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  1. What Should Theists Say About Constructivist Positions in Metaethics?Christian Miller - 2018 - In Kevin Jung (ed.), Religious Ethics and Constructivism: A Metaethical Inquiry. New York: Routledge. pp. 82-103.
    Constructivist positions in meta-ethics are on the rise in recent years. Similarly, there has been a flurry of activity amongst theistic philosophers examining the relationship between God and normative facts. But so far as I am aware, these two literatures have almost never intersected with each other. Constructivists have said very little about God, and theists working on religious ethics have said very little about constructivist views in meta-ethics. In this paper, I draw some connections between the two literatures, and (...)
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  2. The Metaphysics of Nonfactualism.Michael Devitt - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:159-176.
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  3. Review of Leibowtiz and Sinclair (Eds.) Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. [REVIEW]Karl Schafer - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2017.
  4. Democracy and Moral Conflict. [REVIEW]Viorel Ţuţui - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (2):313-318.
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  5. Disagreeing Over Evaluatives: Preference, Normative and Moral Discourse.Justina Diaz Legaspe - 2015 - Manuscrito 38 (2):39-63.
    Why would we argue about taste, norms or morality when we know that these topics are relative to taste preferences, systems of norms or values to which we are committed? Yet, disagreements over these topics are common in our evaluative discourses. I will claim that the motives to discuss rely on our attitudes towards the standard held by the speakers in each domain of discourse, relating different attitudes to different motives –mainly, conviction and correction. These notions of attitudes and motives (...)
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  6. What is Goodness? An Introduction.Deborah Achtenberg - 1982 - Dissertation, New School for Social Research
    The inquiry is an introduction to the question, what is goodness? In it, realist and anti-realist accounts are considered. In Part I, two kinds of anti-realism are considered, subjectivist and strict. Subjectivism is the belief that goodness is belief-, affect-, or convention-dependent. It is suggested that subjectivism is based on an equivocation, is circular or is difficult consistently to maintain. Strict anti-realism is the belief that there is and can be no such thing as goodness. Three strict anti-realists are considered: (...)
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  7. What a Noncognitivist Might Tell a Moral Realist.Arend Kulenkampff & Frank Siebelt - 2000 - ProtoSociology 14:355-377.
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  8. The Judgements of Joan. [REVIEW]R. A. - 1962 - Review of Metaphysics 16 (2):396-396.
    A guide to the different views of Joan of Arc as they have varied from her time until World War II, with emphasis on the political and ideological shifts which lay behind them. The chief chroniclers, sources, and commentators are referred to and their viewpoints briefly described. The author emphasizes the fairness of her trial by the standards of her day, and the political motives underlying her rehabilitation. Joan, he concludes, was a highly complex character, and in her story the (...)
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  9. What Is Moral Philosophy?Louis P. Pojman - 1997 - In Kristin Shrader-Frechette & Laura Westra (eds.), Technology and Values. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 11--24.
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  10. 16 How to Be an Ethical Antirealist.Simon Blackburn - 1995 - In Paul K. Moser & J. D. Trout (eds.), Contemporary Materialism: A Reader. Routledge. pp. 357.
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  11. Moral Philosophy.B. P. H. - 1964 - Review of Metaphysics 18 (1):179-180.
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  12. Broad’s Critical Essays in Moral Philosophy.M. G. - 1973 - Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):121-122.
    This volume brings together sixteen of C. D. Broad’s valuable papers on moral philosophy written between 1914 and 1964. Unlike his widely read Five Types of Moral Theory where he was chiefly concerned to provide an accurate interpretation of various historically important moral philosophers, this volume contains essays which critically examine a variety of normative and meta-ethical issues. Broad never presented a developed moral position of his own, but his careful classifications of possible positions, subtle distinctions, and elaboration of logical (...)
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  13. Précis de Patrologie.Gerald G. Walsh - 1932 - Thought: Fordham University Quarterly 7 (1):159-164.
