About this topic
Summary

What is the relationship between theoretical and practical reason? For instance, might requirements of practical reason be grounded in requirements of practical reason, or vice-versa? Or do theoretical and practical reason form distinct domains? Other issues falling under this topic include questions about the similarities and differences between practical and theoretical reason, and about connections between them (for instance, about ways in which what you ought (have reason, justification…) to do depends on what you ought (have reason, justification…) to believe, and vice-versa).

Key works For influential defences of the idea that some or all requirements of practical reason are grounded in requirements of theoretical reason, see Harman 1997 and Velleman 1989. For discussion see Bratman 1991Setiya 2003, and Ross 2009. For discussion of the idea that requirements of epistemic reason are grounded in practical reason see Foley 1987 and Kelly 2003.
Introductions Wallace 2008Wiland 2012, and Brunero & Kolodny 2013 include some discussion of this topic.
  Show all references
Related categories
Siblings:
148 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 148
  1. Facundo M. Alonso (forthcoming). Intending, Settling, and Relying. In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Volume 4. Oxford University Press
    Philosophers of action of different persuasions have suggested that there is a tight connection between the phenomenon of intending and the phenomena of “being settled on” and of “settling” a course of action. For many, this connection supports an important constraint on intention: one may only intend what one takes one’s so intending as settling. Traditionally, this has been understood as a doxastic constraint on intention: what one takes one’s intention as settling is what one believes one’s so intending as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Facundo M. Alonso (2016). Reasons for Reliance. Ethics 126 (2):311-338.
    Philosophers have in general offered only a partial view of the normative grounds of reliance. Some maintain that either one of evidence or of pragmatic considerations has a normative bearing on reliance, but are silent about whether the other kind of consideration has such a bearing on it as well. Others assert that both kinds of considerations have a normative bearing on reliance, but sidestep the question of what their relative normative bearing is. My aim in this article is to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  3. Facundo M. Alonso (2014). What is Reliance? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):163-183.
    In this article I attempt to provide a conceptual framework for thinking about reliance in a systematic way. I argue that reliance is a cognitive attitude that has a tighter connection to the guidance of our thought and action than ordinary belief does. My main thesis is that reliance has a ‘constitutive aim’: namely, it aims at guiding our thought and action in a way that is sensible from the standpoint of practical or theoretical ends. This helps explain why reliance (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  4. Chrisoula Andreou (2005). The Voices of Reason. American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1):33 - 45.
    It is widely held that instrumental reasoning to a practical conclusion is parasitic on non-instrumental practical reasoning. This conclusion is based on the claim that when there is no reason to adopt a certain end, there is no reason to take the means (qua means) to that end. But, as will be argued, while there is a sense of reason according to which the previous statement is true, there is another sense according to which it is false. Furthermore, in both (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  5. Chrisoula Andreou & Sergio Tenenbaum (eds.) (2016). Belief, Action and Rationality Over Time. Routledge.
    Action theorists and formal epistemologists often pursue parallel inquiries regarding rationality, with the former focused on practical rationality, and the latter focused on theoretical rationality. In both fields, there is currently a strong interest in exploring rationality in relation to time. This exploration raises questions about the rationality of certain patterns over time. For example, it raises questions about the rational permissibility of certain patterns of intention; similarly, it raises questions about the rational permissibility of certain patterns of belief. While (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Jonny Anomaly (2008). Personal Identity and Practical Reason. Dialogue 47 (2):331.
    ABSTRACT: This essay examines and criticizes a set of Kantian objections to Parfit's attempt in Reasons and Persons to connect his theory of personal identity to practical rationality and moral philosophy. Several of Parfit's critics have tried to sever the link he forges between his metaphysical and practical conclusions by invoking the Kantian thought that even if we accept his metaphysical theory of personal identity, we still have good practical grounds for rejecting that theory when deliberating about what to do. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. G. E. M. Anscombe (1957). Intention. Harvard University Press.
