Many authors writing about global justice seem to take national responsibility more or less for granted. Most of them, however, offer very little argument for their position. One of the few exceptions is David Miller. He offers two models of collective responsibility: the like-minded group model and the cooperative practice model. While some authors have criticized whether these two models are applicable to nations, as Miller intends, my criticism is more radical: I argue that these (...) two models fail as accounts of collective responsibility as such. This result should not surprise us (liberals): there simply is no such thing as collective responsibility (in a strict sense), there is only individual responsibility. Thus individuals are not automatically responsible for the actions of their groups, nations or states, not even if they do not actively dissociate themselves from those actions. (shrink)

We would like to open some questions here about the institutional and cultural conditions of anything that might be called cultural studies or multiculturalism. By introducing cultural studies and multiculturalism many intellectuals aim at a more democratic culture. We share this aim. In this essay, however, we would like to argue that the projects of cultural studies and multiculturalism require: a more international model of cultural studies than the dominant Anglo-American versions; renewed attention to the institutional environments (...) of cultural studies; and a questioning of the relations between multiculturalism and identity politics. We seek less to “fix” these problems than to provide a critical analysis of the languages, the methods of criticism, and the assumptions about identity, culture, and politics that present the problems to us. Because the thickets entangling what our group calls cultural studies are so deeply rooted in Western academia, which to a large degree constitutes our own group, the counterexample of cultural criticism in other contexts can be more than usually instructive. We begin by considering the position of cultural studies in China, since our group includes a number of Chinese intellectuals, on whose experience the following section is largely based. The Chicago Cultural Studies Group began meeting in June 1990. It includes Lauren Berlant, David Bunn, Vinay Dharwadker, Norma Field, Dilip Gaonkar, Marilyn Ivy, Benjamin Lee, Leo Ou-fan Lee, Xinmin Liu, Mathew Roberts, Sharon Stephens, Katie Trumpener, Greg Urban, Michael Warner, Jianyang Zha, and Jueliang Zhou. (shrink)

Since Darwin, the idea of psychological continuity between humans and other animals has dominated theory and research in investigating the minds of other species. Indeed, the field of comparative psychology was founded on two assumptions. First, it was assumed that introspection could provide humans with reliable knowledge about the causal connection between specific mental states and specific behaviors. Second, it was assumed that in those cases in which other species exhibited behaviors similar to our own, similar psychological causes were at (...) work. In this paper. we show how this argument by analogy is flowed with respect to the case of second-order mental states. As a test case, we focus on the question of how other species conceive of visual attention, and in particular whether chimpanzees interpret seeing as a mentalistic event involving internal states of perception, attention, and belief. We conclude that chimpanzees do not reason about seeing in this manner, and indeed, there is considerable reason to suppose that they do not harbor representations of mental states in general. We propose a reinterpretation model in which the majority of the rich social behaviors that humans and other primates share in common emerged long before the human lineage evolved the psychological means of interpreting those behaviors in mentalistic terms. Although humans, chimpanzees, and most other species may be said to possess mental states, humans alone may have evolved a cognitive specialization for reasoning about such states. (shrink)

What exactly do we do when we try to make sense of other people e.g. by ascribing mental states like beliefs and desires to them? After a short criticism of Theory-Theory, Interaction Theory and the Narrative Theory of understanding others as well as an extended criticism of the Simulation Theory in Goldman's recent version (2006), we suggest an alternative approach: the Person Model Theory . Person models are the basis for our ability to register and evaluate persons having (...) mental as well as physical properties. We argue that there are two kinds of person models, nonconceptual person schemata and conceptual person images , and both types of models can be developed for individuals as well as for groups. (shrink)

This paper argues that the two models of collective responsibility David Miller presents in National Responsibility and Global Justice do not apply to nations. I first consider the 'like-minded group' model, paying attention to three scenarios in which Miller employs it. I argue that the feasibility of the model decreases as we expand outwards from the smallest group to the largest, since it increasingly fails to capture all members of the group adequately, and (...) the locus of any like-mindedness becomes too abstract and vague to have the causal force the model requires. I thereafter focus on the 'cooperative practice' model, examining various ways in which the analogy Miller draws between an employee-led business and a nation breaks down. In concluding I address the concern that my arguments have worrying consequences and suggest that, on the contrary, the rejection of the idea of national responsibility is a positive move. (shrink)

Will we, by 2050, be able to feed a rapidly growing population with healthy and sustainably grown food in a world threatened by systemic environmental crises? There are too many uncertainties for us to predict the long-term evolution of the global agri-food system, but we can explore a wide range of futures to inform policymaking and public debate on the future of food. This is typically done by creating scenarios and quantifying them with computer simulation models to get numerical estimates (...) of how different aspects of the global agri-food system might evolve under different hypotheses. Among the many scenarios produced over the last twenty years, one would expect to see the future advocated by the food sovereignty movement, which claims to represent roughly two hundred million self-described “peasants” worldwide. This movement defends a vision of the future based on relocalized, sustainable, and just agri-food systems, self-governed through direct and participatory democratic processes. Yet, food sovereignty is conspicuously absent from quantified scenarios of global food futures. As part of the roundtable, “Ethics and the Future of the Global Food System,” this essay identifies seven obstacles that undermine the creation of food sovereignty scenarios by examining two attempts at crafting such scenarios. (shrink)

How should we deal with mental disorder - as an "illness" like diabetes or bronchitis, as a "problem in living", or what? This book seeks to answer such questions by going to their roots, in philosophical questions about the nature of the human mind, the ways in which it can be understood, and about the nature and aims of scientific medicine. The controversy over the nature of mental disorder and the appropriateness of the "medical model" is not just (...) an abstract theoretical debate: it has a bearing on very practical issues of appropriate treatment, as well as on psychiatric ethics and law. A major contention of this book is that these questions are ultimately philosophical in character: they can be resolved only if we abandon some widespread philosophical assumptions about the "mind" and the "body", and about what it means for medicine to be "scientific". The "phenomenological" approach of the twentieth-century French philosopher, Maurice Merleau-Ponty is used to question these assumptions. His conception of human beings as "body-subjects" is argued to provide a more illuminating way of thinking about mental disorder and the ways in which it can be understood and treated. The conditions we conventionally call "mental disorders" are, it is argued, not a homogeneous group: the standard interpretation of the medical model fits some more readily than others. The core mental disorders, however, are best regarded as disturbed ways of being in the world, which cause unhappiness because of deviation from "human" rather than straightforwardly "biological" norms. That is, they are problems in how we experience the world and especially other people, rather than in physiological functioning - even though the nature of our experience cannot ultimately be separated from the ways in which our bodies function. This analysis is applied within the book both to issues in clinical treatment and to the special ethical and legal questions of psychiatry. Written by a well known philosopher in an accessible and clear style, this book should be of interest to a wide range of readers, from psychiatrists to social workers, lawyers, ethicists, philosophers and anyone with an interest in mental health. (shrink)

