Friends of Wright-entitlement cannot appeal to direct epistemic consequentialism (believe or accept what maximizes expected epistemic value) in order to account for the epistemic rationality of accepting Wright-entitled propositions. The tenability of direct consequentialism is undermined by the “Truth Fairy”: a powerful being who offers you great epistemic reward (in terms of true beliefs) if you accept a proposition p for which you have evidence neither for nor against. However, this chapter argues that a form of indirect epistemic consequentialism seems (...) promising as a way to deal with the Truth Fairy problem. The relevant form of indirect consequentialism accommodates evidentialism but allows for exceptions in the case of anti-sceptical hypotheses. Since these are the kind of propositions to which Wright-entitlement is supposed to apply—i.e. cornerstone propositions—indirect consequentialism is entitlement-friendly. (shrink)

Many philosophers of the last century thought all moral judgments can be expressed using a few basic concepts — what are today called ‘thin’ moral concepts such as ‘good,’ ‘bad,’ ‘right,’ and ‘wrong.’ This was the view, fi rst, of the non-naturalists whose work dominated the early part of the century, including Henry Sidgwick, G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross, and C.D. Broad. Some of them recognized only one basic concept, usually either ‘ought’ or ‘good’; others thought there were two. But they (...) all assumed that other moral concepts, including such ‘thick’ ones as the virtue-concepts ‘courageous’ and ‘kindly,’ can be reductively analyzed using one or more thin concepts and some more or less determinate.. (shrink)

Jorn Sonderholm (2005) has argued that Simon Blackburn's commitment semantics for evaluative discourse is unable to explain the validity of simple inferences involving disjunction. This is true insofar as the basic rules which Blackburn suggests are not strong enough, but it is relatively simple to augment those rules so as to meet Sonderholm's challenge, whilst respecting the spirit of commitment semantics. One way of doing this is to add a reduction rule such that if accepting p commits one to inconsistent (...) commitments, one is committed to accepting ¬p. Thus Sonderholm has not provided any reason to doubt the adequacy of commitment semantics to explain validity in evaluative discourse. (shrink)

R.M. Hare had an ambitious scheme of providing a unified account of meta-ethics and normative ethics by combining expressivism with Kantianism and utilitarianism. The project of this thesis is to defend Hare’s theory in its most ambitious form. This means not just showing how the expressivist, Kantian and utilitarian elements are consistent, or that the three are each correct, but also that they are interdependent. The only defensible form of expressivism is Kantian; the only defensible Kantian theory is both expressivist (...) and utilitarian; the only defensible utilitarianism is Kantian. The thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 aims to show how expressivism can provide a coherent account of moral judgement and discourse. The argument for expressivism draws on Hare’s thought that the main error of moral realism is to think of moral objectivity as requiring objects, moral properties which are really there in the world. It is shown, using an argument based on the Euthyphro and the Open Question Argument that realism is untenable because it makes this mistake, and this clears the path to expressivism. Chapter 2 is a full account of the issues surrounding the Frege-Geach problem (often pressed against Hare), showing how it can be solved and how exactly the expressivist’s embrace of minimalism about truth interacts with the solution to the Frege-Geach Problem. I include an explanation of how the expressivist is able to solve the most threatening version of the problem: Schroeder’s discussion of negation. Chapter 3 argues for the connection between expressivism and Kantianism. The argument (roughly following Korsgaard) is that Humean versions of expressivism run into a sceptical challenge of normative regress. Kant employed a transcendental argument to resolve this regress, deriving his Formula of Universal Law from the Categorical Imperative. This argument defended with expressivism playing a crucial role. This chapter thus explains how Hare is entitled to universalizability in a way that avoids the shmoralising objection: it is not justified merely by being derived from our moral concepts but rather from our inescapable nature as agents. Chapter 4 illuminates the other connection, between Kantianism and utilitarianism. The largest part of the chapter is spent defending Hare’s argument from universalizability to utilitarianism. Doing so shows how Hare’s utilitarianism depends on his Kantianism, and so also how it indirectly depends on his utilitarianism. I then go on to defend Hare’s distinctive two-level version of utilitarianism, especially against the objections of Bernard Williams. It is also argued that various difficulties for utilitarianism – utility monsters, interpersonal comparison, Korsgaard’s objections – can be met by a form of utilitarianism like Hare’s, which is Kantian, and thus that such a form of utilitarianism is indeed the most defensible. (shrink)

