Results for ' norms, intentionality, intentional strategy, philosophical dispositions'

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  5
    Norms as “Intentional Systems”.Pascal Richard - 2023 - Phenomenology and Mind 24:206-215.
    The present paper investigates the nature of norms in correlation to the philosophical notions of intentionality and disposition. Following Amselek (2017; 2020), norms are here understood as tools giving the measure of what is possible to do. Intentionality, understood as “being-about”, in relation to norms allows us both to form a description of reality in the norm, and to correct our actions in order to correspond to the norm. Through the notion of disposition, i.e., on the one hand, the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Should pride of place be given to the norms? Intentionality and normativity.Clotilde Calabi & Alberto Voltolini - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (1):85-98.
    Reasons motivate our intentions and thus our actions, justify our beliefs, ground our hopes and connect our feelings of shame and pride to our thoughts. Given that intentions, beliefs and emotions are intentional states, intentionality is strongly connected with normativity. Yet what is more precisely their relationship? Some philosophers, notably Brandom and McDowell, contend at places that intentionality is intrinsically normative. In this paper, we discuss Brandom and McDowell’s thesis and the arguments they provide for its defence. In contrast (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Subjectivism about normativity and the normativity of intentional states.Gorman Michael - 2003 - International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):5-14.
    Subjectivism about normativity (SN) is the view that norms are never intrinsic to things but are instead always imposed from without. After clarifying what SN is, I argue against it on the basis of its implications concerning intentionality. Intentional states with the mind-to-world direction of fit are essentially norm-subservient, i.e., essentially subject to norms such as truth, coherence, and the like. SN implies that nothing is intrinsically an intentional state of the mind-to-world sort: its being such a state (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Norms of intentionality: norms that don’t guide.Benjamin W. Jarvis - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):1-25.
    More than ever, it is in vogue to argue that no norms either play a role in or directly follow from the theory of mental content. In this paper, I present an intuitive theory of intentionality (including a theory of mental content) on which norms are constitutive of the intentional properties of attitude and content in order to show that this trend is misguided. Although this theory of intentionality—the teleological theory of intentional representation—does involve a commitment to representational (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  5. Intentionality and Normativity.Uriah Kriegel - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):185-208.
    One of the most enduring elements of Davidson’s legacy is the idea that intentionality is inherently normative. The normativity of intentionality means different things to different people and in different contexts, however. A subsidiary goal of this paper is to get clear on the sense in which Davidson means the thesis that intentionality is inherently normative. The central goal of the paper is to consider whether the thesis is true, in light of recent work on intentionality that insists on an (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  6. Modality, normativity, and intentionality.Robert Brandom - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):611-23.
    A striking feature of the contemporary philosophical scene is the flourishing of a number of research programs aimed in one way or another at making intentional soup out of nonintentional bones—more carefully, specifying in a resolutely nonintentional, nonsemantic vocabulary, sufficient conditions for states of an organism or other system to qualify as contentful representations. This is a movement with a number of players, but for my purposes here, the work of Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan can serve as paradigms. (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  7.  78
    Collective Intentionality and the (Re)Production of Social Norms: The Scope for a Critical Social Science.Juljan Krause - 2012 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (3):323-355.
    This article aims to contribute to a critical ontology of social objects. Recent works on collective intentionality and norm-following neglect the question how free agents can be brought to collectively intend to x , although x is not in their own interest. By arguing for a natural disposition to empathic understanding and drawing on recent research in the neurosciences, this article outlines an ontological framework that extends collective intentionality to questions of oppression and status asymmetries. In a contribution to this (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  8.  69
    Strategy and Intentionality.Jay Ogilvy - 2010 - World Futures 66 (2):73-102.
    This article applies the analytic rigor of philosophy to the vexed topic of business strategy, and uses the objective, public evidence of business strategy as an existence proof for the possibility of free will and purpose in the private realm of subjective intentionality. The first part distinguishes three types of intentionality in philosophy—purposive intentionality, referential intentionality, and the problematic intentionality of a godlike, miraculous “inner intender.” After rejecting this third type of intentionality, and noting that its rejection saves the first (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  9.  25
    Naturalistic Descriptions and Normative-Intentional Interpretations.Bernd Prien - 2007 - Human Affairs 17 (1):22-32.