    This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   307 citations  
  8. Robert Audi (2001). The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality. Oxford University Press.
    The literature on theoretical reason has been dominated by epistemological concerns, treatments of practical reason by ethical concerns. This book overcomes the limitations of dealing with each separately. It sets out a comprehensive theory of rationality applicable to both practical and theoretical reason. In both domains, Audi explains how experience grounds rationality, delineates the structure of central elements, and attacks the egocentric conception of rationality. He establishes the rationality of altruism and thereby supports major moral principles. The concluding part describes (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   23 citations  
  9. Derek Baker (2015). Akrasia and the Problem of the Unity of Reason. Ratio 28 (1):65-80.
    Joseph Raz and Sergio Tenenbaum argue that the Guise of the Good thesis explains both the possibility of practical reason and its unity with theoretical reason, something Humean psychological theories may be unable to do. This paper will argue, however, that Raz and Tenenbaum face a dilemma: either the version of the Guise of the Good they offer is too strong to allow for weakness of will, or it will lose its theoretical advantage in preserving the unity of reason.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  10. Derek Baker (2015). Deliberators Must Be Imperfect. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):321-347.
    This paper argues that, with certain provisos, predicting one's future actions is incompatible with rationally deliberating about whether to perform those actions. It follows that fully rational omniscient agents are impossible, since an omniscient being could never rationally deliberate about what to do . Consequently, theories that explain practical reasons in terms of the choices of a perfectly rational omniscient agent must fail. The paper considers several ways of defending the possibility of an omniscient agent, and concludes that while some (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Derek Clayton Baker, Akrasia and the Problem of the Unity of Reason.
    Joseph Raz and Sergio Tenenbaum argue that the Guise of the Good thesis explains both the possibility of practical reason and its unity with theoretical reason, something Humean psychological theories may be unable to do. This paper will argue, however, that Raz and Tenenbaum face a dilemma: either the version of the Guise of the Good they offer is too strong to allow for weakness of will, or it will lose its theoretical advantage in preserving the unity of reason.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Gerald W. Barnes (1982). Mince Pie Reasoning. Analysis 42 (3):163 - 169.
    ‘…one might easily wonder why no one has ever pointed out the mince pie syllogism…” (G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention, 2nd edition 1969, sec. 33).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Tomas Barrero (2010). Reason, Action, and Weakness of the Will: A Semantic Approach. Ideas Y Valores 59 (143):161-187.
    This paper develops some of Austin’s ideas on excuses, stressing their “dimensional” character and relating it to Searle’s distinction between intention-in-action and previous intention, in order to show that the original speech-act shaped distinction between weakness of the will and moral weakness can be embedded in a quite different theoretical framework such as Davidson’s, while Austin’s dimensional classification of actions cannot. Finally, the article analyzes how Grice’s critique of Davidson’s views on akrasia is more faithful to Austin and more radical (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Christian Barry & Patrick Tomlin (2016). Moral Uncertainty and Permissibility: Evaluating Option Sets. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (6):1-26.
    In this essay, we explore an issue of moral uncertainty: what we are permitted to do when we are unsure about which moral principles are correct. We develop a novel approach to this issue that incorporates important insights from previous work on moral uncertainty, while avoiding some of the difficulties that beset existing alternative approaches. Our approach is based on evaluating and choosing between option sets rather than particular conduct options. We show how our approach is particularly well-suited to address (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Peter Baumann (2012). Knowledge, Practical Reasoning and Action. Logos and Episteme 3:7-26.
    Is knowledge necessary or sufficient or both necessary and sufficient for acceptable practical reasoning and rational action? Several authors (e.g., Williamson, Hawthorne, and Stanley) have recently argued that the answer to these questions is positive. In this paper I present several objections against this view (both in its basic form as well in more developed forms). I also offer a sketch of an alternative view: What matters for the acceptability of practical reasoning in at least many cases (and in all (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16. Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler (eds.) (2006). Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays. Cambridge University Press.
    Practical conflicts pervade human life. Agents have many different desires, goals, and commitments, all of which can come into conflict with each other. How can practical reasoning help to resolve these practical conflicts? In this collection of essays a distinguished roster of philosophers analyse the diverse forms of practical conflict. Their aim is to establish an understanding of the sources of these conflicts, to investigate the challenge they pose to an adequate conception of practical reasoning, and to assess the degree (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Matthew A. Benton (2014). Knowledge Norms. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:nn-nn.
    Encyclopedia entry covering the growing literature on the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (and its rivals), the Knowledge Norm of Action (and pragmatic encroachment), the Knowledge Norm of Belief, and the Knowledge Norm of Disagreement.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  18. Corine Besson (forthcoming). Norms, Reasons and Reasoning: A Guide Through Lewis Carroll’s Regress Argument. In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity.
  19. John Bigelow & Michael Smith (1997). How Not to Be Muddled by a Meddlesome Muggletonian. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (4):511 – 527.
