RESUMEN -/- En este ensayo propongo una interpretación de la relación entre la ciencia y el Ideal Ascético en La Genealogía de la Moral, que busca explicar la enigmática alianza entre ambos que Nietzsche establece al final del tercer tratado de la mencionada obra. Según Nietzsche, contrario a lo que se cree, la ciencia moderna no es realmente un antagonista del Ideal Ascético sino más bien su forma más reciente y más noble. Argüiré que, para Nietzsche, (...) el Ideal Ascético ha sido hasta el momento la única respuesta que el ser humano ha dado a su forma especial de existencia, que consiste en encontrarse en la situación de ser el único animal capacitado para la independencia y la soberanía. El Ideal Ascético expresa una huida de la responsabilidad y la carga (el sufrimiento) que esa capacidad para la soberanía comporta. Así pues, la ciencia, como expresión última de dicho ideal, representa al igual que éste una evasión de la independencia y una declaración de guerra contra la libertad de la voluntad, es decir, contra la autonomía. (shrink)

Ao lado das imagens já conhecidas de Nietzsche como “precursor do nazismo”, “racista”, “pós-moderno”, “pensador perigoso e irracionalista”, em tempos recentes acrescentou-se à imagem de “precursor do transhumanismo”. Ao apresentarmos aqui alguns elementos do transhumanismo, em especial aqueles ligados às mais recentes biotecnologias, bem como alguns conceitos do pensamento de Nietzsche, em especial o além-do-homem e a ontologia da imanência do vir-a-ser, visamos ampliar esse debate, enfatizando que, para Nietzsche, o ideal transhumanista não seria mais do que um sintoma (...) do ideal ascético, tão presente ainda na nossa contemporaneidade. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é articular o conceito de seriedade à crítica aos ideais ascéticos na filosofia madura de Nietzsche.

O objetivo do artigo é questionar o otimismo em relação aos anseios por transformação para algo melhor no contexto pós-pandemia. Por um lado, se é natural que desejemos alguma transformação depois da vivência do flagelo da pandemia – respostas ao sentido do sofrimento como mais um desdobramento dos ideais ascéticos, como escreveu Nietzsche –, por outro lado, o anseio por transformação encontra um limite tanto no sentido do desafio da transformação – um obstáculo para ela mesma –, quanto pelo otimismo (...) nas teses esclarecidas que superestimam os indivíduos e seus potenciais cognitivos e subestimam o potencial dos conflitos internos. Finalizo com uma breve indicação da urgência de um programa genealógico da cultura brasileira. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to point out five aspects of Nietzschean thought that may be relevant to debates in the philosophy of science around the nature and representation of scientific knowledge. To this end, a literature review is carried out with the aim of selecting excerpts from Nietzschean works such as The Birth of Tragedy, Genealogy of Morals, The Gay Science and others that allow us to interpret Nietzsche as a philosopher of science concerned with the construction of (...) scientific knowledge about the physical reality. As a result, it is possible to identify an epistemological proposal in the Nietzschean perspective, whose objective representation of the world should point to an aesthetics of life. (shrink)

En el panorama actual de la filosofía ético-política, la ascesis ha sido una de las nociones más influyentes, tomando un lugar determinante a partir de la empresa de Nietzsche en su tratamiento sobre los ideales ascéticos. Ciertamente, con la herencia foucaultiana de este concepto como prácticas de sí, filosofías como la de Judith Butler, Peter Sloterdijk, Elettra Stimilli, entre otros, han admitido como supuesto ontológico central que el cómo los humanos se relacionan consigo mismos es clave para comprender las maneras (...) en que nuestras realidades son configuradas, y que dicha relación tiene lugar en las prácticas que realizamos día a día. No obstante, en diversas religiones y filosofías de la antigüedad, la ascesis ocupaba un rol aparejado con otras nociones, como la de gnosis (que se instaura como un conocimiento especial de la manera en que la realidad está organizada), con vistas a asegurar que los individuos pudiesen ascender a formas de vida que procurasen su salvación. Frente a esta diferencia tan radical en uno y otro momento de la historia de la filosofía, intentaremos trazar ciertas notas que nos permitirían comparar una y otra interpretación de la ascesis, sacando así a luz los aspectos que caracterizan la concepción contemporánea de la ascesis misma. _Palabras clave: _ascesis, vida, educación, filosofía contemporánea, práctica. (shrink)