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  14. Metaethics and Teleology.Jonathan Jacobs - 2001 - Review of Metaphysics 55 (1):41 - 55.
    THERE IS AN IMPORTANT RESPECT in which virtue-centered ethical realism needs to be more Aristotelian than it is typically willing to admit. This concerns the way in which teleological considerations need to be more explicitly acknowledged. Reflection on moral phenomenology, discourse, and practice supports realism and also reveals that teleological considerations cannot be entirely disowned by it. The teleology is not a grand teleology, however; it is not the view that there is a unique perfection of human nature, and it (...)
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  15. Expressivist Relativism?Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. [REVIEW]Stephen Darwall - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):183-188.
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  16. An Irrealist Theory of Self.Jonardon Ganeri - 2004 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 12 (1):60-79.
    It has become a common-place to read the ‘no-self’ theory of the Buddhist philosophers as a reductionist account of persons. In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit himself seemed to endorse the association, having learned of the Buddhist theory from his colleague at All Souls College, Bimal Krishna Matilal. The Buddha’s denial that there are real selves metaphysically distinct from continuous streams of psycho-physical constituents lends itself, to be sure, to a reductionist interpretation. I believe, nevertheless, that there are good grounds (...)
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  17. Empiricism in Science and Ethics.Stefan Sencerz - 1993 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):449-470.
    We elucidate the conditions under which any hypothesis is explanatorily relevant by analyzing several tests of explanatory relevance and explanations based on those tests. A new causal criterion of explanatory relevance is developed and defended. We show how the causal criterion succeeds in establishing, at the very least, a very strong presumption against moral facts.
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  18. Error: (On Our Predicament When Things Go Wrong).David A. Horner - 2007 - Review of Metaphysics 61 (2):443-444.
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  19. Moral Anti-Realism.Richard Joyce - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    It might be expected that it would suffice for the entry for “moral anti-realism” to contain only some links to other entries in this encyclopedia. It could contain a link to “moral realism” and stipulate the negation of the view there described. Alternatively, it could have links to the entries “anti-realism” and “morality” and could stipulate the conjunction of the materials contained therein. The fact that neither of these approaches would be adequate—and, more strikingly, that following the two procedures would (...)
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  20. Error and the New Realism.A. O. Lovejoy - 1913 - Philosophical Review 22 (4):410-423.
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  21. Realism-Without Error?Francis Parker - 1967 - The Monist 51 (2):224-237.
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  22. Objectivism and Mr. Hare's Language of Morals.Sidney Zink - 1957 - Mind 66 (261):79-87.
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Moral Emotivism and Sentimentalism
  1. The Mark of the Moral: Beyond the Sentimentalist Turn.Frank Hindriks & Hanno Sauer - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (4):569-591.
    In light of recent empirical data, many psychologists and philosophers have turned away from rationalism about moral judgment and embraced sentimentalism. In the process, they have rejected the classical “moral signature” as a way of distinguishing moral from conventional norms in favor of a sentimentalist approach to carving out the moral domain. In this paper, we argue that this sentimentalist turn has been made prematurely. Although we agree that the experiments reveal that the classical approach is flawed, we propose to (...)
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  2. Moral Testimony: Once More with Feeling.Guy Fletcher - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11:45-73..
    It is commonly claimed that reliance upon moral testimony is problematic in a way not common to reliance upon non-moral testimony. This chapter provides a new explanation of what the problem consists in—one that enjoys advantages over the most widely accepted explanation in the extant literature. The main theses of the chapter are as follows: that many forms of normative deference beyond the moral are problematic, that there is a common explanation of the problem with all of these forms of (...)
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  3. Feeling Good: The Role of Feelings in the Making of Moral Judgement.Jeremias Koh Jian Min - unknown
    This thesis focuses on the question of whether moral feelings are necessary to the making of moral judgments. This is an important question and the answer one gives has more interesting implications than one might initially expect. I will argue that an experientialist account of moral concepts, on which moral judgments are beliefs about objective facts represented by moral feelings, provides the best naturalistic answer to the question. To make my point, I anchor my arguments in a series of comparisons (...)
