This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:See also:
218 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 218
  1. Varol Akman, The Mark of the Mental.
    and it's just comfortable in here. But what is a belief anyway? How does it acquire the content it has (e.g., that it's chilly in here)? These questions cannot really be answered without clarifying the concept of "a mechanism with a mind". What conditions must be satisfied by a mechanism (say, a computer or a robot) before we can attribute a mind to it? Obviously, the essence of this problem concerns the relation between mental and physical properties. After all, a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Inácio de Araújo Almeida (2013). Verdade, Relativismo E Consciência Em Joseph Ratzinger. Lumen Veritatis 6 (24):77-88.
    Since Joseph Ratzinger ascended the pontifical throne, the issue of relativism has been the subject of ongoing study, as well as heated debate. Moreover, it has frequently been asked how this theme arose in his thought, along with how the most salient characteristics of relativism should be gauged. Therefore, this paper seeks to provide some explanations on the concept of truth and relativism of this author, focusing on two main ideas. The first is an analysis of how the problem of (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. G. E. M. Anscombe (1981). Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind. University of Minnesota Press.
    The intentionality of sensation -- The first person -- Substance -- The subjectivity of sensation -- Events in the mind -- Comments on Professor R.L. Gregory's paper on perception -- On sensations of position -- Intention -- Pretending -- On the grammar of "Enjoy" -- The reality of the past -- Memory, "experience," and causation -- Causality and determination -- Times, beginnings, and causes -- Soft determinism -- Causality and extensionality -- Before and after -- Subjunctive conditionals -- "Under a (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   86 citations  
  4. Richard E. Aquila (1979). Mental Particulars, Mental Events, and the Bundle Theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (March):109-120.
    I argue, First, That the bundle theory is compatible with certain views of mental states as alterations in an underlying substance. Then I distinguish between momentary and enduring experiencers and argue that the bundle theory does not imply the possibility of experiences apart from experiencers, But at most apart from enduring experiencers. Finally, I reject strawson's claim that the bundle theory implies that some particular person's experience might instead have belonged to some other person. Regarding experiences as events rather than (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Dan Arnold (2008). Dharmakīrti's Dualism: Critical Reflections on a Buddhist Proof of Rebirth. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1079-1096.
    Dharmakīrti, elaborating one of the Buddhist tradition's most complete defenses of rebirth, advanced some of this tradition's most explicitly formulated arguments for mind-body dualism. At the same time, Dharmakīrti himself may turn out to be vulnerable to some of the same kinds of arguments pressed against physicalists. It is revealing, then, that in arguing against physicalism himself, Dharmakīrti does not have available to him what some would judge to be more promising arguments for dualism (arguments, in particular, following Kant's 2nd (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Wolfgang Baer (2006). Amazing Light --Visions for Discovery. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 1-2):177-183.
    An International Symposium In Honor of the 90th Birthday Year of Charles Townes October 6-8, 2005, UC Berkeley.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. David Bain (2009). McDowell and the Presentation of Pains. Philosophical Topics 37 (1):1-24.
    It can seem natural to say that, when in pain, we undergo experiences which present to us certain experience-dependent particulars, namely pains. As part of his wider approach to mind and world, John McDowell has elaborated an interesting but neglected version of this account of pain. Here I set out McDowell’s account at length, and place it in context. I argue that his subjectivist conception of the objects of pain experience is incompatible with his requirement that such experience be presentational, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. David Bain (2005). Daniel Dennett. Reconciling Science and Our Self-Conception. By Matthew. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):369-371.
    Review of Matthew 's Elton's book, *Daniel Dennett: Reconciling Science and Our Self-Conception*.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Katalin Balog, Illuminati, Zombies and Metaphysical Gridlock.
    In this paper I survey the landscape of anti-physicalist arguments and physicalist responses to them. The anti-physicalist arguments I discuss start from a premise about a conceptual, epistemic, or explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal descriptions and conclude from this – on a priori grounds – that physicalism is false. My primary aim is to develop a master argument to counter these arguments. With this master argument in place, it is apparent that there is a puzzling symmetry between dualist attacks (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Marina Paola Banchetti-Robino & Jean Pierre Noël Llored (2016). Reality Without Reification: Philosophy of Chemistry’s Contribution to Philosophy of Mind. In Grant Fisher Eric Scerri (ed.), Essays in the Philosophy of Chemistry. Oxford University Press 83-110.