    Holton, we acknowledge, has given a good counter-example to a theory, and that theory is interesting and worth refuting. The theory we have in mind is like Smith's, but is more reductionist in spirit. It is a theory that ties value to Reason and to processes of reasoning, or inference - not to the recognition of reasons and acting on reasons. Such a theory overestimates the importance of logic, truth, inference, and thinking things through for yourself independently of any ideas (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  20. Renée Bilodeau (2002). Intention et faiblesse de la volonté. Dialogue 41 (01):27-44.
    Akrasia is both an intentional and an irrational phenomenon. These two characteristics can be reconciled by a careful reconstruction of practical reasoning. I undertake this task along Davidsonian lines, arguing against his critics that the notion of unconditional judgment is the key to an adequate account of akrasia. Unless akrasia is conceived as a failure of the agent to form an unconditional judgment that conforms to her best judgment "all things considered," the intentionality of akrasia is lost. Likewise, I show (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Renée Bilodeau (2001). Croyance et justification. Cahiers de Philosophie de L’Université de Caen 37:153-165.
    Cet article se propose de montrer que l’éthique de la croyance, si elle permet de clarifier certains problèmes épistémiques, a le tort d’être utilisée à des fins pour lesquelles le réseau conceptuel de l’éthique est inadéquat. Dans ce but, je présente d’abord la thèse de la divergence et les arguments qui militent en sa faveur. J’indique ensuite pourquoi ces arguments ne sont pas concluants en examinant de plus près les rapports existant entre raisons épistémiques et raisons pratiques. Cette discussion se (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Robert Binkley (1965). A Theory of Practical Reason. Philosophical Review 74 (4):423-448.
    This paper proposes a concept of "valid reasoning" that will apply univocally to reasoned judgment (inference), Reasoned decision (choice), And reasoned withholding of judgment and decision. "reasoning" is taken to include all these; "validity" of reasoning is defined in terms of the "ideally rational mind", Which is in turn defined by a modal logic of judging and deciding. The definition is defended by relating it to another ideal, That of the socratically omniscient and stoically omniscient sage, Who is defined by (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  23. Michael Bratman (2009). Intention, Belief, and Instrumental Rationality. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press 13--36.
    Two approaches to instrumental rationality Suppose I intend end E, believe that a necessary means to E is M, and believe that M requires that I intend M. My attitudes concerning E and M engage a basic requirement of practical rationality, a requirement that, barring a change in my cited beliefs, I either intend M or give up intending E.2 Call this the Instrumental Rationality requirement – for short, the IR requirement.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  24. Michael E. Bratman (2014). Temptation and the Agent’s Standpoint. Inquiry 57 (3):293-310.
    Suppose you resolve now to resist an expected temptation later while knowing that once the temptation arrives your preference or evaluative assessment will shift in favor of that temptation. Are there defensible norms of rational planning agency that support sticking with your prior intention in the face of such a shift at the time of temptation and in the absence of relevant new information? This article defends the idea that it might be rational to stick with your prior intention in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  25. Michael E. Bratman (2009). Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical. In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity. OUP Oxford
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  26. Jason Bridges (2007). Review: The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (464):1083-1088.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Stephen Brock (2011). Natural Law, the Understanding of Principles, and Universal Good. Nova et Vetera 9:671-706.
  28. John Broome (2013). Practical Reasoning and Inference. In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press 286.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  29. John Broome (1999). Normative Requirements. Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
    Normative requirements are often overlooked, but they are central features of the normative world. Rationality is often thought to consist in acting for reasons, but following normative requirements is also a major part of rationality. In particular, correct reasoning – both theoretical and practical – is governed by normative requirements rather than by reasons. This article explains the nature of normative requirements, and gives examples of their importance. It also describes mistakes that philosophers have made as a result of confusing (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   103 citations  
  30. Jessica Brown (2008). Knowledge and Practical Reason. Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1135-1152.
    It has become recently popular to suggest that knowledge is the epistemic norm of practical reasoning and that this provides an important constraint on the correct account of knowledge, one which favours subject-sensitive invariantism over contextualism and classic invariantism. I argue that there are putative counterexamples to both directions of the knowledge norm. Even if the knowledge norm can be defended against these counterexamples, I argue that it is a delicate issue whether it is true, one which relies on fine (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  31. Jessica Brown (2008). Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning. Noûs 42 (2):167-189.