No FP 1888, 14 [89], Nietzsche distingue um sentido trágico e um sentido cristão para o sofrimento. Com esse par conceitual, o filósofo designa o conflito entre duas justificações antagônicas da vida, contrapondo dois tipos de sofredores com anseios contrários. O presente artigo defende a hipótese de que a mencionada distinção ilustra um modo de pensar o sofrimento, característico do período de 1886-1888 da filosofia nietzschiana. Partindo da Genealogia da Moral, ver-se-á como a discussão metodológica envolvida na fluidez de sentido (...) implica uma contraposição à pretensão do ideal ascético de estabelecer um sentido fixo e universal para o sofrimento. Em seguida, será considerado o §370 da Gaia Ciência, no qual a heurística da necessidade fornece a Nietzsche a distinção entre dois tipos de sofredores, bem como a configuração das artes e filosofias em correspondência com seus anseios. Por fim, os prefácios de 1886 serão interpretados como o marco teórico que estabelece o modo de pensar o sofrimento por pares antagônicos, na medida em que, nesse conjunto de textos, Nietzsche narra como aprendeu a ver a distinção entre dois tipos de filosofar: um oriundo da fraqueza e outro, da força. Conclusivamente, serão traçadas considerações para estabelecer a contraposição tipológica de sofredores antagônicos como uma chave de leitura legítima para analisar o sofrimento no período final da filosofia de Nietzsche. (shrink)

"Siamo come lucciole che hanno disimparato a illuminare e che prima si sono messe a girare attorno alla lanterna magica dell'ideale ascetico e ora attorno alle insegne pubblicitarie al neon. Lucciole che hanno scordato d’avere una potenzialità di orientatività preziosa nel proprio sistema affettivo" (G. Cusinato, La totalità incompiuta, Milano 2008, 314). Che cos'è una persona? Come si costituisce concretamente l'identità personale? Che rapporto c'è fra identità personale e identità psichica? C'è coincidenza fra persona e homo sapiens? La persona è (...) ancora oggi, nonostante tutto, al centro del dibattito filosofico, sociologico, giuridico e bioetico, eppure la sua dimensione sembra sfuggire continuamente alle reti concettuali e alle categorie epistemologiche della scienza. In questo lavoro si propone una fenomenologia della persona a partire dal confronto con la teoria dei sistemi autopoietici di Maturana e Varela e dei sistemi sociali di Luhmann, mettendo in luce che la persona non può essere considerata un sistema autopoietico. La persona si delinea piuttosto come un sistema excentrico che si costituisce mediante l'esecuzione dell'atto. Questa prospettiva viene esplorata attraverso un dialogo serrato con l'antropologia filosofica tedesca, la stessa che all'inizio del Novecento mette in luce che l'uomo non ha un'essenza precostituita e proprio per questo necessita di un processo di Bildung. L'antropologia filosofica di Scheler e Plessner nasce nella Germania degli anni Venti in un periodo ancora fluido in cui l'eclissi delle tradizionali concezioni dell'uomo non aveva ancora lasciato il posto alla cristallizzazione totalitaria dell'uomo di massa che si sarebbe imposta negli anni Trenta. (shrink)

O texto tem o objetivo de apresentar como o filósofo francês Gilles Deleuze, a partir da obra Nietzsche e a Filosofia, interpreta a Genealogia da Moral, obra escrita pelo filósofo alemão Friedrich Nietzsche, levando em consideração as formas mais gerais do niilismo: ressentimento, má consciência e ideal ascético.

