique à la question de savoir ce qu’on pense : par une décision ou un engagement, plutôt qu’une interprétation de soi. Mais quel est le rapport entre ces deux types de réflexion sur soi ? Que faire lorsqu’elles entrent en conflit ? Ce livre cherche à répondre à ces questions. Ce faisant, il montre l’importance d’une autre voie vers la connaissance de soi jusqu’à présent laissée de côté par les auteurs analytiques : la réflexion phénoménologique sur notre expérience du monde. (shrink)

Since Socrates, and through Descartes to the present day, the problems of self-knowledge have been central to philosophy's understanding of itself. Today the idea of ''first-person authority''--the claim of a distinctive relation each person has toward his or her own mental life--has been challenged from a number of directions, to the point where many doubt the person bears any distinctive relation to his or her own mental life, let alone a privileged one. In Authority and Estrangement, Richard Moran argues (...) for a reconception of the first-person and its claims. Indeed, he writes, a more thorough repudiation of the idea of privileged inner observation leads to a deeper appreciation of the systematic differences between self-knowledge and the knowledge of others, differences that are both irreducible and constitutive of the very concept and life of the person.Masterfully blending philosophy of mind and moral psychology, Moran develops a view of self-knowledge that concentrates on the self as agent rather than spectator. He argues that while each person does speak for his own thought and feeling with a distinctive authority, that very authority is tied just as much to the disprivileging of the first-person, to its specific possibilities of alienation. Drawing on certain themes from Wittgenstein, Sartre, and others, the book explores the extent to which what we say about ourselves is a matter of discovery or of creation, the difficulties and limitations in being ''objective'' toward ourselves, and the conflicting demands of realism about oneself and responsibility for oneself. What emerges is a strikingly original and psychologically nuanced exploration of the contrasting ideals of relations to oneself and relations to others. (shrink)

Since Socrates, and through Descartes to the present day, the problems of self-knowledge have been central to philosophy's understanding of itself. Today the idea of ''first-person authority''--the claim of a distinctive relation each person has toward his or her own mental life--has been challenged from a number of directions, to the point where many doubt the person bears any distinctive relation to his or her own mental life, let alone a privileged one. In Authority and Estrangement, Richard Moran argues (...) for a reconception of the first-person and its claims. Indeed, he writes, a more thorough repudiation of the idea of privileged inner observation leads to a deeper appreciation of the systematic differences between self-knowledge and the knowledge of others, differences that are both irreducible and constitutive of the very concept and life of the person. Masterfully blending philosophy of mind and moral psychology, Moran develops a view of self-knowledge that concentrates on the self as agent rather than spectator. He argues that while each person does speak for his own thought and feeling with a distinctive authority, that very authority is tied just as much to the disprivileging of the first-person, to its specific possibilities of alienation. Drawing on certain themes from Wittgenstein, Sartre, and others, the book explores the extent to which what we say about ourselves is a matter of discovery or of creation, the difficulties and limitations in being ''objective'' toward ourselves, and the conflicting demands of realism about oneself and responsibility for oneself. What emerges is a strikingly original and psychologically nuanced exploration of the contrasting ideals of relations to oneself and relations to others. (shrink)

Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences. The main principles that he justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are discussed along the way. Pettigrew looks to decision theory in order to ground his argument. He treats an agent's credences as if they were a choice she makes between different options, gives an account of the purely epistemic utility enjoyed by different (...) sets of credences, and then appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility set out here is the veritist's: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, Pettigrew conducts an investigation in the version of epistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology. (shrink)

Using the lives of the three outstanding French intellectuals of the twentieth century, renowned historian Tony Judt offers a unique look at how intellectuals can ignore political pressures and demonstrate a heroic commitment to personal integrity and moral responsibility unfettered by the difficult political exigencies of their time. Through the prism of the lives of Leon Blum, Albert Camus, and Raymond Aron, Judt examines pivotal issues in the history of contemporary French society—antisemitism and the dilemma of Jewish identity, political and (...) moral idealism in public life, the Marxist moment in French thought, the traumas of decolonization, the disaffection of the intelligentsia, and the insidious quarrels rending Right and Left. Judt focuses particularly on Blum's leadership of the Popular Front and his stern defiance of the Vichy governments, on Camus's part in the Resistance and Algerian War, and on Aron's cultural commentary and opposition to the facile acceptance by many French intellectuals of communism's utopian promise. Severely maligned by powerful critics and rivals, each of these exemplary figures stood fast in their principles and eventually won some measure of personal and public redemption. Judt constructs a compelling portrait of modern French intellectual life and politics. He challenges the conventional account of the role of intellectuals precisely because they mattered in France, because they could shape public opinion and influence policy. In Blum, Camus, and Aron, Judt finds three very different men who did not simply play the role, but evinced a courage and a responsibility in public life that far outshone their contemporaries. "An eloquent and instructive study of intellectual courage in the face of what the author persuasively describes as intellectual irresponsibility."—Richard Bernstein, _New York Times_. (shrink)

