Results for 'thick value concepts'

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  1.  70
    Moral Emotions and Thick Ethical Concepts.Sunny Yang - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:469-479.
    My aim in this paper is to illuminate the limitations of adopting thick ethical concepts to support the rationality of moral emotion. To this end, I shall first of all concentrate on whether emotions, especially moral emotions are thick concepts and can be analysed into both evaluative and descriptive components. Secondly,I shall examine Gibbard’s thesis that to judge an act wrong is to think guilt and anger warranted. I then raise the following question. If we identify (...)
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  2.  39
    Care as a Thick Ethical Concept.Ira Chadha-Sridhar - 2023 - Res Publica 29 (3):405-423.
    Philosophers who study care—most often, care ethicists—are involved in an ongoing discussion about the concept of care. Despite the significant progress made in this discussion, certain conflicting images of care seem to persist in the literature. On one hand, as feminist theorists across disciplines have highlighted, care is a complex social practice that is mired in inequality and injustice. The deeply gendered nature of caring and the unequal division of care-work creates and cements structural inequalities. On the other hand, care (...)
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  3.  12
    The case for a thick shareholder concept.Katherina Pattit & Jason Pattit - 2019 - Business and Society Review 124 (4):497-514.
    Markets, corporations, shareholding, management, law, and ethics are all human constructs. A human element seems essential to their existence. Yet, the predominant conception of shareholders as used in academia as well as the business world is thin, generic, and inanimate. This article argues that a thick conception of shareholders as human beings is needed to legitimize and improve managerial decision making under value pluralism, accurately reflect empirical reality of capital markets, and meet moral demands to respect the dignity (...)
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  4.  78
    Novel & worthy: creativity as a thick epistemic concept.Julia Sánchez-Dorado - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (3):1-23.
    The standard view in current philosophy of creativity says that being creative has two requirements: being novel and being valuable. The standard view on creativity has recently become an object of critical scrutiny. Hills and Bird have specifically proposed to remove the value requirement from the definition, as it is not clear that creative objects are necessarily valuable or creative people necessarily praiseworthy. In this paper, I argue against Hills and Bird, since eliminating the element of value from (...)
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  5. Tracing thick and thin concepts through corpora.Kevin Https://Orcidorg Reuter, Lucien Baumgartner & Pascale Willemsen - 2024 - Language and Cognition.
    Philosophers and linguists currently lack the means to reliably identify evaluative concepts and measure their evaluative intensity. Using a corpus-based approach, we present a new method to distinguish evaluatively thick and thin adjectives like ‘courageous’ and ‘awful’ from descriptive adjectives like ‘narrow,’ and from value-associated adjectives like ‘sunny.’ Our study suggests that the modifiers ‘truly’ and ‘really’ frequently highlight the evaluative dimension of thick and thin adjectives, allowing for them to be uniquely classified. Based on these (...)
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  6.  28
    Profit and Other Values: Thick Evaluation in Decision Making.Bastiaan van der Linden & R. Edward Freeman - 2017 - Business Ethics Quarterly 27 (3):353-379.
    ABSTRACT:Profit maximizers have reasons to agree with stakeholder theorists that managers may need to consider different values simultaneously in decision making. However, it remains unclear how maximizing a single value can be reconciled with simultaneously considering different values. A solution can neither be found in substantive normative philosophical theories, nor in postulating the maximization of profit. Managers make sense of the values in a situation by means of the many thick value concepts of ordinary language. (...) evaluation involves the simultaneous consideration of different values: making sense of a value always involves knowing how to engage with it given the other values in the situation. This also goes for profit: maximization is only one way of engaging with the value of profit, and grasping whether maximization is appropriate involves considering other values. We discuss some consequences of our approach for stakeholder theorists and profit maximizers. (shrink)
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  7. Thick Concepts.Brent G. Kyle - 2016 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A term expresses a thick concept if it expresses a specific evaluative concept that is also substantially descriptive. It is a matter of debate how this rough account should be unpacked, but examples can help to convey the basic idea. Thick concepts are often illustrated with virtue concepts like courageous and generous, action concepts like murder and betray, epistemic concepts like dogmatic and wise, and aesthetic concepts like gaudy and brilliant. These concepts (...)
