Moral Realism

Edited by David Killoren (Australian Catholic University)
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  1. What is Goodness? An Introduction.Deborah Achtenberg - 1982 - Dissertation, New School for Social Research
    The inquiry is an introduction to the question, what is goodness? In it, realist and anti-realist accounts are considered. In Part I, two kinds of anti-realism are considered, subjectivist and strict. Subjectivism is the belief that goodness is belief-, affect-, or convention-dependent. It is suggested that subjectivism is based on an equivocation, is circular or is difficult consistently to maintain. Strict anti-realism is the belief that there is and can be no such thing as goodness. Three strict anti-realists are considered: (...)
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  2. Teleological Moral Realism : An Explication and Defense.David Eric Alexander - unknown
    Contemporary moral realists assume that goodness is a property susceptible to Kripkean/Putnamian developments in philosophy of language and metaphysics. However, close attention to the actual use of the term ‘good’ reveals that ‘good’ does not refer to a property but to a predicate-forming functor. Relying on an argument advanced by P. T. Geach, I argue that the semantics of ‘good’ is such that statements of the form “x is good” are semantically incomplete. In order to complete such statements some substantive (...)
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  3. Yes to Realism! No to Non-Naturalism!Ulysses T. Araña - 2009 - Kritike 3 (1):98.
    According to contemporary moral realism a moral property, like goodness or badness, is either a natural property or a non-natural property of actions or situations. Contemporary moral naturalists like Richard Boyd, Nicholas Sturgeon, and David Brink are a group of philosophers who are often referred to as Cornell realists because of their connection with Cornell University. Frank Jackson is another contemporary moral naturalist who is one of the leaders of The Canberra Planners at the Australian National University with which he (...)
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  4. Moral Realism and Indeterminacy.I. An Epistemological Argument - 2002 - In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Realism and Relativism. Blackwell.
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  5. What Kind of Theory is the Humean Theory of Motivation?Caroline T. Arruda - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):322-342.
    I consider an underappreciated problem for proponents of the Humean theory of motivation. Namely, it is unclear whether is it to be understood as a largely psychological or largely metaphysical theory. I show that the psychological interpretation of HTM will need to be modified in order to be a tenable view and, as it will turn out, the modifications required render it virtually philosophically empty. I then argue that the largely metaphysical interpretation is the only a plausible interpretation of HTM's (...)
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  6. Our Reliability is in Principle Explainable.Dan Baras - 2017 - Episteme 14 (2):197-211.
    Non-skeptical robust realists about normativity, mathematics, or any other domain of non- causal truths are committed to a correlation between their beliefs and non- causal, mind-independent facts. Hartry Field and others have argued that if realists cannot explain this striking correlation, that is a strong reason to reject their theory. Some consider this argument, known as the Benacerraf–Field argument, as the strongest challenge to robust realism about mathematics, normativity, and even logic. In this article I offer two closely related accounts (...)
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  7. Reductionist Moral Realism and the Contingency of Moral Evolution.Max Barkhausen - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):662-689.
    Reductionist forms of moral realism, such as naturalist realism, are often thought immune to epistemological objections that have been raised against nonnaturalist realism in the form of reliability worries or evolutionary debunking arguments. This article establishes that reductionist realist views can only explain the reliability of our moral beliefs at the cost of incurring repugnant first-order conclusions.
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  8. Realism, Rational Action, and the Humean Theory of Motivation.Melissa Barry - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):231-242.
    Realists about practical reasons agree that judgments regarding reasons are beliefs. They disagree, however, over the question of how such beliefs motivate rational action. Some adopt a Humean conception of motivation, according to which beliefs about reasons must combine with independently existing desires in order to motivate rational action; others adopt an anti-Humean view, according to which beliefs can motivate rational action in their own right, either directly or by giving rise to a new desire that in turn motivates the (...)
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  9. The Problem of Obligation, the Finite Rational Will, and Kantian Value Realism.Anne Margaret Baxley - 2012 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (6):567-583.
