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  1. S. C. A. (1973). Interpretations of Life and Mind: Essays Around the Problem of Reduction. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):126-127.
  2. Alain Badiou (2000). One, Multiple, Multiplicity/Ies. Multitudes 1.
    The philosopher replies to reactions provoked by his book about Gilles Deleuze in 1997, that were published by Futur Antérieur.
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  3. William P. Bechtel (2001). The Compatibility of Complex Systems and Reduction: A Case Analysis of Memory Research. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 11 (4):483-502.
    Some theorists who emphasize the complexity of biological and cognitive systems and who advocate the employment of the tools of dynamical systems theory in explaining them construe complexity and reduction as exclusive alternatives. This paper argues that reduction, an approach to explanation that decomposes complex activities and localizes the components within the complex system, is not only compatible with an emphasis on complexity, but provides the foundation for dynamical analysis. Explanation via decomposition and localization is nonetheless extremely challenging, and an (...)
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  4. William P. Bechtel & Andrew Hamilton (2007). Reduction, Integration, and the Unity of Science: Natural, Behavioral, and Social Sciences and the Humanities. In T. Kuipers (ed.), Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues (Volume 1 of the Handbook of the Philosophy of Science). Elsevier
    1. A Historical Look at Unity 2. Field Guide to Modern Concepts of Reduction and Unity 3. Kitcher's Revisionist Account of Unification 4. Critics of Unity 5. Integration Instead of Unity 6. Reduction via Mechanisms 7. Case Studies in Reduction and Unification across the Disciplines.
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  5. Ansgar Beckermann (2001). Physicalism and New Wave Reductionism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:257-261.
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  6. Ansgar Beckermann (1997). Property Physicalism, Reduction, and Realization. In Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press 303--321.
    Ansgar Beckermann Once, a mind-body theory based upon the idea of supervenience seemed to be a promising alternative to the various kinds of reductionistic physicalism. In recent years, however, Jaegwon Kim has subjected his own brainchild to a very thorough criticism. With most of Kim’s arguments I agree wholeheartedly - not least because they converge with my own thoughts.2 In order to explain the few points of divergence with Kim’s views, I shall have to prepare the ground a little. In (...)
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  7. John Bickle, Concepts of Intertheoretic Reduction in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind.
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  8. John Bickle (1997). Psychoneural Reductionism: The New Wave. MIT Press.
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  9. John Bickle (1996). New Wave Psychophysical Reductionism and the Methodological Caveats. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):57-78.
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  10. Ned Block (2015). The Canberra Plan Neglects Ground. In Terence Horgan, Marcelo Sabates & David Sosa (eds.), Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim,. Cambridge University Press 105-133.
    This paper argues that the “Canberra Plan” picture of physicalistic reduction of mind--a picture shared by both its proponents and opponents, philosophers as diverse as David Armstrong, David Chalmers Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Joe Levine and David Lewis--neglects ground (Fine, 2001, 2012). To the extent that the point of view endorsed by the Canberra Plan has an account of the physical/functional ground of mind at all, it is in one version trivial and in another version implausible. In its most general (...)
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  11. Selmer Bringsjord (1994). Searle on the Brink. Psyche 1 (5).
    In his recent _The Rediscovery of the Mind_ John Searle tries to destroy cognitive science _and_ preserve a future in which a ``perfect science of the brain'' (1992, p. 235) arrives. I show that Searle can't accomplish both objectives. The ammunition he uses to realise the first stirs up a maelstrom of consciousness so wild it precludes securing the second.
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  12. D. H. M. Brooks (1994). How to Perform a Reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):803-14.
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  13. Martin Bunzl (1987). Reductionism and the Mental. American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (April):181-9.
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  14. A. S. C. (1973). Interpretations of Life and Mind. Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):126-127.
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  15. Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.) (1997). Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press.
  16. Robert L. Causey (1972). Attribute Identities in Microreductions. Journal of Philosophy 64 (August):407-22.
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  17. John B. Cobb Jr (1984). Overcoming Reductionism. In Charles Hartshorne, John B. Cobb & Franklin I. Gamwell (eds.), Existence and Actuality: Conversations with Charles Hartshorne. University of Chicago Press
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  18. Richard Combes (1988). Ockhamite Reductionism. International Philosophical Quarterly 28 (September):325-36.
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  19. Gregory Currie & Alan Musgrave (eds.) (1985). Popper and the Human Sciences. Distributors for the United States and Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    ... THIRD WORLD EPISTEMOLOGY L. Jonathan Cohen . Sir Karl Popper's striking hypothesis about a third world of objective knowledge deserves careful scrutiny ...