Using the lives of the three outstanding French intellectuals of the twentieth century, renowned historian Tony Judt offers a unique look at how intellectuals can ignore political pressures and demonstrate a heroic commitment to personal integrity and moral responsibility unfettered by the difficult political exigencies of their time. Through the prism of the lives of Leon Blum, Albert Camus, and Raymond Aron, Judt examines pivotal issues in the history of contemporary French society—antisemitism and the dilemma of Jewish identity, political and (...) moral idealism in public life, the Marxist moment in French thought, the traumas of decolonization, the disaffection of the intelligentsia, and the insidious quarrels rending Right and Left. Judt focuses particularly on Blum's leadership of the Popular Front and his stern defiance of the Vichy governments, on Camus's part in the Resistance and Algerian War, and on Aron's cultural commentary and opposition to the facile acceptance by many French intellectuals of communism's utopian promise. Severely maligned by powerful critics and rivals, each of these exemplary figures stood fast in their principles and eventually won some measure of personal and public redemption. Judt constructs a compelling portrait of modern French intellectual life and politics. He challenges the conventional account of the role of intellectuals precisely because they mattered in France, because they could shape public opinion and influence policy. In Blum, Camus, and Aron, Judt finds three very different men who did not simply play the role, but evinced a courage and a responsibility in public life that far outshone their contemporaries. "An eloquent and instructive study of intellectual courage in the face of what the author persuasively describes as intellectual irresponsibility."—Richard Bernstein, _New York Times_. (shrink)

One of our most brilliant evolutionary biologists, Richard Lewontin has also been a leading critic of those--scientists and non-scientists alike--who would misuse the science to which he has contributed so much. In The Triple Helix, Lewontin the scientist and Lewontin the critic come together to provide a concise, accessible account of what his work has taught him about biology and about its relevance to human affairs. In the process, he exposes some of the common and troubling misconceptions that misdirect (...) and stall our understanding of biology and evolution.The central message of this book is that we will never fully understand living things if we continue to think of genes, organisms, and environments as separate entities, each with its distinct role to play in the history and operation of organic processes. Here Lewontin shows that an organism is a unique consequence of both genes and environment, of both internal and external features. Rejecting the notion that genes determine the organism, which then adapts to the environment, he explains that organisms, influenced in their development by their circumstances, in turn create, modify, and choose the environment in which they live.The Triple Helix is vintage Lewontin: brilliant, eloquent, passionate, and deeply critical. But it is neither a manifesto for a radical new methodology nor a brief for a new theory. It is instead a primer on the complexity of biological processes, a reminder to all of us that living things are never as simple as they may seem. (shrink)

Effective altruism sounds so innocuous—who could possibly be opposed to doing good more effectively? Yet it has inspired significant backlash in recent years. This paper addresses some common misconceptions and argues that the core “beneficentric” ideas of effective altruism are both excellent and widely neglected. Reasonable people may disagree on details of implementation, but all should share the basic goals or values underlying effective altruism.

In her recent, provocative essay “What Is the Point of Equality?”, Elizabeth Anderson argues against a common ideal of egalitarian justice that she calls “ luck egalitarianism” and in favor of an approach she calls “democratic equality.”1 According to the luck egalitarian, the aim of justice as equality is to eliminate so far as is possible the impact on people’s lives of bad luck that falls on them through no fault or choice of their own. In the ideal luck egalitarian (...) society, there are no inequalities in people’s life prospects except those that arise through processes of voluntary choice or faulty conduct, for which the agents involved can reasonably be held responsible. Anderson asserts that the adherents of luck egalitarianism, which can be elaborated in many different ways, include John Roemer, Erik Rakowski, Thomas Nagel, Ronald Dworkin, Gerald Cohen, Richard Arneson, and Philippe Van Parijs.2 In contrast, according to the democratic equality conception, justice as equality requires an end to oppressive social relationships. In the ideal society of democratic equality, the social conditions of everyone’s freedom are secured, each stands to every other in a relationship of fundamental equality, including equal respect, and all have real freedom to participate in democratic self-government. (shrink)