    Abstract Robert Stern's Understanding Moral Obligation is a remarkable achievement, representing an original reading of Kant's contribution to modern moral philosophy and the legacy he bequeathed to his later-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century successors in the German tradition. On Stern's interpretation, it was not the threat to autonomy posed by value realism, but the threat to autonomy posed by the obligatory nature of morality that led Kant to develop his critical moral theory grounded in the concept of the self-legislating moral agent. Accordingly, (...)
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  10. The Reality Principle: Realism as an Ethical Obligation.Chris Beckett - 2007 - Ethics and Social Welfare 1 (3):269-281.
    Although a ?realist? stance is sometimes contrasted with a ?principled? one, this article argues that realism is, of itself, an important ethical principle. Acknowledging the problems that exist in defining ?reality?, and the fact that the nature of reality is contested, the article nevertheless insists on an ?out there? reality. It asserts that the existence of this external reality is, in practice, generally accepted, and indeed must be accepted if we are to make the important distinction between truth and falsehood. (...)
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  11. Meta‐Normative Realism, Evolution, and Our Reasons to Survive.Jeff Behrends - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):486-502.
    In this article, I articulate and respond to an epistemological challenge to meta-normative realism. The challenge has it that, if realism about the normative is correct, and if evolutionary forces have significantly influenced our normative judgments, then it would be a remarkable coincidence if the content of the normative facts and our normative judgments were aligned. I criticize David Enoch's recent attempt to meet this challenge, but provide an alternative response that is structurally similar. I argue that if realism is (...)
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  12. Enoch, David. Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.Jeff Behrends - 2012 - Review of Metaphysics 66 (1):146-148.
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  13. Realism, Power, and Objective Interests.Ted Benton - 1982 - In Keith Graham (ed.), Contemporary Political Philosophy: Radical Studies. Cambridge University Press.
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  14. Outline for an Argument for Moral Realism.Lars Bergström - 1981 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 12:215-225.
    Moral realism is defined here as the ontological view that there are moral facts. This is compared with traditional views in moral philosophy, such as naturalism, nonnaturalism, and noncognitivism. It is argued that we have no good reasons to avoid inconsistencies among our moral views unless (we believe that) moral realism is true. Various counter-arguments to this claim are criticized. Moreover, it is argued that, since we do not want to give up the practice of moral reasoning, we have a (...)
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  15. Blessed Are the Peacemakers.Simon Blackburn - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):843-853.
    In this paper I explore the points of similarity and difference that distinguish expressivists such as myself from the position known as Cornell realism. I argue that there are considerable overlaps of doctrine, although these doctrines are arrived at in very different ways. I urge that Cornell realism can only benefit by taking on some of the commitments of expressivism.
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  16. Moral Realism and Justification.Ph Blosser - 1990 - Philosophia Reformata 55:177.
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  17. Moral Realism and Other Issues.Eva D. Bodanszky - 1988 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
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  18. Moral Realism: A Defense.David Owen Brink - 1985 - Dissertation, Cornell University
    I defend moral realism against various metaphysical and epistemological objections and develop a utilitarian specification of moral realism. ;Chapter 1. Moral realism is the claim that there are moral facts whose existence and nature are independent of our evidence for them. Moral realism derives appeal from the plausibility of realism about other disciplines and from the way we deliberate in moral matters. ;Chapter 2. Moral realism is not undermined by general epistemological objections. Realists can and should degend a coherentist epistemology. (...)
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  19. Moral Realism: From Metaphysics to Ethics as Action.Keith Edward Burkum - 1998 - Dissertation, Vanderbilt University
    The focus of this project, Moral Realism: From Metaphysics To Ethics As Action, is to show that the effort to ground ethics in metaphysics is profoundly misguided. Various accounts of moral realism are discussed as leading examples of the effort to support the authority of ethics by means of metaphysical realism. These views require adherance both to the theses of globalism and precision which jointly imply the construction of ethics as system of thought split between the first-order and second-order levels (...)
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  20. Neointuitionism: The Neglected Moral Realism.Robert G. Burton - 1987 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):147-152.
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  21. Realism in Ethics.Panayot Butchvarov - 1988 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):395-412.