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  20. Berent Enc (1976). Identity Statements and Microreductions. Journal of Philosophy 73 (June):285-306.
    The view that scientific reduction succeeds by establishing property identities is challenged. it is argued that, instead of identity statements making reductions successful, the fact that a reduction is successful makes the identity statements possible. the argument proceeds first by showing that an explanatory asymmetry is generated by statements expressing property identities, second by locating the source of the asymmetry in a "generative relation" that obtains between the two properties. it is then argued that reduction succeeds only if the reducing (...)
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  21. Jeffrey E. Foss (1995). Materialism, Reduction, Replacement, and the Place of Consciousness in Science. Journal of Philosophy 92 (8):401-29.
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  22. Robert Francescotti (2002). Whether Mentality is "Higher-Level". Philosophical Inquiry 24 (3-4):65-76.
  23. Carl Gillett (2007). The Metaphysics of Mechanisms and the Challenge of the New Reductionism. In Maurice K. D. Schouten & H. L. De Joong (eds.), The Matter of Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Blackwell
    Over the last century, as Figure 1 graphically illustrates, scientific investigations have given us a detailed account of many natural phenomena, from molecules to manic depression, through so-called.
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  24. Carl Gillett (2007). Understanding the New Reductionism: The Metaphysics of Science and Compositional Reduction. Journal of Philosophy 104 (4):193-216.
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  25. Gordon G. Globus, Grover Maxwell & I. Savodnik (eds.) (1975). Consciousness and the Brain. Plenum Press.
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  26. Irwin Goldstein (2004). Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and a Posteriori Identities. In Maite Ezcurdia, Robert Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy. University of Calgary Press 261-273.
    Orthodox neural materialists think mental states are neural events or orthodox material properties of neutral events. Orthodox material properties are defining properties of the “physical”. A “defining property” of the physical is a type of property that provides a necessary condition for something’s being correctly termed “physical”. In this paper I give an argument against orthodox neural materialism. If successful, the argument would show at least some properties of some mental states are not orthodox material properties of neural events. Opposing (...)
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  27. Marjorie G. Grene (ed.) (1971). Interpretations Of Life And Mind: Essays Around The Problem Of Reduction. Humanities Press.
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  28. S. Guccione & A. Ruffilli (2007). Richet's Feeble Reductionism. Metalogicon 2:83-94.
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  29. James Hampton (1987). Multiple Review. Mind and Language 2 (3):264-269.
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  30. Alexander Hieke Hannes Leitgeb (ed.) (2008). Reduction and elimination in philosophy and the sciences : papers of the 31th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
  31. Margaret Harris (1987). Multiple Review. Mind and Language 2 (4):350-353.
    Language and Experience: Evidence from the Blind Child. By BARBARA LANDAU and LILA R. GLEITMAN.
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  32. Geoffrey Hellman (1999). Reduction(?) To What? Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):203-214.
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  33. Alexander Hieke & Hannes Leitgeb (eds.) (2009). Reduction - Abstraction - Analysis. Ontos.
    This volume collects contributions comprising all these topics, including articles by Alexander Bird, Jaakko Hintikka, James Ladyman, Rohit Parikh, Gerhard ...
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  34. Christopher S. Hill (1984). In Defense of Type Materialism. Synthese 59 (June):295-320.
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  35. C. A. Hooker (1979). Yoshida: Reductionism. Dialogue 18 (1):81.
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  36. Steven Horst, Beyond Reduction: What Can Philosophy of Mind Learn From Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science? The Order Project: Online Discussion Papers.
    Recent debates about the metaphysics of mind have tended to assume that inter-theoretic reductions are the norm in the natural sciences. With this assumption in place, the apparent explanatory gaps surrounding consciousness and intentionality seem unique, fascinating, and perhaps metaphysically significant. Over the past several decades, however, philosophers of science have largely rejected the notions that inter-theoretic reduction is either widespread in the natural sciences or a litmus for the legitimacy of the special sciences. If we adopt a post-reductionist philosophy (...)
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  37. Frank Jackson (2002). From Reduction to Type-Type Identity. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):644-647.
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  38. Catholijn M. Jonker, Jan Treur & Wouter C. A. Wijngaards (2002). Reductionist and Anti-Reductionist Perspectives on Dynamics. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):381 – 409.