McFetridge (in Logical necessity and other essays . London: Blackwell, 1990 ) suggests that to treat a proposition as logically necessary—to believe a proposition logically necessary, and to manifest that belief—is a matter of preparedness to deploy that proposition as a premise in reasoning from any supposition. We consider whether a suggestion in that spirit can be generalized to cover all cases of absolute necessity, both logical and non-logical, and we conclude that it can. In Sect. 2, we explain the (...) significance that such an account of manifestation of belief in absolute necessity has for the prospects of a non-realist theory of modality. In Sect. 3, we offer a sympathetic articulation of the detail that underlies the McFetridge conception of belief in logical necessity. In Sects. 4 and 5, we show that the conception so articulated will not generalize to encompass all cases of belief in absolute necessity and proceed to offer a remedy. Our proposal is based upon a distinction between two kinds of suppositional act: A-supposing and C-supposing (Sect. 6). In Sect. 7, we then explain and defend our central thesis: (roughly) that (manifestation of) belief in absolute necessity is a matter of preparedness to deploy as a premise in reasoning under any C-supposition. Finally, we indicate that there is some promise in the parallel thesis that manifestation of the treatment of a proposition as a priori is a matter of preparedness to deploy as a premise in reasoning under any A-supposition (Sect. 8). (shrink)

In a recent article, Mark Colyvan has criticized Jerrold Katz's attempt to show that Quinean holism is self-refuting. Katz argued that a Quinean epistemology incorporating a principle of the universal revisability of beliefs would have to hold that that and other principles of the system were both revisable and unrevisable. Colyvan rejects Katz's argument for failing to take into account the logic of belief revision. But granting the terms of debate laid down by Colyvan, the universal revisability principle still commits (...) Quineans to holding that one belief is both revisable and unrevisable: the belief that some beliefs are revisable. (shrink)

It is common to hear talk of the aim of belief and to find philosophers appealing to that aim for numerous explanatory purposes. What belief 's aim explains depends, of course, on what that aim is. Many hold that it is somehow related to truth, but there are various ways in which one might specify belief 's aim using the notion of truth. In this article, by considering whether they can account for belief 's standard of correctness and the epistemic (...) norms governing belief, I argue against certain prominent specifications of belief 's aim given in terms of truth, and advance a neglected alternative. (shrink)

The _Physics_ is a foundational work of western philosophy, and the crucial one for understanding Aristotle's views on matter, form, essence, causation, movement, space, and time. This richly annotated, scrupulously accurate, and consistent translation makes it available to a contemporary English reader as no other does—in part because it fits together seamlessly with other closely associated works in the New Hackett Aristotle series, such as the _Metaphysics_, _De Anima_, and forthcoming _De Caelo_ and _On Coming to Be and Passing Away_. (...) Eventually the series will include all of Aristotle's works. Sequentially numbered endnotes provide the information most needed at each juncture, while a detailed Index of Terms indicates places where focused discussion of key notions occurs. An illuminating general Introduction describes the book that lies ahead, explaining what sort of work it is and what sorts of evidence it relies on. (shrink)

This book examines democracy in recent Chinese-language philosophical work. It focuses on Confucian-inspired political thought in the Chinese intellectual world from after the communist revolution in China until today. The volume analyzes six significant contemporary Confucian philosophers in China and Taiwan, describing their political thought and how they connect their thought to Confucian tradition, and critiques their political proposals and views. It illustrates how Confucianism has transformed in modern times, the divergent understandings of Confucianism today, and how contemporary Chinese philosophers (...) understand democracy, as well as their criticisms of Western political thought. (shrink)