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  22. Morality, Meaning and Realism.Douglas Joel Butler - 1988 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Moral realism is developed as the view that moral language is mind-independent, specifically that moral sentences relate to something other than our socially constructed conventions, in such a way that: each moral sentence is rendered determinately true or false simpliciter; some affirmative moral sentences are true; and we are possibly unable in principle to determine the truth or the falsity of moral sentences. Three further results are defended. Moral realism is shown to be compatible with moral pluralism. Moral realism need (...)
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  23. Evolution and the Possibility of Moral Realism. [REVIEW]Peter Carruthers & Scott M. James - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):237-244.
    A commentary on Richard Joyce's The Evolution of Morality.
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  24. Moral Realism and Faultless Disagreement.Daniel Cohnitz - 2016 - Ratio 29 (2):202-212.
    Is moral realism compatible with the existence of moral disagreements? Since moral realism requires that if two persons are in disagreement over some moral question at least one must be objectively mistaken, it seems difficult to uphold that there can be moral disagreements without fault. Alison Hills argued that moral realism can accommodate such disagreements. Her strategy is to argue that moral reasoners can be faultless in making an objectively false moral judgement if they followed the relevant epistemic norm, i.e. (...)
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  25. The Relevance of Moral Disagreement. Some Worries About Nondescriptivist Cognitivism.Josep E. Corbí - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):217-233.
    Nondescriptivist Cognitivism vindicates the cognitive value of moral judgements despite their lack of descriptive content. In this paper,I raise a few worries about the proclaimed virtues of this new metaethical framework Firstly, I argue that Nondescriptivist Cognitivism tends to beg the question against descriptivism and, secondly, discuss Horgan and Timmons' case against Michael Smith's metaethical rationalism. Although I sympathise with their main critical claims against the latter, I am less enthusiastic about the arguments that they provide to support them.
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  26. Terence CUNEO, The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2010 - Ithaque 7:131-135.
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  27. Review of Moral Realism: A Defence by R Shafer-Landau. [REVIEW]D. F. Cox - 2005 - Philosophical Books 46 (1):92-93.
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  28. 1 Moral Realism.Terence Cuneo - 2011 - In Christian Miller (ed.), Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum. pp. 3.
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  29. Two Conceptions of Moral Realism.Jonathan Dancy & Christopher Hookway - 1986 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 60 (1):167 - 205.
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  30. Kant y Apel: el problema de la fundamentación trascendental de la moral.José Luis López Y. López de Lizaga - 2010 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 35 (2):59-82.
    Este artículo compara los argumentos de Kant contra la deducción trascendental de la ley moral con el intento de fundamentación pragmático-trascendental de la moral propuesto por Apel. A pesar de mejorar los argumentos trascendentales kantianos, las tesis de Apel sobre la fundamentación trascendental de la moral parecen incurrir en una confusión entre la constricción de las leyes lógicas y la obligatoriedad de las normas morales, y en última instancia parecen borrar la diferencia kantiana entre razón teórica y razón práctica.
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  31. What a Kantian Can Know a Priori? A Defense of Moral Cognitivism.Katerina Deligiorgi - 2011 - In Sorin Baiasu, Sami Pihlstrom & Howard Williams (eds.), Politics and Metaphysics in Kant.
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  32. Brink's Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. [REVIEW]Michael R. Depaul - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):731-735.
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  33. The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism, by Terence Cuneo.Keith DeRose - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):1-5.
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  34. What Moral Realism Can Learn From the Philosophy of Time.Heather Dyke - 2003 - In Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 11--25.
    It sometimes happens that advances in one area of philosophy can be applied to a quite different area of philosophy, and that the result is an unexpected significant advance. I think that this is true of the philosophy of time and meta-ethics. Developments in the philosophy of time have led to a new understanding of the relation between semantics and metaphysics. Applying these insights to the field of meta-ethics, I will argue, can suggest a new position with respect to moral (...)
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  35. Moral Realism: Its Aetiology and a Consequent Dilemma.Crawford L. Elder - 1987 - American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1):33 - 45.
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  36. An Outline of an Argument for Robust Metanormative Realism.David Enoch - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2 (2007):21-50.
