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  1. William P. Bechtel (2001). The Compatibility of Complex Systems and Reduction: A Case Analysis of Memory Research. [REVIEW] Minds And Machines 11 (4):483-502.
    Some theorists who emphasize the complexity of biological and cognitive systems and who advocate the employment of the tools of dynamical systems theory in explaining them construe complexity and reduction as exclusive alternatives. This paper argues that reduction, an approach to explanation that decomposes complex activities and localizes the components within the complex system, is not only compatible with an emphasis on complexity, but provides the foundation for dynamical analysis. Explanation via decomposition and localization is nonetheless extremely challenging, and an (...)
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  2. William P. Bechtel & Andrew Hamilton (2007). Reduction, Integration, and the Unity of Science: Natural, Behavioral, and Social Sciences and the Humanities. In T. Kuipers (ed.), Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues (Volume 1 of the Handbook of the Philosophy of Science). Elsevier.
    1. A Historical Look at Unity 2. Field Guide to Modern Concepts of Reduction and Unity 3. Kitcher's Revisionist Account of Unification 4. Critics of Unity 5. Integration Instead of Unity 6. Reduction via Mechanisms 7. Case Studies in Reduction and Unification across the Disciplines.
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  3. Ansgar Beckermann (2001). Physicalism and New Wave Reductionism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:257-261.
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  4. Ansgar Beckermann (1997). Property Physicalism, Reduction, and Realization. In Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press. 303--321.
    Ansgar Beckermann Once, a mind-body theory based upon the idea of supervenience seemed to be a promising alternative to the various kinds of reductionistic physicalism. In recent years, however, Jaegwon Kim has subjected his own brainchild to a very thorough criticism. With most of Kim’s arguments I agree wholeheartedly - not least because they converge with my own thoughts.2 In order to explain the few points of divergence with Kim’s views, I shall have to prepare the ground a little. In (...)
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  5. John Bickle, Concepts of Intertheoretic Reduction in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind.
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  6. John Bickle (1997). Psychoneural Reductionism: The New Wave. MIT Press.
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  7. John Bickle (1996). New Wave Psychophysical Reductionism and the Methodological Caveats. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):57-78.
  8. Ned Block (forthcoming). The Canberra Plan Neglects Ground. In Terence Horgan, Marcelo Sabates & David Sosa (eds.), Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim,. Cambridge University Press.
    This paper argues that the “Canberra Plan” picture of physicalistic reduction of mind--a picture shared by both its proponents and opponents, philosophers as diverse as David Armstrong, David Chalmers Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Joe Levine and David Lewis--neglects ground (Fine, 2001, 2012). To the extent that the point of view endorsed by the Canberra Plan has an account of the physical/functional ground of mind at all, it is in one version trivial and in another version implausible. In its most general (...)
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  9. Selmer Bringsjord (1994). Searle on the Brink. Psyche 1 (5).
    In his recent _The Rediscovery of the Mind_ John Searle tries to destroy cognitive science _and_ preserve a future in which a ``perfect science of the brain'' (1992, p. 235) arrives. I show that Searle can't accomplish both objectives. The ammunition he uses to realise the first stirs up a maelstrom of consciousness so wild it precludes securing the second.
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  10. D. H. M. Brooks (1994). How to Perform a Reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):803-14.
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  11. Martin Bunzl (1987). Reductionism and the Mental. American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (April):181-9.
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  12. Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.) (1997). Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press.
  13. Robert L. Causey (1972). Attribute Identities in Microreductions. Journal of Philosophy 64 (August):407-22.
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  14. Richard Combes (1988). Ockhamite Reductionism. International Philosophical Quarterly 28 (September):325-36.
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  15. Gregory Currie & Alan Musgrave (eds.) (1985). Popper and the Human Sciences. Distributors for the United States and Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    ... THIRD WORLD EPISTEMOLOGY L. Jonathan Cohen . Sir Karl Popper's striking hypothesis about a third world of objective knowledge deserves careful scrutiny ...
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  16. Simon Cushing (2013). Autism: The Very Idea. In Jami L. Anderson & Simon Cushing (eds.), The Philosophy of Autism. Rowman & Littlefield. 17-45.
    If each of the subtypes of autism is defined simply as constituted by a set of symptoms, then the criteria for its observation are straightforward, although, of course, some of those symptoms themselves might be hard to observe definitively. Compare with telling whether or not someone is bleeding: while it might be hard to tell if someone is bleeding internally, we know what it takes to find out, and when we have the right access and instruments we can settle the (...)
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  17. Berent Enc (1976). Identity Statements and Microreductions. Journal of Philosophy 73 (June):285-306.