A conceptual model of a partnership in ‘like-minded thinking’ consists of the following components: a relationship, a shared goal with mutual agreement to work toward that goal, and reciprocal encouragement between two people. A like-minded alliance is a relationship that offers support while at the same time encourages hope and establishes a reciprocating emotional attitude of hopefulness.The discussion focuses on the principles of such a model that is designed primarily as a lay intervention for (...) anyone who has a close friend with cancer and who wants to assist the friend in maintaining a hopeful attitude in the face of illness. While this model is not directed at healthcare professionals it may be transferable into psychosocial interventions to assist persons toward sustaining hopefulness in the context of the cancer trajectory. Much has been written in the literature about how hopelessness spawns despair for individuals who have cancer and in those near the end of life; it may even create a desire for hastened death (Breitbart W., Heller K.S.: 2003, ‘Reframing Hope: Meaning-Centered Care for Patients Near the End of Life; Journal of Palliative Medicine 6, 979–988; Jones J.M., Huggins M.A., Rydall A.C., Rodin G.M.: 2003, ‘Symptomatic distress, hopelessness, and the desire for hastened death in hospitalized cancer patients’ Journal of Psychosomatic Research 55, 411–418).Therefore, the aim of this paper is to explore how like-minded thinking for a person with cancer and his or her support person provides a framework for a personal shared worldview that is hope-based, meaningful and coherent. (shrink)

This edited volume examines aspects of the mind/consciousness that are relevant to the interpretations of quantum mechanics. In it, an international group of contributors focus on the possible connections between quantum mechanics and consciousness. They look at how consciousness can help us with quantum mechanics as well as how quantum mechanics can contribute to our understanding of consciousness. For example, what do different interpretations aimed at solving the measurement problem in quantum mechanics tell us about the nature of consciousness, (...) such as von Neumann's interpretation? Each interpretation has, associated to it, a corresponding metaphysical framework that helps us think about possible “models” of consciousness. Alternatively, what does the nature of consciousness tell us about the role of the observer and time reversibility in the measurement process? The book features 20 papers on contemporary approaches to quanta and mind. It brings together the work of scholars from different disciplines with diverse views on the connections between quanta and mind, ranging from those who are supportive of a link between consciousness and quantum physics to those who are very skeptical of such link. Coverage includes such topics as free will in a quantum world, contextuality and causality, mind and matter interaction, quantum panpsychism, the quantum and quantum-like brain, and the role of time in brain-mind dynamics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Like an Elephant Pricked by a Thorn:Buddhist Meditation Instructions as a Door to Deep ListeningWilla B. MillerThe phrase “deep listening” has been circulating in recent years in the contexts of contemplative education, psychotherapy, pastoral care, and the arts. This article is a reflection on deep listening from a Buddhist perspective, as it might support the ongoing development of career educators, although this reflection might apply equally well to (...) ministers and (in the Buddhist world) dharma teachers. My motivation to contribute to this discourse of listening is spurred by the belief that the effectiveness of educators, ministers, and dharma teachers might be enhanced by training in the art of listening. These career professionals share a key aspect of their role in common: They get up in front of groups of people to teach or preach. In this performative role, it is possible for teachers (or preachers) to become so accustomed to being the source of information that a dynamic is created, inside and outside the classroom or pulpit, in which discourse is weighted primarily in one direction. This dynamic, I would argue, prevents optimal learning and stunts the feedback loop necessary for pedagogical health, both for students and for their educators.Listening, as a valued pedagogical discipline on the part of the teacher, has the potential to rebalance this dynamic. To educate effectively, we need to come to know the hearts and minds of those we educating, not as a theoretical group but as individuals. It takes time, effort, patience, and a dose of curiosity to listen attentively to students, to get to know them. But this effort is worth it. Only once we begin to listen to the voice of their interests, passions, and history can we begin to understand or assess their needs. Every human being is in formation. Every human being is completely unique. Listening, with curiosity and attention, is a window into the formation of the human being in his or her uniqueness. To the degree that we become familiar with the unique in our students is the degree to which we can effectively meet them where they are.There are as many definitions of deep listening as there are theorists. On a panel on the topic of deep listening at the 2013 American Academy of Religions meeting, Duane Bidwell of the Claremont School of Theology aptly noted that deep listening is [End Page 15] “an undertheorized category.” It is not a term that has been claimed by only one field or person, but it has become popular in some religious circles and psychotherapeutic circles as a term that implies that listening can dive below the surface contents of a narrative. Two years ago, in a chapter of an anthology titled The Arts of Contemplative Care, I proposed that Buddhist practices of self-cultivation may provide models that can be adapted for applications of deep listening in a context of spiritual care.1 In that chapter, I noted that Patrul Rinpoche’s three points of “how not to listen” found in The Words of My Perfect Teacher (Kun bzang bla med zhal lung)2 can help us reflect on the difference between poor and effective listening techniques in the context of spiritual care. In this article, taking a similar approach but with different material, I will explore how instructions on meditation culled from the Tibetan Buddhist tradition can be adapted to develop a discipline of deep listening for educators. In exploring this topic, I will also propose a definition of deep listening to act as support for the discipline itself. Specifically, I draw on religious instructions found in a Tibetan genre called “māhamudrā meditation instructions” (phyag chen sgom khrid), from within the Kagyu (‘brug pa bka’ brgyud) school of Tibetan Buddhism, to construct a definition of deep listening for use in educational contexts.The term “deep” (zab mo) often appears in Tibetan religious exegesis as an adjective modifying the word “dharma” (teaching). There, we find the term “deep teaching” (chos zab mo) juxtaposed with the term “vast teaching” (chos rgya che ba) in Tibetan commentaries. To say that a teaching is deep (zab mo) in the Buddhist context is to indicate that it... (shrink)