    Naturalistic Descriptions and Normative-Intentional Interpretations Normative pragmatists about linguistic meaning such as Sellars and Brandom have to explain how norms can be implicit in practices described in purely naturalistic terms. The explanation of implicit norms usually offered in the literature commits pragmatists to equate actions with naturalistic events. Since this is an unacceptable consequence, I propose an alternative explanation of implicit norms that avoids this identification. To do so, one has to treat the normative-intentional concepts such as "norm", (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10.  22
    Brandom on Modality, Normativity and Intentionality.Robert Brandom - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):611-623.
    A striking feature of the contemporary philosophical scene is the flourishing of a number of research programs aimed in one way or another at making intentional soup out of nonintentional bones—more carefully, specifying in a resolutely nonintentional, nonsemantic vocabulary, sufficient conditions for states of an organism or other system to qualify as contentful representations. This is a movement with a number of players, but for my purposes here, the work of Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan can serve as paradigms. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  11.  56
    The Normativity of Thought and Meaning.Karl Karlander - unknown
    In recent years the normativity of thought and meaning has been the subject of an extensive debate. What is at issue is whether intentionality has normative features, and if so, whether that constitutes a problem for naturalistic attempts to account for intentional phenomena. The origin of the debate is Saul Kripke’s interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, published in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Kripke claimed, on behalf of Wittgenstein, that dispositional accounts of linguistic meaning - accounts, i.e., (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  12.  77
    Breve storia dell'etica.Sergio Cremaschi - 2012 - Roma RM, Italia: Carocci.
    The book reconstructs the history of Western ethics. The approach chosen focuses the endless dialectic of moral codes, or different kinds of ethos, moral doctrines that are preached in order to bring about a reform of existing ethos, and ethical theories that have taken shape in the context of controversies about the ethos and moral doctrines as means of justifying or reforming moral doctrines. Such dialectic is what is meant here by the phrase ‘moral traditions’, taken as a name for (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  13. A Preface Paradox for Intention.Simon Goldstein - 2016 - Philosophers' Imprint 16.
    In this paper I argue that there is a preface paradox for intention. The preface paradox for intention shows that intentions do not obey an agglomeration norm, requiring one to intend conjunctions of whatever else one intends. But what norms do intentions obey? I will argue that intentions come in degrees. These partial intentions are governed by the norms of the probability calculus. First, I will give a dispositional theory of partial intention, on which degrees of intention are the degrees (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  14. The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95.
    The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  15. Setiya on intention, rationality and reasons.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):510-521.
    ‘The idea that there are standards of practical reason apart from or independent of good character,’ Kieran Setiya trenchantly argues, ‘is a philosophical mirage’. 1 Setiya's argument in this fine book is a striking blend of philosophy of action and normative philosophy. A central claim is that the intention is a special kind of belief. I want both to challenge that claim and to reflect on a subtle argument in its favour that is in the background.1.Practical thinking, as understood (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  16.  38
    Intentional (Nation‐)States: A Group‐Agency Problem for the State’s Right to Exclude.Matthew R. Joseph - 2021 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 38 (1):73-87.
    Most philosophical defences of the state’s right to exclude immigrants derive their strength from the normative importance of self-determination. If nation-states are taken to be the political institutions of a people, then the state’s right to exclude is the people’s right to exclude – and a denial of this right constitutes an abridgement of self-determination. In this paper, I argue that this view of self-determination does not cohere with a group-agency view of nation-states. On the group-agency view that I (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17.  27
    The Intentional Stance. [REVIEW]Edward N. Zalta - 1989 - Review of Metaphysics 43 (2):397-400.
    In this book, Dennett determines just how far we can push the idea that mental states are distinguished by intentionality, that is, by the fact that they have content in virtue of being about, or directed towards, the world at large. Intentionality is characteristic of such states as belief and desire, since all belief is belief of something or that something be the case. In contrast to the physical stance and the design stance, the intentional stance is the predictive (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Turning representation inside out: An adverbial approach to the metaphysics of language and mind.Steven F. Geisz - 2009 - Philosophical Forum 40 (4):437-471.
