The goal of this paper is to provide an initial defense of a neglected epistemology of value according to which a fundamental mode of access to evaluative facts and properties is constituted by a distinctive kind of feeling, sometimes called ‘value feeling’. The paper defends the appeal to value feelings against some objections that have been leveled against it, objections intended to show that it is a nonstarter. The paper argues that these objections can be (...) met and that the view that there are such value feelings constitutes a reasonable hypothesis. (shrink)

This paper examines the model of the emotions put forward by Reinach and Scheler at the beginning of the 20th century and presents it as a plausible alternative to the contemporary “perceptual model.” According to the Reinach-Scheler view, emotions are not perceptions of value, but possible responses to values given to us in value-feelings. The paper is divided into two parts. The first is an historical investigation of the origins of the model in Reinach’s and Scheler’s works within (...) the broader context of early phenomenology. The second part presents systematic arguments for the distinction between value-feeling and emotional response. (shrink)

A vast range of our everyday experiences seem to involve an immediate consciousness of value. We hear the rudeness of someone making offensive comments. In seeing someone risking her life to save another, we recognize her bravery. When we witness a person shouting at an innocent child, we feel the unfairness of this action. If, in learning of a close friend’s success, envy arises in us, we experience our own emotional response as wrong. How are these values apprehended? The (...) three most common answers provided by contemporary philosophy explain the consciousness of value in terms of judgment, emotion, or perception. An alternative view endorsed mainly by authors inspired by the phenomenological tradition argues that values are apprehended by an intentional feeling. In this model, it is by virtue of a feeling that objects are presented as being in different degrees and nuances fair or unfair, boring or funny, good or bad. This paper offers an account of this model of feeling and its basic features, and defends it over alternative models. To this end, the paper discusses different versions of the model circulating in current research which until now have developed in parallel rather than in mutual exchange. The paper also applies the proposed account to the moral domain and examines how a feeling of values is presupposed by several moral experiences. (shrink)

Dressing up animals in ridiculous costumes, shaming dogs on the internet, playing Big Buck Hunter at the local tavern, feeding vegan food to cats, and producing and consuming “knockout” animals, what, if anything, do these acts have in common? In this article, I develop two respect-based arguments that explain how these acts are morally problematic, even though they might not always, if ever, affect the experiential welfare of animals. While these acts are not ordinary wrongs, they are animal dignitary wrongs.

One of the pioneers of modern sociology, Max Scheler (1874- 1928) ranks with Max Weber, Edmund Husserl, and Ernst Troeltsch as being among the most brilliant minds of his generation. Yet Scheler is now known chiefly for his philosophy of religion, despite his groundbreaking work in the sociology of knowledge, the sociology of emotions, and phenomenological sociology. This volume comprises some of Scheler's most interesting work--including an analysis of the role of sentiments in social interaction, a sociology of knowledge rooted (...) in global social and cultural comparisons, and a cross-cultural theory of values--and identifies some of his important contributions to the discussion of issues at the forefront of the social sciences today. Editor Harold J. Bershady provides a richly detailed biographical portrait of Scheler, as well as an incisive analysis of how his work extends and integrates problems of theory and method addressed by Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons, among others. Harold J. Bershady, professor of sociology at the University of Pennsylvania, is the author of Ideology and Social Knowledge and the editor of Social Class and Democratic Leadership . Heritage of Sociology series. (shrink)

Throughout her work, Audre Lorde maintains that her self-preservation in the face of oppression depends on acting from the recognition and valorization of her feelings as a deep source of knowledge. This claim, taken as a portrayal of agency, poses challenges to standard positions in ethics, epistemology, and moral psychology. This article examines the oppositional agency articulated by Lorde’s thought, locating feeling, poetry, and the power she calls “the erotic” within her avowed project of self-preservation. It then explores the (...) implications of taking seriously Lorde’s account, particularly for theorists examining ethics and epistemology under nonideal social conditions. For situations of sexual intimacy, for example, Lorde’s account unsettles prevailing assumptions about the role of consent in responsibility between sexual partners. I argue that obligations to solicit consent and respect refusal are not sufficient to acknowledge the value of agency in intimate encounters when agency is oppositional in the way Lorde describes. (shrink)