In his recent book, National responsibility and global justice, David Miller conceptualizes and justifies a model of national responsibility. His conceptualization proceeds in two steps: he starts by developing two models of collective responsibility, the like?minded group model and the cooperative practice model. He then proceeds to discuss national responsibility, a species of collective responsibility, and argues that nations have features such that the two models of collective responsibility also apply to them. In this (...) article I focus on the question whether Miller?s like?minded group model and the cooperative practice model are plausible and convincing models of collective responsibility. I will argue that the like?minded model does not provide a plausible conceptualization of collective responsibility, while the collective practice model provides a good model for collective responsibility but is not particularly helpful in conceptualizing national responsibility. (shrink)

In National Responsibility and Global Justice, David Miller defends the view that a member of a nation can be collectively responsible for an outcome despite the fact that: (i) she did not control it; (ii) she actively opposed those of her nation’s policies that produced the outcome; and (iii) actively opposing the relevant policy was costly for her. I argue that Miller’s arguments in favor of this strong externalist view about responsibility and control are insufficient. Specifically, I show that Miller’s (...) two models of synchronic collective responsibility*the like-minded group model and the cooperative practice model*ground neither synchronic nor diachronic national responsibility, nor apply in the case of nations generally speaking. Keywords: collective responsibility; David Miller; nations; historical responsibility; national responsibility (Published: 19 May 2009) Citation: Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2009, pp. 109-130. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v2i2.1935. (shrink)

The claim is frequently made that structured collections of individuals who are themselves subjects of mental and cognitive states – such collections as courts, countries, and corporations – can be, and often are, subjects of mental or cognitive states. And, to be clear, advocates for this so-called group-minds hypothesis intend their view to be interpreted literally, not metaphorically. The existing critical literature casts substantial doubt on this view, at least on the assumption that groups are claimed to instantiate the (...) same species of mental and cognitive properties as individual humans. In this essay, I evaluate a defensive move made by some proponents of the group-oriented view: to concede that group states and individual states aren’t of the same specific natural kinds, while holding that groups instantiate different species of mental or cognitive states – perhaps a different species of cognition itself – from those instantiated by humans. In order to evaluate this defense of group cognition, I develop a view of natural kinds – or at least of the sort of evidence that supports inferences to the sameness of natural kind – a view I have previous dubbed the ‘tweak-and-extend’ theory. Guided by the tweak-and-extend approach, I arrive at a tentative conclusion: that what is common to models of individual cognitive processing and models of group processing does not suffice to establish sameness of cognitive (or mental) kinds, properties, or state-types, not even at a generic or overarching level. (shrink)

The current orthodoxy in the philosophy of mind can be thought of as a kind of third-person imperialism, viz. the view that consciousness, like other natural phenomena, will yield to scientific explanation at some level of analysis. Among its dissenters are a group of antireductionists and antimaterialists who advocate a kind of first-person isolationism, viz. the view that consciousness, unlike other natural phenomena, will fail to yield to scientific explanation at any level of analysis. In its various forms, (...) the latter view is based on arguments that identify first-person phenomena, such as subjectivity and qualia, that no third-person approach to consciousness can explain. ;I argue that neither subjectivity nor qualia constitute insuperable obstacles for scientific explanations of consciousness. By identifying a set of persistent ambiguities within the subjectivity-based arguments of antiphysicalists, I provide a general framework for systematically locating fallacies within them. I then examine the common antiphysicalist assumption that the meanings of phenomenal concepts are fully determined by the conscious mental states to which they refer. By showing how it results in a commitment to the existence of essentially private language, I contend that this assumption is indefensible, and that antiphysicalist arguments that rely on it are therefore unsound. ;I then argue that qualia are intrinsic, basic, and subjective properties of conscious mental states, and that, contrary to antireductionists' suggestions, this higher-order classification is compatible with qualia reduction. I show this compatibility by examining the putative higher-order properties of qualia and comparing them to the higher-order properties characteristic of connectionist models of cognitive processes. I contend that the higher-order properties characteristic of connectionist networks approximate the putative higher-order properties of qualia sufficiently well to conclude that qualia reductionism can accommodate claims that qualia are intrinsic, basic, and subjective properties, and explain the motivating intuitions for those claims generated by inverted, absent, and alien qualia thought experiments. In this way I argue that the putative higher-order classifications of qualia not only fail to defeat qualia reduction but, ironically, turn out to support it. (shrink)

Minds are said to be systematic: the capacity to entertain certain thoughts confers to other related thoughts. Although an important property of human cognition, its implication for cognitive architecture has been less than clear. In part, the uncertainty is due to lack of precise accounts on the degree to which cognition is systematic. However, a recent study on learning transfer provides one clear example. This study is used here to compare transfer in humans and feedforward networks. Simulations and analysis show, (...) that while feedforward networks with shared weights are capable of exhibiting transfer, they cannot support the same degree of transfer as humans. One interpretation of these results is that common connectionist models lack explicit internal representations permitting rapid learning. (shrink)

This essay advances an original theory of mind-group and personal identity and at the same time critically examines related concepts in the work of Peter Strawson and Harry Frankfurt. A mind group is here defined as a kind of social group that is built up by way of the practical beliefs, desires, and preferences of those who make up the group. Part One of the paper introduces a summative model of mind-group identity. It explicates (...) social life as a net of beliefs and desires, the points of intersection of which are persons who share these beliefs and desires. The second Part propounds an account of “person” that strikes a balance between situationists, who hold that persons change their behavior in every new circumstance, and the champions of “character” in virtue ethics. In the interest of achieving this compromise position between these competing orientations, we consider persons as quasi-geometric figures that at once persist in the current of time yet concomitantly change under differing circumstances. Our practical preferences are what determine the frame that facilitates analysis of the person as a quasi-geometric figure. The paper concludes by showing, in Part Three, how the conception of person introduced here resolves diffi-culties of the summative model. (shrink)

