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  1. Juan José Acero (2002). La Conciencia Explicada Por Dennett. Theoria 17 (1):81-112.
    This paper contains two sections. In the first one, some ideas on human mind Dennett presents in his book Consciousness Explained are sketched. In the second section, a critical review is made on Dennett's Multiple Drafts Theory. It is concluded that some of its proposals do not find enough experimental support from research on Cognitive Neuroscience. Even though there is no cardinal point in the brain, both functional and anatomical criteria can be found to distinguish conscious and unconscious information processing (...)
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  2. Jeffrey C. Alexander & Paul Colomy (1985). Toward Neo-Functionalism. Sociological Theory 3 (2):11-23.
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  3. William P. Alston (1985). Functionalism and Theological Language. American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (3):221 - 230.
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  4. Lise Marie Andersen, Functionalism and Embodied, Embedded Mind - The Extended Story.
    In “The Mind Incarnate” Shapiro argues that research in the area of embodied, embedded mind and cognition undermines a functionalist program. In contrast Clark, in “Pressing the Flesh”, argues that embodied, embedded approaches can be viewed as extended functionalistic approaches. In the light of these arguments my thesis is devoted to elucidating the logical relation between functionalism and embodied, embedded approaches. I argue that the functionalist programme is not undermined by embodied and embedded approaches. Shapiro argues that research of embodied, (...)
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  5. R. J. B. (1966). Functionalism. Review of Metaphysics 19 (4):815-815.
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  6. Bernard J. Baars (1996). Understanding Subjectivity: Global Workspace Theory and the Resurrection of the Observing Self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (3):211-17.
    The world of our experience consists at all times of two parts, an objective and a subjective part . . . The objective part is the sum total of whatsoever at any given time we may be thinking of, the subjective part is the inner 'state' in which the thinking comes to pass.
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  7. Bernard J. Baars & J. B. Newman (1994). A Neurobiological Interpretation of the Global Workspace Theory of Consciousness. In Antti Revonsuo & Matti Kamppinen (eds.), Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience. Lawrence Erlbaum.
  8. Lynne Rudder Baker (1985). A Farewell to Functionalism. Philosophical Studies 48 (July):1-14.
    dilemma, a dilemma concerning the individuation of psychological states that explain behavior. Beliefs are individuated by most functionahsts in terms of that 'that'-clauses; functional states are individuated 'narrowly' (i.e.
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  9. Elizabeth Bates & Brian MacWhinney (1989). Functionalism and the Competition Model. In Brian MacWhinney & Elizabeth Bates (eds.), The Crosslinguistic Study of Sentence Processing. Cambridge University Press. 3--73.
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  10. Mark Bauer (2013). Multiple Realizability, Constraints, and Identity. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):446-464.
    Shapiro has suggested that the empirical plausibility of the multiple realizability of human-like minds is dubious, because a contrary thesis, the Mental Constraint Thesis, enjoys positive empirical evidence. The Mental Constraint Thesis states that, given the actual physical laws, there is only one way to realize a human-like mind. I will suggest, however, that the Mental Constraint Thesis is not a contrary to the empirical multiple realizability thesis relevant to psychological reduction or autonomy and, as a consequence, has no bearing (...)
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  11. Christian Beenfeldt (2008). A Wake Up Call—or More Sweet Slumber? A Review of Daniel Dennett's Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness. Think 7 (19):85-92.
    Beenfeldt assesses Dennett's approach to the philosophical problem of consciousness.
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  12. Ned Block (1993). 11 Troubles with Functionalism. In Alvin Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Mit Press. 231.
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  13. Ned Block (1971). Are Mechanistic and Teleological Explanations of Behaviour Incompatible? Philosophical Quarterly 21 (April):109-117.
  14. Kenneth Boyce & Alvin Plantinga (2012). 7 Proper Functionalism. In Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology. Continuum. 124.
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  15. Glenn Braddock (2002). Eliminativism and Indeterminate Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):37-54.
    One of Daniel Dennett's most sophisticated arguments for his eliminativism about phenomenological properties centers around the color phi phenomenon. He attempts to show that there is no phenomenological fact of the matter concerning the phenomenon of apparent motion because it is impossible to decide between two competing explanations. I argue that the two explanations considered by Dennett are both based on the assumption that a realist account of the phenomenon must include a neat mapping between phenomenological time and objective time. (...)
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  16. Darren Bradley (2013). Functionalism and The Independence Problems. Noûs 47 (1):545-557.
    The independence problems for functionalism stem from the worry that if functional properties are defined in terms of their causes and effects then such functional properties seem to be too intimately connected to these purported causes and effects. I distinguish three different ways the independence problems can be filled out – in terms of necessary connections, analytic connections and vacuous explanations. I argue that none of these present serious problems. Instead, they bring out some important and over-looked features of functionalism.
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  17. Neil Brenner (1994). Foucault's New Functionalism. Theory and Society 23 (5):679-709.
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  18. Selmer Bringsjord (1999). The Zombie Attack on the Computational Conception of Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):41 - 69.