This paper argues that moral distress is a distinctive category of reactive attitudes that are taken to be part and parcel of the social dynamics for recognition. While moral distress does not demonstrate evidence of wrongdoing, it does emotionally articulate a demand for normative attention that is addressed to others as moral providers. The argument for this characterization of the deontic power of moral distress builds upon two examples in which the cognitive value of the victim’s emotional experience is (...) controversial: the case of micro-aggression, and the case of misplaced distress. In contrast to appraisal and perceptual models of distress, it is argued that its epistemic and normative value is dialogical rather than evidential, in that it presses claims that engage the audience in a normative discussion about the normative standing of the claimant, the proper grounds of the attitude, and the normative standards used to assess them. (shrink)

This book proposes and defends a new theory of emotional experience. Drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, with links to contemporary philosophy of mind, it argues that emotional experiences are sui generis states, not to be modelled after other mental states – such as perceptions, judgements, or bodily feelings – but given their own analysis and place within our mental economy. More specifically, emotional experiences are claimed to be feelings-towards-values.

Some of the contemporary ethical debates have put in value the rational feature of feelings because of the estimative intentionality that is implied in them. In this context, some claim that the intentionality of emotions is a kind of value perception, as Phenomenology stressed at the beginning of the twentieth century, particularly Max Scheler, by analysing emotional Feeling [_Fühlen_] in the frame of emotional life. In order to extend the context of this philosophical debate, and after describing (...) Scheler’s phenomenology of feelings of the intentional and non-intentional emotional life, firstly, we defend _the_ _axiological_ _and_ _emotional_ _intentionality_ _as_ _double_ _intentionality_ that—in our understanding—Scheler analyses phenomenologically, while taking distance from Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl’s intentional structure of estimative emotions. And, secondly, we propose a tentative interpretation of _the link_ between estimative and emotional double intentionality _as living_ _structure_ _of_ _ethical_ _life_, in the light of Martin Heidegger’s Hermeneutical Phenomenology. (shrink)

Starting again of thesis that the value appear to us like value in self, transcendental, and value for somebody, this paper enlarging upon idea that the value is object of knowledge but different of any others objects of the reality. The knowledge of value involve a emotional constituent and other rational constituent. Advancing the judgement of value, the feeling of value is essential for detection and to converted the being of value (...) into reality of life and culture. This part of value feeling do not put in danger the unity and eternity of value and it is very important for the knowledge and the intercultural communication in the world. (shrink)

One of the pioneers of modern sociology, Max Scheler ranks with Max Weber, Edmund Husserl, and Ernst Troeltsch as being among the most brilliant minds of his generation. Yet Scheler is now known chiefly for his philosophy of religion, despite his groundbreaking work in the sociology of knowledge, the sociology of emotions, and phenomenological sociology. This volume comprises some of Scheler's most interesting work—including an analysis of the role of sentiments in social interaction, a sociology of knowledge rooted in global (...) social and cultural comparisons, and a cross-cultural theory of values—and identifies some of his important contributions to the discussion of issues at the forefront of the social sciences today. Editor Harold J. Bershady provides a richly detailed biographical portrait of Scheler, as well as an incisive analysis of how his work extends and integrates problems of theory and method addressed by Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons, among others. Harold J. Bershady, professor of sociology at the University of Pennsylvania, is the author of _Ideology and Social _ _Knowledge_ and the editor of _Social Class and _ _Democratic Leadership_. Heritage of Sociology series. (shrink)

Max Scheler and Mencius both take feeling to be the origin of value and could therefore be considered to be proponents of axiological sentimentalism. Despite the great spatial and temporal distance between them, there are striking similarities between the theories of value they developed. It should be noted, however, that there are also some differences between them that are mainly derived from some difficulties with their theories of value. These difficulties should be removed so that a (...) better theory of value could be developed. It is accordingly the aim of this paper to promote a phenomenological dialogue between Scheler and Mencius that could lead to such a better theory. In Sects. 1, 2, I will first delineate Scheler’s theory of value and feeling, then that of Mencius. In Sect. 3, I will point out some difficulties with the two theories and promote a dialogue between them that would improve each theory. In Sect. 4, I will conclude with some remarks concerning the future task of the phenomenological dialogue between Scheler and Mencius. (shrink)