What is the mind? How does it work? How does it influence behavior? Some psychologists hope to answer such questions in terms of concepts drawn from computer science and artificial intelligence. They test their theories by modeling mental processes in computers. This book shows how computer models are used to study many psychological phenomena--including vision, language, reasoning, and learning. It also shows that computer modeling involves differing theoretical approaches. Computational psychologists disagree about some basic questions. For instance, should the mind (...) be modeled by digital computers, or by parallel-processing systems more like brains? Do computer programs consist of meaningless patterns, or do they embody (and explain) genuine meaning? (shrink)

In artificial intelligence literature, “delusions” are characterized as the generation of unfaithful output from reliable source content. There is an extensive literature on computer-generated delusions, ranging from visual hallucinations, like the production of nonsensical images in Computer Vision, to nonsensical text generated by (natural) language models, but this literature is predominantly taxonomic. In a recent research paper, however, a group of scientists from DeepMind successfully presented a formal treatment of an entire class of delusions in generative AI models (...) (i.e., models based on a transformer architecture, both with and without RLHF—reinforcement learning with human feedback, such as BERT, GPT-3 or the more recent GPT-3.5), referred to as auto-suggestive delusions. Auto-suggestive delusions are not mere unfaithful output, but are self-induced by the transformer models themselves. Typically, these delusions have been subsumed under the concept of exposure bias, but exposure bias alone does not elucidate their nature. In order to address their nature, I will introduce a formal framework that clarifies the probabilistic delusions capable of explaining exposure bias in a broad manner. This will serve as the foundation for exploring auto-suggestive delusions in language models. Next, an examination of self- or auto-suggestive delusions will be undertaken, by drawing an analogy with the rule-following problematic from the philosophy of mind and language. Finally, I will argue that this comprehensive approach leads to the suggestion that transformers, large language models in particular, may develop in a manner that touches upon solipsism and the emergence of a private language, in a weak sense. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that intentional psychology (i.e. the interpretation of human behaviour in terms of intentional states and propositional attitudes) plays an essential role in the sciences of the mind. However, this role is not one of identifying scientifically respectable states of the world. Rather, I argue that intentional psychology acts as a type of phenomenological model, as opposed to a mechanistic one. I demonstrate that, like other phenomenological models in science, intentional psychology is a methodological (...) tool with its own benefits and insights that complements our mechanistic understanding of systems. As a result, intentional psychology's distinctive scientific benefit is its ability to model systems in unique, non-mechanistic, ways. This allows us to generate predictions that we cannot otherwise generate using the mechanistic models of neuroscience and cognitive psychology necessary for various scientific tasks. (shrink)

The ability to group perceptual objects into functionally relevant categories is vital to our comprehension of the world. Such categorisation aids in how we search for objects in familiar scenes and how we identify an object and its likely uses despite never having seen that specific object before. The systems that mediate this process are only now coming to be understood through considerable research efforts combining neurological, psychological and behavioural studies. What is much less well understood are the differences (...) between the categories, how they are formed and how they are used by experts and non-experts in a complex task that can take decades to master. In a quite different direction to previous studies, this work infers the different categorical structures that might be used by amateurs and professionals in the oriental game of Go. This is achieved by using a newly developed combination of artificial neural networks (Self-organising Maps) and perceptual inference to show that categories of strategic scenes can be learned while playing games using a model of ‘conditional perceptual learning’. Applying this technique to two databases of games, one of amateurs and one of professionals, shows that a structural hierarchy of scene information develops that can be readily incorporated into traditional psychological models of decisions and readily implemented in computational systems. The results are discussed in terms of the heuristics and biases literature, emphasising where the significant similarities and differences lie between this work and previous work. (shrink)

The theory of imperatives is philosophically relevant since in building it — some of the long standing problems need to be addressed, and presumably some new ones are waiting to be discovered. The relevance of the theory of imperatives for philosophical research is remarkable, but usually recognized only within the field of practical philosophy. Nevertheless, the emphasis can be put on problems of theoretical philosophy. Proper understanding of imperatives is likely to raise doubts about some of our deeply entrenched and (...) tacit presumptions. In philosophy of language it is the presumption that declaratives provide the paradigm for sentence form; in philosophy of science it is the belief that theory construction is independent from the language practice, in logic it is the conviction that logical meaning relations are constituted out of logical terminology, in ontology it is the view that language use is free from ontological commitments. The list is not exhaustive; it includes only those presumptions that this paper concerns. (shrink)

On the basis of the Conservation of Resource theory and using the Job Demands-Resources model, this study examines the relationships among job demands and job resources of online teaching, perceived instructional efficacy of OT, mindfulness in teaching, and emotional exhaustion to understand the psychological stress experienced by teachers engaged in OT and how mindfulness has moderating effects on relieving anxiety and preventing burnout. A total of 476 teachers with OT experience completed online a self-report survey with items adapted from (...) related scales. The hypotheses were validated using structural equation modeling. Causal relationships were assessed using path analysis, and multi-group analysis was performed to examine the moderating effect of MiT. JD-OT has significant and negative impact on PIE-OT, JR-OT has significant and positive impact on PIE-OT, and PIE-OT has significant and negative impact on EE. Moreover, PIE-OT mediates the positive relationship of JD-OT with EE and the negative relationship of JR-OT with EE. The moderating role of MiT in the relationship of JD-OT and JR-OT with PIE-OT was also validated. In OT work environments, teachers have great need and desire for JR, which can have a positive impact on PIE. Mindfulness training contributes to improving OT efficacy and reducing EE. Enhancing teachers’ MiT enables them to deal with demands from work and their superiors and motivates them to respond with ease to the stressful external environment. (shrink)