    Is it true that if zombies---creatures who are behaviorally indistinguishable from us, but no more conscious than a rock-are logically possible, the computational conception of mind is false? Are zombies logically possible? Are they physically possible? This paper is a careful, sustained argument for affirmative answers to these three questions.
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  19. Jeff Buechner (2007). Gödel, Putnam, and Functionalism: A New Reading of 'Representation and Reality'. A Bradford Book.
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  20. Neil Campbell (2010). Functional Reduction and Mental Causation. Acta Analytica 25 (4):435-446.
    Over the past few decades, Jaegwon Kim has argued that non-reductive physicalism is an inherently unstable position. In his view, the most serious problem is that non-reductive physicalism leads to type epiphenomenalism—the causal inefficacy of mental properties. Kim suggests that we can salvage mental causation by endorsing functional reduction. Given the fact that Kim’s goal in formulating functional reduction is to provide a robust account of mental causation it would be surprising if his position implies eliminativism about mental properties or (...)
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  21. Lawrence Richard Carleton (1982). The Rise of Chicago Functionalism. Erkenntnis 18 (1):3 - 23.
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  22. Timothy Chan (2008). Belief, Assertion and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):395 - 414.
    In this article I argue that two received accounts of belief and assertion cannot both be correct, because they entail mutually contradictory claims about Moore’s Paradox. The two accounts in question are, first, the Action Theory of Belief (ATB), the functionalist view that belief must be manifested in dispositions to act, and second, the Belief Account of Assertion (BAA), the Gricean view that an asserter must present himself as believing what he asserts. It is generally accepted also that Moorean assertions (...)
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  23. Paul M. Churchland (2005). Functionalism at Forty. Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):33 - 50.
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  24. Paul M. Churchland (1982). Is 'Thinker' a Natural Kind? Dialogue 21 (June):223-38.
    Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is here criticized from the perspective of a more naturalistic and less compromising form of materialism. Parallels are explored between the problem of cognitive activity and the somewhat more settled problem of vital activity. The lessons drawn suggest that functionalism in the philosophy of mind may be both counterproductive as a research strategy, and false as a substantive position.
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  25. Jonathan Cohen (1999). Why Asymmetries in Color Space Cannot Save Functionalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):950-950.
    Palmer's strategy of saving functionalism by constraining spectrum inversions cannot succeed because (1) there remain many nontrivial transformations not ruled out by Palmer's constraints, and (2) the constraints involved are due to the contingent makeup of our visual systems, and are therefore not available for use by functionalists.
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  26. Jonas Dagys (2006). Functionalism in Philosophy of Mind: Methodology or Ontology? Problemos 70:113-125.
    Straipsnyje tiriamos dvi XX a. viduryje iðplëtotos funkcionalistinio sàmonës aiðkinimo kryptys: D. Armstrongo ir D. Lewiso analitinis funkcionalizmas ir H. Putnamo komputacinis funkcionalizmas. Siekiamaparodyti, kad ðios dvi kryptys ið esmës sutampa metodologiniu poþiûriu, taèiau jø atstovai suteikiasavøjø teorijø metodologiniam pagrindui skirtingas ontologines interpretacijas. Sutardami, kad fizikinio bûvio ir funkcinio bûvio sàvokos skiriasi, jie nesutaria dël to, ar funkcinio bûvio sàvokà reikialaikyti iðskirianèia atskirà ontologinæ bûviø kategorijà, ar ði sàvoka iðreiðkia tik skirtingà tø paèiø fizikiniø bûviø identifikavimo realiame pasaulyje bûdà. Ðiame (...)
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  27. Daniel Dennett (1993). Caveat Emptor (Reply to Essays on Consciousness Explained - Reply to Mangan, Toribio, Baars and Mcgovern) In. Consciousness and Cognition 2 (1):48-57.
    What I find particularly valuable in the juxtaposition of these three essays on my book is the triangulation made possible by their different versions of much the same story. I present my view as a product of cognitive science, but all three express worries that it may involve some sort of ominous backsliding towards the evils of behaviorism. I agree with Baars and McGovern when they suggest that philosophy has had some baleful influences on psychology during this century. Logical positivism (...)
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  28. Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne (1993). Multiple Drafts: An Eternal Golden Braid? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):810.
    We have learned that the issues we raised are very difficult to think about clearly, and what "works" for one thinker falls flat for another, and leads yet another astray. So it is particularly useful to get these re-expressions of points we have tried to make. Both commentaries help by proposing further details for the Multiple Drafts Model, and asking good questions. They either directly clarify, or force us to clarify, our own account. They also both demonstrate how hard it (...)
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  29. John Divers & Alexander Miller (1994). Best Opinion, Intention-Detecting and Analytic Functionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):239-245.
  30. R. Double (1989). Philosophical Functionalism-Reply. Behaviorism 17 (2):159-160.
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  31. Zoe Drayson (2010). Extended Cognition and the Metaphysics of Mind. Cognitive Systems Research 11 (4):367-377.