A central issue in Chinese philosophy today is the relationship between Confucianism and democracy. While some political figures have argued that Confucian values justify non-democratic forms of government, many scholars have argued that Confucianism can provide justification for democracy, though this Confucian democracy will differ substantially from liberal democracy. These scholars believe it is important for Chinese culture to develop its own conception of democracy using Confucian values, drawn mainly from Kongzi (Confucius) and Mengzi (Mencius), as the basis. This essay (...) describes some obstacles to this form of Confucian democracy. It argues that considering the political philosophies of Kongzi and Mengzi in the context of their views on personal cultivation reveals that they oppose some of the central assumptions of democracy. They do not trust the public to make good decisions, and advocate government for the people, but not by the people. These philosophies alone cannot generate democracy. (shrink)

Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can be transferred (...) to an accidentally true belief; if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then it can be warranted and accidentally true. We argue that each of these is either false or no more plausible than its denial. Along the way, we offer a solution to the Gettier Problem that is compatible with fallibilism. (shrink)

1. Happiness, then and now -- Happiness, eudaimonia, and practical reasoning -- Happiness as eudaimonia -- Happiness and virtuous activity -- New directions from old debates -- 2. Happiness then: the sufficiency debate -- Aristotle's case against the sufficiency thesis -- 3. Happiness now: rethinking the self -- Socrates' case for the sufficiency thesis -- Epictetus and the stoic self -- The Stoics' case for the sufficiency thesis -- The embodied conception of the self -- The embodied conception and psychological (...) well-being -- The Stoics' case against the embodied conception. (shrink)

The social sciences playa variety of multifaceted roles in the policymaking process. So varied are these roles, indeed, that it is futile to talk in the singular about the use of social science in policymaking, as if there were one constant relationship between two fixed and stable entities. Instead, to address this issue sensibly one must talk in the plural about uses of dif ferent modes of social scientific inquiry for different kinds of policies under various circumstances. In some cases, (...) the influence of social scientific research is direct and tangible, and the connection between the find ings and the policy is easy to see. In other cases, perhaps most, its influence is indirect-one small piece in a larger mosaic of politics, bargaining, and compromise. Occasionally the findings of social scientific studies are explicitly drawn upon by policymakers in the formation, implementation, or evaluation of particular policies. More often, the categories and theoretical models of social science provide a general background orientation within which policymakers concep tualize problems and frame policy options. At times, the in fluence of social scientific work is cognitive and informational in nature; in other instances, policymakers use social science primarily for symbolic and political purposes in order to le gitimate preestablished goals and strategies. Nonetheless, amid this diversity and variety, troubling general questions persistently arise. (shrink)

This article takes issue with the stereotype of "Confucianism" as authoritarian, a view common in discussions of modern China as well as in scholarship on early China. By studying the roles of master and students and the relationship between them in the Analects , it attempts to show that according to this text the master did not occupy a position of complete dominance over the student. Masters are not generally considered to be like fathers, and students have more room to (...) dispute with their master than previously recognized. In contrast to later depictions of Kongzi, he is not presented as infallible in the Analects , and his students do not always accept his opinions. Questioning the master is often a good quality in a disciple. The master-student relationship, while undoubtedly hierarchical, did not involve complete submission by the student. It is argued here that there is little basis for concluding that the Analects is fundamentally authoritarian in its depiction of teaching. It further suggests a need for a distinct understanding of teaching authority that is not modeled on political authority. (shrink)

This edited volume presents a comprehensive examination of contemporary Confucian philosophy from its roots in the late 19th century to the present day. It provides a thorough introduction to the major philosophers and topics in contemporary Confucian philosophy. The individual chapters study the central figures in 20th century Confucian philosophy in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, as well as the important influences on recent Confucian philosophy. In addition, topical chapters focus on contemporary Confucian theory of knowledge, ethics, politics, aesthetics, and (...) views of human nature. The volume brings together scholars from around the world to provide a sound overview of the philosophy of the period and illustrate the important current debates. Confucian philosophy has been undergoing a revival in China for more than three decades, and this book presents the most significant work of the past century and more. By giving a detailed account of the philosophical positions involved, explaining the terminology of contemporary Confucian philosophy, and situating the views in their historical context, this volume enables the reader to understand what is at stake and evaluate the arguments. (shrink)

Sometimes it takes years of debate for philosophers to discover what it is they really disagree about. Sometimes they talk past each other in long series of books and articles, never guessing at the root disagreement that divides them. But occasionally a day comes when something happens to coax the cat out of the bag. "Aha!" one philosopher exclaims to another, "so that's why you've been disagreeing with me, misunderstanding me, resisting my conclusions, puzzling me all these years!".