The notion of group responsibility has received some very fruitful examination in recent years. But there still remains an important commonsense objection to this notion. Moral responsibility for an action is ordinarily linked to and held to depend upon the action's being the product of an act of choice on the part of the agent. The thrust of the objection here is that it is extremely difficult to understand how intentional acts like acts of choice can be properly (...) attributed to a group. The notion of a group "consciousness" does not seem a very satisfactory resolution of this problem. In this paper I shall propose that there are actually three distinct processes, as well as many hybrid combinations of them there, by which groups "make choices." That is, when we look at the activities of groups, we discover three different kinds of analogues to the act of choice of the individual person. I shall be illustrating each of these models with examples of health care decisions. In addition, I shall also try to illustrate how the level of personal moral responsibility of each of the individuals making up the group, i.e., each one's responsibility for the group's action, can be seen to flow from the particular role that an individual plays within the process of "group choice" that is involved. In this way, I hope to shed light not only on the topics of group choice, group responsibility, and the interplay of personal and group responsibility, but also to show concretely the valuable role that these themes can play in our understanding of the moral elements of the health care setting. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Autism provides a model for exploring the nature of self‐consciousness: self‐consciousness requires the ability to reflect on mental states, and autism is a disorder with a specific impairment in the neurocognitive mechanism underlying this ability. Experimental studies of normal and abnormal development suggest that the abilities to attribute mental states to self and to others are closely related. Thus inability to pass standard ‘theory of mind’ tests, which refer to others’ false beliefs, may imply lack of self‐consciousness. Individuals who (...) persistently fail these tests may, in the extreme, be unable to reflect on their intentions or to anticipate their own actions. In contrast, individuals with high‐functioning autism or Asperger syndrome often possess a late‐acquired, explicit theory of mind, which appears to be the result of effortful learning. An experimental study with three people with Asperger syndrome suggested that level of performance on standard theory of mind tasks was strongly related to the ability to engage in introspection. Qualitative differences in the introspections of high‐functioning people with autism are also reflected in autobiographical accounts which may give a glimpse of what it is like to be autistic. (shrink)

This collection by a distinguished group of philosophers, psychologists, and physiologists reflects an interdisciplinary approach to the central question of cognitive science: how do we model the mind? Among the topics explored are the relationships (theoretical, reductive, and explanatory) between philosophy, psychology, computer science, and physiology; what should be asked of models in science generally, and in cognitive science in particular; whether theoretical models must make essential reference to objects in the environment; whether there are human competences that (...) are resistant, in principle, to modelling; whether simulated thinking and intentionality are really thinking and intentionality; how semantics can be generated from syntactics; the meaning of the terms "representations" and "modelling;" whether the nature of the "hardware" matters; and whether computer models of humans are "dehumanizing." Contributors include Donald Davidson, Daniel C. Dennett, Margaret A. Boden, Adam Morton, Dennis Noble, T. Poggio, Colin Blakemore, K.V. Wilkes, P.N. Johnson-Laird, and Jonathan St. B.T. Evans. (shrink)

Reissuing works originally published between 1949 and ‘79, this set presents a rich selection of renowned scholarship across the subject, touching also on ethics, religion, and psychology and other behavioural science. Classic previously out-of-print works are brought back into print here in this set of important discourse and theory.

Societies are composed of groups that interact. Symbiotic groups are those in which agents complement each other in resources that they have in excess. Symbiotic groups are useful especially when the resources in an environment are distributed unevenly, because they enable agents to trade resources easily. However, for trading to happen successfully, agents in symbiotic groups need to cooperate, i.e., they should be willing to donate resources when appropriate. Similarly, if some agents in a symbiotic group are defectors, they (...) should be identified by others and eliminated from the group for the well-being of the remaining agents. Accordingly, we first study Edmonds’ tag-based model of symbiotic groups to understand the lifespan of symbiotic groups (e.g., why some groups live shorter than others). Then, we enhance Edmonds’ model by adding the capability of reciprocal interactions to agents, thus achieving a hybrid model. We capture reciprocity in three different models and study their effects on the elimination of defectors in symbiotic groups. Our experimental results show that the groups that are built with the proposed hybrid model can eliminate more defectors and earlier than tag-based models. Further, the hybrid approach can generate symbiotic groups more effectively and efficiently. (shrink)

-/- The aim of this paper is to grasp the relevant distinctions between various ways in which models and simulations in Artificial Intelligence (AI) relate to cognitive phenomena. In order to get a systematic picture, a taxonomy is developed that is based on the coordinates of formal versus material analogies and theory-guided versus pre-theoretic models in science. These distinctions have parallels in the computational versus mimetic aspects and in analytic versus exploratory types of computer simulation. The proposed taxonomy cuts across (...) the traditional dichotomies between symbolic and embodied AI, general intelligence and symbol and intelligence and cognitive simulation and human/non-human-like AI. -/- According to the taxonomy proposed here, one can distinguish between four distinct general approaches that figured prominently in early and classical AI, and that have partly developed into distinct research programs: first, phenomenal simulations (e.g., Turing’s “imitation game”); second, simulations that explore general-level formal isomorphisms in pursuit of a general theory of intelligence (e.g., logic-based AI); third, simulations as exploratory material models that serve to develop theoretical accounts of cognitive processes (e.g., Marr’s stages of visual processing and classical connectionism); and fourth, simulations as strictly formal models of a theory of computation that postulates cognitive processes to be isomorphic with computational processes (strong symbolic AI). -/- In continuation of pragmatic views of the modes of modeling and simulating world affairs, this taxonomy of approaches to modeling in AI helps to elucidate how available computational concepts and simulational resources contribute to the modes of representation and theory development in AI research—and what made that research program uniquely dependent on them. (shrink)

Are LLMs cultural technologies like photocopiers or printing presses, which transmit information but cannot create new content? A challenge for this idea, which we call "bibliotechnism", is that LLMs often do generate entirely novel text. We begin by defending bibliotechnism against this challenge, showing how novel text may be meaningful only in a derivative sense, so that the content of this generated text depends in an important sense on the content of original human text. We go on to present (...) a different, novel challenge for bibliotechnism, stemming from examples in which LLMs generate “novel reference”, using novel names to refer to novel entities. Such examples could be smoothly explained if LLMs were not cultural technologies but possessed a limited form of agency (beliefs, desires, and intentions). According to interpretationism in the philosophy of mind, a system has beliefs, desires and intentions if and only if its behavior is well-explained by the hypothesis that it has such states. In line with this view, we argue that cases of novel reference provide evidence that LLMs do in fact have beliefs, desires, and intentions, and thus have a limited form of agency. (shrink)

Kammerer and Frankish (this issue) challenge us to expand our conception of introspection beyond neurotypical human cases. This article describes a possible 'ancillary mind' modelled on a system envisioned in Leckie's (2013) science fiction novel Ancillary Justice. The ancillary mind constitutes a borderline case between a communicating group of individuals and a single, spatially distributed mind. It occupies a grey zone with respect to personal identity and subject individuation, neither determinately one person or subject nor determinately many persons or (...) subjects, and thus some of its processes might be neither determinately introspection within a mind nor determinately communication between minds. If ancillary minds defy discrete countability, the same might be true for some actual minds on Earth. Kammerer and Frankish's research programme can be extended to include not only the study of possible forms of introspection, but also the study of possible mental activity intermediate between introspection and communication. (shrink)

