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  1. Mark Germine (1997). The Physiology of Collective Consciousness. World Futures 48 (1):57-104.
    (1997). The physiology of collective consciousness. World Futures: Vol. 48, The Concept of Collective Consiousness: Research Perspectives, pp. 57-104.
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  2. Attila Grandpierre (2001). Measurement of Collective and Social Fields of Consciousness. World Futures 57 (1):85-94.
    It is possible to reveal and to examine the collective and social fields of consciousness experimentally. An account is given of planned experiments based on quantitative calculations, which indicate that the effects of individual and collective fields of consciousness on matter may elicit directly observable physical results. Moreover, it is shown that collective coherent consciousness fields may enhance the physical effects of consciousness at a significant rate. The predicted results have a significance in our picture of our consciousness, in self-assertion (...)
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  3. Bryce Huebner (2014). Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality. OUP USA.
    This book develops a novel approach to distributed cognition and collective intentionality. It is argued that collective mentality should be only be posited where specialized subroutines are integrated in a way that yields skillful, goal-directed behavior that is sensitive to concerns that are relevant to a group as such.
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  4. Bryce Huebner (2011). Genuinely Collective Emotions. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):89-118.
    It is received wisdom in philosophy and the cognitive sciences that individuals can be in emotional states but groups cannot. But why should we accept this view? In this paper, I argue that there is substantial philosophical and empirical support for the existence of collective emotions. Thus, while there is good reason to be skeptical about many ascriptions of collective emotion, I argue that some groups exhibit the computational complexity and informational integration required for being in genuinely emotional states.
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  5. Bryce Huebner, Michael Bruno & Hagop Sarkissian (2010). What Does the Nation of China Think About Phenomenal States? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):225-243.
    Critics of functionalism about the mind often rely on the intuition that collectivities cannot be conscious in motivating their positions. In this paper, we consider the merits of appealing to the intuition that there is nothing that it’s like to be a collectivity. We demonstrate that collective mentality is not an affront to commonsense, and we report evidence that demonstrates that the intuition that there is nothing that it’s like to be a collectivity is, to some extent, culturally specific rather (...)
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  6. François Kammerer (2015). How a Materialist Can Deny That the United States is Probably Conscious – Response to Schwitzgebel. Philosophia 43 (4):1047-1057.
    In a recent paper, Eric Schwitzgebel argues that if materialism about consciousness is true, then the United States is likely to have its own stream of phenomenal consciousness, distinct from the streams of conscious experience of the people who compose it. Indeed, most plausible forms of materialism have to grant that a certain degree of functional and behavioral complexity constitutes a sufficient condition for the ascription of phenomenal consciousness – and Schwitzgebel makes a case to show that the United States (...)
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  7. Joel Krueger (2015). The Affective 'We': Self-Regulation and Shared Emotions. In Thomas Szanto & Dermot Moran (eds.), The Phenomenology of Sociality: Discovering the 'We'. Routledge 263-277.
    What does it mean to say that an emotion can be shared? I consider this question, focusing on the relation between the phenomenology of emotion experience and self-regulation. I explore the idea that a numerically single emotion can be given to more than one subject. I term this a “collective emotion”. First, I consider different forms of emotion regulation. I distinguish between embodied forms of self-regulation, which use subject-centered features of our embodiment, and distributed forms of self-regulation, which incorporate resources (...)
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  8. Christian List (2016). What is It Like to Be a Group Agent? Noûs 50 (3).
    The existence of group agents is relatively widely accepted. Examples are corporations, courts, NGOs, and even entire states. But should we also accept that there is such a thing as group consciousness? I give an overview of some of the key issues in this debate and sketch a tentative argument for the view that group agents lack phenomenal consciousness. In developing my argument, I draw on integrated information theory, a much-discussed theory of consciousness. I conclude by pointing out an implication (...)
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  9. Ignazio Masulli (1997). Recurrences of Form in the Old World as Evidence of Collective Consciousness: A Hypothesis for Historical Research. World Futures 48 (1):191-211.