    This paper explores the relationship between several ideas about the mind and cognition. The hypothesis of extended cognition claims that cognitive processes can and do extend outside the head, that elements of the world around us can actually become parts of our cognitive systems. It has recently been suggested that the hypothesis of extended cognition is entailed by one of the foremost philosophical positions on the nature of the mind: functionalism, the thesis that mental states are defined by their functional (...)
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  32. Leon Duguit (1938). Social Functionalism the Law and the State. In Jerome Hall (ed.), Readings in Jurisprudence. Gaunt. 31--199.
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  33. W. Y. Elliott (1938). Social Functionalism 211 the Metaphysics of Duguit's Pragmatic Conception of Law. In Jerome Hall (ed.), Readings in Jurisprudence. Gaunt. 37--211.
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  34. Kathleen Emmett (1978). Oneiric Experiences. Philosophical Studies 34 (November):445-50.
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  35. Berent Enc (1982). Intentional States of Mechanical Devices. Mind 91 (April):161-182.
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  36. Pascal Engel (1987). Functionalism, Belief, and Content. In S. Torrance (ed.), The Mind and the Machine. Horwood.
  37. Gary Fuller (1992). Functionalism and Personal Identity. The Personalist Forum 8 (Supplement):133-143.
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  38. A. Campbell Garnett (1940). Functionalism and the Intentional Act. Philosophical Review 49 (4):453-464.
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  39. N. Georgalis (1996). Awareness, Understanding, and Functionalism. Erkenntnis 44 (2):225-56.
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  40. Carl Gillett (2013). Understanding the Sciences Through the Fog of “Functionalism (S)”. In Philippe Huneman (ed.), Functions: Selection and Mechanisms. Springer. 159--181.
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  41. Carl Gillett (2007). A Mechanist Manifesto for the Philosophy of Mind: A Third Way for Functionalists. Journal of Philosophical Research 32:21-42.
    One of the main early forms of “functionalism,” developed by writers like Jerry Fodor and William Lycan, focused on “mechanistic” explanation in the special sciences and argued that “functional properties” in psychology were continuous in nature with the special science properties posited in such mechanistic explanations. I dub the latter position“Continuity Functionalism” and use it to critically examine the “Standard Picture” of the metaphysics of functionalism which takes “functional” properties to be second-order properties and claims there are two metaphysical forms (...)
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  42. Andrew Hampton Gleeson (1998). Three Dogmas of Functionalism. Dissertation, The Australian National University (Australia)
    This thesis is a critique of functionalism in the philosophy of mind. I distinguish three tenets, or 'dogmas' of functionalism, viz: Mental states are causes of behaviour; Mental states can, in principle, be defined in non-mental terms; We understand everything, or at least everything of importance, about the mental states of people, by subsuming token mental states under one or other mental state type. ;The first dogma is rejected in the form which identifies mental state types with physical types, on (...)
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  43. Herbert Granger (1990). Aristotle and the Functionalist Debate. Apeiron 23 (1):27 - 49.
  44. Joe Gray, Susan Chopping, Julia Nunn, David Parslow, Lloyd Gregory, Steve Williams, Michael J. Brammer & Simon Baron-Cohen (2002). Implications of Synaesthesia for Functionalism: Theory and Experiments. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (12):5-31.
    Functionalism offers an account of the relations that hold between behavioural functions, information and neural processing, and conscious experience from which one can draw two inferences: for any discriminable difference between qualia there must be an equivalent discriminable difference in function; and for any discriminable functional difference within a behavioural domain associated with qualia, there must be a discriminable difference between qualia. The phenomenon of coloured hearing synaesthesia appears to contradict the second of these inferences. We report data showing that (...)
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  45. Robert Van Gulick (1982). Functionalism as a Theory of Mind. Philosophy Research Archives 8:185-204.
    A general characterization of functionalist theories of mind is offered and a number of issues are discussed which allow for alternative versions of functionalism. Some issues, such as the distinction between the implicit definition and partial specification views are of a general nature, while others raise questions more specific to functionalism, such as whether the relation between psychological and physiological properties is one of identity or instantiation. Section II attempts to undermine several arguments which have been offered to support the (...)
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  46. Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1995). Locating Consciousness. John Benjamins.
    Spelling out in detail what we do and do not know about phenomenological experience, this book denies the common view of consciousness as a central decision...
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  47. Gilbert Harman (1988). Wide Functionalism. In Stephen Schiffer & Susan Steele (eds.), Cognition and Representation. Westview Press.
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  48. J. Heil (2004). Functionalism. In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press. 139--49.
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  49. J. Heil (1997). Dennett, DC-Kinds of Minds. Philosophical Books 38:265-267.
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  50. Eric Hiddleston (2011). Second-Order Properties and Three Varieties of Functionalism. Philosophical Studies 153 (3):397 - 415.
    This paper investigates whether there is an acceptable version of Functionalism that avoids commitment to second-order properties. I argue that the answer is "no". I consider two reductionist versions of Functionalism, and argue that both are compatible with multiple realization as such. There is a more specific type of multiple realization that poses difficulties for these views, however. The only apparent Functionalist solution is to accept second-order properties.
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