    In this essay, we argue that there exist obvious parallels between questions that inform philosophy of chemistry and the so-called hard problem of consciousness in philosophy of mind. These include questions regarding the emergence of higher-level phenomena from lower-level physical states, the reduction of higher-level phenomena to lower-level physical states, and 'downward causation'. We, therefore, propose that the 'hard problem' of consciousness should be approached in a manner similar to that used to address parallel problems in philosophy of chemistry. Thus, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Emilia Barile (2007). La Materia Della Mente: Lavori in Corso. Aracne.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Christian Barth (2014). Objectivity and the Language-Dependence of Thought: A Transcendental Defence of Universal Lingualism. Routledge.
    Does thought depend on language? Primarily as a consequence of the cognitive turn in empirical disciplines like psychology and ethology, many current empirical researchers and empirically minded philosophers tend to answer this question in the negative. This book rejects this mainstream view and develops a philosophical argument in favor of a universal dependence of language on thought. In doing so, it comprises insights of two primary representatives of 20 th century and contemporary philosophy, namely Donald Davidson and Robert Brandom. Barth (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Ralph Barton Perry (1909). The Mind Within and the Mind Without. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (7):169-175.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. J. V. Bateman (1940). Professor Alexander's Proofs of the Spatio-Temporal Nature of Mind. Philosophical Review 49 (May):309-324.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. John Beloff (1962). The Existence Of Mind. McGibbon & Kee.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   79 citations  
  16. Jiri Benovsky (2015). Dual‐Aspect Monism. Philosophical Investigations 38 (4).
    In this article, I am interested in dual-aspect monism as a solution to the mind-body problem. This view is not new, but it is somewhat under-represented in the contemporary debate, and I would like to help it make its way. Dual-aspect monism is a parsimonious, elegant and simple view. It avoids problems with “mental causation”. It naturally explains how and why mental states are correlated with physical states while avoiding any mysteries concerning the nature of this relation. It fits well (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Arthur F. Bentley (1941). Some Logical Considerations Concerning Professor Lewis's Mind. Journal of Philosophy 38 (November):634-635.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Gustav Bergmann (1942). An Empiricist Schema of the Psychophysical Problem. Philosophy of Science 9 (January):72-91.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Reinaldo Bernal Velasquez (2013). Précis of "E-physicalism-a physicalist theory of phenomenal consciousness". Ideas Y Valores 152 (152):268-297.
    El libro E-physicalism - A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness presenta una teoría en el área de la metafísica de laconciencia fenomenal. Está basada en las convicciones de que la experiencia subjetiva -en el sentido de Nagel - es un fenómeno real,y de que alguna variante del fisicalismo debe ser verdadera.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Reinaldo Bernal (2013). La conscience phénoménale, et pourquoi elle doit voir une nature physique. In Marc Silverstein (ed.), Matériaux scientifiques et philosophiques pour un matérialisme contemporain. Éditions Matériologiques
    Je commence par tenter de clarifier le concept de « conscience phénoménale », suivant la notion de « l’effet ça fait » élaborée par Nagel (1974). Deuxièmement, je défends la réalité de la conscience (phénoménale) en opposition avec l'éliminativisme. Il n’est pas possible de prouver que la conscience est un phénomène réel, mais les éliminativistes ne peuvent pas non plus prouver qu’elle n’en est pas un. Pour le réaliste, la conscience est donnée comme un fait brut. Troisièmement, j’introduis une notion (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. B. Berofsky (2015). Mind, Brain, and Free Will, by Richard Swinburne. Mind 124 (493):387-390.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Graham H. Bird (1971). Minds and States of Mind. Philosophical Quarterly 21 (July):244-246.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Brand Blanshard (1941). The Nature of Mind. Journal of Philosophy 38 (April):207-215.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Jonathan Bricklin (2010). Consciousness Already There Waiting to Be Uncovered: William Jamess Mystical Suggestion as Corroborated by Himself and His Contemporaries. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (11-12):11-12.