There have been many discussions recently from philosophers, cognitive scientists, and psychologists about group polarization, with online and social media environments in particular receiving a lot of attention, both because of people's increasing reliance on such environments for receiving and exchanging information and because such environments often allow individuals to selectively interact with those who are like-minded. My goal here is to argue that the group epistemologist can facilitate understanding the kinds of factors that drive (...) class='Hi'>group polarization in a way that has been overlooked by the existing research. Specifically, I argue that polarization can occur in part because of the ways that members of a group treat the group itself (as opposed to an individual member within that group) as a source of information, and in doing so makes their own position, as well as that of the group, more extreme. I refer to this as a structural factor in driving polarization, and argue that such factors can contribute to explanations of polarization that occurs specifically in an important subset of groups, namely online and social media groups in which little is known about other members within the group, what I refer to as anonymous, semi-anonymous and pseudonymous (ASAP) groups. (shrink)

The chapter discusses the principle of conservatism and traces how the general principle is related to the specific one. This tracing suggests that the principle of conservatism needs to be refined. Connecting the principle in cognitive science to more general questions about scientific inference also allows us to revisit the question of realism versus instrumentalism. The framework deployed in model selection theory is very general; it is not specific to the subject matter of science. The chapter outlines some non-Bayesian (...) ideas that have been developed in model selection theory. The principle of conservatism, like C. Lloyd Morgan's canon, describes a preference concerning kinds of parameters. It says that a model that postulates only lower-level intentionality is preferable to one that postulates higher-level intentionality if both fit the data equally well. The model selection approach to parsimony helps explain why unification is a theoretical virtue. (shrink)

How do we ensure that future generally intelligent AI share our values? This is the value-alignment problem. It is a weighty matter. After all, if AI are neutral with respect to our wellbeing, or worse, actively hostile toward us, then they pose an existential threat to humanity. Some philosophers have argued that one important way in which we can mitigate this threat is to develop only AI that shares our values or that has values that ‘align with’ ours. However, there (...) is nothing to guarantee that this policy will be universally implemented—in particular, ‘bad actors’ are likely to flout it. In this paper, I show how the predictive processing model of the mind, currently ascendant in cognitive science, may ameliorate the value-alignment problem. In essence, I argue that there are a plurality of reasons why any future generally intelligent AI will possess a predictive processing cognitive architecture (e.g. because we decide to build them that way; because it is the only possible cognitive architecture that can underpin general intelligence; because it is the easiest way to create AI.). I also argue that if future generally intelligent AI possess a predictive processing cognitive architecture, then they will come to share our pro-moral motivations (of valuing humanity as an end; avoiding maleficent actions; etc.), regardless of their initial motivation set. Consequently, these AI will pose a minimal threat to humanity. In this way then, I conclude, the value-alignment problem is significantly ameliorated under the assumption that future generally intelligent AI will possess a predictive processing cognitive architecture. (shrink)

Aristotle is oftentimes viewed through a strictly philosophical lens as heir to Plato and has having introduced logical rigor where an emphasis on the theory of Forms formerly prevailed. It must be appreciated that Aristotle was the son of a physician, and that his inculcation of the thought of other Greek philosophers addressing health and the natural elements led to an extremely broad set of biologically- and medically-related writings. As this article proposes, Aristotle deepened the fourfold theory of the elements (...) with anatomic and physiologic observations. In books like History of Animals, Parts of Animals, and the lost Anatomai, he actively dissected organisms and recorded his findings. The corpus of medically-related literature Aristotle developed had a direct influence on subsequent Greek thinkers, including Galen, and on Medieval Islamic and modern Western practitioners such as William Harvey. Aristotle's ideas continue to influence modern medical thinkers in Europe and America through both his interpretation by European philosophers gaining the attention of medical humanists, and his writings' enduring impact on medical researchers balancing scientific with more personalistic approaches to medicine. (shrink)

The libertarian attribute of Thaler and Sunstein’s nudge theory (Nudge: improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. Yale University Press, New Haven, 2008) is one of the most important features for its candidature as a new model for public policy-making. It relies on the reversibility of choices made under the influence of nudging. Since the mind is articulated into two systems, the choice taken by System 1 is always reversible because it can be overridden by the deliberative and corrective (...) role of System 2. This article does not aim to criticise the whole theory of nudge and neither to assess its practical efficacy as a policy-making tool. Rather it intends to show that there are doubts that the specific claim of reversibility is correct for a subset of nudges called “System 1 nudges” (Sunstein in The ethics of influence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016). And that therefore, in this case, the libertarian claim seems little justified. The thrust of my argument contests the truth of the main pillar of the libertarian claim, namely the dual-process theory of mind. I will show that even the minimal version of dual reasoning, namely the Type 1 and Type 2 processes proposed by Evans and Stanovich (Perspect Psychol Sci 8(3):223–241, 2013), is weakened by psychological and neural data. (shrink)

Folk-sociology is a set of intuitive assumptions that organize our spontaneous theories about society, including the notion that social groups are agent-like. Pietraszewski's model may explain this folk-sociological assumption in an elegant way. However, large-scale group dynamics include features that seem to escape agent-like descriptions. Therefore, one may want to find out whether the “event-grammar” proposed here can account for these features.