Increasing attention is paid in the social sciences and management studies to the constitution and claims of different theories, perspectives, and "paradigms." This book is one of the most respected and robust analyses of these issues. For this new paperback edition Richard Whitley--a leading figure in European business education--has written a new introduction which addresses the particular epistemological issues of business management studies.

Distinguished philosopher Richard Wollheim's rich and thought-provoking account of the emotions considers what emotions are, how they arise in our lives, and how standard and "moral" emotions differ.

Few philosophers have left a legacy like that of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. He has been credited not only with inventing the differential calculus, but also with anticipating the basic ideas of modern logic, information science, and fractal geometry. He made important contributions to such diverse fields as jurisprudence, geology and etymology, while sketching designs for calculating machines, wind pumps, and submarines. But the common presentation of his philosophy as a kind of unworldly idealism is at odds with all this bustling (...) practical activity. In this book Richard. T. W. Arthur offers a fresh reading of Leibniz’s philosophy, clearly situating it in its scientific, political and theological contexts. He argues that Leibniz aimed to provide an improved foundation for the mechanical philosophy based on a new kind of universal language. His contributions to natural philosophy are an integral part of this programme, which his metaphysics, dynamics and organic philosophy were designed to support. Rather than denying that substances really exist in space and time, as the idealist reading proposes, Leibniz sought to provide a deeper understanding of substance and body, and a correct understanding of space as an order of situations and time as an order of successive things. This lively and approachable book will appeal to students of philosophy, as well as anyone seeking a stimulating introduction to Leibniz's thought and its continuing relevance. (shrink)

The discussion of good and evil must not be confined to the sterile lecture halls of academics but related instead to ordinary human feelings, needs, and desires, says noted philosopher Richard Taylor. Efforts to understand morality by exploring human reason will always fail because we are creatures of desire as well. All morality arises from our intense and inescapable longing. The distinction between good and evil is always clouded by rationalists who convert the real problems of ethics into complex (...) philosophical puzzles. In the first part of Good and Evil, Taylor looks for a more meaningful conception by reexamining and rejecting the whole rationalistic tradition that dominates philosophical ethics. The second part provides an empirical explanation of good and evil, noting that one does not have to look too far to find prime examples of the failure of fixed moral rules. Including important commentary on Joseph Fletcher's groundbreaking situation ethics, and Aristotle's virtues (e.g., magnanimity and pride), Taylor rounds out the book by developing a philosophy of aspiration--personal worth as an ethical ideal--to replace the morality of duty. He offers a modified form of situation ethics to fit the contemporary problems we face. (shrink)

This much acclaimed book has emerged as neo-pragmatism's most significant contribution to contemporary aesthetics. By articulating a deeply embodied notion of aesthetic experience and the art of living, and by providing a compellingly rigorous defense of popular art—crowned by a pioneer study of hip hop—Richard Shusterman reorients aesthetics towards a fresher, more relevant, and socially progressive agenda. The second edition contains an introduction where Shusterman responds to his critics, and it concludes with an added chapter that formulates his novel (...) notion of somaesthetics. (shrink)

By a thorough study of the Posterior Analytics and related Aristotelian texts, Richard McKirahan reconstructs Aristotle's theory of episteme--science. The Posterior Analytics contains the first extensive treatment of the nature and structure of science in the history of philosophy, and McKirahan's aim is to interpret it sympathetically, following the lead of the text, rather than imposing contemporary frameworks on it. In addition to treating the theory as a whole, the author uses textual and philological as well as philosophical material (...) to interpret many important but difficult individual passages. A number of issues left obscure by the Aristotelian material are settled by reference to Euclid's geometrical practice in the Elements. To justify this use of Euclid, McKirahan makes a comparative analysis of fundamental features of Euclidian geometry with the corresponding elements of Aristotle's theory. Emerging from that discussion is a more precise and more complex picture of the relation between Aristotle's theory and Greek mathematics--a picture of mutual, rather than one-way, dependence. Originally published in 1992. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