This chapter compares Lotze’s, Lipps’, and Voigtländer’s notion of feelings of self-worth in order to carve out the specific and genuine aspects of Voigtländer’s understanding of self-feeling, as developed in her dissertation. Three lines of thinking important to her approach to the constitution of self-feeling are identified. While primarily sitting on an axis that stretches from the post-romantic Lotze via the descriptive psychologist Lipps to what is later understood as phenomenological philosophy, traces of two other major traditions can (...) be discovered in her proposal: (a) romantic psychology of the unconscious as found, for instance, in C. G. Carus, and (b), Nietzsche’s genealogical psychology of value. Both these traditions would later inspire biologistic versions of German Lebensphilosophie. By relying on them, it is argued, Voigtländer’s notion of self-feeling shows affinities with those vitalist approaches that fueled racist and eugenic ideologies in National Socialism. Given this, her theory of self-feeling in her dissertation from 1910 turns out to be fairly compatible with her later engagement in the fields of eugenics and membership in the NSDAP. Although her account of self-feeling is unique and interesting, therefore, it is finally suggested that Voigtländer’s proposal should be read with due caution. (shrink)

This volume explores the role and status of phenomena such as feelings, values, willing, and action in the domain of perception and (social) cognition, as well as the way in which they are related. In its exploration, the book takes Husserl's lifelong project Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins (1909-1930) as its point of departure, and investigates these phenomena with Husserl but also beyond Husserl. Divided into two parts, the volume brings together essays that address the topics from different phenomenological, philosophical, (...) and psychological perspectives. They discuss Husserl's position in dialogue with historical and recent philosophical and psychological debates and develop phenomenological accounts and descriptions with the help of Geiger, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Plessner, Sartre, Scheler, Schopenhauer, and Reinach. (shrink)

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 4, Page 257-261, October 2022. Müller argues that the perceptual or “Axiological Receptivity” model of emotions is incoherent, because it requires an emotion to apprehend and respond to its formal object at the same time. He defends a contrasting view of emotions as “Position-Takings" towards “formal objects”, aspects of an emotion's target pertinent to the subject's concerns. I first cast doubt on the cogency of Müller's attack on AR as begging questions about the temporal characteristics (...) of perceptual events. I then argue that Müller's version of PT is not radical enough. On my attitudinal view, formal objects are not values but natural properties that justify specific affective or behavioral responses. Values are constituted only by a negotiated social aggregation of individual evaluative attitudes. (shrink)

One of the pioneers of modern sociology, Max Scheler ranks with Max Weber, Edmund Husserl, and Ernst Troeltsch as being among the most brilliant minds of his generation. Yet Scheler is now known chiefly for his philosophy of religion, despite his groundbreaking work in the sociology of knowledge, the sociology of emotions, and phenomenological sociology. This volume comprises some of Scheler's most interesting work—including an analysis of the role of sentiments in social interaction, a sociology of knowledge rooted in global (...) social and cultural comparisons, and a cross-cultural theory of values—and identifies some of his important contributions to the discussion of issues at the forefront of the social sciences today. Editor Harold J. Bershady provides a richly detailed biographical portrait of Scheler, as well as an incisive analysis of how his work extends and integrates problems of theory and method addressed by Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons, among others. Harold J. Bershady, professor of sociology at the University of Pennsylvania, is the author of _Ideology and Social _ _Knowledge_ and the editor of _Social Class and _ _Democratic Leadership_. Heritage of Sociology series. (shrink)

