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  1. G. A. (1974). The Structure of the Life-World. Review of Metaphysics 28 (1):138-139.
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  2. W. S. A. (1979). Marx's Social Ontology. Review of Metaphysics 32 (4):755-756.
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  3. Walter L. Adamson (1981). Marx's Social Ontology" by Carol Gould. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences 11 (1):108.
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  4. Joseph Agassi (2005). Back to the Drawing Board. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (4):509-518.
    Within ontology new theories are extremely rare. Hacking bravely claims to have one: "historical ontology" or "dynamic nominalism." Regrettably, he uses "nominalism" idiosyncratically, without explaining it or its qualifier. He does say what historical ontology is: it is "the presentation of the history of ontology in context." This idea is laudable, as it invites presenting idealism as once attractive but no longer so (due to changes in perception theory, for example). But this idea is a proposal, not a theory, muchless (...)
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  5. Joel Anderson (1996). The Personal Lives of Strong Evaluators: Identity, Pluralism, and Ontology in Charles Taylor's Value Theory. Constellations 3 (1):17-38.
  6. Sybol Anderson (2012). Heikki Ikäheimo and Arto Laitinen (Eds), Recognition and Social Ontology. [REVIEW] Critical Horizons 13 (1):134 - 137.
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  7. Sybol Anderson (2012). Heikki Ikäheimo and Arto Laitinen (Eds), Recognition and Social Ontology. Critical Horizons 13 (1):134 - 137.
    Heikki Ikäheimo and Arto Laitinen (eds), Recognition and Social Ontology Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 134-137 Authors Sybol Cook Anderson, St. Mary's College of Maryland, USA Journal Critical Horizons: A Journal of Philosophy & Social Theory Online ISSN 1568-5160 Print ISSN 1440-9917 Journal Volume Volume 13 Journal Issue Volume 13, Number 1 / 2012.
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  8. Sybol Cook Anderson (2012). Heikki Ikäheimo and Arto Laitinen (Eds), Recognition and Social Ontology (Leiden, EJ Brill, 2011), ISBN 978-90-04-20290-0 (Hbk), 398 Pp. US $182.00. [REVIEW] Critical Horizons 13 (1):134-137.
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  9. Margaret S. Archer (2010). After Mandelbaum : From Societal Facts to Emergent Properties. In Ian Verstegen (ed.), Maurice Mandelbaum and American Critical Realism. Routledge.
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  10. Nicholas Bardsley (2001). Collective Reasoning: A Critique of Martin Hollis's Position. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 4 (4):171-192.
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  11. J. H. M. Beattie (1984). Objectivity and Social Anthropology: J. H. M. Beattie. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 17:1-20.
    This lecture is divided, roughly, into three parts. First, there is a general and perhaps rather simple-minded discussion of what are the ‘facts’ that social anthropologists study; is there anything special about these ‘facts’ which makes them different from other kinds of facts? It will be useful to start with the common-sense distinction between two kinds or, better, aspects of social facts; first—though neither is analytically prior to the other—and putting it very crudely, ‘what people do’, the aspect of social (...)
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  12. T. Bejarano-Fernández (2008). The Construction of Social Reality de John Searle. Thémata: Revista de Filosofía 39:331-334.
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  13. Hans Bernhard Schmid (2008). Plural Action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (1):25-54.
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  14. Roy Bhaskar (2007). 12 Theorising Ontology. In Clive Lawson, John Latsis & Nuno Martins (eds.), Contributions to Social Ontology. Routledge. 15--192.
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  15. Matteo Bianchin (forthcoming). From Joint Attention to Communicative Action Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science. Philosophy and Social Criticism:0191453714556693.
    In this article I consider the relevance of Tomasello’s work on social cognition to the theory of communicative action. I argue that some revisions are needed to cope with Tomasello’s results, but they do not affect the core of the theory. Moreover, they arguably reinforce both its explanatory power and the plausibility of its normative claims. I proceed in three steps. First, I compare and contrast Tomasello’s views on the ontogeny of human social cognition with the main tenets of Habermas’ (...)
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  16. Matteo Bianchin (forthcoming). Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons. Philosophy of the Social Sciences:0048393115580267.