    The view that scientific reduction succeeds by establishing property identities is challenged. it is argued that, instead of identity statements making reductions successful, the fact that a reduction is successful makes the identity statements possible. the argument proceeds first by showing that an explanatory asymmetry is generated by statements expressing property identities, second by locating the source of the asymmetry in a "generative relation" that obtains between the two properties. it is then argued that reduction succeeds only if the reducing (...)
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  18. Jeffrey E. Foss (1995). Materialism, Reduction, Replacement, and the Place of Consciousness in Science. Journal of Philosophy 92 (8):401-29.
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  19. Robert Francescotti (2002). Whether Mentality is Higher-Level. Philosophical Inquiry 24 (3-4):65-76.
  20. Carl Gillett (2007). The Metaphysics of Mechanisms and the Challenge of the New Reductionism. In Maurice K. D. Schouten & H. L. De Joong (eds.), The Matter of Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Blackwell.
    Over the last century, as Figure 1 graphically illustrates, scientific investigations have given us a detailed account of many natural phenomena, from molecules to manic depression, through so-called.
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  21. Carl Gillett (2007). Understanding the New Reductionism: The Metaphysics of Science and Compositional Reduction. Journal of Philosophy 104 (4):193-216.
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  22. Gordon G. Globus, Grover Maxwell & I. Savodnik (eds.) (1975). Consciousness and the Brain. Plenum Press.
  23. Irwin Goldstein (2004). Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and a Posteriori Identities. In Maite Ezcurdia, Robert Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), New Essays in the Philosophy of Language and Mind. University of Calgary Press. 261-273.
    Orthodox neural materialists think mental states are neural events or orthodox material properties of neutral events. Orthodox material properties are defining properties of the “physical”. A “defining property” of the physical is a type of property that provides a necessary condition for something’s being correctly termed “physical”. In this paper I give an argument against orthodox neural materialism. If successful, the argument would show at least some properties of some mental states are not orthodox material properties of neural events. Opposing (...)
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  24. Marjorie G. Grene (ed.) (1971). Interpretations Of Life And Mind: Essays Around The Problem Of Reduction. Humanities Press.
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  25. Alexander Hieke Hannes Leitgeb (ed.) (2008). Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences : Papers of the 31th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
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  26. Geoffrey Hellman (1999). Reduction(?) To What? Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):203-214.
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  27. A. Hieke & H. Leitgeb (eds.) (2009). Reduction - Abstraction - Analysis. Ontos.
    This volume collects contributions comprising all these topics, including articles by Alexander Bird, Jaakko Hintikka, James Ladyman, Rohit Parikh, Gerhard ...
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  28. Christopher S. Hill (1984). In Defense of Type Materialism. Synthese 59 (June):295-320.
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  29. Frank Jackson (2002). From Reduction to Type-Type Identity. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):644-647.
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  30. Max Kistler (2005). Is Functional Reduction Logical Reduction? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (14):219-234.
    The functionalist conception of mental properties, together with their multiple realizability, is often taken to entail their irreducibility. It might seem that the only way to revise that judgement is to weaken the requirements traditionally imposed on reduction. However, Jaegwon Kim has recently argued that we should, on the contrary, strengthen those requirements, and construe reduction as what I propose to call “logical reduction”, a model of reduction inspired by emergentism. Moreover, Kim claims that what he calls “functional reduction” allows (...)
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  31. P. S. Kitcher (1980). How to Reduce a Functional Psychology. Philosophy of Science 47 (1):134-40.
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  32. Patricia Kitcher (1980). Discussion: How to Reduce a Functional Psychology? Philosophy of Science 47 (March):134-140.
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  33. T. Kuipers (ed.) (2007). Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues (Volume 1 of the Handbook of the Philosophy of Science). Elsevier.
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  34. Christian List & Peter Menzies (2009). Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle. Journal of Philosophy 106 (9):475-502.
    It is often argued that higher-level special-science properties cannot be causally efficacious since the lower-level physical properties on which they supervene are doing all the causal work. This claim is usually derived from an exclusion principle stating that if a higher-level property F supervenes on a physical property F* that is causally sufficient for a property G, then F cannot cause G. We employ an account of causation as difference-making to show that the truth or falsity of this principle is (...)
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  35. David Ludwig (2011). Beyond Physicalism and Dualism? Putnam’s Pragmatic Pluralism and the Philosophy of Mind. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 3 (1).
  36. Andrew Lugg (1975). Putnam on Reductionism. Cognition 3 (3):289-293.
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  37. Jack C. Lyons (2006). In Defense of Epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):76-794.
    Recent worries about possible epiphenomenalist consequences of nonreductive materialism are misplaced, not, as many have argued, because nonreductive materialism does not have epiphenomenalist implications but because the epiphenomenalist implications are actually virtues of the theory, rather than vices. It is only by showing how certain kinds of mental properties are causally impotent that cognitive scientific explanations of mentality as we know them are possible.