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  8.  97
    Thick Concepts and Holism about Reasons.Andrew Sneddon - 2010 - Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (4):461-468.
    Thick moral concepts are a topic of particular disagreement in discussions of reasons holism. These concepts, such as justice, are called “thick” because they have both evaluative and descriptive aspects. Thin moral concepts, such as good, are purely evaluative. The disagreement concerns whether the fact that an action is, for example, just always a reason in favor of performing that action. The present argument follows Jonathan Dancy’s strategy of connecting moral reasons and concepts to (...)
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  9. What are Thick Concepts?Matti Eklund - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):25-49.
    Many theorists hold that there is, among value concepts, a fundamental distinction between thin ones and thick ones. Among thin ones are concepts like good and right. Among concepts that have been regarded as thick are discretion, caution, enterprise, industry, assiduity, frugality, economy, good sense, prudence, discernment, treachery, promise, brutality, courage, coward, lie, gratitude, lewd, perverted, rude, glorious, graceful, exploited, and, of course, many others. Roughly speaking, thick concepts are value (...) with significant descriptive content. I will discuss a number of problems having to do with how best to understand the notion of a thick concept. Thick concepts have been widely discussed in the .. (shrink)
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  10. Knowledge as a Thick Concept: New Light on the Gettier and Value Problems.Brent G. Kyle - 2011 - Dissertation, Cornell University
    I argue that knowledge is a particular kind of concept known as a thick concept. Examples of thick concepts include courage, generosity, loyalty, brutality, and so forth. These concepts are commonly said to combine both evaluation and description, and one of the main goals of this dissertation is to provide a new account of how a thick concept combines these elements. It is argued that thick concepts are semantically evaluative, and that they combine (...)
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  11.  38
    Health and Disease as 'Thick' Concepts in Ecosystemic Contexts.James Lindemann Nelson - 1995 - Environmental Values 4 (4):311 - 322.
    In this paper, I consider what kind of normative work might be done by speaking of ecosystems utilising a 'medical' vocabulary – drawing, that is, on such notions as 'health', 'disease', and 'illness'. Some writers attracted to this mode of expression have been rather modest about what they think it might purchase. I wish to be bolder. Drawing on the idea of 'thick' evaluative concepts as discussed by McDowell, Williams and Taylor, and resorting to a phenomenological argument for (...)
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  12. Thick Concepts as Social Factors of Oppression on Moral Decisions and Injustice.Ozan A. Altinok - 2022 - Chinese Journal of Contemporary Values 9 (No. 4): pp. 116–128. Translated by Yue QI.
    Social dimension of moral responsibility has started to gain more attention in moral philosophy, be it within the network of action theory, or any other meta-ethical domain. Although there are many social acts and therefore social dimensions of responsibility, I aim to indicate one aspect of sociality in our thinking and practice, particularly in our moral thinking, that is the thick concepts. In this work, I consider Vargas’s concept moral ecology (2015, 2018) as a tool to understand certain (...)
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  13. Thick Concepts.Debbie Roberts - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):677-688.
    In ethics, aesthetics and increasingly in epistemology, a distinction is drawn between thick and thin evaluative concepts. A common characterisation of the distinction is that thin concepts have only evaluative content, whereas thick concepts combine evaluative and descriptive content. Because of this combination, it is again commonly thought that thick concepts have various distinctive powers including the power to undermine the distinction between fact and value. This paper discusses the accuracy of this (...)
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  14. Democratising Measurement: or Why Thick Concepts Call for Coproduction.Anna Alexandrova & Mark Fabian - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (1):1-23.
    Thick concepts, namely those concepts that describe and evaluate simultaneously, present a challenge to science. Since science does not have a monopoly on value judgments, what is responsible research involving such concepts? Using measurement of wellbeing as an example, we first present the options open to researchers wishing to study phenomena denoted by such concepts. We argue that while it is possible to treat these concepts as technical terms, or to make the relevant (...)
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  15.  71
    Thick concepts and internal reasons.Ulrike Heuer - 2012 - In Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 219.
    It has become common to distinguish between two kinds of ethical concepts: thick and thin ones. Bernard Williams, who coined the terms, explains that thick concepts such as “coward, lie, brutality, gratitude and so forth” are marked by having greater empirical content than thin ones. They are both action-guiding and world-guided: -/- If a concept of this kind applies, this often provides someone with a reason for action… At the same time, their application is guided by (...)