    I argue that a capacity for mindreading conceived along the line of simulation theory provides the cognitive basis for forming we-centric representations of actions and goals. This explains the plural first personal stance displayed by we-intentions in terms of the underlying cognitive processes performed by individual minds, while preserving the idea that they cannot be analyzed in terms of individual intentional states. The implication for social ontology is that this makes sense of the plural subjectivity of joint actions without making (...)
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  17. Olle Blomberg (forthcoming). Shared Intention and the Doxastic Single End Condition. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    What is required for several agents to intentionally φ together? I argue that each of them must believe or assume that their φ-ing is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Various analogies between intentional singular action and intentional joint action show that this *doxastic single end condition* captures a feature at the very heart of the phenomenon of intentional joint action. For instance, just as several simple actions are only unified into a complex intentional singular activity if (...)
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  18. Alban Bouvier (2004). Individual Beliefs and Collective Beliefs in Sciences and Philosophy: The Plural Subject and the Polyphonic Subject Accounts: Case Studies. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (3):382-407.
    The issue of knowing what it means for a group to have collective beliefs is being discussed more and more in contemporary philosophy of the social sciences and philosophy of mind. Margaret Gilbert’s reconsideration of Durkheim’s viewpoint in the framework of the plural subject’s account is one of the most famous. This has implications in the history and the sociology of science—as well asin the history and sociology of philosophy—although Gilbert only outlined them in the former fields and said nothing (...)
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  19. Robert Greenleaf Brice (2008). A Reply to John Searle and Other Traditionalists. Multicultural Education 16 (2):37-40.
    One of the more recent pedagogical debates confronting university instructors is whether liberal education should be replaced with multiculturalism. John Searle has labeled these positions as “traditionalists” and “challengers,” respectively. While not finding “much that is objectionable in the [traditionalists’] assumptions,” Searle argues that the challengers’ assumptions are “weak” and “fallacious.” This negative outcome for the challengers however, is due in large part to Searle’s misrepresentation of their position. Searle presents a flawed, straw-man argument; he unfairly and inaccurately presents the (...)
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  20. Krzysztof Brzechczyn (2009). Methodological Peculiarities of History in Light of Idealizational Theory of Science. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 97 (1):137-157.
    The aim of the paper is an extension of the idealizational theory of science in order to explicate intuitions of historians and philosophers of history about unpredictability and contingency of history. The author identifies two types of essential structures: the first kind dominated by the main factor and the second kind which is dominated by a class of secondary factors. In an essential structure dominated by the main factor, the power of influence it exerts is greater than the sum of (...)
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  21. F. Buekens & M. Boudry (2012). Psychoanalytic Facts as Unintended Institutional Facts. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (2):239-269.
    We present an inference to the best explanation of the immense cultural success of Freudian psychoanalysis as a hermeneutic method. We argue that an account of psychoanalytic facts as products of unintended declarative speech acts explains this phenomenon. Our argument connects diverse, seemingly independent characteristics of psychoanalysis that have been independently confirmed, and applies key features of John Searle’s and Eerik Lagerspetz’s theory of institutional facts to the psychoanalytic edifice. We conclude with a brief defence of the institutional approach against (...)
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  22. N. S. C. (1964). Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Review of Metaphysics 17 (3):486-487.
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  23. Marc Champagne (2014). Book Review: Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (2):252-258.
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  24. A. Chatterjee (2013). Ontology, Epistemology, and Multimethod Research in Political Science. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (1):73-99.
    Epistemologies and research methods are not free of metaphysics. This is to say that they are both, supported by (or presumed by), and support (or presume) fundamental ontologies. A discussion of the epistemological foundations of "multimethod" research in the social sciences—in as much as such research claims to unearth "causal" relations—therefore cannot avoid the ontological presuppositions or implications of such a discussion. But though there isn’t necessarily a perfect correspondence between ontology, epistemology, and methodology, they do constrain each other. As (...)
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  25. Hyundeuk Cheon (2014). In What Sense Is Scientific Knowledge Collective Knowledge? Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (4):407-423.