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  38. Holger Lyre (2009). The “Multirealization” of Multiple Realizability. In A. Hieke & H. Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction - Abstraction - Analysis. Ontos. 79.
    Multiple Realizability (MR) must still be regarded as one of the principal arguments against type reductionist accounts of higher-order properties and their special laws. Against this I argue that there is no unique MR but rather a multitude of MR categories. In a slogan: MR is itself “multi-realized”. If this is true then we cannot expect one unique reductionist strategy against MR as an anti-reductionist argument. The main task is rather to develop a taxonomy of the wide variety of MR (...)
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  39. Christopher Maloney (2001). Reservations About New Wave Reduction. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:263-277.
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  40. Ausonio Marras (2002). Kim on Reduction. Erkenntnis 57 (2):231-57.
    In Mind in a Physical World (1998), Jaegwon Kim has recently extended his ongoing critique of `non-reductive materialist' positions in philosophy of mind by arguing that Nagel's model of reduction is the wrong paradigm in terms of which to contest the issue of psychophysical reduction, and that an altogether different model of scientific reduction – a functional model of reduction – is needed. In this paper I argue, first, that Kim's conception of the Nagelian model is substantially impoverished and potentially (...)
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  41. Patrick McGivern (2008). Reductive Levels and Multi-Scale Structure. Synthese 165 (1):53 - 75.
    I discuss arguments about the relationship between different “levels” of explanation in the light of examples involving multi-scale analysis. I focus on arguments about causal competition between properties at different levels, such as Jaegwon Kim’s “supervenience argument.” A central feature of Kim’s argument is that higher-level properties can in general be identified with “micro-based” properties. I argue that explanations from multi-scale analysis give examples of explanations that are problematic for accounts such as Kim’s. I argue that these difficulties suggest that (...)
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  42. Andrew Melnyk (2006). Functionalism and Psychological Reductionism: Friends, Not Foes. In Maurice Schouten & Huib Looren de Jong (eds.), The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction.
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  43. Ruth G. Millikan (1999). Historical Kinds and the "Special Sciences". Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):45-65.
    There are no "special sciences" in Fodor's sense. There is a large group of sciences, "historical sciences," that differ fundamentally from the physical sciences because they quantify over a different kind of natural or real kind, nor are the generalizations supported by these kinds exceptionless. Heterogeneity, however, is not characteristic of these kinds. That there could be an univocal empirical science that ranged over multiple realizations of a functional property is quite problematic. If psychological predicates name multiply realized functionalist properties, (...)
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  44. Laurence F. Mucciolo (1974). Scientific Reduction and the Mind-Body Problem. Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Suppl.) 185:185-204.
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  45. Thomas Nickles (1973). Two Concepts of Intertheoretic Reduction. Journal of Philosophy 70 (April):181-201.
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  46. David Papineau (1985). Social Facts and Psychological Facts. In Gregory Currie & A. Musgrave (eds.), Popper and the Human Sciences. Martinus Nijhoff. 43-52.
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  47. Arthur R. Peacocke (1976). Reductionism: A Review of the Epistemological Issues and Their Relevance to Biology and the Problem of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Zygon 11 (December):307-334.
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  48. Isabelle Peschard & Michel Bitbol (2008). Heat, Temperature and Phenomenal Concepts. In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. MIT Press. 155.
    The reduction of the concept of heat to that of molecular kinetic energy is recurrently presented as lending analogical support to the project of reduction of phenomenal concepts to physical concepts. The claimed analogy draws on the way the use of the concept of heat is attached to the experience in first person of a certain sensation. The reduction of this concept seems to prove the possibility to reduce discourse involving phenomenal concepts to a scientific description of neural activity. But (...)
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  49. Thomas Polger (2004). Natural Minds. MIT Press.
    In Natural Minds Thomas Polger advocates, and defends, the philosophical theory that mind equals brain—that sensations are brain processes—and in doing so brings the mind-brain identity theory back into the philosophical debate about consciousness. The version of identity theory that Polger advocates holds that conscious processes, events, states, or properties are type- identical to biological processes, events, states, or properties— a "tough-minded" account that maintains that minds are necessarily indentical to brains, a position held by few current identity theorists. Polger's (...)
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  50. John F. Post, Breakwater: The New Wave, Supervenience and Individualism.
    New-wave psychoneural reduction, a la Bickle and Churchland, conflicts with the way certain adaptation properties are individuated according to evolutionary biology. Such properties cannot be reduced to physical properties of the token items that have the adaptation properties. The New Wave may entail a form of individualism inconsistent with evolutionary biology. All of this causes serious trouble as well for Jaegwon Kim's thesis of the Causal Individuation of Kinds, his Weak Supervenience thesis, Alexander's Dictum, his synchronicity thesis that all psychological (...)
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