En el tratado "¿Qué significan los ideales ascéticos?" hace Nietzsche la genealogía del "sistema de interpretación más pensado hasta el final" (Genealogía de la moral, III, 23). El ensayo se presenta como una descripción de la interpretación genealógica en su articulación inmanente, tiene que vérselas en el fondo con la cuestión de por qué los modernos representantes de aquel sistema de interpretación son sus pretendidos antagonistas en tanto renuncian a interpretar. El planteo del problema no se alcanza por vía descriptiva. (...) El trasfondo del ensayo es la pregunta por la posibilidad de una descripción no interpretativa. (shrink)

O artigo é uma reflexão sobre o modo como, na "Genealogia da Moral", Nietzsche repensa "o problema estético" a partir da oposição entre a concepção kantiana do belo como predicado de um juízo "desinteressado" e a concepção stendhaliana do belo como efeito de uma "cristalização" e uma "promessa de felicidade". A chave do pensamento de Nietzsche neste contexto está no conceito de "embriaguez" , por um lado, como termo-chave para designar a "pré-condição fisiológica" da arte, mas, por outro, como um (...) processo de espiritualização dos instintos ou das pulsões que as interioriza e intensifica. Esta espiritualização distingue-se da contemplação desinteressada porque não nos des-afecta e porque é, em grande medida, uma espiritualização da sexualidade, mas não deixa, por isso, de implicar uma reavaliação dos valores e uma ampliação do horizonte do humano. É por isso que a arte pode ser pensada como um "contra-movimento" que afirma a vida e combate o "ideal ascético" e o "niilismo europeu". The present article is a reflection on the way how, in "Genealogy of Morals", Nietzsche rethinks "the aesthetic issue" based on the opposition between Kant's conception of beauty as a predicate of a "disinterested" judgment and the stendhaliana conception of beauty as the effect of a "crystallization" and a "promise of happiness". The key to the thought of Nietzsche's in this context resides on the concept of "intoxication" on the one hand, as a key-term to designate the "pre-physiological condition" of art, but on the other hand, as a process of spiritualisation of the instincts or of the drives, which internalizes and intensifies them. This spiritualization is distinguished from disinterested contemplation for it does not dis-affects us, and because it is by large a spiritualization of sexuality, without renouncing to imply a revaluation of the values and a widening on the horizon of the human. That is why art can be thought of as a "counter-movement" that affirms life and fights the "ascetic ideal" and the "European nihilism". (shrink)

Resumo: O artigo aborda o tema “Revolução”, analisado por Holanda em Raízes do Brasil. A leitura foi mediada pela filosofia de Nietzsche, onde exploramos as noções de má consciência, ideal ascético e as críticas à modernidade. Além de duas referências explícitas ao filósofo, as abrangentes noções nietzschianas subsidiam as avaliações de Holanda sobre os “novos tempos” no Brasil. No entanto, a crítica do brasileiro foi direcionada àquelas “superfetações liberais”, dado o seu caráter exógeno às tradições brasileiras. Em contrapartida, (...) considerou positivos os valores do personalismo, subjacentes ao nosso modo de vida, favoráveis à criação de forma política concernente à sociedade.: The article presents an approach to the theme “Revolução”, debated by Holanda on his book “Raízes do Brasil”. The analysis was based on Nietzsche’s philosophy, by exploring concepts concerning bad consciousness, ascetic ideal and criticism of the modernity. Besides two explicit references to the philosopher, the embracing Nietzschian notions support Holanda’s assessment of the “new times” in Brazil. Nonetheless, the Brazilian’s criticism was targeted at those “liberal superfetation”, owing to its exogenous feature to the Brazilian traditions. In contrast, he considered positively the values of personalism, implicit in our way of life, favorable to the invention of a politic shape as far as the society is concerned. (shrink)

O artigo tentar mostrar três coisas: primeiro que, embora Nietzsche rejeite alguns dos aspectos mais importantes da famosa metafísica da vontade que se encontra no centro de toda a filosofia de Schopenhauer, tal metafísica não deixa por isso de ser o ponto de partida da sua análise do “facto fundamental da vontade humana” na Genealogia da Moral ; depois, que o modo como Schopenhauer entende o ascetismo e a “negação da vontade” tem uma importância crucial para a compreensão da concepção (...) nietzschiana do “ideal ascético” e de uma “vontade do nada” como vontade ascética; por fim, que a interpretação daquilo a que Nietzsche chama “niilismo” na Genealogia e, em geral, na sua obra não pode dispensar a reflexão sobre o modo como Nietzsche e Schopenhauer pensam o ascetismo e a ideia de uma “vontade do nada”. Este último ponto implica a revisão crítica de importantes interpretações do niilismo em Nietzsche, como a de Stegmaier e a de van Tongeren. (shrink)