Il concetto di omologia riveste un ruolo centrale nella biologia teoretica contemporanea perché attorno ad esso e per suo tramite trovano articolazione numerosi progetti di ricerca miranti a ripensare la centralità dell’organismo, i suoi percorsi evolutivi e il significato della sua interazione con la realtà ambientale. La rete di omologie che tesse l’organismo permette di strutturarne e canalizzarne le innovazioni morfologiche e funzionali. Appunto questa componente sistemica rende dunque l’omologia un concetto fondamentale per una considerazione dinamica della forma vivente, (...) come quella cui mira un’estetica che non intenda limitarsi a indagare sull’atteggiamento estetico e sulle produzioni artistiche, ma sappia tematizzare in senso più comprensivo la questione (eminentemente propria della tradizione morfologica) dell’unità dell’agire e del percepire come configurazione estetica del vivente.Il presente studio propone una ricognizione di alcuni dei principali momenti fondativi del concetto di omologia, a partire dalle ricerche botaniche di Goethe e dal significato che esse rivestono nel progetto morfologico goethiano, per proseguire con l’elaborazione del concetto di “elemento anatomico” da parte di Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire e la sua problematica rilettura da parte di Arthur Schopenhauer, conducendo sino alla fondazione del concetto moderno di omologia con Richard Owen, alla sua messa in relazione col concetto di analogia e all’elaborazione del concetto di “archetipo del vertebrato”. In tal modo, il presente studio mira a individuare alcuni motivi salienti di attualità del concetto e delle potenzialità teoriche che in esso trovano espressione, fra prospettiva morfologica e attenzione ai vincoli materiali della forma. (shrink)

Bayle est souvent considéré comme sceptique, mais sa conception de la raison n’est pas toujours claire ; ce qui en revanche est clair, c’est qu’il manifeste une profonde méfiance à l’égard des capacités de la raison de livrer une connaissance certaine. Cependant, une nouvelle interprétation de Bayle comme rationaliste « stratonicien » a été développée par Gianluca Mori, qui donne une description détaillée de Bayle comme philosophe critique désireux de rendre compte de toutes positions possibles dans leur complexité et de (...) tirer toutes les conséquences des arguments invoqués au service des principes dits « stratoniciens ». Cette conception de Bayle comme rationaliste critique stratonicien rend possible une interprétation de Bayle moins comme un « supersceptique » à la Richard Popkin, que celui qui permet à la raison d’opérer avec une portée et une autorité plus grandes que ne le permettrait le scepticisme. Mori affirme que la conception de la raison chez Bayle est assez forte ; selon lui, la raison peut aller jusqu’au bout, avec une autorité absolue, et tirer des conclusions. Je soutiens que la conception de la nature et de la fonction de la raison chez Bayle se situe en fait entre le rationalisme stratonicien de Mori et l’interprétation « supersceptique » de Popkin. Comme Mori, je pense qu’il s’agit d’un rationalisme « critique » ; mais contre lui, je pense que la raison elle-même définit et recommande ses propres limites. J’appelle cette conception de la raison « sceptico-rationaliste » et, en suivant Bayle, je suggère comment le « bon sens » (qui fait partie de la raison) aide à définir ces limites. (shrink)

Der Hermann Heller der frühen Bundesrepublik : Wolfgang Abendroth zum 100. Geburtstag -- Richard Rorty und das Entzücken am Schock der Deflationierung -- "... and to define America, her athletic democracy" : im Andenken an Richard Rorty -- Wie die ethische Frage zu beantworten ist : Derrida und die Religion -- Derridas klärende Wirkung : ein letzter Gruss -- Ronald Dworkin : ein Solitär im Kreise der Rechtsgelehrten -- Ein avantgardischer Spürsinn für Relevanzen : die Rolle des Intellektuellen (...) und die Sache Europas -- Europa und sine Immigranten -- Europa in der Sackgasse : Plädoyer für eine Politik der abgestuften Integration -- Medien, Märkte und Konsumenten : die seriöse Presse als Rückgrat der politischen Öffentlichkeit -- Hat die Demokratie noch eine epistemische Dimension? : empirische Forschung und normative Theorie. (shrink)