  32. Michael Brownstein & Alex Madva (2012). The Normativity of Automaticity. Mind and Language 27 (4):410-434.
    While the causal contributions of so-called ‘automatic’ processes to behavior are now widely acknowledged, less attention has been given to their normative role in the guidance of action. We develop an account of the normativity of automaticity that responds to and builds upon Tamar Szabó Gendler's account of ‘alief’, an associative and arational mental state more primitive than belief. Alief represents a promising tool for integrating psychological research on automaticity with philosophical work on mind and action, but Gendler errs in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  33. John Brunero (2009). Against Cognitivism About Practical Rationality. Philosophical Studies 146 (3):311-325.
    Cognitivists about Practical Rationality argue that we can explain some of the requirements of practical rationality by appealing to the requirements of theoretical rationality. First, they argue that intentions involve beliefs, and, second, they show how the theoretical requirements governing those involved beliefs can explain some of the practical requirements governing those intentions. This paper avoids the ongoing controversy about whether and how intentions involve beliefs and focuses instead on this second part of the Cognitivist approach, where I think Cognitivism (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  34. John Brunero (2005). Instrumental Rationality and Carroll's Tortoise. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (5):557 - 569.
    Some philosophers have tried to establish a connection between the normativity of instrumental rationality and the paradox presented by Lewis Carroll in his 1895 paper “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles.” I here examine and argue against accounts of this connection presented by Peter Railton and James Dreier before presenting my own account and discussing its implications for instrumentalism (the view that all there is to practical rationality is instrumental rationality). In my view, the potential for a Carroll-style regress just (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  35. Lara Buchak (2010). Instrumental Rationality, Epistemic Rationality, and Evidence-Gathering. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):85-120.
    This paper addresses the question of whether gathering additional evidence is always rationally required, both from the point of view of instrumental rationality and of epistemic rationality. It is shown that in certain situations, it is not instrumentally rational to look for more evidence before making a decision. These are situations in which the risk of “misleading” evidence – a concept that has both instrumental and epistemic senses – is not offset by the gains from the possibility of non-misleading evidence. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  36. Paola Cantù & Italo Testa (2006). Teorie dell’argomentazione. Un’introduzione alle logiche del dialogo. Bruno Mondadori.
    TABLE OF CONTENTS -/- I. La rinascita novecentesca 1. Chaïm Perelman: la nuova retorica 2. Stephen Toulmin: la pratica logica e l’uso degli argomenti 3. Ragionamento e linguaggio: la logica naturale di Jean-Blaise Grize -/- II. La logica informale 1. Informale vs. formale? 2. Il concetto di argomento 3. La ripresa della teoria di Paul Grice 4. La ricostruzione degli argomenti 5. La valutazione degli argomenti: le fallacie 6. Il network problem -/- III. Dialogo e dialettica 1. La logica dialogica (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. L. Jonathan Cohen (1989). Belief and Acceptance. Mind 98 (391):367-389.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   28 citations  
  38. Stewart Cohen (2012). Does Practical Rationality Constrain Epistemic Rationality? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):447-455.
  39. Mark Colby (1999). The Epistemological Foundations of Practical Reason. Inquiry 42 (1):25 – 47.
    One consequence of the later Wittgenstein's influential critique of epistemological foundationalism has been to convince many contemporary philosophers that the ideal of universal and necessary cognitive grounds for moral or political norms is illusory. Recent neo-Wittgensteinian accounts of practical reason attempt to formulate a conception of a post-foundational politics in which a political ethos can be legitimate, rational or just even if its informing practices and cognitive standards lack foundational justification. Against these appropriations of Wittgenstein, I argue that his account (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. Juan Manuel Comesana (2003). The Ways of Reason. Dissertation, Brown University
    This dissertation is about rationality, both practical rationality , and theoretical rationality . I argue that there are interesting similarities as well as interesting differences between practical and theoretical rationality. One of the similarities is that both of them are essentially related to the explanation of actions and beliefs, and one of the differences is that whereas theoretical rationality has the hyper-external aim of truth, practical rationality has the non-hyper-external aim of desire satisfaction. ;In chapter 1 I present a general (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Steven Daskal (2010). Absolute Value as Belief. Philosophical Studies 148 (2):221 - 229.