This paper critically engages with Tom Shakespeare’s book Disability rights and wrongs. It concentrates on his attempt to demolish the social model of disability, as well as his sketch of an “alternative” approach to understanding “disability”. Shakespeare’s critique, it is argued, does British disability studies a “wrong” by presenting it as a meagre discipline that has not been able to engage with disability and impairment effects in an analytically sophisticated fashion. What was required was a measured presentation and evaluation (...) of the rich mix of theoretical and empirically based ideas to be found in the discipline, as the groundwork for forward thinking located within a social oppression paradigm. Shakespeare’s undermining of the discipline’s credibility in the eyes of outsiders and newcomers represents a diversionary missed opportunity by an influential writer and activist.Shakespeare’s book1 has certainly stirred up debate, and invited a flurry of angry reviews, in disability studies in the UK—the social science discipline that has been developing radical ideas about disability and disablism since the 1980s. Peopled by both disabled academics and like-minded non-disabled researchers and writers, the DS community recognises that Shakespeare’s book seeks to deliver a fatal wound to what he sees as its sacred cow: the British social model of disability.Shakespeare explains that what he calls the “strong” version of the social model of disability was formulated by Michael Oliver, a leading DS writer and disability activist, on the basis of the social and political ideas advanced in the 1970s by a group of disabled individuals fighting to free themselves from what they experienced as an oppressive care system that relegated and segregated people with serious impairments to residential institutions and to the category of the unemployable.2 3 In short, the social model asserts that “disability” is not caused …. (shrink)

Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart invites readers to embark on a new journey into a land of rationality that differs from the familiar territory of cognitive science and economics. Traditional views of rationality tend to see decision makers as possessing superhuman powers of reason, limitless knowledge, and all of eternity in which to ponder choices. To understand decisions in the real world, we need a different, more psychologically plausible notion of rationality, and this book provides it. It is about (...) fast and frugal heuristics--simple rules for making decisions when time is pressing and deep thought an unaffordable luxury. These heuristics can enable both living organisms and artificial systems to make smart choices, classifications, and predictions by employing bounded rationality. But when and how can such fast and frugal heuristics work? Can judgments based simply on one good reason be as accurate as those based on many reasons? Could less knowledge even lead to systematically better predictions than more knowledge? Simple Heuristics explores these questions, developing computational models of heuristics and testing them through experiments and analyses. It shows how fast and frugal heuristics can produce adaptive decisions in situations as varied as choosing a mate, dividing resources among offspring, predicting high school drop out rates, and playing the stock market. As an interdisciplinary work that is both useful and engaging, this book will appeal to a wide audience. It is ideal for researchers in cognitive psychology, evolutionary psychology, and cognitive science, as well as in economics and artificial intelligence. It will also inspire anyone interested in simply making good decisions. (shrink)

Organisational Ethics could be more effectively taught if organisational agency could be better distinguished from activity in other group entities, and defended against criticisms. Some criticisms come from the side of what is called “methodological individualism”. These critics argue that, strictly speaking, only individuals really exist and act, and organisations are not individuals, real things, or agents. Other criticisms come from fear of the possible use of alleged “corporate personhood” to argue for a possible radical expansion of corporate rights (...) e.g. to claim a right to vote. Others say that if corporate businesses were persons, and judged as such, they would be sociopaths (Bakan 2004). Large corporate businesses are one kind of organisation, and if organisations were allowed to claim to be full persons, this would mean that the latter criticisms were valid. The proposed account goes between the horns of the above dilemma: impersonal aggregates or full persons. It avoids both the reductive individualism and expansive, full personhood account. It gives grounds for attributing and distributing praise and blame to organisations as whole complex entities, and to their parts. Primarily, responsibility belongs to Board incumbents within them, on the basis of their goals; their direction of the acts of the other main internal role incumbents, managers and staff, and enablers, in the role structure; their own ethical decision methods; the impact of their acts on external stakeholders like end-users, other players in the practice or local community, and on the state. These factors are picked out on the basis of a theory of meaning Aristotle’s theory of analogy of attribution, some architectonic features of his Philosophical Anthropology; and Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics (NAVE). The paper expounds a quasi-person model of organisations, (QPM), previously described in this journal (Ardagh 2011, 2012, 2013). This model identifies functional similarities at three levels, between capacities within natural persons (NPs) on the one hand and the roles/ incumbents within the structure of organisational artificial/quasi-persons (APs on the other). In each entity, we find an architectonic direction, sub-ordered operational entities, and enablers (a DOE structure) in a communicative structure or reporting chain of authority. The common elements between natural persons (NP) and artificial persons (AP) and their ethically relevant attributes are captured in an acronym –GRAEOS. Both persons and organisations have a “top” entity capable of having/choosing worthwhile ethically permissible goals, G; of architectonically directing the use of capacities/repertoires or incumbents in designed architectonic roles, R, within a DOE-type structure, well or badly; of using ethical decision making procedures, E; of execution of good choices for the person or organisation in action, A, with good or bad impacts on others, or with others, O, in the context practice or domain; and of having good relations with the law and the state, S. Application to the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster, and public sector organisations, is briefly discussed to illustrate the potential to deal with short or long case study narratives. (shrink)

During the last few decades, models have become the centre of attention in both cognitive science and philosophy of science. In cognitive science, the claim that humans reason with mental models, rather than mentally manipulate linguistic symbols, is the majority view. Similarly, philosophers of science almost unanimously acknowledge that models have to be taken as a central unit of analysis. Moreover, some philosophers of science and cognitive scientists have suggested that the cognitive hypothesis of mental models is a promising way (...) of accounting for the use of models in science. However, once the importance of models in cognition as well as in science has been acknowledged, much more needs to be said about how models enable agents to make predictions, and to understand the world. In this paper, our goal (as a cognitive scientist, working on causal reasoning, and a philosopher of science, working on models and representations) is twofold. We would like to further develop the notion of mental models, and to explore the parallels between mental models as a concept in cognitive science, and models in science. While acknowledging that the parallel move towards models in cognitive science and in philosophy of science is in the right direction, we think that: i. the notion of mental models needs to be clarified in order to serve as a useful tool, ii. the relation between the hypothesis of mental models and the use of models in science is still to be clarified. First, we will briefly recall a few points about the mental model hypothesis, on the one hand, and the model-centred view of science, on the other hand. Then, we will present our parallel criticisms, and put forward our own proposals. (shrink)

Cognitive architectures are unified theories of cognition that take the form of computational formalisms. They support computational models that collectively account for large numbers of empirical regularities using small numbers of computational mechanisms. Empirical coverage and parsimony are the most prominent criteria by which architectures are designed and evaluated, but they are not the only ones. This paper considers three additional criteria that have been comparatively undertheorized. (a) Successful architectures possess subjective and intersubjective meaning, making cognition comprehensible to individual cognitive (...) scientists and organizing groups of like-minded cognitive scientists into genuine communities. (b) Successful architectures provide idioms that structure the design and interpretation of computational models. (c) Successful architectures are strange: They make provocative, often disturbing, and ultimately compelling claims about human information processing that demand evaluation. (shrink)