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  16.  48
    Thick Concepts in Economics: The Case of Becker and Murphy’s Theory of Rational Addiction.Catherine Herfeld & Charles Djordjevic - 2021 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 51 (4):371-399.
    In this paper, we examine the viability of avoiding value judgments encoded in thick concepts when these concepts are used in economic theories. We focus on what implications the use of such thick concepts might have for the tenability of the fact/value dichotomy in economics. Thick concepts have an evaluative and a descriptive component. Our suggestion is that despite attempts to rid thick concepts of their evaluative component, economists are (...)
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  17. "Just the Facts": Thick Concepts and Hermeneutical Misfit.Rowan Bell - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly (TBA).
    Oppressive ideology regularly misrepresents features of structural injustice as normal or appropriate. Resisting such injustice therefore requires critical examination of the evaluative judgments encoded in shared concepts. In this paper, I diagnose a mechanism of ideological misevaluation, which I call "hermeneutical misfit." Hermeneutical misfit occurs when thick concepts, or concepts which both describe and evaluate, mobilize ideologically warped evaluative judgments which do not fit the facts (e.g. "slutty"). These ill-fitted thick concepts in turn are (...)
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  18. Just the Right Thickness: A Defense of Second-Wave Virtue Epistemology.Guy Axtell & J. Adam Carter - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (3):413-434.
    Abstract Do the central aims of epistemology, like those of moral philosophy, require that we designate some important place for those concepts located between the thin-normative and the non-normative? Put another way, does epistemology need "thick" evaluative concepts and with what do they contrast? There are inveterate traditions in analytic epistemology which, having legitimized a certain way of viewing the nature and scope of epistemology's subject matter, give this question a negative verdict; further, they have carried with (...)
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  19. Which Attitudes for the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value?Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1099-1122.
    According to the fitting attitude (FA) analysis of value concepts, to conceive of an object as having a given value is to conceive of it as being such that a certain evaluative attitude taken towards it would be fitting. Among the challenges that this analysis has to face, two are especially pressing. The first is a psychological challenge: the FA analysis must call upon attitudes that shed light on our value concepts while not presupposing the (...)
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  20. Wherein is the concept of disease normative? From weak normativity to value-conscious naturalism.M. Cristina Amoretti & Elisabetta Lalumera - 2021 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 25 (1):1-14.
    In this paper we focus on some new normativist positions and compare them with traditional ones. In so doing, we claim that if normative judgments are involved in determining whether a condition is a disease only in the sense identified by new normativisms, then disease is normative only in a weak sense, which must be distinguished from the strong sense advocated by traditional normativisms. Specifically, we argue that weak and strong normativity are different to the point that one ‘normativist’ label (...)
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  21. Justice, Thick Versus Thin.Brent G. Kyle - 2020 - In Mortimer Sellers & Stephan Kirste (eds.), Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. pp. 1-7.
    This entry addresses the question of whether justice is thick, thin, or neither. It discusses three main ways of understanding the difference between thick and thin – Williams’ 1985 distinction, the Continuum Approach, and Hare’s distinction. The question of how to classify justice turns out to be a problem for Williams’ 1985 distinction. If the Continuum Approach is correct, it’s far from clear why it would matter whether a given concept is classified as thick, thin, or neither. (...)
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  22. Thickness and Evaluation.Matti Eklund - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (1):89-104.
    This is a review essay devoted to Pekka Väyrynen’s The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty. Väyrynen’s book, concerned with thick terms and thick concepts, argues for a pragmatic view on the evaluativeness associated with these terms and concepts. The essay raises a number of critical questions regarding what Väyrynen’s arguments for his view actually show. It deals with, for example, thick properties, the fact-value distinction, what it is for terms and concepts to (...)
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  23. Slim Epistemology with a Thick Skin.Pekka Väyrynen - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (3):389-412.
    The distinction between “thick” and “thin” value concepts, and its importance to ethical theory, has been an active topic in recent meta-ethics. This paper defends three claims regarding the parallel issue about thick and thin epistemic concepts. (1) Analogy with ethics offers no straightforward way to establish a good, clear distinction between thick and thin epistemic concepts. (2) Assuming there is such a distinction, there are no semantic grounds for assigning thick epistemic (...)