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Some Questions on Confucian Relationality:Reading Human BecomingsDavid Elstein (bio)Human Becomings: Theorizing Persons for Confucian Role Ethics. By Roger T. Ames. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2021.This recent book by Roger Ames continues his (and Henry Rosemont's) project of articulating and defending the interpretation of Confucian thought using the category "role ethics." This project perhaps originated with Rosemont's 1991 article "Rights-Bearing Individuals and Role-Bearing Persons" and more (...) recently continued with Ames' Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary (2011) and their jointly authored Confucian Role Ethics: A Moral Vision for the 21st Century? (2016). In Human Becomings, Ames expands on what he calls "a focus-field, narrative, and relationally constituted conception of persons" (p. xii). That is, the view of personhood that constitutes the foundation for role ethics. In a sense, this description is too modest, as Ames extends this ontology far beyond persons to all events, continuing to develop a process cosmology that describes the world in general.Over many years, Ames has forged an innovative and influential theoretical interpretation of Confucian philosophy. As an occasional critic of Ames, I appreciate this book tremendously for the way he articulates his vision of how to approach Chinese philosophy, his careful construction of his interpretation, and how he answers questions and objections concerning Confucian role ethics. It is a very rich book that merits careful study, and even in an expanded review such as this I will have to be selective in the points that I address.Ames has developed role ethics and the associated view of relationally constituted persons in part because he believes it is the best way to understand Confucian philosophy on its own terms instead of uncomfortably shoehorning it into existing Western philosophical categories (most commonly, virtue ethics in other Anglophone scholarship). One of his motives is to take Chinese philosophy on its own terms free from the distortions introduced by relying on familiar categories (pp. 20–21). The most important such distortion is that the individual is the starting point for philosophizing. One of Ames' main points in the book is that it is very hard to escape the assumption of the discrete, independent, and autonomous individual when [End Page 172] thinking in familiar Western categories, whether of virtue ethics, utilitarianism, or deontology (p. 46). We must rather appreciate how different Confucianism is.However, he has another goal beyond proffering a superior interpretation of Confucian philosophy. Foundational individualism is also the ultimate cause for what Ames calls the "perfect storm" we find ourselves in: the combination of environmental, economic, social, and political problems that are rooted in misplaced individualism, and that cannot be resolved without deep reconsideration of our values and indeed ourselves (pp. 12–14). Hence, it is not merely that the Confucian relational person is different, but in making relations the basic category the Confucian conception is superior and presumably we would do well do adopt it. One gets a sense of the scope of Ames' argument here.There is much in this book I want to respond to and question, and so I will forego much summary. Instead, I will raise a series of questions about parts of the argument and, in the course of discussing these, touch on some of the main points of the book. I will be questioning a series of related claims that I believe are the heart of what Ames wants to demonstrate: a relationality or process cosmology (not substance ontology) is fundamental to Confucian thought; this relational view naturally implies or entails role ethics, not virtue ethics or deontology; relational persons and role ethics together are a better account of our moral life and will go a considerable way toward resolving the problems caused by foundational individualism. In response, I want to raise the following questions:1. Is relationality truly a part of original Confucian thought?2. Does relationality rule out any notion of essential human nature, and does it necessarily imply or entail role ethics?3. Is relationality true or merely a useful way of thinking (if these can be distinguished)? Do we know that it is useful?4. Is there anything in Confucian role ethics that a... (shrink)

As Confucian political thought is adapted to modern circumstances, the question of free expression merits more attention. Most contemporary Confucian political theorists accept a right to political...