In common treatments of deontic logic, the obligatory is what is true in all deontically ideal possible worlds. In this article, I offer a new semantics for Standard Deontic Logic with Leibnizian intensions rather than possible worlds. Even though the new semantics furnishes models that resemble Venn diagrams, the semantics captures the strong soundness and completeness of Standard Deontic Logic. Since, unlike possible worlds, many Leibnizian intensions are not maximally consistent entities, we can amend the semantics to invalidate the (...) inference rule which ensures that all tautologies are obligatory. I sketch this amended semantics to show how it invalidates the rule in a new way. (shrink)

I develop a broadly reliabilist theory of non-ideal epistemic rationality and argue that if it is correct we should reject the recently popular idea that the standards of non-ideal epistemic rationality are mere social conventions.

Neste artigo, utilizaremos os conceitos nietzschianos de ideais ascéticos, ressentimento e moral de rebanho visando mostrar o entrelaçamento apontado por Nietzsche entre humanidade e doença a partir de uma leitura do filme Dogville de Lars Von Trier.

Recent methodological debates regarding the place of feasibility considerations in normative political theory are hindered for want of a rigorous model of the feasibility frontier. To address this shortfall, I present an analysis of feasibility that generalizes the economic concept of a production possibility frontier and then develop a rigorous model of the feasibility frontier using the familiar possible worlds technology. I then show that this model has significant methodological implications for political philosophy. On the Target View, a political (...) class='Hi'>ideal presents a long-term goal for morally progressive reform efforts and, thus, serves as an important reference point for our specification of normative political principles. I use the model to show that we can- not reasonably expect that adopting political ideals as long-term reform objectives will guide us toward the realization of morally optimal feasible states of affairs. I conclude by proposing that political philosophers turn their attention to the analysis of actual social failures rather than political ideals. (shrink)

Science is the study of our world, as it is in its messy reality. Nonetheless, science requires idealization to function—if we are to attempt to understand the world, we have to find ways to reduce its complexity. Idealization and the Aims of Science shows just how crucial idealization is to science and why it matters. Beginning with the acknowledgment of our status as limited human agents trying to make sense of an exceedingly complex world, Angela Potochnik moves on to explain (...) how science aims to depict and make use of causal patterns—a project that makes essential use of idealization. She offers case studies from a number of branches of science to demonstrate the ubiquity of idealization, shows how causal patterns are used to develop scientific explanations, and describes how the necessarily imperfect connection between science and truth leads to researchers’ values influencing their findings. The resulting book is a tour de force, a synthesis of the study of idealization that also offers countless new insights and avenues for future exploration. (shrink)

The paper discusses three talks, which were given at the meetings of the Philosophical Society of Berlin (Philosophische Gesellschaft zu Berlin) in the mid-1870s. In these talks, the principles of some main movements in contemporary philosophy (realism, absolute idealism, critical idealism) were elaborated and contrasted to each other. The paper focuses on the concepts of real-idealism and ideal-realism. All the discussants, Friedrich Frederichs, C. L. Michelet and J. H. von Kirchmann, introduce these concepts. Frederichs, an adherent of critical idealism, (...) argues only for the standpoint of real-idealism. Michelet, G. W. F. Hegel’s personal student and an adherent of absolute idealism, takes real-idealism and ideal-realism to be the two sides of the one coin. Kirchmann, an advocate of realism, regards real-idealism as an objective, and he is skeptical about the possibility to achieve it. (shrink)

Robin McKenna argues that we need to make space for an approach to epistemology that avoids the idealizations typical of the field. He applies this approach to topics in applied and social epistemology, such as what to do about science denial, whether we should try to be intellectually autonomous, and what our obligations are to other inquirers.