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  24. Values and Emotions.Christine Tappolet - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 80-95.
    Evaluative concepts and emotions appear closely connected. According to a prominent account, this relation can be expressed by propositions of the form ‘something is admirable if and only if feeling admiration is appropriate in response to it’. The first section discusses various interpretations of such ‘Value-Emotion Equivalences’, for example the Fitting Attitude Analysis, and it offers a plausible way to read them. The main virtue of the proposed way to read them is that it is well-supported by a (...)
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  25.  42
    Objectivity, Intrinsicality and Sustainability: Comment on Nelson's 'Health and Disease as "Thick" Concepts in Ecosystemic Contexts'.Bryan Norton - 1995 - Environmental Values 4 (4):323 - 332.
    Ecosystem health, as James Nelson argues, must be understood as having both descriptive and normative content; it is in this sense a 'morally thick' concept. The health analogy refers (a) at the similarities between conservation ecology and medicine or plant pathology as normative sciences, and (b) to the ability of ecosystems to 'heal' themselves in the face of disturbances. Nelson, however, goes beyond these two aspects and argues that judgements of illness in ecosystems only support moral obligations to protect (...)
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  26. Translating Evaluative Discourse: the Semantics of Thick and Thin Concepts.Ranganathan Shyam - 2007 - Dissertation, York University
    According to the philosophical tradition, translation is successful when one has substituted words and sentences from one language with those from another by cross-linguistic synonymy. Moreover, according to the orthodox view, the meaning of expressions and sentences of languages are determined by their basic or systematic role in a language. This makes translating normative and evaluative discourse puzzling for two reasons. First, as languages are syntactically and semantically different because of their peculiar cultural and historical influences, and as values and (...)
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  27.  65
    Literary Thickness.Rafe McGregor - 2015 - British Journal of Aesthetics 55 (3):343-360.
    In this paper, I shall demonstrate the value of the concept of literary thickness – i.e. form-content inseparability – as a tool of literary appreciation. I set out the relationships between non-fiction, fiction, literature, and poetry in Section 1 and sketch a preliminary definition of literary thickness in Section 2. I argue that a convincing account of reference in literary fictions can be provided by means of literary thickness in Sections 3 and 4. I argue that the match between (...)
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  28.  84
    Personality Disorders and Thick Concepts.Konrad Banicki - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (3):209-221.
    'Cruel' simply ignores the supposed fact/value dichotomy and cheerfully allows itself to be used sometimes for a normative purpose and sometimes as a descriptive term.Personality disorders have always attracted considerable attention within the philosophy of psychiatry. It was not until two papers written by Louis Charland, however, that they simulated a wider and lively debate. The importance and, at least partly, the strength of Charland's analyses lie in the fact that they are relatively particular and focused in their...
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  29.  51
    A new account of thick concepts.Andrew Payne - 2005 - Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (1):89-103.
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  30. The Fact/Value Entanglement as a Linguistic Illusion.Óscar L. González-Castán - 2008 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 95 (1):287-305.
    This paper addresses four different, albeit related, issues concerning Hilary Putnam's fact/value entanglement theory. It is organized around a series of questions. First, what set of problems does the theory attempt to resolve? The revision of the empiricists and the positivist traditions will be the main concern of this first section. Secondly, how does the notion of "fact/value entanglement" solves these problems? I argue that while Putnam has persuasively defended the possibility of an entanglement between descriptive functions and (...)
     
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  31. Evaluative vs. Deontic Concepts.Christine Tappolet - 2022 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley. pp. 1791-99.
    Ethical thought is articulated around normative concepts. Standard examples of normative concepts are good, reason, right, ought, and obligatory. Theorists often treat the normative as an undifferentiated domain. Even so, it is common to distinguish between two kinds of normative concepts: evaluative or axiological concepts, such as good, and deontic concepts, such as ought. This encyclopedia entry discusses the many differences between the two kinds of concepts.
     
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  32.  63
    Psychology's facts and values: A perennial entanglement.Svend Brinkmann - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):749 – 765.