Following Mou Zongsan’s interpretation of Wang Yangming, this paper investigates the phenomenology of values and moral emotions in Max Scheler and the Confucian learning of heart, especially Wang Yangming. Part I illustrates the meaning of moral emotions in Confucianism and introduces Wang Yangming’s idea of pure knowing . Part II introduces Max Scheler’s idea of a priori value and feeling in order to explain how pure knowing could be both immanent and transcendental, both subjective and objective. Part III (...) explores the phenomena of value and feeling in Confucianism and Wang Yangming, giving a Schelerian interpretation of Wang Yangming’s teaching of four verses. Similar to Max Scheler, Confucian learning of heart affirms the intentional structure between hierarchy of values on the one hand and loving, preferring, and feeling of values on the other hand. This paper intends to clarify the basic structure of Wang Yangming’s thought; therefore, analyses on detailed moral emotions will be left to .. (shrink)

Recent work on empathy has focused on the phenomenon of feeling on behalf of, or for, others, and on determining the role it ought to play in our moral lives. Much less attention, however, has been paid to ‘feeling-with.’ In this paper, I distinguish ‘feeling-with’ from ‘feeling-for.’ I identify three distinguishing features of ‘feeling-with,’ all of which serve to make it distinct from empathy. Then, drawing on work in feminist moral psychology and feminist ethics, I (...) argue that ‘feeling-with’ has unique moral value over and above ‘feeling-for.’ I end by rebutting some likely objections to the claim that ‘feeling-with’ is morally valuable. (shrink)

Entrepreneurs with social goals face various challenges; insights into how these entrepreneurs experience and appreciate their work remain a black box though. Drawing on identity, conservation of resources, and person–organization fit theories, this study examines how entrepreneurs’ social value creation beliefs relate to their work-related well-being (job satisfaction, work engagement, and lack of work burnout), as well as how this process might be influenced by social concerns with respect to the common good. Using data from the German Public (...) class='Hi'>Value Atlas 2015 and 2019 and the Swiss Public Value Atlas 2017, a three-study design analyzes three samples of entrepreneurs in Germany and Switzerland. Study 1 reveals that entrepreneurs report higher job satisfaction when they believe their organization creates social value. Study 2 indicates that these beliefs relate negatively to work burnout; entrepreneurs’ perceptions of having meaningful work mediate this relationship. Study 3 affirms and extends these results by showing that a sense of work meaningfulness mediates the relationship between social value creation beliefs and work engagement and that this mediating role is more prominent among entrepreneurs with strong social concerns. This investigation thus identifies a critical pathway—the extent to which entrepreneurs experience their work activities as important and personally meaningful—that connects social value creation beliefs with enhanced work-related well-being, as well as how this process might vary with a personal orientation that embraces the common good. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to identify the most important elements of Hartmann’s understanding of “feeling of value” and to point out the ambiguities associated with this notion. The most important stages in the formation of this concept are delineated by the publications: Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, Ethik, Vom Wesen sittlicher Forderungen.[1] In all of these texts, Hartmann treats feeling of value as a proper way of knowing value, in relation to which philosophical (...) cognition of value is only secondary and dependent. Hartmann’s understanding of feeling of value in ethics is, however, very broad, so that it somewhat loses the subtle divisions that were characteristic of the views of Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand. At the same time, however, Hartmann’s concept introduces several new elements that are important for the understanding of the nature of the feeling of value, such as, among others, the limited capacity of the axiological consciousness, the shifting horizon of values, or the relational reference of values to the person as the subject and addressee of an action and the reference to the situation in which a given action is taken. Moreover, to a greater extent than Scheler and von Hildebrand, Hartmann develops a field for the presence of rationalistic elements in the cognition of values. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"But I Don’t Feel It":Values and Emotions in the Assessment of Competence in Patients With Anorexia NervosaJochen Vollmann (bio)Keywordscompetence assessment, mental capacity, informed consent, psychiatry, anorexia nervosaThe respect of the self-determination of patients obliges physicians to obtain the patient's consent before providing medical treatment. One important condition for a valid informed consent is the patient's competence to make autonomous health care decisions. Therefore, a proper assessment of competence to (...) make health care decisions is crucial particularly in patients with mental disorders (Vollmann 2000; Helmchen and Vollmann 2001). In recent years, several empirical studies on the assessment of competence in patients suffering from different mental disorders have been performed using the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool-Treatment (MacCAT-T; Grisso and Appelbaum1998). This assessment tool is based on legal standards of competence such as understanding, reasoning, appreciation, and expressing a choice. Since its first publication, the MacCAT-T has been widely accepted as a "gold standard" of competence assessment in the psychiatric literature. In recent years the MacCAT-T has been applied to patients suffering from depression, schizophrenia, dementia, angina pectoris, and normal controls (for overview, see Welie [2001] and Bauer and Vollmann [2002]).Tan and her colleagues (2006) use the MacCAT-T the first time to assess competence to make treatment decisions in patients with anorexia nervosa. Coming from clinical practice, the authors have noticed that the MacCAT-T might not work in this group of patients. Therefore, they use semi-structured interviews in addition to the MacCAT-T to identify aspects of thinking that might be relevant to the issue of competence to refuse treatment. They use grounded theory techniques for a qualitative analysis of the data as well as five brief, self-administered questionnaires to ascertain levels of psychopathology.The results of the study show that anorexia nervosa can have complex and variable effects on concentration, beliefs, and thought processing without affecting the ability to perform well on the MacCAT-T. At the same time, participants also report a change in their value system as well as in their personal identity. The authors argue that the results of their studies suggest that the competence to refuse treatment might be compromised in [End Page 289] people with anorexia nervosa in ways that are not captured by the MacCAT-T. This is an interesting finding in patients with anorexia nervosa, because in all other studies with patients suffering from mental disorders such as dementia, depression, and schizophrenia, the MacCAT-T identified more patients as limited in their competence to make health care decisions in comparison with other methods of competence assessment such as clinical judgment (Vollmann et al. 2003). The authors argue on the basis on their qualitative, semistructured interviews that anorexia nervosa–specific difficulties with a thought process and the change of values are missed by the MacCAT-T.Furthermore, Tan and her associated could not find a relationship between the participants' scores on the psychopathological scales, the MacCAT-T scores, and their difficulties expressed during the qualitative interviews, although the small size of the study precludes statistical analysis. In an earlier study, clinical dementia scales but not neuropsychological testing correlated with formal (MacCAT-T) and clinical assessment of competence. Therefore, psychopathological factors might play a different role in different subgroups of patients suffering from different mental problems. However, the idea of an objective neuropsychological model of competence assessment, again, finds no support in the presented empirical data.The qualitative data from patients with anorexia nervosa underline the problem of the cognitive bias of the MacCAT-T assessment and the illusion of value-free categories. It has been argued that the cognitive focus for the MacCAT-T is in itself a normative convention and that the MacCAT-T is missing the complexity of the process to make health care decisions in real life. Therefore, values and emotions should be considered in addition to cognitive functions in assessing competence to make health care decisions (Breden and Vollmann 2004; see also "Mental capacity" 2004). Although many authors agree that the cognitive approach of capacity assessment is important but not sufficient for the assessment of competence to make health care decisions, it remains an... (shrink)