Political philosophers frequently claim that political ideals can provide normative guidance for unjust and otherwise nonideal circumstances. This is mistaken. This paper demonstrates that political ideals contribute nothing to our understanding of the normative principles we should satisfy amidst unjust or otherwise nonideal circumstances.

In this paper, I first outline the view developed in my recent book on the role of idealization in scientific understanding. I discuss how this view leads to the recognition of a number of kinds of variability among scientific representations, including variability introduced by the many different aims of scientific projects. I then argue that the role of idealization in securing understanding distances understanding from truth, but that this understanding nonetheless gives rise to scientific knowledge. This discussion will clarify how (...) my view relates to three other recent books on understanding by Henk de Regt, Catherine Elgin, and Kareem Khalifa. (shrink)

Ch. 1. Problemy metodologii issledovanii︠a︡ nravstvennogo ideala russkoĭ filosofii -- ch. 2. Personalia. Nravstvennye iskanii︠a︡ russkikh mysliteleĭ.

Many AI systems that make important decisions are black boxes: how they function is opaque even to their developers. This is due to their high complexity and to the fact that they are trained rather than programmed. Efforts to alleviate the opacity of black box systems are typically discussed in terms of transparency, interpretability, and explainability. However, there is little agreement about what these key concepts mean, which makes it difficult to adjudicate the success or promise of opacity alleviation methods. (...) I argue for a unified account of these key concepts that treats the concept of understanding as fundamental. This allows resources from the philosophy of science and the epistemology of understanding to help guide opacity alleviation efforts. A first significant benefit of this understanding account is that it defuses one of the primary, in-principle objections to post hoc explainable AI (XAI) methods. This “rationalization objection” argues that XAI methods provide mere rationalizations rather than genuine explanations. This is because XAI methods involve using a separate “explanation” system to approximate the original black box system. These explanation systems function in a completely different way than the original system, yet XAI methods make inferences about the original system based on the behavior of the explanation system. I argue that, if we conceive of XAI methods as idealized scientific models, this rationalization worry is dissolved. Idealized scientific models misrepresent their target phenomena, yet are capable of providing significant and genuine understanding of their targets. (shrink)

Because idealizations frequently advance scientific understanding, many claim that falsehoods play an epistemic role. In this paper, we argue that these positions greatly overstate idealiza...

In this paper, I propose that the debate in epistemology concerning the nature and value of understanding can shed light on the role of scientific idealizations in producing scientific understanding. In philosophy of science, the received view seems to be that understanding is a species of knowledge. On this view, understanding is factive just as knowledge is, i.e., if S knows that p, then p is true. Epistemologists, however, distinguish between different kinds of understanding. Among epistemologists, there are those who (...) think that a certain kind of understanding—objectual understanding—is not factive, and those who think that objectual understanding is quasi-factive. Those who think that understanding is not factive argue that scientific idealizations constitute cognitive success, which we then consider as instances of understanding, and yet they are not true. This paper is an attempt to draw lessons from this debate as they pertain to the role of idealizations in producing scientific understanding. I argue that scientific understanding is quasi-factive. (shrink)

This paper articulates and responds to a challenge to contemporary compatibilist views of free will. Despite the popularity and appeal of compatibilist theories, many are left with lingering doubts about compatibilism. This paper explains this doubt in terms of the absurdity challenge: because a compatibilist accepts that they do not have causal access to all the actual sufficient causal sources of their own agency, the compatibilist can find their own agency absurd. By taking a cue from political philosophy, this paper (...) argues that a non-ideal construction of the problem of free will allows compatibilists to overcome this existential-metaphysical challenge, and by doing so, perhaps adopt a metaphysically progressive picture of human agency. (shrink)

Numerous philosophers allege that the "general theory of second best" (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956) poses a challenge to the Target View, which asserts that real world reform efforts should aim to establish arrangements that satisfy the constitutive features of ideal just states of affairs. I demonstrate two claims that are relevant in this context. First, I show that the theory of second best fails to present a compelling challenge to the Target View in general. But, second, the theory of (...) second best requires ideal theorists to undertake certain kinds of causal and comparative analyses that are typically thought to lie beyond the borders of conventional ideal theory. (shrink)

Eva Erman and Niklas Möller have recently presented a trenchant critique of my (2015) argument that ideal normative theories are uninformative for certain practical purposes. Their criticisms are largely correct. In this note, I develop the ideas behind my earlier argument in a way that circumvents their critique and explains more clearly why ideal theory is uninformative for certain purposes while leaving open the possibility that it might be informative for other purposes.