There is too much that we do not know about COVID-19. The longer we take to find it out, the more lives will be lost. In this paper, we will defend a principle of risk parity: if it is permissible to expose some members of society (e.g. health workers or the economically vulnerable) to a certain level of ex ante risk in order to minimize overall harm from the virus, then it is permissible to expose fully informed volunteers to a (...) comparable level of risk in the context of promising research into the virus. We apply this principle to three examples of risky research: skipping animal trials for promising treatments, human challenge trials to speed up vaccine development, and low-dose controlled infection or “variolation.” We conclude that if volunteers, fully informed about the risks, are willing to help fight the pandemic by aiding promising research, there are strong moral reasons to gratefully accept their help. To refuse it would implicitly subject others to still graver risks. (shrink)

Jacques Derrida, one of the most influential, controversial and complex thinkers of our time, has come to be at the centre of many political debates. This is the first book to consider the political implications of Derrida's deconstruction. It is a timely response both to Derrida's own recent shift towards thinking about the political, and to the political focus of contemparary Continental philosophy. Richard Beardsworth's study, Derrida and the Political , locates a way of thinking about deconstruction using the (...) tools of political philosophy. Richard Beardsworth has provided students of philosophy, politics and critical theory with a thought-provoking, upper level introduction to Derrida'a work as a political theorist. (shrink)

In his new introduction, "Note on a Missing Text," Richard Wolin uses the absence from this edition of an interview with Jacques Derrida as a springboard for ...

Jacques Derrida, one of the most influential, controversial and complex thinkers of our time, has come to be at the centre of many political debates. This is the first book to consider the political implications of Derrida's deconstruction. It is a timely response both to Derrida's own recent shift towards thinking about the political, and to the political focus of contemparary Continental philosophy. Richard Beardsworth's study, _Derrida and the Political_, locates a way of thinking about deconstruction using the tools (...) of political philosophy. Richard Beardsworth has provided students of philosophy, politics and critical theory with a thought-provoking, upper level introduction to Derrida'a work as a political theorist. (shrink)

In two retrospective essays titled "Ten Years After" and "Twenty-Five Years After," Rorty shows how his book was shaped by the time in which it was written and ...

Taking Aristide Zolberg and Long Litt Woon's now classic article, "Why Islam is Like Spanish," as its point of departure, this paper elaborates on the social boundary concepts introduced there and argues that these ideas offer new insight into the processes leading to fundamental ethno-racial change. The boundary concepts allow us to move beyond the static, one-directional concept of assimilation inherited from a previous era. They also help us to understand the conditions under which a majority group may tolerate the (...) large-scale assimilation of minorities. These revised understandings alert us to the potential for boundary change that is entailed in coming demographic shifts, in particular the departure of the baby boom from the labor market in the U.S. (shrink)

_What does it mean when a radical understanding of National Socialism is inextricably embedded in the work of the twentieth century’s most important philosopher?_ Martin Heidegger’s sympathies for the conservative revolution and National Socialism have long been well known. As the rector of the University of Freiburg in the early 1930s, he worked hard to reshape the university in accordance with National Socialist policies. He also engaged in an all-out struggle to become the movement’s philosophical preceptor, “to lead the leader.” (...) Yet for years, Heidegger’s defenders have tried to separate his political beliefs from his philosophical doctrines. They argued, in effect, that he was good at philosophy but bad at politics. But with the 2014 publication of Heidegger’s _Black Notebooks_, it has become clear that he embraced a far more radical vision of the conservative revolution than previously suspected. His dissatisfaction with National Socialism, it turns out, was mainly that it did not go far enough. The notebooks show that far from being separated from Nazism, Heidegger’s philosophy was suffused with it. In this book Richard Wolin explores what the notebooks mean for our understanding of arguably the most important philosopher of the twentieth century, and of his ideas—and why his legacy remains radically compromised. (shrink)

Conservative assumptions in medical ethics risk immense harms during a pandemic. Public health institutions and public discourse alike have repeatedly privileged inaction over aggressive medical interventions to address the pandemic, perversely increasing population-wide risks while claiming to be guided by ‘caution’. This puzzling disconnect between rhetoric and reality is suggestive of an underlying philosophical confusion. In this paper, I argue that we have been misled by status quo bias—exaggerating the moral significance of the risks inherent in medical interventions, while systematically (...) neglecting the risks inherent in the status quo prospect of an out-of-control pandemic. By coming to appreciate the possibility and significance of status quo risk, we will be better prepared to respond appropriately when the next pandemic strikes. (shrink)

