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  1. The Judgements of Joan. [REVIEW]R. A. - 1962 - Review of Metaphysics 16 (2):396-396.
  2. What is Goodness? An Introduction.Deborah Achtenberg - 1982 - Dissertation, New School for Social Research
    The inquiry is an introduction to the question, what is goodness? In it, realist and anti-realist accounts are considered. In Part I, two kinds of anti-realism are considered, subjectivist and strict. Subjectivism is the belief that goodness is belief-, affect-, or convention-dependent. It is suggested that subjectivism is based on an equivocation, is circular or is difficult consistently to maintain. Strict anti-realism is the belief that there is and can be no such thing as goodness. Three strict anti-realists are considered: (...)
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  3. 16 How to Be an Ethical Antirealist.Simon Blackburn - 1995 - In Paul K. Moser & J. D. Trout (eds.), Contemporary Materialism: A Reader. Routledge. pp. 357.
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  4. The Meaning of 'Ought': Beyond Descriptivism and Expressivism in Metaethics.Matthew Chrisman - 2015 - Oxford University Press USA.
    The word 'ought' is one of the core normative terms, but it is also a modal word. In this book Matthew Chrisman develops a careful account of the semantics of 'ought' as a modal operator, and uses this to motivate a novel inferentialist account of why ought-sentences have the meaning that they have. This is a metanormative account that agrees with traditional descriptivist theories in metaethics that specifying the truth-conditions of normative sentences is a central part of the explanation of (...)
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  5. Expressivist Relativism? [REVIEW]Stephen Darwall - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):183-188.
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  6. The Metaphysics of Nonfactualism.Michael Devitt - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:159 - 176.
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  7. Broad's Critical Essays in Moral Philosophy.M. G. - 1973 - Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):121-122.
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  8. An Irrealist Theory of Self.Jonardon Ganeri - 2004 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 12 (1):60-79.
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  9. Moral Philosophy.B. P. H. - 1964 - Review of Metaphysics 18 (1):179-180.
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  10. Error: (On Our Predicament When Things Go Wrong).David A. Horner - 2007 - Review of Metaphysics 61 (2):443-444.
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  11. Metaethics and Teleology.Jonathan Jacobs - 2001 - Review of Metaphysics 55 (1):41 - 55.
  12. What a Noncognitivist Might Tell a Moral Realist.Arend Kulenkampff & Frank Siebelt - 2000 - ProtoSociology 14.
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  13. Disagreeing Over Evaluatives: Preference, Normative and Moral Discourse.Justina Diaz Legaspe - 2015 - Manuscrito 38 (2):39-63.
    Why would we argue about taste, norms or morality when we know that these topics are relative to taste preferences, systems of norms or values to which we are committed? Yet, disagreements over these topics are common in our evaluative discourses. I will claim that the motives to discuss rely on our attitudes towards the standard held by the speakers in each domain of discourse, relating different attitudes to different motives –mainly, conviction and correction. These notions of attitudes and motives (...)
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  14. Error and the New Realism.A. O. Lovejoy - 1913 - Philosophical Review 22 (4):410-423.
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  15. Realism-Without Error?Francis Parker - 1967 - The Monist 51 (2):224-237.
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  16. What Is Moral Philosophy?Louis P. Pojman - 1997 - In Kristin Shrader-Frechette & Laura Westra (eds.), Technology and Values. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 11--24.
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  17. Review of Leibowtiz and Sinclair (Eds.) Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. [REVIEW]Karl Schafer - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2017.
  18. Empiricism in Science and Ethics.Stefan Sencerz - 1993 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):449-470.
    We elucidate the conditions under which any hypothesis is explanatorily relevant by analyzing several tests of explanatory relevance and explanations based on those tests. A new causal criterion of explanatory relevance is developed and defended. We show how the causal criterion succeeds in establishing, at the very least, a very strong presumption against moral facts.
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  19. Democracy and Moral Conflict. [REVIEW]Ţuţui Viorel - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (2):313-318.
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  20. Précis de Patrologie.Gerald G. Walsh - 1932 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):159-164.
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  21. Objectivism and Mr. Hare's Language of Morals.Sidney Zink - 1957 - Mind 66 (261):79-87.
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Moral Emotivism and Sentimentalism
  1. A Sentimentalist's Defense of Contempt, Shame and Disdain.K. Abramson - 2009 - In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press.
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  2. What Are Emotions About?Lilli K. Alanen - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):311-354.
    This paper discusses the interrelations between three aspects of human emotions: their intentionality, their expressivity and their moral significance. It distinguishes three kinds of philosophical views of emotions: the cognitivist (classically held by the Stoics), the emotivist which reduces emotions to non-intentional bodily sensations and physiological states, and the moral phenomenologist, the latter being held by Annette Baier, whose work is the focus of the discussion. Her view, which represents an original development of ideas found in Descartes and Hume, avoids (...)
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  3. A Danger of Definition: Polar Predicates in Moral Theory.Mark Alfano - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (3).