    The idea of a logical and metaphysical gap between facts and values is taken for granted in much psychology. Howard Kendler has recently defended the standard view that human values cannot be discovered by psychology. In contrast, various postmodern approaches have sought to attack the fact-value dichotomy with the argument that psychological facts are inevitably morally and politically laden, and therefore relative. In this article, a third line of thought is pursued, significantly inspired by philosopher of science, Hilary Putnam. (...)
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  33.  9
    Mind, Values, and Metaphysics. Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan, Volume 1.Anne Reboul (ed.) - 2014 - Cham: Springer Verlag.
    This book addresses five main topics of metaphysics in its first section: formal objects and truth-makers; tropes; properties and predicates; varieties of relations; and the notion of explanation in metaphysics. The second part of this volume focuses on the history of philosophy with an emphasis on Austrian philosophy: the ideas of Bolzano, Wittgenstein, Locke and Bergson, amongst others, are explored in the papers presented here. This is the first volume in a two-volume set that originates from papers presented to Professor (...)
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  34. Dichotomies and Artifacts: A Reply to Professor Hookway.Jaime Nubiola - 2008 - In Rivas Monroy , Cancela Silva & Martínez Vidal (eds.), Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities. pp. 71-80.
    In this reply to Professor Hookway’s lecture the comments are focused, first, on the topic of what dichotomies really are, since it is an illuminating way of understanding pragmatism in general and Putnam’s pragmatism in particular. Dichotomies are artifacts that we devise with some useful purpose in mind, but when inflated into absolute dichotomies they become metaphysical bogeys as it is illustrated by the twentieth century distinction between fact and value. Secondly, a brief comment on the so-called “thick (...)
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  35.  19
    Bernard Williams and the concept of shame: What makes an emotion moral?Dina Mendonça & Susana Cadilha - 2019 - Labyrinth: An International Journal for Philosophy, Value Theory and Sociocultural Hermeneutics 21 (1):99-115.
    The paper proposes a way to understand moral emotions in ethics building upon Bernard Williams' claim that feelings, emotions and sentiments are an integral part of rationality. Based upon Bernard Williams' analysis of shame we argue that the richness and thickness that it is attached to some emotions is the key to understand why some emotions have a distinct ethical resonance. The first part takes up Bernard Williams' philosophical assessment of the concept of shame establishing a general framework to show (...)
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  36.  75
    Berlin, value pluralism and the common good: A reply to Brian Trainor.George Crowder - 2008 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 34 (8):925-939.
    Brian Trainor argues that the current hostility of political theorists towards the idea of the common good is in part due to the influence of Isaiah Berlin's concept of `value pluralism', or the incommensurability of basic human values. I agree with Trainor's opposition to the `agonistic' interpretation of pluralism, associated with thinkers like Chantal Mouffe. However, it is not the case that the only alternative to the pluralism— agonism thesis is the monist defence of a thick common good (...)
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  37. The Fair Value of Economic Liberty.Daniel M. Layman - 2015 - Res Publica 21 (4):413-428.
    In Free Market Fairness, John Tomasi tries to show that ‘thick’ economic liberties, including the right to own productive property, are basic liberties. According to Tomasi, the policy-level consequences of protecting economic liberty as basic are essentially libertarian in character. I argue that if economic liberties are basic, just societies must guarantee their fair value to all citizens. And in order to secure the fair value of economic liberty, states must guarantee that citizens of roughly similar dispositions (...)
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  38.  14
    Re-envisioning personhood from the perspective of Japanese philosophy: Watsuji Tetsuro's Aidagara-based ethics.Hirotaka Sugita - 2022 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 54 (9):1367-1376.
    This paper re-envisions the personhood of severely disabled children, who are often excluded from the category of human beings in the academic literature due to their perceived lack of mental faculties, based on Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsuro’s concept of human beings. It begins with Carl Elliott’s claim that personhood should be used as a thick ethical concept. This concept has two features. First, it represents a fusion of fact and value. Second, it is embedded in our rich and (...)
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  39.  46
    Does the harm component of the harmful dysfunction analysis need rethinking?: Reply to Powell and Scarffe.Jerome C. Wakefield & Jordan A. Conrad - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (9):594-596.