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  4. Smith, Adam.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2006 - In Virgilio Melchiorre (ed.), Enciclopedia Filosofica. Milan, Italy: Bompiani. pp. 10726-10730.
    A presentation of Adam Smith's epistemology, ethics, political theory and economics.
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  5. Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind: By May, Joshua, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, Pp. Xv + 264, £45. [REVIEW]Jeanette Kennett - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):199-201.
    Volume 98, Issue 1, March 2020, Page 199-201.
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  6. Why Are You Proud of That? Cognitivism About "Possessive" Emotions.Jeremy Fischer - forthcoming - Southwest Philosophy Review 36 (2).
    Cognitivism about the emotions is the view that emotions involve judgments (or quasi-judgmental cognitive states) that we could, in principle, articulate without reference to the emotions themselves. D’Arms and Jacobson (2003) argue that no such articulation is available in the case of “possessive” emotions, such as pride and guilt, and, so, cognitivism (in regard to such emotions, at least) is false. This article proposes and defends a cognitivist account of our partiality to the objects of our pride. I argue that (...)
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  7. Sidgwick's Dualism of Practical Reason, Evolutionary Debunking, and Moral Psychology.Peter Andes - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (4):361-377.
    Sidgwick's seminal text The Methods of Ethics left off with an unresolved problem that Sidgwick referred to as the dualism of practical reason. The problem is that employing Sidgwick's methodology of rational intuitionism appears to show that there are reasons to favour both egoism and utilitarianism. Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer offer a solution in the form of an evolutionary debunking argument: the appeal of egoism is explainable in terms of evolutionary theory. I argue that like rational prudence, rational (...)
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  8. Daniel Kelly: Yuck! The Nature and Moral Significance of Disgust. [REVIEW]Tom Cochrane - 2011 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 11 (37).
    I review Daniel Kelly's 2011 book on disgust. I am convinced by his arguments that disgust should not be appealed to in moral judgement. I am bit more sceptical about the model of disgust itself.
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  9. The Limits of Emotion in Moral Judgment.Joshua May - 2018 - In Karen Jones & Francois Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms. Oxford University Press. pp. 286-306.
    I argue that our best science supports the rationalist idea that, independent of reasoning, emotions aren’t integral to moral judgment. There’s ample evidence that ordinary moral cognition often involves conscious and unconscious reasoning about an action’s outcomes and the agent’s role in bringing them about. Emotions can aid in moral reasoning by, for example, drawing one’s attention to such information. However, there is no compelling evidence for the decidedly sentimentalist claim that mere feelings are causally necessary or sufficient for making (...)
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  10. Review - Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind. [REVIEW]Michael Klenk - 2019 - Metapsychology 23 (24).
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  11. Sontag on Impertinent Sympathy and Photographs of Evil.Sean T. Murphy - forthcoming - In Colin Marshall (ed.), Comparative Metaethics: Neglected Perspectives on the Foundations of Morality. Routledge.
    This chapter corrects for Susan Sontag's undeserved neglect by contemporary ethical philosophers by bringing awareness to some of the unique metaethical insights born of her reflections on photographic representations of evil. I argue that Sontag's thought provides fertile ground for thinking about: (1) moral perception and its relation to moral knowledge; and (2) the epistemic and moral value of our emotional responses to the misery and suffering of others. I show that, contrary to standard moral perception theory (e.g. Blum 1994), (...)
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  12. Jesse J. Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals , Pp. Ix +334.Ben Fraser - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (4):558-563.
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  13. Chornobyl as an Open Air Museum: A Polysemic Exploration of Power and Inner Self.Olga Bertelsen - 2018 - Kyiv-Mohyla Humanities Journal 5:1-36.