    (1997). Recurrences of form in the old world as evidence of collective consciousness: A hypothesis for historical research. World Futures: Vol. 48, The Concept of Collective Consiousness: Research Perspectives, pp. 191-211.
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  10. Kay Mathiesen (2007). Introduction to Special Issue of Social Epistemology on "Collective Knowledge and Collective Knowers". Social Epistemology 21 (3):209 – 216.
  11. Dénes Némedi (2000). A Change in Ideas: Collective Consciousness, Morphology, and Collective Representations. In W. S. F. Pickering (ed.), Durkheim and Representations. Routledge 83--97.
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  12. Gregory Nixon (2010). Hollows of Memory: From Individual Consciousness to Panexperientialism & Beyond. QuantumDream, Inc..
    The question under discussion is metaphysical and truly elemental. It emerges in two aspects – how did we come to be conscious of our own existence, and, as a deeper corollary, do existence and awareness necessitate each other? I am bold enough to explore these questions and I invite you to come along; I make no claim to have discovered absolute answers. However, I do believe I have created here a compelling interpretation. You’ll have to judge for yourself.
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  13. Ashish Pandey & Rajen K. Gupta (2008). A Perspective of Collective Consciousness of Business Organizations. Journal of Business Ethics 80 (4):889-898.
    The article discusses the meaning of consciousness and presents a collective consciousness view of business organizations and their development. It proposes an integrative hierarchical framework of three levels of organizational consciousness: material, social and spiritual. The concepts of excellence, ethical and moral temperament of organizations at different levels of consciousness are also discussed. The article describes the features of social and spiritually conscious business organizations, taking some examples from secondary sources. Overall, it is an attempt to link the ideals of (...)
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  14. Dr Axel Randrup, Collective Consciousness and Idealist Philosophy.
    Abstract Descriptions of publications on collective consciousness, collective conscious experience, and idealist philosophy by Axel Randrup. The recognition of collective consciousness overcomes the problem of solipsism, which has been seen as an argument against idealist philosophy.
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  15. Robert D. Rupert (2011). Empirical Arguments for Group Minds: A Critical Appraisal. Philosophy Compass 6 (9):630-639.
    This entry addresses the question of group minds, by focusing specifically on empirical arguments for group cognition and group cognitive states. Two kinds of positive argument are presented and critically evaluated: the argument from individually unintended effects and the argument from functional similarity. A general argument against group cognition – which appeals to Occam’s razor – is also discussed. In the end, much turns on the identification of a mark of the cognitive; proposed marks are briefly surveyed in the final (...)
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  16. Maria Sagi (1997). Holistic Healing as Fresh Evidence for Collective Consciousness. World Futures 48 (1):151-160.
    (1997). Holistic healing as fresh evidence for collective consciousness. World Futures: Vol. 48, The Concept of Collective Consiousness: Research Perspectives, pp. 151-160.
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  17. Eric Schwitzgebel (2016). Is the United States Phenomenally Conscious? Reply to Kammerer. Philosophia 44 (3):877-883.
    In Schwitzgebel I argued that the United States, considered as a concrete entity with people as some or all of its parts, meets plausible materialistic criteria for consciousness. Kammerer defends materialism against this seemingly unintuitive conclusion by means of an “anti-nesting principle” according to which group entities cannot be literally phenomenally conscious if they contain phenomenally conscious subparts who stand in a certain type of functional relation to the group as a whole. I raise three concerns about Kammerer’s view. First, (...)
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  18. George Taylor, Genetic Expression of Collective Consciousness.
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  19. Robert A. Wilson (2004). Boundaries of the Mind: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences: Cognition. Cambridge University Press.
    Where does the mind begin and end? Robert Wilson establishes the foundations for the view that the mind extends beyond the boundary of the individual. He blends traditional philosophical analysis, cognitive science, and the history of psychology and the human sciences. Wilson then develops novel accounts of mental representation and consciousness, discussing a range of other issues, such as nativism and the idea of group minds. Boundaries of the Mind re-evaluates the place of the individual in the cognitive, biological and (...)
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