    In this paper, I use an example from the history of philosophy to show how independently defining each side of a pair of contrary predicates is apt to lead to contradiction. In the Euthyphro, piety is defined as that which is loved by some of the gods while impiety is defined as that which is hated by some of the gods. Socrates points out that since the gods harbor contrary sentiments, some things are both pious and impious. But “pious” and (...)
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  4. A Defence of Emotivism.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    As a non-cognitivist analysis of moral language, Charles Stevenson's sophisticated emotivism is widely regarded by moral philosophers as a substantial improvement over its historical antecedent, radical emotivism. None the less, it has come in for its share of criticism. In this essay, Leslie Allan responds to the key philosophical objections to Stevenson's thesis, arguing that the criticisms levelled against his meta-ethical theory rest largely on a too hasty reading of his works.
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  5. From the "Naturalistic Fallacy" to the Ideal Observer Theory.Glen-O. Allen - 1970 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30:533-549.
    G. E. MOORE'S PROOF THAT 'GOOD' CANNOT BE DEFINED IS THE\nANALOGUE OF HUME'S PROOF THAT THE IDEA OF CAUSE HAS NO\nEMPIRICAL CORRELATE. AS A PROOF, IT CANNOT SUSTAIN ETHICAL\nINTUITIONISM, EMOTIVISM, OR THE VARIOUS MODIFICATIONS OF\nETHICAL NATURALISM WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE TO REST UPON IT.\nHOWEVER, IT DOES SUSTAIN THE THEORY THAT VALUES ARE CAUSES\nOF HUMAN RESPONSES, AND THAT, UNDER A METHODOLOGICAL\nINTERPRETATION OF OBJECTIVITY, VALUES HAVE OBJECTIVE\nCOGNITIVE STATUS AS CAUSES OF RESPONSES IN THE\nCONSCIOUSNESS OF A HYPOTHETICAL BEING, AN IDEAL OBSERVER.
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  6. The Evolution of the Moral Sentiments and the Metaphysics of Morals.Fritz Allhoff - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):97-114.
    So-called evolutionary error theorists, such as Michael Ruse and Richard Joyce, have argued that naturalistic accounts of the moral sentiments lead us to adopt an error theory approach to morality. Roughly, the argument is that an appreciation of the etiology of those sentiments undermines any reason to think that they track moral truth and, furthermore, undermines any reason to think that moral truth actually exists. I argue that this approach offers us a false dichotomy between error theory and some form (...)
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  7. Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Making Moral Judgments?Marco Aurelio Sousa Alves - 2013 - Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 12 (1):113-126.
    Jesse Prinz (2006, 2007) claimed that emotions are necessary and sufficient for moral judgments. First of all, I clarify what this claim amounts to. The view that he labels emotionism will then be critically assessed. Prinz marshals empirical findings to defend a series of increasingly strong theses about how emotions are essential for moral judgments. I argue that the empirical support upon which his arguments are based is not only insufficient, but it even suggests otherwise, if properly interpreted. My criticism (...)
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  8. Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Making Moral Judgments?Marco Sousa Alves - 2013 - Ethic@ 12 (1):113-126.
    Jesse Prinz claimed that emotions are necessary and sufficient for moral judgments. First of all, I clarify what this claim amounts to. The view that he labels emotionism will then be critically assessed. Prinz marshals empirical findings to defend a series of increasingly strong theses about how emotions are essential for moral judgments. I argue that the empirical support upon which his arguments are based is not only insufficient, but it even suggests otherwise, if properly interpreted. My criticism is then (...)
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  9. The Limits of Emotivism. Some Remarks on Professor von Wright's Paper "Valuations".Alberto Artosi - 2000 - Ratio Juris 13 (4):358-363.
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  10. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.Annette Baier - 1999 - International Studies in Philosophy 31 (4):140-141.
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  11. A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise.Annette Baier - 1991 - Harvard University Press.
  12. Le double sens de la communauté morale : la considérabilité morale et l’agentivité morale des autres animaux.Christiane Bailey - 2014 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (3):31-67.
    Christiane Bailey | : Distinguant deux sens de « communauté morale », cet article soutient que certains animaux appartiennent à la communauté morale dans les deux sens : ils sont des patients moraux dignes de considération morale directe et équivalente, mais également des agents moraux au sens où ils sont capables de reconnaître, d’assumer et d’adresser aux autres des exigences minimales de bonne conduite et de savoir-vivre. Au moyen de la notion d’« attitudes réactives » développée par Peter F. Strawson, (...)
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  13. Empathy, Care, and Understanding in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments.Olivia Bailey - 2016 - The Adam Smith Review 9.
  14. The Moon Before the Dawn : A Seventeenth Century Precursor of Smith's the Theory of Moral Sentiments.Jack Barbalet - 2007 - In Geoff Cockfield, Ann Firth & John Laurent (eds.), New Perspectives on Adam Smith's the Theory of Moral Sentiments. E. Elgar. pp. 84--105.
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  15. Troubles with Horgan and Timmons' Nondescriptivist Cognitivism.Stephen J. Barker - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):235-255.