    In ‘Rethinking Disease’, Powell and Scarffe1 propose what in effect is a modification of Jerome Wakefield’s2 3 harmful dysfunction analysis of medical disorder. The HDA maintains that ‘disorder’ is a hybrid factual and value concept requiring that a biological dysfunction, understood as a failure of some feature to perform a naturally selected function, causes harm to the individual as evaluated by social values. Powell and Scarffe accept both the HDA’s evolutionary biological function component and its incorporation of a (...) component. Their proposed ‘new twist’ is to revise the value component: ‘Our proposed definition of disease is as follows: a biomedical state is a disease only if it implicates a biological dysfunction that is, or would be, properly disvalued’. So, they propose that a disorder is a ‘properly disvalued dysfunction’ rather than a ‘harmful dysfunction’, an approach they term ‘thickly normative’ in contrast to the thin normative approach of the HDA. There has been a surge of interest recently in better understanding the ‘harm’ component of the HDA. Powell and Scarffe’s analysis is a helpful contribution to this discussion. We focus here exclusively on their proposal regarding the analysis of the concept of disorder and ignore many important related issues that the authors address, ranging from prioritising resource allocation between disorders and non-disorders to whether the concept of disorder should be replaced by a generic welfarist concept. The resolution of these additional issues depends on first understanding ‘disorder’. The authors’ proposed changes to the HDA also deserve evaluation because the HDA, which has been endorsed by leading nosologists,4 plays an influential role in nosological debate across categories of disorder ranging, for example, from sexual paraphilias5 to psychopathy.6 A basic problem is that Powell and Scarffe misinterpret …. (shrink)
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  40.  34
    Resourcefulness of an empirically informed and thickly normative account of disease.Şerife Tekin - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (9):589-590.
    Educators who start a philosophy of medicine or medical ethics class with a philosophical discussion on the definition of basic concepts in medicine, such as health and disease, might relate to this anecdotal account. Students initially find the topic engaging because of the ubiquity of the concept of disease regulating not only their direct encounter with health-related contexts, for example, when veterans returning to school receive accommodations after being diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, but also their social world, (...)
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  41. Thick Ethical Concepts.Pekka Väyrynen - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    [First published 09/2016; substantive revision 02/2021.] Evaluative terms and concepts are often divided into “thin” and “thick”. We don’t evaluate actions and persons merely as good or bad, or right or wrong, but also as kind, courageous, tactful, selfish, boorish, and cruel. The latter evaluative concepts are "descriptively thick": their application somehow involves both evaluation and a substantial amount of non-evaluative description. This article surveys various attempts to answer four fundamental questions about thick terms and (...)
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  42. Qu'est-ce qu'un jugement esthétique? Chs1,2 online.John Zeimbekis - 2006 - Vrin.
    Among the book's arguments: Aesthetic property relativism, as described by Alan Goldman, requires subjects to make judgments based on prima facie preferences for determinable properties (eg being curved, being blue). These judgments are not bona fide because they do not require acquaintance with objects. Value concepts and aesthetic (thick) concepts relate contingently. We can be aesthetic property realists, or quasi-realists, without being aesthetic value realists. Contains epistemological arguments against neuro-aesthetics (Ramachandran), aesthetic sense theory (Hutcheson), physiological (...)
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  43.  43
    Noble in Reason, Infinite in Faculty: Themes and Variations in Kant's Moral and Religious Philosophy.A. W. Moore - 2003 - New York: Routledge.
    In this bold and innovative new work, A.W. Moore poses the question of whether it is possible for ethical thinking to be grounded in pure reason. In order to understand and answer this question, he takes a refreshing and challenging look at Kant’s moral and religious philosophy. Identifying three Kantian Themes – morality, freedom and religion – and presenting variations on each of these themes in turn, Moore concedes that there are difficulties with the Kantian view that morality can be (...)