Mou Zongsan was one of the most important Chinese philosophers of the twentieth century, yet his political thought is given little attention. This is unfortunate, because his political philosophy presents significant challenges to liberal views on freedom and the basis for democracy. Mou rejects the liberal understanding of freedom as absence of interference, and instead argues for a limited conception of positive freedom in government that includes teaching basic moral values. He bases democracy on the Confucian idea of respect for (...) humanity's universal moral potential. At the same time, Mou also provides an alternative to many current conceptions of Confucian democracy, which favor pragmatist and communitarian interpretations. Mou's thought thus illustrates how Chinese conceptions of Confucian democracy frequently differ from those in English-language scholarship. The goal of this article is to examine how Mou creatively interpreted Confucian thought to develop a unique New Confucian theory of democracy that neither uncritically accepts liberalism nor discounts the importance of liberal features such as individual freedom and rights. It also considers major objections to Mou's view of democracy and his possible responses. (shrink)

Realists about possible worlds typically identify possible worlds with abstract objects, such as propositions or properties. However, they face a significant objection due to Lewis (1986), to the effect that there is no way to explain how possible worlds-as-abstract objects represent possibilities. In this paper, I describe a response to this objection on behalf of realists. The response is to identify possible worlds with propositions, but to deny that propositions are abstract objects, or indeed objects at all. Instead, I argue (...) that realists should follow Prior (1971) and others in treating higher-order quantification (e.g. quantification into predicate or sentence position) as a genuine form of quantification in its own right, and so in particular, not to be analysed in terms of first-order quantification over abstract objects. I argue that from this ‘higher-orderist’ perspective, there is a relatively straightforward answer to the question of how possible worlds-as-propositions succeed in representing possibilities. (shrink)

Jiang Qing's proposal of the kingly way is probably the most detailed Chinese alternative to both the current PRC regime and liberal democracy. The nucleus of the kingly way is the idea of threefold legitimacy : a government must have sacred, popular, and historical-cultural legitimacy. For Jiang, this is a universal and invariant political principle, though how it is realized in concrete political institutions varies according to culture. Jiang is critical of democracy for emphasizing only popular legitimacy and neglecting the (...) other two sources, and believes the kingly way is the solution to the problems of democracy, particularly neglect of the environment and the interests of noncitizens. Jiang's proposals have aroused significant controversy. A number of contemporary Ruists have expressed skepticism or outright rejection of Jiang's ideas. Others are more sympathetic to his attempts to revive Ruism in Chinese politics and society. (shrink)

Realists about possible worlds typically identify possible worlds with abstract objects, such as propositions or properties. However, they face a significant objection due to Lewis (1986), to the effect that there is no way to explain how possible worlds-as-abstract objects represent possibilities. In this paper, I describe a response to this objection on behalf of realists. The response is to identify possible worlds with propositions, but to deny that propositions are abstract objects, or indeed objects at all. Instead, I argue (...) that realists should follow Prior (1971) and others in treating higher-order quantification (e.g. quantification into predicate or sentence position) as a genuine form of quantification in its own right, and so in particular, not to be analysed in terms of first-order quantification over abstract objects. I argue that from this ‘higher-orderist’ perspective, there is a relatively straightforward answer to the question of how possible worlds-as-propositions succeed in representing possibilities. (shrink)

Western philosophers have made significant contributions to the establishment of government around the world. Philosophers like Plato, Locke, Hobbes, and Machiavelli dramatically influenced the government system not just in foreign countries but also in the Philippines. Hence, this seminar paper explored the political notions of four Western philosophers and positioned them in Duterte’s six years of presidency. In pursuit of this study, the researcher employed a systematic literature review. A systematic review process is used to collect articles, and then a (...) qualitative approach is used to assess them. The researcher came up with four major themes in this study particularly (1) Duterte is a Dictator, not a Philosopher-King, (2) Violators of natural rights, (3) the Sea-monster of Davao, and lastly (4) Love, fear, cruelty, and Duterte. Thus, the researcher concurred that all of the philosophical ideas of the four Western philosophers did not fit or even violated during Duterte’s six years of presidency in the Philippines. (shrink)