ABSTRACTPeople sometimes say they are “moved” or “touched” by something. Although the experience is familiar to most, systematic research on being moved has just begun. The current research aims to advance our understanding of the prototypical elicitors of being moved. We tested the hypothesis that being moved is elicited by core values that manifest themselves in circumstances that are unfavourable to their emergence. In three experiments, two with text stimuli and one with pictorial stimuli, we found compelling evidence that the (...) same core value is perceived as more moving when it emerges in unfavourable than in favourable circumstances. The effect was found in both males and females, although stronger in the latter group, and across all investigated core values, although love was generally more moving than other core values. The theoretical and practical significance of these findings is discussed. (shrink)

Max Scheler argues that there is much to learn about reality through faculties that lie beyond the boundary of reason. In his Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, Scheler explores values (Werte), awareness of which depends primarily on affective receptivity rather than rational perceptionof the world. This essay explores the possibility of affective insight in light of Scheler’s analysis of values. Scheler’s notion of values as moral facts is first examined, next consideration is given to how we learn (...) of values, and then Scheler’s account of how the preference we feel for a given value yields insight into its relative rank is considered. In conclusion, I discuss some reasons for being wary of Scheler’s account, as well as other reasons for being open to it. (shrink)

Max Scheler argues that there is much to learn about reality through faculties that lie beyond the boundary of reason. In his Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, Scheler explores values (Werte), awareness of which depends primarily on affective receptivity rather than rational perceptionof the world. This essay explores the possibility of affective insight in light of Scheler’s analysis of values. Scheler’s notion of values as moral facts is first examined, next consideration is given to how we learn (...) of values, and then Scheler’s account of how the preference we feel for a given value yields insight into its relative rank is considered. In conclusion, I discuss some reasons for being wary of Scheler’s account, as well as other reasons for being open to it. (shrink)

This study analysed the effects a values education programme can have on the feelings of self‐realisation, self‐concept and self‐esteem of Romany adolescents in southern Spain. To do this, an experimental group received a values education intervention but a control group did not. The intervention programme was adapted to the Romany culture. The self‐realisation, self‐concept and self‐esteem of both groups were evaluated using the Self‐Concept and Realisation Questionnaire. Statistical analyses showed the existence of significant differences between the experimental and control groups (...) on the variables studied. Based on the results, we suggest that a values education programme like this, that has been culturally adapted, can make a positive impact on the self‐realisation of young people from a marginalised community. (shrink)

Robert Solomon’s philosophy of emotion should be understood in the light of his lifelong commitment to existentialism and his advocacy of “the passionate life” as a means of creating value. Although he developed his views in the framework of the “cognitive theory” of emotions, closer examination reveals many themes in common with a socially situated, transactionalist view of emotions.

This paper offers a Nietzschean theory of emotion as expressed by following thesis: paradigmatic emotional experiences exhibit a distinctive kind of affective intentionality, specified in terms of felt valenced attitudes towards the (apparent) evaluative properties of their objects. Emotional experiences, on this Nietzschean view, are therefore fundamentally feelings towards value. This interpretation explains how Nietzschean affects can have evaluative intentional content without being constituted by cognitive states, as these feelings towards value are neither reducible to, nor to be (...) thought along the lines of, judgements, perceptions, or other mental states. (shrink)

This paper explores Landmann-Kalischer’s analogy between the sensing of secondary qualities and the feeling of values in her work “Philosophie der Werte” (Philosophy of Values) (1910). Attention is paid to the epistemic motivation of the analogy, the distinction between pure feelings and affects, and the relation of pure feelings to value judgments. Her account is contrasted with two other accounts of the Brentanian tradition: Scheler’s approach within early phenomenology and Meinong’s account within the Graz School. I demonstrate that (...) Landmann-Kalischer’s pioneering work helped to forge a new view of affectivity which became dominant among Brentano’s followers. According to this new view, there is a type of affective experience which is both intentional and cognitive. More precisely, she argued that the affective experience in question is a feeling. The paper also argues that her account can enrich today’s meta-ethical research. It is argued that her account of pure feelings provides arguments against the view that makes emotions responsible for the apprehension of value. Furthermore, it is shown that we need an analysis of how objective knowledge of value can be obtained from our affective intuitions. -/- . (shrink)

This essay raises a challenge for the perceptual theory of emotion. According to the perceptual theory, emotions are perceptual states that represent values. But if emotions represent values, something should explain why. In virtue of what do emotions represent the values they do? A psychosemantics would answer this, and that’s what the perceptual theorist owes us. To date, however, the only perceptual theorist to attempt a psychosemantics for emotion is Jesse Prinz. And Prinz’s theory, I argue, faces an important difficulty: (...) It makes the pairing of any given emotion with its respective value entirely arbitrary. But that’s a problem. It seems—and this is a major contention of this essay—that an emotion, in virtue of how it feels, bears a natural or non-arbitrary link to the value it represents. And this datum makes it all the more difficult to provide a viable psychosemantics for the evaluative content of emotion. (shrink)

A work of Vietnamese art crossed a million-dollar mark in the international art market in early 2017. The event was reluctantly seen as a sign of maturity from the Vietnamese art amidst the many existing problems. Even though the Vietnamese media has discussed the issues enthusiastically, there is a lack of literature from the Vietnamese academics examining the subject, and even rarer in from the market perspective. This paper aims to contribute an insightful perspective on the Vietnamese art market, and (...) hesitantly the Vietnamese art as well, through the lens of fake, forgery and copy artworks. 35 cases of fake, forgery and copy paintings were found on the news and from the experts' wisdom. Through the examples, we argue that the Vietnamese art market is a temporary reaction to the immaturely rising of the Vietnamese art and the economy. Therefore, the art market is unable to function healthily unless the Vietnamese art and the economy developed. (shrink)