Charles Sanders Peirce is regarded as the founding father of pragmatism and a key figure in the development of American philosophy, yet his practical philosophy remains under-acknowledged and misinterpreted. In this book, Richard Atkins argues that Peirce did in fact have developed and systematic views on ethics, on religion, and on how to live, and that these views are both plausible and relevant. Drawing on a controversial lecture that Peirce delivered in 1898 and related works, he examines Peirce's theories (...) of sentiment and instinct, his defence of the rational acceptability of religious belief, his analysis of self-controlled action, and his pragmatic account of practical ethics, showing how he developed his views and how they interact with those of his great contemporary William James. This study will be essential for scholars of Peirce and for those interested in American philosophy, pragmatism, the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of action, and ethics. (shrink)

In this major new work, Bernstein explores the ethical and political dimensions of the modernity/post-modernity debate. Bernstein argues that modernity / post-modernity should be understood as a kind of mood - one which is amorphous, shifting and protean but which exerts a powerful influence on our current thinking. Focusing on thinkers such as Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault, Habermas and Rorty, Bernstein probes the strengths and weaknesses of their work, and shows how they have contributed to the formation of a new mood, (...) a new and distinctive constellation of ideas. This new constellation has put ethical and political issues back on the philosophical agenda, forcing us to confront anew, the Socratic question 'How should I live?'. (shrink)

Richard Kraut presents a new theory of human well-being. Kraut's principal idea, Aristotelian in spirit, is that 'external goods' have at most an indirect bearing on the quality of our lives. A good internal life - one with quality emotional, intellectual, social, and perceptual experiences - is what well-being consists in.

One way in which the characteristic gestures of philosophy and criticism differ from each other lies in their involvements with disillusionment, with the undoing of our naivete, especially regarding what we take ourselves to know about the meaning of what we say. Philosophy will often find less than we thought was there, perhaps nothing at all, in what we say about the “external” world, or in our judgments of value, or in our ordinary psychological talk. The work of criticism, on (...) the other hand, frequently disillusions by finding disturbingly more in what is said than we precritically thought was there. In our relation to the meaningfulness of what we say, there is a disillusionment of plentitude as well as of emptiness. And no doubt what is “less” for one discipline may be “more” of what someone else is looking for.In recent years, metaphor has attracted more than its share of both philosophical and critical attention, including philosophical denials of the obvious, as well as critical challenges to the obviousness of the ways we talk about metaphor. In this paper I discuss a problem of each sort and suggest a complex of relations between them. The particular denial of the obvious that I’m interested in is the claim recently made by Donald Davidson that “a metaphor doesn’t say anything beyond its literal meaning ,” nor is it even correct to speak of metaphor as a form of communication.1 There’s disillusionment with a vengeance; and even if not strictly believable, it is still not without its therapeutic value, as we shall see. 1. Donald Davidson, “What Metaphors Mean,” in On Metaphor, ed. Sheldon Sacks , p. 30; hereafter abbreviated “WMM.” Davidson’s view has found supporters among both philosophers and literary theorists. It is, for example, important to the early argument of Richard Rorty’s recent book. See his Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity , p. 18. Richard Moran is an assistant professor of philosophy at Princeton University. He is currently working on a book on subjectivity and contemporary concepts of personhood. (shrink)

The Oxford Companion to the Mind is a classic. Published in 1987, to huge acclaim, it immediately took its place as the indispensable guide to the mysteries - and idiosyncracies - of the human mind. In no other book can the reader find discussions of concepts such as language, memory, and intelligence, side by side with witty definitions of common human experiences such as the 'cocktail-party' and 'halo' effects, and the least effort principle. Richard Gregory again brings his wit, (...) wisdom, and expertise to bear on this most elusive of subjects. Research into the mind and brain has moved on in bounds in recent years, and interest in the subject has never been so high. There has been a shift in focus away from Freud's concept of the unconscious onto consciousness itself. The new edition of the Companion includes three 'mini symposia' - on consciousness, brain scanning, and artificial intelligence - with contributions from a number of specialists, and encompassing a range of approaches. Cultural as well as scientific in approach, this accessible book offers authoritative descriptions and analysis. With new entries on controversial topics such as artificial life, attachment theory, caffeine, cruetly, drama, extra-terrestrial intelligence, genetics of mental illness, imagination, lying, puzzles, and twins, this highly-anticipated second edition explores the most intriguing of subjects. (shrink)