This paper will attempt to assess the primary differences between what I take to be the two primary philosophical "traditions" in contemporary French philosophy, using Derrida (transcendence) and Deleuze (immanence) as exemplary representatives. The body of the paper will examine the use of these terms in three different areas of philosophy on which Derrida and Deleuze have both written: subjectivity, ontology, and epistemology. (1) In the field of subjectivity, the notion of the subject has been critiqued in two manners, either (...) by appealing either to the transcendence of the other (Levinas, Derrida) or to the immanent jlux of experience itself, in relation to which the Ego itself is trancendent (Deleuze, Foucault, Sartre, James). (2) In the field of ontology, a purely "immanent" ontology would be an ontology in which there is neither a "beyond" or an "otherwise" Being, nor "interruptions" in Being, both of which would require an appeal to a formal element of transcendence (Deleuze). Such a "transcendent" and aporetic structure, which can never appear or be present as such within Being, is what lies at the basis of the project of deconstruction, with its attendant aporias (Derrida). (3) This distinction, finally, finds parallels in Kant's epistemology, for whom the possible experience is conditioned by purely immanent criteria (Deleuze), whereas what goes beyond the limits of possible experience is transcendent (Derrida). Drawing on these three thread of analysis, the paper concludes with an assessment of what is at stake in the ethical differences between the two traditions. The question of "transcendence" is "What mast I do?", which is the question of morality (a duty or obligation that is beyond being, an "ought" beyond the "is"). The question of "immanence" is "What can I do?" (my power or capacity as an existing individual within being). For Levinas and Derrida, ethics precedes ontology because it is derived from an element of transcendence (the Other); for Deleuze, ethics is ontology because it is derived from the immanent relation of beings to Being at the level of their existence (Spinoza). (shrink)

In this groundbreaking book, Daniel D. Novotny explores one of the most controversial topics of Suarez's philosophy: "beings of reason." Beings of reason are impossible intentional objects, such as blindness and square-circle.

After reading Professor El Amine’s response to my review of her Classical Confucian Political Thought, I realize we are not as far apart on many issues as it appeared. Nevertheless, some areas of substantive disagreement remain. I will take the opportunity to highlight a couple of these. One is whether the good qualities expected of the common people should be properly considered virtues, that is, whether they are different in kind from the virtues that mark a superior man or even (...) potentially a sage. This is especially relevant because it bears on the question of whether “political order, not moral edification, is the end” of the moral education that we agree is part of government’s role.... (shrink)

Confucian political philosophy is enjoying a renaissance. In the last two decades a number of significant monographs in English have appeared, to say nothing of the Chinese studies that are virtually beyond count. If they have a common theme, it is that Confucian politics is an extension of its ethical thought. Confucian politics is not a mere application of techniques for producing order, as in Legalism, nor does it separate politics and personal morality, as in liberalism. Considering a wide array (...) of sources, in Classical Confucian Political Thought: A New Interpretation, Loubna El Amine notes how prevalent the view is that the goal of politics is moral transformation. It is precisely... (shrink)

The problem known as Buridan’s Ass says that a hungry donkey equipoised between two identical bales of hay will starve to death. Indecision kills the ass. Some philosophers worry about human analogs. Computer scientists since the 1960s have known about the computer versions of such cases. From what Leslie Lamport calls ‘Buridan’s Principle’—a discrete decision based on a continuous range of input-values cannot be made in a bounded time—it follows that the possibilities for human analogs of Buridan’s Ass are far (...) more wide-ranging and securely provable than has been acknowledged in philosophy. We are never necessarily decisive. This is mathematically provable. I explore four consequences: first, increased interest of the literature’s solutions to Buridan’s Ass; second, a new asymmetry between responsibility for omissions and responsibility for actions; third, clarification of the standard account of akrasia; and, fourth, clarification of the role of credences in normative decision-theory. (shrink)