Initiated by Robert Wesson, _Evolution and Human Values_ is a collection of newly written essays designed to bring interdisciplinary insight to that area of thought where human evolution intersects with human values. The disciplines brought to bear on the subject are diverse - philosophy, psychiatry, behavioral science, biology, anthropology, psychology, biochemistry, and sociology. Yet, as organized by co-editor Patricia A. Williams, the volume falls coherently into three related sections. Entitled Evolutionary Ethics, the first section brings contemporary research to an area (...) first explored by Herbert Spencer. Evolutionary ethics looks to the theory of evolution by natural selection to find values for human living. The second section, Evolved Ethics, discusses the evolution of language and religion and their impact on moral thought and feeling. Evolved ethics was partly Charles Darwin's subject in _The Descent of Man._ The last section bears the title Scientific Ethics. A nascent field, scientific ethics asks about the evolution of human nature and the implications of that nature for ethical theory and social policy. Together, the essays collected here provide important contemporary insights into what it is - and what it may be - to be human. (shrink)

It is generally assumed that emotion concepts are purely descriptive. However, recent investigations suggest that the concept of happiness includes information about the morality of the agent's life. In this study, we argue that normative influences on emotion concepts are not restricted to happiness and are not about moral norms. In a series of studies, we show that emotion attribution is influenced by whether the agent's psychological and bodily states fit the situation in which they are experienced. People consider that (...) emotions are not just about feeling in certain ways, but also about feeling the right way. (shrink)

With a focus on Confucian descriptions, this book carefully examines feeling, value and virtue and reveals the order of the heart by a phenomenological clarification of our personal and interpersonal experience.

In certain startling neurological and psychiatric conditions, what is ordinarily most intimate and familiar to us—our own body—can feel alien. For instance, in cases of somatoparaphrenia subjects misattribute their body parts to others, while in cases of depersonalization subjects feel estranged from their bodies. These ownership disorders thus appear to consist in a loss of any feeling of bodily ownership, the felt sense we have of our bodies as our own. Against this interpretation of ownership disorders, I defend Sufficiency, (...) the thesis that every experience of bodily awareness suffices for a feeling of bodily ownership. Since Sufficiency conflicts with a face‐value interpretation of these ownership disorders, the burden is on me to explain away the apparent tension. To do so, I identify and correct what I believe to be the fundamental mistake in the extant literature on the feeling of bodily ownership, namely the tendency to treat the notion of a feeling of bodily ownership as a single psychological construct. Instead, I distinguish the feeling of minimal ownership, the first‐personal character of bodily awareness, from the feeling of affective ownership, the distinctive type of felt concern we have for our bodies. I motivate this distinction by raising the disownership puzzle, the fact that subjects suffering from ownership disorders display an ambiguous set of symptoms, arguing the distinction I draw between minimal and affective ownership is just what is required to resolve the puzzle. (shrink)

This essay is motivated by the contention that an incomplete picture of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy of feelings persists. While his standard account of feelings, as it is presented in his major works, has been extensively studied, there is another branch of his theory of feelings, which has received little attention. This other branch is Husserl’s rigorous and distinct investigations of the feeling of approval. Simply stated, the goal of this essay is to outline the evolution of this secondary branch (...) of Husserl’s philosophy of feelings from 1896 to 1911. I highlight how Husserl’s examinations of approval – as an intention that performs both an axiological and a seemingly cognitive function – lead him to extraordinary observations about the execution of feelings and the truth of judgments. (shrink)

In Vom Selbstgefühl (1910) (identical to Über die Typen des Selbstgefühls), Else Voigtländer undertakes an accurate analysis of a category of feelings named “feeling of self-worth” and its types. This entry presents Voigtländer's definition, characterization and taxonomy of the feeling of self-worth.