    In this paper, reduction and its pragmatics are discussed in light of the development in computer science of languages to describe processes. The design of higher-level description languages within computer science has had the aim of allowing for description of the dynamics of processes in the (physical) world on a higher level avoiding all (physical) details of these processes. The higher description levels developed have dramatically increased the complexity of applications that came within reach. The pragmatic attitude of a (scientific) (...)
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  39. Geert Keil (2001). Rorty und der Eliminative Materialismus – eine Mesalliance? In Thomas Schäfer, Udo Tietz & Rüdiger Zill (eds.), Hinter den Spiegeln. Beiträge zur Philosophie Richard Rortys. Suhrkamp 56-72.
    Im Beitrag von Geert Keil geht es um das Verhältnis zwischen Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft. Der Beitrag geht der Frage nach, inwiefern Rortys frühes Eintreten für den Eliminativen Materialismus mit seinen entspannten Auffassungen zum Status der Wissenschaften vereinbar ist. Allgemein sieht Rorty die Wissenschaften als eine Reihe etablierter sozialer Praktiken an, als Werkzeuge, mit bestimmten Teilen der Welt zurechtzukommen. Dieses pragmatistisch-instrumentalistische Wissenschaftsverständnis steht in auffallendem Kontrast zu der Rolle, die den Naturwissenschaften im Rahmen des Eliminativen Materialismus zufallen soll. Dieser Lösungsvorschlag für (...)
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  40. Max Kistler (2005). Is Functional Reduction Logical Reduction? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (14):219-234.
    The functionalist conception of mental properties, together with their multiple realizability, is often taken to entail their irreducibility. It might seem that the only way to revise that judgement is to weaken the requirements traditionally imposed on reduction. However, Jaegwon Kim has recently argued that we should, on the contrary, strengthen those requirements, and construe reduction as what I propose to call “logical reduction”, a model of reduction inspired by emergentism. Moreover, Kim claims that what he calls “functional reduction” allows (...)
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  41. P. S. Kitcher (1980). How to Reduce a Functional Psychology. Philosophy of Science 47 (1):134-40.
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  42. Patricia Kitcher (1980). Discussion: How to Reduce a Functional Psychology? Philosophy of Science 47 (March):134-140.
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  43. T. Kuipers (ed.) (2007). Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues (Volume 1 of the Handbook of the Philosophy of Science). Elsevier.
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  44. David Lamb (1975). Reductionism. Radical Philosophy 10:22.
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  45. Christian List & Peter Menzies (2009). Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle. Journal of Philosophy 106 (9):475-502.
    It is often argued that higher-level special-science properties cannot be causally efficacious since the lower-level physical properties on which they supervene are doing all the causal work. This claim is usually derived from an exclusion principle stating that if a higher-level property F supervenes on a physical property F* that is causally sufficient for a property G, then F cannot cause G. We employ an account of causation as difference-making to show that the truth or falsity of this principle is (...)
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  46. Michael Lockwood (1993). The Grain Problem. In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press 271-291.
  47. David Ludwig (2015). A Pluralist Theory of the Mind. Springer.
    This book challenges common debates in philosophy of mind by questioning the framework of placement problems in contemporary metaphysics. The author argues that placement problems arise when exactly one fundamental ontology serves as the base for all entities, and will propose a pluralist alternative that takes the diversity of our conceptual resources and ontologies seriously. This general pluralist account is applied to issues in philosophy of mind to argue that contemporary debates about the mind-body problem are built on this problematic (...)
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  48. David Ludwig (2011). Beyond Physicalism and Dualism? Putnam’s Pragmatic Pluralism and the Philosophy of Mind. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 3 (1):245-257.
    Although Hilary Putnam has played a significant role in shaping contemporary philosophy of mind, he has more recently criticised its metaphysical foundations as fun-damentally flawed. According to Putnam, the standard positions in the philosophy of mind rest on dubious ontological assumptions which are challenged by his “pragmatic pluralism” and the idea that we can always describe reality in different but equally fun-damental ways. Putnam considers this pluralism about conceptual resources as an alterna-tive to both physicalism and dualism. Contrary to physicalism, (...)
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  49. Andrew Lugg (1975). Putnam on Reductionism. Cognition 3 (3):289-293.
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  50. Jack C. Lyons (2006). In Defense of Epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):76-794.
    Recent worries about possible epiphenomenalist consequences of nonreductive materialism are misplaced, not, as many have argued, because nonreductive materialism does not have epiphenomenalist implications but because the epiphenomenalist implications are actually virtues of the theory, rather than vices. It is only by showing how certain kinds of mental properties are causally impotent that cognitive scientific explanations of mentality as we know them are possible.
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