The Five Relationships are commonly held to be fundamental to Confucian thought and, according to some scholars, constitute the basis of all human relationships. This essay examines how the ruler-minister relationship served as a site over a debate about the political importance of virtue in early Chinese philosophy. Some early texts, including the Confucian texts Mengzi and Xunzi, argue that virtue confers a different status that rulers should recognize by treating the virtuous as equals or even superiors. In particular, these (...) texts claim that teachers and worthies are not ministers, and thus do not fit the rulerminister paradigm. Other texts, such as the Han Feizi and Guanzi, argue against this position, denying that virtue is relevant to political status. They claim that the ruler is superior to all, and that it is dangerous to grant special status based on moral qualities. The texts that adhere most closely to the Five Relationships are actually those considered Legalist, not Confucian. Thus, reexamining the Five Relationships is a way to throw light on the contested status of the morally worthy in early Chinese social and political thought. (shrink)

The Jewish Philosophy Reader is the first comprehensive anthology of classic writings on Jewish philosophy from the Bible to postmodernism. The Reader is clearly divided into four separate parts: Foundations and First Principles, Medieval and Renaissance Jewish Philosophy, Modern Jewish Thought, and Contemporary Jewish Philosophy. Each part is clearly introduced by the editors. The readings featured are representative writings of each era listed above and are from the following major thinkers: Abrabanel, Baeck, Bergman, Borowitz, Buber, Cohen, Crescas, Fackenheim, Geiger, Gersonides, (...) Goodman, Graetz, Halevi, Hartman, Heschel, Hess, Hirsch, Ibn Ezra, Ibn Gabirol, Ibn Paquda, Kellner, Kook, Krochmal, Leibowitz, Levinas, Maimonides, Maybaum, Mendelssohn, Novak, Philo, Plaskow, Rosenzweig, Saadia, Scholem, Seeskin, Soloveitchik, Spinoza, Strauss, Wolf, Zunz. (shrink)

This article uses LeBron James's departure from the Cleveland Cavaliers in 2010 to examine the question of athletes’ loyalty to their team and to their region. Athletes often face significant criticism when they leave their original team as it supposedly indicates a lack of loyalty. Given Confucian emphasis on the importance of community, it might be expected that Confucians would endorse this criticism. Instead, I argue that properly understood, James's decision was probably permissible from a Confucian perspective.

At present, there is a wide divergence in attitudes toward free speech in countries strongly influenced by Confucianism. Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have fairly robust rights of free expression. Mainland China does not, strongly restricting speech that the government judges threatens State interests. I argue that although traditional Confucian scholars supported many restrictions on expression, Confucian philosophers actually have good reason to want to protect expression about values. Subsequently, I consider how to address the problem of disinformation while preserving this (...) Confucian right to free expression. I focus on the case of Taiwan, as the Confucian state facing the most serious disinformation campaigns from China. The goal of government and civil society actors has been to focus on correcting disinformation while preserving free access to information, though laws do provide for civil and even criminal penalties for intentional spread of false information. As many democratic societies are facing the problem of concerted disinformation campaigns that aim to sow confusion and increase discord among the populace, Taiwan’s successes here are worth studying. Yet the Confucian cultural background means people accept more government involvement in defining what is true and false than may be the case elsewhere, and the right to free speech is less absolute. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 4, Page 568-579, May 2022. At present, there is a wide divergence in attitudes toward free speech in countries strongly influenced by Confucianism. Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have fairly robust rights of free expression. Mainland China does not, strongly restricting speech that the government judges threatens State interests. I argue that although traditional Confucian scholars supported many restrictions on expression, Confucian philosophers actually have good reason to want to protect expression about values. Subsequently, (...) I consider how to address the problem of disinformation while preserving this Confucian right to free expression. I focus on the case of Taiwan, as the Confucian state facing the most serious disinformation campaigns from China. The goal of government and civil society actors has been to focus on correcting disinformation while preserving free access to information, though laws do provide for civil and even criminal penalties for intentional spread of false information. As many democratic societies are facing the problem of concerted disinformation campaigns that aim to sow confusion and increase discord among the populace, Taiwan’s successes here are worth studying. Yet the Confucian cultural background means people accept more government involvement in defining what is true and false than may be the case elsewhere, and the right to free speech is less absolute. (shrink)