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  44. Il relativismo etico fra antropologia culturale e filosofia analitica.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2007 - In Ilario Tolomio, Sergio Cremaschi, Antonio Da Re, Italo Francesco Baldo, Gian Luigi Brena, Giovanni Chimirri, Giovanni Giordano, Markus Krienke, Gian Paolo Terravecchia, Giovanna Varani, Lisa Bressan, Flavia Marcacci, Saverio Di Liso, Alice Ponchio, Edoardo Simonetti, Marco Bastianelli, Gian Luca Sanna, Valentina Caffieri, Salvatore Muscolino, Fabio Schiappa, Stefania Miscioscia, Renata Battaglin & Rossella Spinaci (eds.), Rileggere l'etica tra contingenza e principi. Ilario Tolomio (ed.). Padova: CLUEP. pp. 15-46.
    I intend to: a) clarify the origins and de facto meanings of the term relativism; b) reconstruct the reasons for the birth of the thesis named “cultural relativism”; d) reconstruct ethical implications of the above thesis; c) revisit the recent discussion between universalists and particularists in the light of the idea of cultural relativism.. -/- 1.Prescriptive Moral Relativism: “everybody is justified in acting in the way imposed by criteria accepted by the group he belongs to”. Universalism: there are at least (...)
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  45.  24
    Relaciones recíprocas entre el Movimiento Ecología Profunda y las ciencias naturales.Alicia Irene Bugallo - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 23:175-182.
    We highlight the deep ecology movement, inspired on ecological knowledge but mainly on the life-style of the ecological and biological field-worker. Its creator, the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess, stresses that human and no human beings have, at least, one kind of right in common: namely the ‘right’ to express its own nature, to live and blossom. This idea shows the inspiration from perseverare in suo esse, from Baruch Spinoza’s Ethics. But beyond this Spinozan influence, the striving for expression of one’s (...)
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  46.  9
    Dlaczego nauka nie może być wolna od wartości.Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik - 2004 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 52 (2):275-292.
    Against the background of the ideal of value-free science formulated by M. Weber the paper defends the view that science is not - and cannot be - value-free, and, moreover, that values relevant to science are both cognitive and moral.Three arguments are developed to support this thesis: (1) Since there is no algorithm for making methodological decisions as to what theory should be accepted, what method should be used, etc, scientists have to pass judgements that are essentially evaluative. (...)
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  47. Towards an Ethic of Technology? Nanotechnology and the Convergence of Applied Ethics.Marie-Hélène Parizeau - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37 (9999):293-302.
    The hypothesis I develop involves that we have been witnessing, during the last ten years or so, an interpenetration in the area of applied ethics of certain concepts originally belonging to different areas of ethics, namely bioethics, environmental ethics, and also business ethics. Certain concepts such as “future generations,” “consent,” “precautionary principle,” “intrinsic value,” “global governance,” “sustainable development,” or “scientific uncertainty” are becoming “thick ethical concepts,” in the terminology of metaethics; or in the terminology of (...)
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  48. Dichotomies and Artifacts: A Reply to Professor Hookway.Jaime Nubiola - 2008 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 95:71-80.
    In this reply to Professor Hookway's lecture the comments are focused, first, on the topic of what dichotomies really are, since it is an illuminating way of understanding pragmatism in general and Putnam's pragmatism in particular. Dichotomies are artifacts that we devise with some useful purpose in mind, but when inflated into absolute dichotomies they become metaphysical bogeys as it is illustrated by the twentieth century distinction between fact and value. Secondly, a brief comment on the so-called "thick" (...)
     
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  49.  69
    Thick Ethical Concepts in the Philosophy and Literature of Iris Murdoch.Jessy E. G. Jordan - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):402-417.
    Although thick ethical concepts have been neglected in Murdochian scholarship, this article argues that they were central to the thought of Iris Murdoch. In the first section, the article provides a sustained account of thick ethical concepts in Murdoch's philosophy, demonstrating how these concepts align with and illuminate familiar aspects of her philosophical essays. The first section also explores the ways in which Murdoch's alternative account of moral concepts was at the heart of her (...)
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    Williams on Thick Ethical Concepts and Reasons for Action.Eric Wiland - 2013 - In Simon Kirchin (ed.), Thick Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 210-216.
    Bernard Williams argued that philosophers should pay more attention to the role thick ethical concepts play in our moral thinking, and, separately, that all reasons for action depend in the first place upon the agent's pre-exisitng motives. Here I argue that these two views are in tension. Much like the standard examples of thick ethical concepts, the concept REASONABLE is likewise thick, and the features of the world that guide its correct use have much less (...)
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