    This study focuses on nuclear tourism, which flourished a decade ago in the Exclusion Zone, a regimented area around the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (Ukraine) established in 1986, where the largest recorded nuclear explosion in human history occurred. The mass pilgrimage movement transformed the place into an open air museum, a space that preserves the remnants of Soviet culture, revealing human tragedies of displacement and deaths, and the nature of state nuclear power. This study examines the impact of the site (...)
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  14. Osaammeko rakentaa moraalisia toimijoita?Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - In Panu Raatikainen (ed.), Tekoäly, ihminen ja yhteiskunta.
    Jotta olisimme moraalisesti vastuussa teoistamme, meidän on kyettävä muodostamaan käsityksiä oikeasta ja väärästä ja toimimaan ainakin jossain määrin niiden mukaisesti. Jos olemme täysivaltaisia moraalitoimijoita, myös ymmärrämme miksi jotkin teot ovat väärin, ja kykenemme siten joustavasti mukauttamaan toimintaamme eri tilanteisiin. Esitän, ettei näköpiirissä ole tekoälyjärjestelmiä, jotka kykenisivät aidosti välittämään oikein tekemisestä tai ymmärtämään moraalin vaatimuksia, koska nämä kyvyt vaativat kokemustietoisuutta ja kokonaisvaltaista arvostelukykyä. Emme siten voi sysätä koneille vastuuta teoistaan. Meidän on sen sijaan pyrittävä rakentamaan keinotekoisia oikeintekijöitä - järjestelmiä, jotka eivät (...)
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  15. Moral Thinking, Fast and Slow.Hanno Sauer - 2018 - New York: Routledge.
    In recent research, dual-process theories of cognition have been the primary model for explaining moral judgment and reasoning. These theories understand moral thinking in terms of two separate domains: one deliberate and analytic, the other quick and instinctive. -/- This book presents a new theory of the philosophy and cognitive science of moral judgment. Hanno Sauer develops and defends an account of "triple-process" moral psychology, arguing that moral thinking and reasoning are only insufficiently understood when described in terms of a (...)
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  16. Practical Reason, Sympathy and Reactive Attitudes.Max Khan Hayward - 2017 - Noûs:51-75.
    This paper has three aims. First, I defend, in its most radical form, Hume's scepticism about practical reason, as it applies to purely self-regarding matters. It's not always irrational to discount the future, to be inconstant in one's preferences, to have incompatible desires, to not pursue the means to one's ends, or to fail to maximize one's own good. Second, I explain how our response to the “irrational” agent should be understood as an expression of frustrated sympathy, in Adam Smith's (...)
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  17. What Is Sentimentalism? What Is Rationalism? Commentary on Joshua May.Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
    In Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind, Joshua May argues successfully that many claims about the causal influence of affect on moral judgment are overblown. But the findings he cites are compatible with many of the key arguments of philosophical sentimentalists. His account of rationalism, in turn, relies on an overly broad notion of inference, and leaves open crucial questions about how we reason to moral conclusions.
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  18. La teoría del juicio moral en David Hume: un movimiento a tres tiempos.Alejandro Ordieres - 2017 - Estudios 15 (121):39-53.
    In David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature, reason and passion are in constant interaction forming belief. Moral events are distinguished on three levels: moral sentiment, moral action and moral judgment, in which reason and passion interact, although with different functions at each level.
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  19. L’indignation, le mépris et le pardon dans l’émergence du cadre légal d’Occupy Geneva.Frédéric Minner - 2018 - Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales 56 (2):133-159.
    Cet article s’intéresse au problème de la maintenance, c’est-à-dire au moment où les membres d’un collectif social tentent d’assurer dans le temps l’existence de leur collectif en instituant des règles pour réguler leurs comportements. Ce problème se pose avec acuité lorsque certains membres ne respectent pas ces règles communes. Pour maintenir la coopération sociale, les membres peuvent décider d’instituer des règles secondaires visant à sanctionner les transgressions des règles primaires déjà établies. La maintenance d’un collectif peut ainsi reposer sur l’émergence (...)