    By taking the collective character of scientific research seriously, some philosophers have claimed that scientific knowledge is indeed collective knowledge. However, there is little clarity on what exactly is meant by collective knowledge. In this article, I argue that there are two notions of collective knowledge that have not been well distinguished: irreducibly collective knowledge (ICK) and jointly committed knowledge (JCK). The two notions provide different conditions under which it is justified to ascribe knowledge to a group. It is argued (...)
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  26. Alan D. Code (1991). Aristotle, Searle, and the Mind-Body Problem. In Ernest Lepore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  27. Julian C. Cole (2012). An Abstract Status Function Account of Corporations. Philosophy of the Social Sciences (1):0048393112455106.
    In this article, I articulate and defend an account of corporations motivated by John Searle’s discussion of them in his Making the Social World. According to this account, corporations are abstract entities that are the products of status function Declarations. They are also connected with, though not reducible to, various people and certain of the power relations among them. Moreover, these connections are responsible for corporations having features that stereotypical abstract entities lack (e.g., the abilities to take actions and make (...)
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  28. Corbin Collins (1997). Searle on Consciousness and Dualism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (1):15-33.
    In this article, I examine and criticize John Searle's account of the relation between mind and body. Searle rejects dualism and argues that the traditional mind-body problem has a 'simple solution': mental phenomena are both caused by biological processes in the brain and are themselves features of the brain. More precisely, mental states and events are macro-properties of neurons in much the same way that solidity and liquidity are macro-properties of molecules. However, Searle also maintains that the mental is (...)
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  29. John Searle’S. Conception (2010). Acting on Gaps? John Searle's Conception of Free Will. In Jan G. Michel, Dirk Franken & Attila Karakus (eds.), John R. Searle: Thinking About the Real World. Ontos. 103.
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  30. J. Coulter (1982). Remarks on the Conceptualization of Social Structure. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 12 (1):33-46.
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  31. Elizabeth Cripps (2011). Collectivities Without Intention. Journal of Social Philosophy 42 (1):1-20.
  32. A. S. Cua (1987). The Structure of Social Complexes. Review of Metaphysics 41 (2):335 - 353.
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  33. Richard T. de George (1983). Social Reality and Social Relations. Review of Metaphysics 37 (1):3-20.
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  34. K. E. (1981). Human Encounters in the Social World. Review of Metaphysics 34 (3):609-611.
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  35. Dave Elder-Vass (2007). Re-Examining Bhaskar's Three Ontological Domains : The Lessons From Emergence. In Clive Lawson, John Latsis & Nuno Martins (eds.), Contributions to Social Ontology. Routledge. 15--160.
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  36. Ronald P. Endicott (1996). Searle, Syntax, and Observer-Relativity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):101-22.
    I critically examine some provocative arguments that John Searle presents in his book The Rediscovery of Mind to support the claim that the syntactic states of a classical computational system are "observer relative" or "mind dependent" or otherwise less than fully and objectively real. I begin by explaining how this claim differs from Searle's earlier and more well-known claim that the physical states of a machine, including the syntactic states, are insufficient to determine its semantics. In contrast, his more recent (...)
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  37. Brian Epstein (2015). How Many Kinds of Glue Hold the Social World Together? In Mattia Gallotti & John Michael (eds.), Social Ontology and Social Cognition.
    In recent years, theorists have debated how we introduce new social objects and kinds into the world. Searle, for instance, proposes that they are introduced by collective acceptance of a constitutive rule; Millikan and Elder that they are the products of reproduction processes; Thomasson that they result from creator intentions and subsequent intentional reproduction; and so on. In this chapter, I argue against the idea that there is a single generic method or set of requirements for doing so. Instead, there (...)
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  38. Brian Epstein (2015). The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences. Oxford.
    We live in a world of crowds and corporations, artworks and artifacts, legislatures and languages, money and markets. These are all social objects — they are made, at least in part, by people and by communities. But what exactly are these things? How are they made, and what is the role of people in making them? In The Ant Trap, Brian Epstein rewrites our understanding of the nature of the social world and the foundations of the social sciences. Epstein explains (...)