When we admire a person, we don’t just have a wow-response towards them, as we might towards a painting or a sunset. Rather, we construe them as realizing an ideal of the person in their lives to a conspicuous degree. To merit admiration, it is not enough simply to do something valuable or to possess desirable character traits. Rather, one’s achievements must manifest commitments and character traits that define a worthwhile ideal. Agential admiration, I argue, is a person-focused (...) attitude like shame, contempt, and hubristic pride, not an act-focused one like gratitude or guilt, not to mention mere evaluation as excellent. Given its holistic focus, its motivational effects permeate our interactions with its target, who is construed as an exemplar. Consequently, even if someone is admirable in some way, admiring them may be all-things-considered inappropriate, if they fall short of other ideals that we ought to care about. (shrink)

In her ‘On the apparent paradox of ideal theory’, Laura Valentini combines three supposedly plausible premises to derive the paradoxical result that ideal theory is both unable to, and indispensable for, guiding action. Her strategy is to undermine one of the three premises by arguing that there are good and bad kinds of ideal theory, and only the bad kinds are vulnerable to the strongest version of their opponents’ attack. By undermining one of the three premises she (...) releases ideal theorists from the paradox, which is as follows. (1) Any sound theory of justice is action-guiding. (2) Any sound theory of justice is ideal. (3) Any ideal theory fails to be action-guiding. Here I shall respond to Valentini in two ways. First, I shall show that both (1) and (2) are false. The falsity of either is sufficient to release ideal theorists from the paradox. Second, I shall show that Valentini’s response to (3) can be extended, because her bad kinds of ideal theory do not necessarily fail to guide action. The cumulative effect of my arguments further strengthens Valentini’s support of ideal theory. I will deal with premises (1) and (2) in Sections I and II, and (3) in Section III. (shrink)

This book argues that the major traditions in the philosophy of language have mistakenly focused on highly idealized linguistic contexts. Instead, it presents a non-ideal foundational theory of language that contends that the essential function of language is to direct attention for the purpose of achieving diverse social and political goals. Philosophers of language have focused primarily on highly idealized linguistic contexts in which cooperative agents are working toward the shared goal of gaining information about the world. This approach (...) abstracts away from important issues like power, ideology, social position, and diversity of goals which are crucial to explaining linguistic phenomena both at the semantic and pragmatic levels. This book begins by examining the work of some of the pioneers of this tradition--primarily David Lewis, Paul Grice, and Robert Stalnaker. The author shows that various problems have their source in idealizations made at the foundational level of linguistic theory and proposes to rebuild from the ground-up. She presents a non-ideal foundational theory of language which retains the major insights of traditional frameworks while rejecting the social idealizations that guide them. Then, she explores the social and political applications of her account to issues such as dog whistling, propaganda, slurs and racist speech, silencing, and manipulation. Non-Ideal Foundations of Language will appeal to researchers and advanced students in philosophy of language who are interested in the social and political applications of language, as well as traditional metasemantic theory. (shrink)

Based on three recently published books on climate justice, this article reviews the field of climate ethics in light of developments of international climate politics. The central problem addressed is how idealised normative theories can be relevant to the political process of negotiating a just distribution of the costs and benefits of mitigating climate change. I distinguish three possible responses, that is, three kinds of non-ideal theories of climate justice: focused on (1) the injustice of some agents not doing (...) their part; (2) the policy process and aiming to be realistic; and (3) grievances related to the transition to a clean-energy economy. The methodological discussion underpinning each response is innovative and should be of interest more generally, even though it is still underdeveloped. The practical upshot, however, is unclear: even non-ideal climate justice may be too disconnected from the fast-moving and messy climate circus. (shrink)