    'Is consciousness already there waiting to be uncovered and is it a veridical revelation of reality?' William James asked in one of his last published essays, 'A Suggestion About Mysticism'. The answer, he said, would not be known 'by this generation or the next'. By separating what James wanted to believe about commonsense reality, from what his 'dispassionate' insights and researches led him to believe, I show how James himself, in collaboration with a few friends, laid the groundwork for adopting (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Jason W. Brown (2002). The Self-Embodying Mind: Process, Brain Dynamics and the Conscious Present. Midpoint Trade Books Inc.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. K. Campbell (1983). Abstract Particulars and the Philosophy of Mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (June):129-41.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  27. Gregg Caruso (2002). Review of David Cockburn’s An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. [REVIEW] Metapsychology.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Chhanda Chakraborti (2005). Mental Properties and Levels of Properties. Metaphysica 6 (2):7-24.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Hugh Chandler, -≫Tredicims' Minds.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Hugh S. Chandler, -≫Minds.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Hugh S. Chandler, -≫13 'Minds'.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Hugh S. Chandler, -≫Many Minds.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Hugh S. Chandler, -≫Borderline 'Minds'.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Hugh S. Chandler, ≫no Mind?
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Hugh S. Chandler, One Mind?
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Hugh S. Chandler, -≫Counting Minds.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Hugh S. Chandler, -≫Singular Minds.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Hugh S. Chandler, How Many Minds?
    In Analysis, Vol. 45, June 1984, George Rea published a paper attacking my claim that there could be ‘indeterminate minds'. This paper is a reply to his attack. I claim, again, that such ‘minds’ are possible – entities such that it is indeterminate whether or not these entities are people with minds. -/- .
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Hugh S. Chandler, -≫Tredecims.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. Hugh S. Chandler, How Many Minds?
    In Analysis, Vol. 45, June 1984, George Rea published a paper attacking my claim that there could be ‘indeterminate people'. This paper is a reply to his attack. I claim, again, that such ‘people’ are possible – entities such that it is indeterminate whether or not these entities are people. -/- .
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Hugh S. Chandler, -≫Indeterminate 'Minds'.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Sara Rachel Chant (2006). The Special Composition Question in Action. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):422–441.
    Just as we may ask whether, and under what conditions, a collection of objects composes a single object, we may ask whether, and under what conditions, a collection of actions composes a single action. In the material objects literature, this question is known as the "special composition question," and I take it that there is a similar question to be asked of collections of actions. I will call that question the "special composition question in action," and argue that the correct (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  43. Stephen R. L. Clark (2010). How to Become Unconscious. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):21-44.
    Consistent materialists are almost bound to suggest that , if it exists at all, is no more than epiphenomenal. A correct understanding of the real requires that everything we do and say is no more than a product of whatever processes are best described by physics, without any privileged place, person, time or scale of action. Consciousness is a myth, or at least a figment. Plotinus was no materialist: for him, it is Soul and Intellect that are more real than (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Stephen R. L. Clark (1990). A Parliament of Souls. Oxford University Press.
    This second volume in the Limits and Renewals trilogy is an attempt to restate a traditional philosophy of mind, drawing on philosophical and poetical resources that are often neglected in modern and postmodern thought, and emphasizing the moral and political implications of differing philosophies of mind and value. Clark argues that without the traditional concept of the soul, we have little reason to believe that rational thought and individual autonomy are either possible or desirable. The particular topics covered include the (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  45. Stephen R. L. Clark (1990). Reason as Daimōn. In Christopher Gill (ed.), The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy. Oxford University Press
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. S. Marc Cohen (1969). The Concept of Pleasure. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 78:386-390.
    Review of The Concept of Pleasure, by David L. Perry (Mouton:1967).
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Arthur W. Collins (1994). Precis of the Nature of Mental Things. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):901-903.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Arthur W. Collins (1994). Reply to Commentators. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):929-945.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. D. E. Cooper (1970). Materialism and Perception. Philosophical Quarterly 20 (October):334-346.
  50. Richard Corry (2015). ESP, Causation, and the Possibility of Precognition. In Edwin May & Sonali Marwaha (eds.), Extrasensory Perception: Support, Skepticism, and Science. Praeger 107--127.
    In this chapter, I aim to clarify the concept of ESP so that we can ask whether it is even logically possible for anything to satisfy this concept. If ESP is not logically possible, then it would be pointless to conduct experiments trying to discover whether it exists. If, on the other hand, it is logically possible, then its existence or otherwise is an empirical question, a question that can be decided only by looking at the empirical evidence for and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 218