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  20. Moral Reasoning and Emotion.Joshua May & Victor Kumar - 2018 - In Karen Jones, Mark Timmons & Aaron Zimmerman (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 139-156.
    This chapter discusses contemporary scientific research on the role of reason and emotion in moral judgment. The literature suggests that moral judgment is influenced by both reasoning and emotion separately, but there is also emerging evidence of the interaction between the two. While there are clear implications for the rationalism-sentimentalism debate, we conclude that important questions remain open about how central emotion is to moral judgment. We also suggest ways in which moral philosophy is not only guided by empirical research (...)
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  21. Review of Ethical Sentimentalism: New Perspectives, Edited by Remy Debes and Karsten Stueber. [REVIEW]Michael Milona - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2018:N/A.
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  22. Psychopathy, Autism, and Basic Moral Emotions: Evidence for Sentimentalist Constructivism.Erick Ramirez - forthcoming - In Serife Tekin & Robyn Bluhm (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophy of Psychiatry. Bloomsbury.
    Philosophers and psychologists often claim that moral agency is connected with the ability to feel, understand, and deploy moral emotions. In this chapter, I investigate the nature of these emotions and their connection with moral agency. First, I examine the degree to which these emotional capacities are innate and/or ‘basic’ in a philosophically important sense. I examine three senses in which an emotion might be basic: developmental, compositional, and phylogenetic. After considering the evidence for basic emotion, I conclude that emotions (...)
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  23. Using Benevolent Affections to Learn Our Duty.Marina Folescu - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):467-489.
    The puzzle is this: I argue that for Reid, moral sense needs benevolent affections – i.e. some of our animal, non-cognitive principles of action – to apply the rules of duty. But he also thinks that duty can conflict with benevolent affections. So what happens in these conflict cases? I will argue that Reid takes moral psychology seriously and that he believes that our natural benevolent affections can be used as indicators of duty. Although creative, his account has a major (...)
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  24. Slote , Michael . Moral Sentimentalism .New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. 163. $65.00 (Cloth).Anita M. Superson - 2012 - Ethics 122 (2):448-453.
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  25. Book ReviewsShaun Nichols,. Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment.New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Pp. 226. $60.00. [REVIEW]Gopal Sreenivasan - 2006 - Ethics 116 (4):800-805.
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  26. Moving Beyond Dichotomies: Liao, S. Matthew , Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of Morality, Oxford University Press, 2016.Ivan Gonzalez-Cabrera - 2017 - Biology and Philosophy 32 (6):1035-1046.
    Matthew Liao’s edited collection Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of Morality covers a wide range of issues in moral psychology. The collection should be of interest to philosophers, psychologist, and neuroscientists alike, particularly those interested in the relation between these disciplines. I give an overview of the content and major themes of the volume and draw some important lessons about the connection between moral neuroscience and normative ethics. In particular, I argue that moving beyond some of the dichotomies implicit in some (...)
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  27. Moral Sentimentalism in Counterfactual Contexts: Moral Properties Are Response-Enabled.Daniel Dohrn - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (1):69-82.
    According to moral sentimentalism, there are close connections between moral truths and moral emotions. Emotions largely form our moral attitudes. They contribute to our answerability to moral obligations. We take them as authoritative in guiding moral judgement. This role is difficult to understand if one accepts a full-blown moral realism, according to which moral truths are completely independent of our emotional response to them. Hence it is tempting to claim that moral truths depend on our emotional responses. I outline a (...)
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  28. Are Emotions Perceptions of Value (and Why This Matters)?Charlie Kurth, Enter Author Name Without Selecting A. Profile: Haley Crosby & Enter Author Name Without Selecting A. Profile: Jack Basse - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    In Emotions, Values & Agency, Christine Tappolet develops a sophisticated, perceptual theory of emotions and their role in wide range of issues in value theory and epistemology. In this paper, we raise three worries about Tappolet's proposal.
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1 — 50 / 1922