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  39. Brian Epstein (2014). What is Individualism in Social Ontology? Ontological Individualism Vs. Anchor Individualism. In Finn Collin & Julie Zahle (eds.), Rethinking the Individualism/Holism Debate: Essays in the Philosophy of Social Science.
    Individualists about social ontology hold that social facts are “built out of” facts about individuals. In this paper, I argue that there are two distinct kinds of individualism about social ontology, two different ways individual people might be the metaphysical “builders” of the social world. The familiar kind is ontological individualism. This is the thesis that social facts supervene on, or are exhaustively grounded by, facts about individual people. What I call anchor individualism is the alternative thesis that facts about (...)
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  40. Brian Epstein (2013). Social Objects Without Intentions. In Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents: Contributions to Social Ontology. 53-68.
    It is often seen as a truism that social objects and facts are the product of human intentions. I argue that the role of intentions in social ontology is commonly overestimated. I introduce a distinction that is implicit in much discussion of social ontology, but is often overlooked: between a social entity’s “grounds” and its “anchors.” For both, I argue that intentions, either individual or collective, are less essential than many theorists have assumed. Instead, I propose a more worldly – (...)
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  41. Ioannis D. Evrigenis (2008). Fear of Enemies and Collective Action. Cambridge University Press.
    This book explores the way in which the fear of enemies shapes political groups at their founding and helps to preserve them by consolidating them in times of crisis. It develops a theory of “negative association” that examines the dynamics captured by the maxim “The enemy of my enemy is my friend” and then traces its role in the history of political thought, demonstrating that the fear of external threats is an essential element of the formation and preservation of political (...)
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  42. Ángel Manuel Faerna (2011). Ontología social y derechos humanos en John R. Searle. Análisis Filosófico 31 (2):115-139.
    Este artículo se opone a la tesis recientemente sostenida por John Searle según la cual no existen los derechos humanos positivos. Argumentamos que la existencia de dichos derechos no es contradictoria, como pretende Searle, con las nociones de "derecho" y"derechos humanos" definidas en su ontología social. Por consiguiente, es posible aceptar la ontología social de Searle y afirmar al mismo tiempo que los derechos humanos positivos existen. En segundo lugar, ofrecemos razones para cuestionar la supuesta prioridad lógica de una ontología (...)
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  43. Evan Fales (1977). The Ontology of Social Roles. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 7 (2):139-161.
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  44. Guglielmo Feis (2011). Meeting Dan Sperber'€™s Challenge to Searlean Social Ontology. Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica--Junior 2 (2):120--123.
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  45. Guglielmo Feis (2010). Maurizio Ferraris, Documentare la documentalità prima del collasso ontologico. Enthymema 1:275--288.
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  46. J. N. Findlay, J. E. McGechie, John R. Searle & Richard Taylor (1956). Report on Analysis 'Problem' No. 9. Analysis 16 (6):121 - 126.
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  47. M. A. Finocchiaro (1981). Context in Reasoning: Reply to Marchi. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 11 (4):457-458.
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  48. Molly Brigid Flynn (2012). A Realer Institutional Reality: Deepening Searle's (De)Ontology of Civilization. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):43-67.
    Abstract This paper puts Searle?s social ontology together with an understanding of the human person as inclined openly toward the truth. Institutions and their deontology are constituted by collective Declarative beliefs, guaranteeing mind-world adequation. As this paper argues, often they are constituted also by collective Assertive beliefs that justify (rather than validate intrainstitutionally) institutional facts. A special type of Status Function-creating ?Assertive Declarative? belief is introduced, described, and used to shore up Searle?s account against two objections: that, as based on (...)
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  49. Mattia Gallotti (2012). A Naturalistic Argument for the Irreducibility of Collective Intentionality. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (1):3-30.
    According to many philosophers and scientists, human sociality is explained by our unique capacity to “share” attitudes with others. The conditions under which mental states are shared have been widely debated in the past two decades, focusing especially on the issue of their reducibility to individual intentionality and the place of collective intentions in the natural realm. It is not clear, however, to what extent these two issues are related and what methodologies of investigation are appropriate in each case. In (...)
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  50. Mattia Gallotti (2011). Why We Cooperate. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 27 (2):183-190.
1 — 50 / 219