Idealization and abstraction are central concepts in the philosophy of science and in science itself. My goal in this paper is suggest an account of these concepts, building on and refining an existing view due to Jones Idealization XII: correcting the model. Idealization and abstraction in the sciences, vol 86. Rodopi, Amsterdam, pp 173–217, 2005) and Godfrey-Smith Mapping the future of biology: evolving concepts and theories. Springer, Berlin, 2009). On this line of thought, abstraction—which I call, for reasons to be (...) explained, abstractness—involves the omission of detail, whereas idealization consists in a deliberate mismatch between a description and the world. I will suggest that while the core idea underlying these authors’ view is correct, they make several assumptions and stipulations that are best avoided. For one thing, they tie abstractness too close to truth. For another, they do not allow sufficient room to the difference between idealization and error. Taking these points into account leads to a refined account of the distinction, in which abstractness is seen in terms of relative richness of detail, and idealization is seen as closely connected with the knowledge and intentions of idealizers. I lay out these accounts in turn, and then discuss the relationship between the two concepts, and several other upshots of the present way of construing the distinction. (shrink)

Does rationality require logical omniscience? Our best formal theories of rationality imply that it does, but our ordinary evaluations of rationality seem to suggest otherwise. This paper aims to resolve the tension by arguing that our ordinary evaluations of rationality are not only consistent with the thesis that rationality requires logical omniscience, but also provide a compelling rationale for accepting this thesis in the first place. This paper also defends an account of apriori justification for logical beliefs that is designed (...) to explain the rational requirement of logical omniscience. On this account, apriori justification for beliefs about logic has its source in logical facts, rather than psychological facts about experience, reasoning, or understanding. This account has important consequences for the epistemic role of experience in the logical domain. In a slogan, the epistemic role of experience in the apriori domain is not a justifying role, but rather an enabling and disabling role. (shrink)

Ideal epistemologists investigate the nature of pure epistemic rationality, abstracting away from human cognitive limitations. Non-ideal epistemologists investigate epistemic norms that are satisfiable by most humans, most of the time. Ideal epistemology faces a number of challenges, aimed at both its substantive commitments and its philosophical worth. This paper explains the relation between ideal and non-ideal epistemology, with the aim of justifying ideal epistemology. Its approach is meta-epistemological, focusing on the meaning and purpose of (...) epistemic evaluations. I provide an account on which the fundamental difference between ideal and non-ideal epistemic evaluations is that only the non-ideal epistemic ‘ought’ implies any substantive ‘can’. I argue that only ideal epistemic evaluations are ‘normatively robust’: they are neither conventional nor seriously context-sensitive. Non-ideal epistemic evaluations are normatively non-robust, exhibiting both conventionality and serious context-sensitivity from an interesting variety of distinct sources. For this reason, non-ideal epistemic evaluations won’t characterize the fundamental nature of epistemic rationality. Non-ideal epistemic rationality depends, not merely on what’s epistemically valuable, but also on modally contingent epistemic conventions and contextually contingent constraints on epistemic options. If we want a normatively robust theory of epistemic rationality, ideal epistemology is the only game in town. (shrink)

Many criticisms of epistemic logic have centered around its use of devices such as idealized knowers with logical omniscience and perfect self-knowledge. One possible response to such criticisms is to say that these idealizations are normative devices, and that epistemic logic tells us how agents ought to behave. This paper will take a different approach, treating epistemic logic as descriptive, and drawing the analogy between its formal models and idealized scientific models on that basis. Treating it as descriptive matches the (...) way in which some philosophers, including one of its founders, Jaako Hintikka, have thought about epistemic logic early in its history. Further, the analogy between the two fields will give us a way to defuse criticisms that see epistemic logic as unrealistic. For example, criticizing models of epistemic logic in which agents know all propositional tautologies as being unrealistic would be like criticizing frictionless planes in physics for being unrealistic. Each one would certainly be an unsuitable model for studying some kinds of phenomena, but is entirely appropriate for others. After outlining the analogy between epistemic and scientific models, we will discuss some ways in which idealizations are used by different research programs in epistemic logic. (shrink)