    In order to resolve problems about the normative aspects of representation without having to (1) provide a naturalized theory of intentional/semantic properties, (2) accept non-natural intentional/semantic properties into our worldview, or (3) eliminate intentionality, this article questions a basic assumption about the metaphysics of representation: that representation involves representation-objects. An alternative, nonreifying approach to the metaphysics of representation is introduced and developed in detail. The argumentative strategy is as follows. First, an adverbial view of linguistic representation is introduced. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Objectivity and Reflection in Heidegger’s Theory of Intentionality.Tucker Mckinney - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (1):111--130.
    Heidegger claims that Dasein’s capacity for adopting intentional stances toward the world is grounded in the reflective structure of its being, which dictates that Dasein exists for the sake of a possibility of itself. Commentators have glossed this reflective structure in terms of the idea that our subjection to the normative demands of intentionality is grounded in a basic commitment to upholding an identity-concept, such as an occupation or social role. I argue that this gloss has serious adverse implications (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20.  81
    Mind, Intentionality and Inexistence.Georges Rey - 2005 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):389-415.
    The present article articulates the strategy of much of my work to date, which has been concerned to understand how we can possibly come to have any objective understanding of the mind. Generally, I align myself with those who think the best prospect of such an understanding lies in a causal/computational/representational theory of thought (CRTT). However, there is a tendency in recent developments of this and related philosophical views to burden the crucial property of intentionality with what I call (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  21. A dilemma for dispositional answers to Kripkenstein’s challenge.Andrea Guardo - 2023 - Minds and Machines 33 (1):135-152.
    Kripkenstein’s challenge is usually described as being essentially about the use of a word in new kinds of cases ‒ the old kinds of cases being commonly considered as non-problematic. I show that this way of conceiving the challenge is neither true to Kripke’s intentions nor philosophically defensible: the Kripkean skeptic can question my answering “125” to the question “What is 68 plus 57?” even if that problem is one I have already encountered and answered. I then argue that once (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22.  70
    Hutcheson's moral sense and the problem of innateness.Daniel Carey - 2000 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (1):103-110.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 38.1 (2000) 103-110 [Access article in PDF] Hutcheson's Moral Sense and the Problem of Innateness Daniel Carey National University of Ireland Francis Hutcheson's philosophy arguably represented a delicate, and at times precarious, synthesis of positions laid out by John Locke and the third Earl of Shaftesbury. From Shaftesbury, whose influence he acknowledged explicitly in the title page of the first edition of the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23. Intentionality, deliberation and autonomy: the action-theoretic basis of practical philosophy.Christoph Lumer & Sandro Nannini (eds.) - 2007 - Ashgate Publishing.
    Many important thinkers in the philosophical tradition, like Aristotle or Hume, have used an explicit theory of action as the basis of their respective normative theories of practical rationality and morality. The idea behind this architecture of theories is that action theory can inform us about the origin, bonds, reach and limits of practical reason. The aim of this book is to revive this direct connection between action theory and practical philosophy, in particular to provide systematic action-theoretical underpinnings for (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. The Deep Self Model and asymmetries in folk judgments about intentional action.Chandra Sekhar Sripada - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (2):159-176.
    Recent studies by experimental philosophers demonstrate puzzling asymmetries in people’s judgments about intentional action, leading many philosophers to propose that normative factors are inappropriately influencing intentionality judgments. In this paper, I present and defend the Deep Self Model of judgments about intentional action that provides a quite different explanation for these judgment asymmetries. The Deep Self Model is based on the idea that people make an intuitive distinction between two parts of an agent’s psychology, an Acting Self that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   58 citations  
  25. "The Logic of the Liver". A Deontic View of the Intentionality of Desire.Federico Lauria - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Geneva
    Desires matter. How are we to understand the intentionality of desire? According to the two classical views, desire is either a positive evaluation or a disposition to act: to desire a state is to positively evaluate it or to be disposed to act to realize it. This Ph.D. Dissertation examines these conceptions of desire and proposes a deontic alternative inspired by Meinong. On this view, desiring is representing a state of affairs as what ought to be or, if one prefers, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26. A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking (review). [REVIEW]Jeremy Henkel - 2006 - Philosophy East and West 56 (2):347-451.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese ThinkingJeremy E. HenkelA Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking. By François Jullien, translated by Janet Lloyd. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004. Pp. x + 202. $22.00.In A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking François Jullien argues that the different ways Chinese and Western thinkers have dealt with warfare and diplomacy reflect important differences in how (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle’s Social Ontology.Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.) - 2007 - Springer.