This paper examines today's received scientific medical model with respect to its ability to satisfy two conditions: (1) its explanatory adequacy relative to the full range of findings in the medical literature, including those indicating a correlation between psychosocial variables and disease susceptibility; and (2) the fit between its physicalist patient and disease concepts and what today's basic sciences, so-called sciences of complexity, tell us about the way matter, notably complex systems (e.g. patients), behave and the nature of scientific (...) explanation. I conclude that the received (biomedical) model falls short on both counts and to satisfy these conditions is to articulate a formal successor model. This successor must be guided by premises consistent with the findings and methods of today's basic sciences on which an applied science like medicine depends for its validity. Additionally, the successor model must be able to explain (and predict) the full range of clinical findings, both those that its predecessors explains and at least some of those that it does not. The aim of the paper is to identify such a model. (shrink)

This paper outlines the demographic characteristics of the Baiga tribe, one of the most primitive of the aboriginal tribal groups of Central India. The Baiga population has grown steadily since the first anthropological study of the tribe in the 1930s. Age at menarche, age at marriage, breast-feeding, and time interval between marriage and first conception are natural. There are more females than males. Sub-tribe endogamy is common; consanguineous marriage is favoured (34% of marriages are between first cousins) and marital distance (...) is low (mean 7·1 km). Though the mean menarcheal age is high (15·2 years), mean age at first marriage is low (16·6 years), giving a long reproductive period. (shrink)

The problem of the values of Ukrainian society is one of the most important and debatable problems in modern scientific discourse. This is due to the transition of our state from the traditional model of the state, in which there is authoritarianism, secrecy, to a socially oriented society and a democratic, open state.Accordingly, there is a change in values, which is an integral part of the existence of any society and state. To replace the Soviet system of declaration of (...) surrogatecollective, paternalistic values, which existed for several decades, a new system is formed, which provides a clear orientation of Ukrainians to European values, the significant achievements of the Ukrainian people, the moral recovery of society, increasing values and culture of civil society. Honor and dignity of Ukrainians, which is an indispensable basis for the development of moral culture of society.The purpose and objectives of the article. Based on the achievements of modern science and philosophy, to analyze the essence of the moral culture of the people, the place of human dignity and its importance in moral culture; to characterize and classify the main factors of dignity formation in the moral culture of the people. The research methodology is complex and is based on philosophical-anthropological and philosophical-cultural analysis of the problems of formation of moral culture of the Ukrainian people and its structural element - human dignity. Research results.The most important, synthetic, integral consequence of human development is moral culture. Moral culture is the level of assimilation by an individual or a group of people of existing moral values in society, the degree of their involvement in the moral aspects of activity, a measure of personal moral development. Practical and spiritual factors include, first of all, ethnic stereotypes specific to a certain people (traditions, customs, rituals, typical traits of character and behavior, dominant emotions, folk crafts, entertainment, games), as well as historical memory, established symbols, folk shrines. Historical memory, preserving every page of life, the people’s struggle for social, political and national rights at all stages of its development, serves as a solid foundation on which national self-consciousness is successfully formed.Institutional factors are important for the formation of dignity in the moral culture of the people. These include nation- and state-building activities of public authorities, national elite, political parties, religious and public organizations. If the state creates conditions in society for the assimilation of the historical and cultural experience accumulated by the nation, it contributes to the education of national self-esteem, ie awareness of community members of their belonging to the nation, their duty to the community of like-minded people. Conclusions. Summarizing the results of the study, we can formulate the following conclusions. Human dignity in the moral culture of the Ukrainian people is the result of the interaction of a combination of many factors that determine its structure and content. The process of its formation is quite long, complex and contradictory. This is due to the fact that it is human dignity that provides the spiritual, ideological foundation for the functioning of national communities, contributing to the development of promising guidelines for the development of the nation and the state. (shrink)

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the philosopher Hans Reichenbach led a group of like-minded colleagues in Berlin that must count as an independent point of origin of the movement of logical empiricism. Like the Vienna Circle with whom they cooperated on numerous occasions, their concern was to develop a philosophy of science adequate to the latest advances in science itself. Differences of philosophical background and interests, however, resulted in putting different accents by justifying scientific (...) knowledge. (shrink)

In our everyday social interactions, we try to make sense of what people are thinking, why they act as they do, and what they are likely to do next. This process is called mindreading. Mindreading, Shannon Spaulding argues in this book, is central to our ability to understand and interact with others. Philosophers and cognitive scientists have converged on the idea that mindreading involves theorizing about and simulating others’ mental states. She argues that this view of mindreading is limiting and (...) outdated. Most contemporary views of mindreading vastly underrepresent the diversity and complexity of mindreading. She articulates a new theory of mindreading that takes into account cutting edge philosophical and empirical research on in-group/out-group dynamics, social biases, and how our goals and the situational context influence how we interpret others’ behavior. -/- Spaulding's resulting theory of mindreading provides a more accurate, comprehensive, and perhaps pessimistic view of our abilities to understand others, with important epistemological and ethical implications. Deciding who is trustworthy, knowledgeable, and competent are epistemically and ethically fraught judgments: her new theory of mindreading sheds light on how these judgments are made and the conditions under which they are unreliable. -/- This book will be of great interest to students of philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind, applied epistemology, cognitive science and moral psychology, as well as those interested in conceptual issues in psychology. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill advocated for increased interactions between individuals of dissenting opinions for the reason that it would improve society. Whether Mill and similar arguments that advocate for opinion diversity are valid depends on background assumptions about the psychology and sociality of individuals. The field of opinion dynamics is a burgeoning testing ground for how different combinations of sociological and psychological facts contribute to phenomena that affect opinion diversity, such as polarization. This paper applies some recent results from the opinion (...) dynamics literature to assess the impacts of the Millian suggestion. The goal is to understand how the scope of the validity of Mill-style arguments depends on plausible assumptions that can be formalized using agent-based models, a common modeling approach in opinion dynamics. The most salient insight is that homophily (increased interactions between like-minded individuals) does not sufficiently explain decreased opinion diversity. Hence, decreasing homophily by increasing interactions between individuals of dissenting opinions is not the simple solution that a Millian-style argument may advocate. (shrink)