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  1. Attila Grandpierre (2001). Measurement of Collective and Social Fields of Consciousness. World Futures 57 (1):85-94.
    It is possible to reveal and to examine the collective and social fields of consciousness experimentally. An account is given of planned experiments based on quantitative calculations, which indicate that the effects of individual and collective fields of consciousness on matter may elicit directly observable physical results. Moreover, it is shown that collective coherent consciousness fields may enhance the physical effects of consciousness at a significant rate. The predicted results have a significance in our picture of our consciousness, in self-assertion (...)
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  2. Bryce Huebner (2014). Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality. OUP USA.
    This book develops a novel approach to distributed cognition and collective intentionality. It is argued that collective mentality should be only be posited where specialized subroutines are integrated in a way that yields skillful, goal-directed behavior that is sensitive to concerns that are relevant to a group as such.
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  3. Bryce Huebner (2011). Genuinely Collective Emotions. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):89-118.
    It is received wisdom in philosophy and the cognitive sciences that individuals can be in emotional states but groups cannot. But why should we accept this view? In this paper, I argue that there is substantial philosophical and empirical support for the existence of collective emotions. Thus, while there is good reason to be skeptical about many ascriptions of collective emotion, I argue that some groups exhibit the computational complexity and informational integration required for being in genuinely emotional states.
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  4. Bryce Huebner, Michael Bruno & Hagop Sarkissian (2010). What Does the Nation of China Think About Phenomenal States? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):225-243.
    Critics of functionalism about the mind often rely on the intuition that collectivities cannot be conscious in motivating their positions. In this paper, we consider the merits of appealing to the intuition that there is nothing that it’s like to be a collectivity. We demonstrate that collective mentality is not an affront to commonsense, and we report evidence that demonstrates that the intuition that there is nothing that it’s like to be a collectivity is, to some extent, culturally specific rather (...)
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  5. Kay Mathiesen (2007). Introduction to Special Issue of Social Epistemology on "Collective Knowledge and Collective Knowers". Social Epistemology 21 (3):209 – 216.
  6. Gregory Nixon (2010). Hollows of Memory: From Individual Consciousness to Panexperientialism & Beyond. QuantumDream, Inc..
    The question under discussion is metaphysical and truly elemental. It emerges in two aspects – how did we come to be conscious of our own existence, and, as a deeper corollary, do existence and awareness necessitate each other? I am bold enough to explore these questions and I invite you to come along; I make no claim to have discovered absolute answers. However, I do believe I have created here a compelling interpretation. You’ll have to judge for yourself.
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  7. Robert D. Rupert (2011). Empirical Arguments for Group Minds: A Critical Appraisal. Philosophy Compass 6 (9):630-639.
  8. Robert A. Wilson (2004). Boundaries of the Mind: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences: Cognition. Cambridge University Press.
    Where does the mind begin and end? Robert Wilson establishes the foundations for the view that the mind extends beyond the boundary of the individual. He blends traditional philosophical analysis, cognitive science, and the history of psychology and the human sciences. Wilson then develops novel accounts of mental representation and consciousness, discussing a range of other issues, such as nativism and the idea of group minds. Boundaries of the Mind re-evaluates the place of the individual in the cognitive, biological and (...)
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