    This book includes ten original essays that critically examine central themes of John Searle’s ontology of society, as well as a new essay by Searle that summarizes and further develops his work in that area. The critical essays are grouped into three parts. Part I (Aspects of Collective Intentionality) examines the account of collective intention and action underlying Searle’s analysis of social and institutional facts, with special emphasis on how that account relates to the dispute between individualism and anti-individualism in (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28.  43
    Chisholm on expressions for intentional relations.Karl Pfeifer - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (1):153 - 156.
    THE PAPER IS A FOOTNOTE TO C B MARTIN AND KARL PFEIFER, "INTENTIONALITY AND THE NON-PSYCHOLOGICAL," "PHIL PHENOMENOL RES" 46 (1986) 531-554. A CHARACTERIZATION OF INTENTIONALITY NOT CONSIDERED THEREIN IS SHOWN, NONETHELESS, ALSO TO FAIL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN INTENTIONAL STATES AND MERELY PHYSICAL CAUSAL CAPACITIES.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  29.  97
    Judgements of intentionality and moral worth: Experimental challenges to Hindriks.Alessandro Lanteri - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):713-720.
    Joshua Knobe found that people are more likely to describe an action as intentional if it has had a bad outcome than a good outcome, and to blame a bad outcome than to praise a good one. These asymmetries raised numerous questions about lay moral judgement. Frank Hindriks recently proposed that one acts intentionally if one fails to comply with a normative reason against performing the action, that moral praise requires appropriate motivation, whereas moral blame does not, and that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  30. Normativity in Reasoning.John Broome - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):622-633.
    Reasoning is a process through which premise-attitudes give rise to a conclusion-attitude. When you reason actively you operate on the propositions that are the contents of your premise-attitudes, following a rule, to derive a new proposition that is the content of your conclusion-attitude. It may seem that, when you follow a rule, you must, at least implicitly, have the normative belief that you ought to comply with the rule, which guides you to comply. But I argue that to follow a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  31. Telling More Than We Can Know About Intentional Action.Chandra Sekhar Sripada & Sara Konrath - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (3):353-380.
    Recently, a number of philosophers have advanced a surprising conclusion: people's judgments about whether an agent brought about an outcome intentionally are pervasively influenced by normative considerations. In this paper, we investigate the ‘Chairman case’, an influential case from this literature and disagree with this conclusion. Using a statistical method called structural path modeling, we show that people's attributions of intentional action to an agent are driven not by normative assessments, but rather by attributions of underlying values and characterological (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  32.  18
    Concepts of Sharedness: Essays on Collective Intentionality.Hans Bernhard Schmid, Katinka Schulte-Ostermann & Nikos Psarros (eds.) - 2008 - De Gruyter.
    The present volume contains a selection of papers presented at the Fifth Conference on Collective Intentionality held at the University of Helsinki August 31 to September 2, 2006 and two additional contributions. The common aim of the papers is to explore the structure of shared intentional attitudes, and to explain how they underlie the social, cultural and institutional world. The contributions to this volume explore the phenomenology of sharedness, the concept of sharedness, and also various aspects of the structure (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  33.  44
    Mind, collective agency, norms.Pietro Salis & Guido Seddone (eds.) - 2017 - Shaker Verlag.
    In recent years, the social world is quickly gaining the focus of attention within the philosophical debates. The work of authors such as John Searle, Barry Smith, Margaret Gilbert, Raimo Tuomela, to name just a few, is becoming increasingly important within the philosophical community. Hence, topics in social ontology dealing with the nature of institutions, collective actions, collective self/personhood, collective intentionality, shared goals and commitments, etc. are increasingly addressed by contemporary philosophical investigations. The discussion on these topics (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34.  65
    Intentional concepts in cognitive neuroscience.Samuli Pöyhönen - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):93-109.
    In this article, I develop an account of the use of intentional predicates in cognitive neuroscience explanations. As pointed out by Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker, intentional language abounds in neuroscience theories. According to Bennett and Hacker, the subpersonal use of intentional predicates results in conceptual confusion. I argue against this overly strong conclusion by evaluating the contested language use in light of its explanatory function. By employing conceptual resources from the contemporary philosophy of science, I show (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  35. Intentionality Bifurcated: A Lesson from Early Modern Philosophy?Lionel Shapiro - 2013 - In Martin Lenz & Anik Waldow (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives on Early Modern Philosophy: Nature and Norms in Thought. Springer.