    Emotivist, or non-descriptivist metaethical theories hold that value-statements do not function by describing special value-facts, but are the mere expressions of naturalistically describable motivational states of (valuing) agents. Non-descriptivism has typically been combined with the claim that value-statements are non-cognitive: they are not the manifestations of genuine belief states. However, all the linguistic, logical and phenomenological evidence indicates that value-statements are cognitive. Non-descriptivism then has a problem. Horgan and Timmons propose to solve it by boldly combining a non-descriptivist thesis about (...)
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  16. Principled Moral Sentiment and the Flexibility of Moral Judgment and Decision Making.Daniel M. Bartels - 2008 - Cognition 108 (2):381-417.
    Three studies test eight hypotheses about (1) how judgment differs between people who ascribe greater vs. less moral relevance to choices, (2) how moral judgment is subject to task constraints that shift evaluative focus (to moral rules vs. to consequences), and (3) how differences in the propensity to rely on intuitive reactions affect judgment. In Study 1, judgments were affected by rated agreement with moral rules proscribing harm, whether the dilemma under consideration made moral rules versus consequences of choice salient, (...)
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  17. Religious Sentiment and the Moral Problem in Italy.Giacomo Barzellotti - 1894 - International Journal of Ethics 4 (4):445-459.
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  18. Religious Sentiment and the Moral Problem in Italy.Giacomo Barzellotti - 1893 - Ethics 4 (4):445.
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  19. Berkeley's Theory of Emotive Meaning (1708).Bertil Belfrage - 1986 - Hisory of European Ideas 7 (6):643-649.
  20. Development of Berkeley's Early Theory of Meaning.Bertil Belfrage - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 176 (3):319-330.
  21. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments by R.Jay Wallace. [REVIEW]Paul Benson - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (11):574-578.
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  22. Being Appropriately Disgusted.Brian Besong - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (1):131-150.
    Empirical research indicates that feelings of disgust actually affect our moral beliefs and moral motivations. The question is, should they? Daniel Kelly argues that they should not. More particularly, he argues for what we may call the irrelevancy thesis and the anti-moralization thesis. According to the irrelevancy thesis, feelings of disgust should be given no weight when judging the moral character of an action (or norm, practice, outcome, or ideal). According to the anti-moralization thesis, feelings of disgust should not be (...)
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  23. The Role of Practical Reason in an Empirically Informed Moral Theory.Lorraine Besser-Jones - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):203-220.
    Empirical research paints a dismal portrayal of the role of reason in morality. It suggests that reason plays no substantive role in how we make moral judgments or are motivated to act on them. This paper explores how it is that an empirically oriented philosopher, committed to methodological naturalism, ought to respond to the skeptical challenge presented by this research. While many think taking this challenge seriously requires revising, sometimes dramatically, how we think about moral agency, this paper will defend (...)
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  24. Ethical Instrumentalism.J. S. Biehl - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):353-369.
    The present essay offers a sketch of a philosophy of value, what I shall here refer to as ‘ethical instrumentalism.’ My primary aim is to say just what this view involves and what its commitments are. In the course of doing so, I find it necessary to distinguish this view from another with which it shares a common basis and which, in reference to its most influential proponent, I refer to as ‘Humeanism.’ A second, more general, aim is to make (...)
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  25. How Emotivism Survives Immoralists, Irrationality, and Depression.Gunnar Bjömsson - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):327-344.
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  26. How Emotivism Survives Immoralists, Irrationality, and Depression.Gunnar Björnsson - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):327-344.
    Argues that emotivism is compatible with cases where we seem to lack motivation to act according to our moral opinions.
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  27. Why Emotivists Love Inconsistency.Gunnar Björnsson - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 104 (1):81 - 108.
    Emotivists hold that moral opinions are wishes and desires, and that the function of moral language is to “express” such states. But if moral opinions were but wishes or desires, why would we see certain opinions as inconsistent with, or following from other opinions? And why should our reasoning include complex opinions such as the opinion that a person ought to be blamed only if he has done something wrong? Indeed, why would we think that anything is conditional on his (...)
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  28. Motivational Internalism and Folk Intuitions.Gunnar Björnsson, John Eriksson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder & Fredrik Björklund - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):715-734.
    Motivational internalism postulates a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. In arguing for and against internalism, metaethicists traditionally appeal to intuitions about cases, but crucial cases often yield conflicting intuitions. One way to try to make progress, possibly uncovering theoretical bias and revealing whether people have conceptions of moral judgments required for noncognitivist accounts of moral disagreement, is to investigate non-philosophers' willingness to attribute moral judgments. A pioneering study by Shaun Nichols seemed to undermine internalism, as a large majority (...)
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  29. Moral Attitudes for Non-Cognitivists: Solving the Specification Problem.Gunnar Björnsson & Tristram McPherson - 2014 - Mind 123 (489):1-38.
    Moral non-cognitivists hope to explain the nature of moral agreement and disagreement as agreement and disagreement in non-cognitive attitudes. In doing so, they take on the task of identifying the relevant attitudes, distinguishing the non-cognitive attitudes corresponding to judgements of moral wrongness, for example, from attitudes involved in aesthetic disapproval or the sports fan’s disapproval of her team’s performance. We begin this paper by showing that there is a simple recipe for generating apparent counterexamples to any informative specification of the (...)
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