Richard Bett presents a ground-breaking study of Pyrrho of Elis, who lived in the late fourth and early third centuries BC and is the supposed originator of Greek scepticism. In the absence of surviving works by Pyrrho, scholars have tended to treat his thought as essentially the same as the long subsequent sceptical tradition which styled itself 'Pyrrhonism'. Bett argues, on the contrary, that Pyrrho's philosophy was significantly different from this later tradition, and offers the first detailed account of (...) that philosophy in this light. Bett considers why Pyrrho was adopted as the figurehead for that tradition: his answer suggests that we should distinguish two phases within Pyrrhonism, of which the initial phase is much closer to Pyrrho's own thought than is the better-known later phase. Bett also investigates the origins and antecedents of Pyrrho's ideas; in particular, Plato is singled out as an important inspiration. The result is the first comprehensive picture of this key figure in the development of philosophy. The new claims that Bett puts forward have major implications for the history and interpretation of ancient Greek thought. (shrink)

There has been in recent years a plethora of defences of theism from analytical philosophers: Richard Gale's important book is a critical response to these writings. New versions of cosmological, ontological, and religious experience arguments are critically evaluated, along with pragmatic arguments to justify faith on the grounds of its prudential or moral benefits. In considering arguments for and against the existence of God, Gale is able to clarify many important philosophical concepts including exploration, time, free will, personhood, actuality, (...) and the objectivity of experience. (shrink)

Richard J. Bernstein argues that many of the important themes in philosophy during the past 150 years are variations and developments of ideas that were prominent in the classical American pragmatists: Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George H. Mead. The pragmatic thinkers reject a sharp dichotomy between subject and object, mind-body dualism, the quest for certainty, and the spectator theory of knowledge. They seek to bring about a sea change in philosophy that highlights the social character (...) of human experience and normative social practices, the self-correcting nature of all inquiry, and the continuity of theory and practice. And they - especially James, Dewey, and Mead - emphasize the democratic ethical-political consequences of a pragmatic orientation. Many of the themes developed by the pragmatic thinkers were central to the work of major twentieth-century philosophers such as Wittgenstein and Heidegger, but the so-called analytic/Continental split obscures this underlying continuity. Bernstein develops an alternative reading of contemporary philosophy that brings out the persistence and continuity of pragmatic themes. He explains why the discussion of pragmatism is alive, varied, and widespread"--Jacket. (shrink)

Drawing upon hitherto-unused sources and written in a lively, accessible style, this book represents a shift in the historiography of British education. At the center of the investigation is Joseph Payne, born in humble circumstances in 1808, who in 1873 was appointed to the first professorship in Britain, established by a chartered body of schoolteachers. By that date Payne had acquired a considerable reputation-as the founder of two of the most successful of Victorian private schools; a classroom practitioner of rare (...) skill; the author of bestselling textbooks; a scholar, despite no formal education; and as a leading member of such bodies as the College of Preceptors, the Scholastic Registration Association, the Girls' Public Day School Trust, the Women's Education Union, and the Social Science Association. (shrink)

Pragmatism is experiencing a powerful revival. But the new pragmatism has not yet expressed itself in a new aesthetic, and not since Dewey's Art as Experience has there been a comprehensive pragmatist treatment of this field. Shusterman's bold and lively book fills the gap by proposing a pragmatist aesthetics for our current postmodern condition. Pragmatist Aesthetics treats the traditionally central topics of aesthetics: the definition of art, aesthetic experience and value, form and unity, interpretation, and the cognitive and moral worth (...) of art. But it also directs philosophical aesthetics towards a much wider and more socially pertinent agenda by considering such contemporary issues as the institutionalization and cultural oppression of art, the aesthetic legitimacy of popular culture, and the ethical art of living beauty through the stylization of conduct and the aesthetic construction of the self. Gracefully but vigorously argued, Pragmatist Aesthetics is an important book which breaks new ground and liberates new areas and directions for philosophical inquiry. Its wide-ranging breadth and accessible style will appeal to all readers with an interest in contemporary philosophy, aesthetics and cultural studies. (shrink)

Richard Shusterman; Aesthetic Experience: From Analysis to Eros, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Volume 64, Issue 2, 18 April 2005, Pages 217–229.