    This paper examines the pressures leading two very different Early Modern philosophers, Descartes and Locke, to invoke two ways in which thought is directed at objects. According to both philosophers, I argue, the same idea can simultaneously count as “of” two different objects—in two different senses of the phrase ‘idea of’. One kind of intentional directedness is invoked in answering the question What is it to think that thus-and-so? The other kind is invoked in answering the question What accounts (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36.  78
    Husserl, Wittgenstein and the snark: Intentionality and social naturalism.Grant Gillett - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):331-349.
    The Snark is an intentional object. I examine the general philosophical characteristics of thoughts of objects from the perspective of Husserl's, hyle, noesis, and noema and show how this meets constraints of opacity, normativity, and possible existence as generated by a sensitive theory of intentionality. Husserl introduces terms which indicate the normative features of intentional content and attempts to forge a direct relationship between the norms he generates and the actual world object which a thought intends. I (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Dennett on intentional systems.Stephen P. Stich - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (1):39-62.
    During the last dozen years, Daniel Dennett has been elaborating an interconnected – and increasingly influential – set of views in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of psychology, and those parts of moral philosophy that deal with the notions of freedom, responsibility, and personhood. The central unifying theme running through Dennett's writings on each of these topics is his concept of an intentional system. He invokes the concept to “legitimize” mentalistic predicates ("Brainstorms", p. xvii), to explain the theoretical (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   74 citations  
  38. The Metaphysics of Practical Rationality: Intentional and Deontic Cognition.Preston Stovall - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (4):549-568.
    Despite growing appreciation in recent decades of the importance of shared intentional mental states as a foundation for everything from divergences in primate evolution, to the institution of communal norms, to trends in the development of modernity as a socio-political phenomenon, we lack an adequate understanding of the relationship between individual and shared intentionality. At the same time, it is widely appreciated that deontic reasoning concerning what ought, may, and ought not be done is, like reasoning about our intentions, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  39.  28
    Connection Principle, Searle, and Unconscious Intentionality.Tomislav Janovic & Davor Pecnjak - 2007 - Prolegomena 6 (1):29-43.
    The present article is a critical assessment of the “Connection Principle” – the principle according to which the two key properties of mental states, intentionality and phenomenality, are necessarily co-instantiated. A theory of mind endorsing some version of this principle assumes that all intentional states are either conscious or otherwise potentially conscious. The Connection Principle, being a subject of much controversy in the past 15 years, has divided the community of philosophers of mind in two, as it were, irreconcilable (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Re-Expressing Normative Pragmatism.Richard Evans - 2009 - In Collective Intentionality VI, Berkeley.
    The central claim of normative pragmatism is that intentional states can be explained in terms of participation in practices. My aim in this paper is not so much to defend this claim as to rearticulate it in a different medium: the medium of computation. I describe two computer programs in which this claim is re-expressed. The first is the latest version of THE SIMS, in which participation in practices enables the Sims to do and understand more. The second is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41.  57
    Philosophical aspects of dual use technologies.Svitlana V. Pustovit & Erin D. Williams - 2008 - Science and Engineering Ethics 16 (1):17-31.
    The term dual use technologies refers to research and technology with the potential both to yield valuable scientific knowledge and to be used for nefarious purposes with serious consequences for public health or the environment. There are two main approaches to assessing dual use technologies: pragmatic and metaphysical. A pragmatic approach relies on ethical principles and norms to generate specific guidance and policy for dual use technologies. A metaphysical approach exhorts us to the deeper study of human nature, our intentions, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  42.  13
    Norme, malédiction et forme de vie dans les “règles” de Chenouté.Fabrizio Vecoli - 2018 - Augustinianum 58 (1):65-86.