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  37. Seeing Aspects, Seeing Value.Joe Fearn - 1998 - Sorites 9:32-45.
    This paper is a defense of moral realism. It claims that Hume's projectivism and abuse of resultance has led us to gross distortions of non-cognitivist ethics. The analogy of moral properties with secondary properties is noted, before offering a stronger theory of moral realism. This theory recognises moral properties as constituting part of the manifest image, in a way that is satisfactory both ontologically and epistemologically This involves a rejection of austere, scientific reductionism. This model of moral realism relies on (...)
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  38. Constitutivism and the Schmagency Challenge.Luca Ferrero - 2009 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Four. Oxford University Press.
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  39. Moral Realism, Moral Disagreement, and Moral Psychology.Simon Fitzpatrick - 2014 - Philosophical Papers 43 (2):161-190.
    This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts to utilize empirical studies of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment to support a version of the argument from disagreement against moral realism. Crucially, Doris et al. claim that the moral disagreements highlighted by these studies are not susceptible to the standard ‘diffusing’ explanations realists have developed in response to earlier versions of the argument. I argue that plausible hypotheses about the cognitive processes underlying ordinary moral judgment and (...)
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  40. Review: Russ Shafer-Landau, Ed., Oxford Studies in Metaethics. [REVIEW]Review by: Guy Fletcher - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):282-288,.
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  41. Solving the Is-Ought Problem [Major Update Required, Draft Work Currently Removed].Gregor Flock - manuscript
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  42. Aristotle's Relationship to Moral Realism and Natural Law.James Joseph Flynn - 1995 - Dissertation, Fordham University
    This study is an investigation into Aristotle's ethical system as regards the question of whether it is a true instance of moral realism, and, in particular, whether it is a genuine case of natural law ethics. Moral realism, as I define it, includes any ethical position that asserts that ethical judgments are true or false insofar as they correspond to a reality that is in some way independent of the person or culture making the ethical judgment. For example, whether slavery (...)
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  43. The Normative Web. An Argument for Moral Realism.Antonio Gaitan Torres - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):333-337.
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  44. Rist, John M., Plato's Moral Realism: The Discovery of the Presuppositions of Ethics.Marie I. George - 2013 - Review of Metaphysics 66 (4):850-852.
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  45. Reviewed Work: Modern Science and Human Values: A Study in the History of Ideas by Everett W. Hall. [REVIEW]Samuel E. Gluck - 1962 - Journal of Philosophy 59 (13):359-362.
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  46. Charles Larmore e Alain Renaut, Dibattito sull’etica. Idealismo o realismo (Roma: Meltemi, 2007). [REVIEW]Lorenzo Greco - 2007 - ReF - Recensioni Filosofiche 23.
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  47. Prescriptive Realism.John E. Hare - 2006 - Philosophia Reformata 71 (1):14-30.
    In my book God’s Call1 I gave an historical account of the debate within twentieth century analytic philosophy between moral realism and expressivism. Moral realism is the view that moral properties like goodness or cruelty exist independently of our making judgements that things have such properties. Such judgements are, on this theory, objectively true when the things referred to have the specified properties and objectively false when they do not. Expressivism is the view that when a person makes a moral (...)
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  48. The Euthyphro, Divine Command Theory and Moral Realism.Gerald K. Harrison - 2014 - Philosophy (1):107-123.
    Divine command theories of metaethics are commonly rejected on the basis of the Euthyphro problem. In this paper, I argue that the Euthyphro can be raised for all forms of moral realism. I go on to argue that this does not matter as the Euthyphro is not really a problem after all. I then briefly outline some of the attractions of a divine command theory of metaethics. I suggest that given one of the major reasons for rejecting such an analysis (...)
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  49. Book Reviews : God's Call: Moral Realism, God's Commands and Human Autonomy, by John E. Hare. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2001. X + 122 Pp. Hb. 9.99. ISBN 0-8028-3903-. [REVIEW]P. Helm - 2003 - Studies in Christian Ethics 16 (1):92-94.
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  50. The Poverty of Naturalistic Moral Realism: Comments on Timmons.Margaret Holmgren - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):131-135.
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