    In “Desire as Belief” and “Desire as Belief II,” David Lewis ( 1988 , 1996 ) considers the anti-Humean position that beliefs about the good require corresponding desires, which is his way of understanding the idea that beliefs about the good are capable of motivating behavior. He translates this anti-Humean claim into decision theoretic terms and demonstrates that it leads to absurdity and contradiction. As Ruth Weintraub ( 2007 ) has shown, Lewis’ argument goes awry at the outset. His decision (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  42. Craig Dilworth (2003). Chapter 9. Theoretical Rationality and Practical Rationality. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 81:113-125.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. E. Sonny Elizondo (2013). Reason in its Practical Application. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (21):1-17.
    Is practical reason a cognitive faculty? Do practical judgments make claims about a subject matter that are appropriately assessed in terms of their agreement with that subject matter? According to Kantians like Christine Korsgaard, the answer is no. To think otherwise is to conflate the theoretical and the practical, the epistemic and the ethical. I am not convinced. In this paper, I motivate my skepticism through examination of the very figure who inspires Korsgaard’s rejection of cognitivism: Kant. For as I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  44. Luca Ferrero (2014). Diachronic Structural Rationality. Inquiry 57 (3):311-336.
    In this paper I investigate whether there are genuine and irreducible pressures of diachronic rationality grounded on the structure of the subject rather than on substantive considerations, such as pragmatic ones. I argue that structural pressures of diachronic rationality have a limited scope. The most important pressure only tells against arbitrary interference with the mechanisms for the retention of attitudes over time. I then argue that in the practical case, a substantial account in terms of the agent's temporal identity appears (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  45. Luca Ferrero (2012). Diachronic Constraints of Practical Rationality. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):144-164.
    In this paper, I discuss whether there are genuinely *diachronic* constraints of practical rationality, that is, pressures on combinations of practical attitudes over time, which are not reducible to mere synchronic rational pressures. Michael Bratman has recently argued that there is at least one such diachronic rational constraint that governs the stability of intentions over time. *Pace* Bratman, I argue that there are no genuinely diachronic constraints on intentions that meet the stringent desiderata set by him. But I show that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   20 citations  
  46. Julian Fink (2013). What is (Correct) Practical Reasoning? Acta Analytica 28 (4):471-482.
    This paper argues that practical reasoning is a mental process which leads a person from a set of existent mental states to an intention. In Section 1, I defend this view against two other proposals according to which practical reasoning either concludes in an action itself or in a normative belief. Section 2 discusses the correctness of practical reasoning and explains how the correctness of instrumental reasoning can be explained by the logical relations that hold between the contents of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Patrick Fleming (2008). On a Purported Principle of Practical Reason. Journal of Philosophical Research 33:143-162.
    A number of philosophers are attracted to the Principle of the Priority of Belief (or PPB) in practical matters. PPB has two parts: (1) it is a principle of practical reason to adjust your desires in accordance with your evaluative beliefs and (2) you should not adjust your evaluative beliefs in accordance with your desires. The central claim of this principle is that beliefs rightly govern desires and that desires have no authority over beliefs. This paper advances conceptual and empiricalarguments (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Bernard Gen (2001). Theoretical Versus Practical Rationality. In James P. Sterba (ed.), Social and Political Philosophy: Contemporary Perspectives. Routledge 77.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Alessandro Giordani & Paolo Gomarasca (2012). Trust as the End of Practical Reason. Justification Procedures. In Botturi Francesco (ed.), Understanding Human Experience. Peter Lang
    This paper is about the epistemology of practical reason and, in particular, the function of trust as an end to be pursued rationally in praxis. Our purpose is threefold: first, to present an outline of the structure of practical reason; secondly, to compare practical reason and scientific reason in order to determine the main differences between these two basic manifestations of human reason; finally, to argue in favour of a non-utilitarian model of practical reason in the light of some results (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Amber L. Griffioen (2013). Irrationality and “Gut” Reasoning: Two Kinds of Truthiness. In Jason Holt (ed.), The Ultimate Daily Show and Philosophy: More Moments of Zen, More Indecision Theory. Wiley Blackwell 309-325.
    There are at least three basic phenomena that philosophers traditionally classify as paradigm cases of irrationality. In the first two cases, wishful thinking and self-deception, a person wants something to be true and therefore ignores certain relevant facts about the situation, making it appear to herself that it is, in fact, true. The third case, weakness of will, involves a person undertaking a certain action, despite taking herself to have an all-things-considered better reason not to do so. While I think (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 148