    In 2014 the coptologist Bentley Layton published a corpus of texts with the title The Canons of our Fathers. Rules of Shenoute. Our article proposes an analysis of these “rules” of the Egyptian abbot Shenoute. This collection is characterised by the explicit intention of disciplining the conscience of each member of the community. This intention can be discerned in the particular use of curses and in a series of precepts that regulate the monk’s interior life prohibiting certain inner conditions that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43.  92
    Husserl’s Original Project for a Normative Phenomenology of Emotions and Values.Panos Theodorou - 2012 - In Values: Readings and Sources on a Key Concept of the Globalized World.
    Phenomenologists are yet another group of philosophers who have also dealt with the problem of values and valuation. What do they have to say about it? Heidegger, to be sure, emphatically warned that we’d better stop approaching serious philosophical problems in terms of valuing and values. It is actually the result of all the efforts to the contrary, he claimed, that has brought nihilism into history and has continued to enhance it along with the accompanying despair. Values and nihilism (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  44.  32
    The affective and normative intentionality of skilled performance: a radical embodied approach.Laura Mojica & Melina Gastelum Vargas - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8205-8230.
    In this paper, we argue that the intentionality at play in skilled performance is not only inherently normative but also inherently affective. We take a radically embodied approach to the mind in which we conceive of cognitive agents as sensorimotor systems moved to maintain their biological and sociocultural identity, whose perception is direct and occurs in terms of affordances. Within this framework, we define skilled performance as the enactment of action and perception patterns in which the agent is intentionally oriented (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  45.  24
    Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context.Dorit Ganson - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):504-507.
    Crafted within a knowledge-first epistemological framework, Mona Simion’s engaging and wide-ranging work ensures that both the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA) and Classical Invariantism (CI) can be part of a viable and productive research program.Dissatisfied with current strategies on offer in the literature, she successfully counters objections to the pair sourced in “shiftiness intuitions”—intuitions that seem to indicate that mere changes in practical context can impact the propriety of assertions and knowledge attributions. For example, in Keith DeRose’s famous pair of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46.  5
    The Knobe effect from the perspective of thomistic ethics: The problem of normative orders and competences.Andrzej Waleszczyński - 2020 - Studia Philosophiae Christianae 56 (S2):173-196.
    This article discusses how to interpret the so-called Knobe effect, which refers to the asymmetry in judgments about the intentionality of the side effects caused by one’s actions. The observed tendency is explained through the “moral undertone” of the actions judged. So far, discussions have mostly been held among philosophers in the analytical tradition, who see the theory of morality largely as an ethics of rules. The analysis developed in this article advances the research carried out so far to include (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. The Call of The Wild: Terror Modulations.Berit Soli-Holt & Isaac Linder - 2013 - Continent 3 (2):60-65.
    This piece, included in the drift special issue of continent., was created as one step in a thread of inquiry. While each of the contributions to drift stand on their own, the project was an attempt to follow a line of theoretical inquiry as it passed through time and the postal service from October 2012 until May 2013. This issue hosts two threads: between space & place and between intention & attention. The editors recommend that to experience the drifiting thought (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Knowledge-how is the Norm of Intention.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1703-1727.
    It is a widely shared intuition that there is a close connection between knowledge-how and intentional action. In this paper, I explore one aspect of this connection: the normative connection between intending to do something and knowing how to do it. I argue for a norm connecting knowledge-how and intending in a way that parallels the knowledge norms of assertion, belief, and practical reasoning, which I call the knowledge-how norm of Intention. I argue that this norm can appeal to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  49. The normativity of the intentional.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Many philosophers have claimed that the intentional is normative. (This claim is the analogue, within the philosophy of mind, of the claim that is often made within the philosophy of language, that meaning is normative.) But what exactly does this claim mean? And what reason is there for believing it? In this paper, I shall first try to clarify the content of the claim that the intentional is normative. Then I shall examine a number of the arguments that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  50. Dispositions and their intentions.Andrea Borghini - 2009 - In G. Damschen, R. Schnepf & K. Stueber (eds.), Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Mind. De Gruyter. pp. 204-219.
    Dispositional Realism is the view according to which some denizens of reality – i.e., dispositions – are properties, that may exist in the natural world and have an irreducible modal character. Among Dispositional Realists, Charlie Martin, Ullin Place and George Molnar most notably argued that the modal character of dispositions should be understood in terms of their intentionality. Other Dispositional Realists, most notably Stephen Mumford, challenged this understanding of the modal character of dispositions. In this paper, I (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000